by Adnan Tabatabai
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani arrived in New York yesterday with the clear understanding that he’s being carefully watched back home. The official purpose of his trip is to address the United Nations General Assembly, but much more is at stake. Rouhani made solving the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program the centerpiece of his presidential campaign, but while the Nov. 24 deadline to reach a final accord is steadily approaching, no deal is in sight. Meanwhile the president of the United States—essentially Iran’s main negotiating partner in the talks—is facing growing pressure to develop a coherent strategy against the radical militia that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL). The course of the next few months could define both leaders’ presidential legacies.
No matter how you look at it, resolving both these issues requires a modus operandi between Iran and the United States. Bilateral talks between the two long-time adversaries have almost become routine over the last year; the latest meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry lasted for more than an hour Sunday in New York. But the debate over the definition of a “functional relationship” with Washington is among the most sensitive issues in Iran with competing political factions exercising extreme skepticism against each other.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is (and has always been) trying to cover all his bases: those backing the Rouhani government’s path towards constructive engagement, and those for whom rapprochement with the US is a red line.
Last week, an infographic published on the ayatollah’s website illustrated why talks with the US in the past 12 months have been harmful to Iran. Two days later, a compilation of quotes by the Supreme Leader supporting the negotiations was published on the same site.
Critics Seek Center Stage
Some of the Rouhani government’s most outspoken opponents convened on Monday for yet another press conference in Tehran to voice their concerns about Iran’s foreign policy. Since May this year, these hard-line conservative MPs, clerics and think tankers—also known as “the concerned” (delvaapasaan)—have routinely set up meetings whenever a new round of nuclear talks is taking place between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1).
Through lectures and a Q&A session with journalists, the panelists of the “Path and Pit” meeting outlined the “dos and don’ts” for Rouhani’s trip and warned against yet another “inappropriate action”—their reference to Rouhani’s last-minute telephone conversation with US President Barack Obama during last year’s UNGA.
The concerns identified by the delvaapasaan are based on a variety of issues that extend far beyond the nuclear negotiations. The group mainly criticizes the Rouhani government for:
- Abandoning resistance as the main theme defining foreign affairs
- Leaning towards appeasement vis-à-vis Washington
- Selling out Iran’s right to scientific progress in the nuclear talks
- Falling short of informing the parliament about the nuclear talks
- Not allowing a critical debate about their foreign policy in the media
- Not following the path outlined by the supreme leader
Panelist Mohammad Hassan Asafari, a member of the parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs, credited Iran’s “strong” position in the region to its policies of resistance and expressed worries about Rouhani’s approach to ending the sanctions regime. “We should not show the enemy that we are eager for the sanctions to be lifted,” he said. “It would pave the way for the enemy’s benefit if Iran looks too keen.”
Hamid Rasai, a MP and leading member of the hard-line Endurance Front who got one of Rouhani’s ministers impeached, argued that direct talks with the United States have not only resulted in no benefit but also been followed by harsher rhetoric from Washington and additional unilateral sanctions.
Rasai also stressed that “Rouhani should know he is the president of the Islamic Republic, not just the president of the people of Iran.” He must therefore seize the opportunity provided by the UNGA “to spread our message to the world”—which former President Ahmadinejad managed to do, according to Rasai.
Mohammad Ali Ramin, a former deputy minister under Ahmadinejad, argued that the group is not only concerned about the nuclear issue but also about the broader picture in which the supreme leader is the Imam of the global umma (community) and not just the Iranian nation. Rouhani should therefore recognize that he is “administering just a corner of that umma” and consider the leader’s viewpoints, said Ramin.
The last speaker in the group, University of Tehran Professor Saeed Zibakalam, said he expects the Rouhani government to whitewash Washington’s position towards Iran, and criticized the negotiating team for substantially exaggerating the benefits of the Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva last year. The plan does not acknowledge Iran’s right to enrich uranium and no sanctions were lifted, argued Zibakalam.
Asked by journalists to identify the difference between the current and previous administration on Iran’s nuclear file, Rasai said that under Ahmadinejad, the nuclear issue was taken care of by the Supreme National Security Council, whereas now it is processed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it is under the scrutiny of “no one but Rouhani”.
Rasai further complained about state media being controlled by a government that he said prevents critical debate and criticized other media for promoting rapprochement with the United States. Rasai even asked a journalist from the reformist daily Etemad why his paper is “waiting for Rouhani to have a meeting with the Satan.”
Rasai and Zibakalam both agreed that the Iranian people would not accept bowing down to the US and would oust any president who attempted to do so.
Political Realities
The meeting was yet another indicator that criticism of Iran’s foreign policy goals has reached a new peak on the home front.
In recent days, far-right conservative outlets like Fars News, Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrouz and Raja News ran features and op-eds warning against the acceptance of a nuclear deal limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment and any rapprochement with the United States.
Indeed, almost immediately after it was reported by the New York Times, public opposition was voiced in Iran to a “face-saving” proposal that would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges in place but suspend operations. “This proposal is ridiculous…If such a proposal is formally presented by American officials, it indicates their childish outlook on the negotiations or the stupid assumptions of the Iranian side,” said Hossein Sheikholeslam, a deputy to the speaker of parliament, according to Fars News.
As I wrote two months ago, the Rouhani administration is not desperate for a deal—especially not one that would be difficult to sell at home.
A recent poll suggests that more than 70% of the Iranian public would not accept a deal that forces Iran to dismantle up to half of its operating centrifuges and limit its nuclear research capacities. A large majority of Iranians also believe that their nuclear program is just an excuse for foreign powers to exert pressure on Iran, according to the poll.
Regardless of whether or not the survey’s methodology is reliable (accurate polling is hard to come by when it comes to Iran), the overall results reflect what one would hear and read in Iran.
While hope persists, we should not expect another big step with regards to US-Iran relations during Rouhani’s trip to New York this year—no phonecall, no handshake, and no joint press conference.
Even if there were a political breakthrough—which seems unlikely at this point—the timing isn’t right. Such political staging would result in harsh political blowback in Washington and Tehran for both presidents.
We should therefore expect the nuclear talks as well as any debate on fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq to be conducted in a private and prudent fashion.
Meanwhile, Iran has been making history with other world powers. The meeting today between Rouhani and French President Francois Hollande was widely publicized by both countries. The expected meeting between Rouhani and British Prime Minister David Cameron would be the first of its kind in 35 years.
Iran’s international outreach should not be interpreted as solely bent on rapprochement with the United States. In this light, Rouhani has a lot to gain from his second visit to New York deal or no deal.
Right now, meeting w/ the President of #France @fhollande re expansion of bilateral ties. #ConstructiveEngagement pic.twitter.com/1QxwADd26e
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) September 23, 2014
by Adnan Tabatabai
The negotiations in Vienna between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program are in the home stretch even if the July 20 deadline to reach a final deal set by last year’s interim accord will not be met.
Few expected a deal to be reached so quickly, less than [...]]]>
by Adnan Tabatabai
The negotiations in Vienna between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program are in the home stretch even if the July 20 deadline to reach a final deal set by last year’s interim accord will not be met.
Few expected a deal to be reached so quickly, less than one year after last year’s historic agreement, the Joint Plan of Action. Experts argued early on that there would be an extension. Even Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araqchi said on July 12 that “there is a possibility of extending the talks for a few days or a few weeks if progress is made.”
While the possibility of a final deal being reached any time soon is far from guaranteed, one thing is certain: the Rouhani government’s most important task will be effectively framing the outcome of these talks at home.
Zarif Makes Iran’s Case
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and his team made two significant moves in presenting Iran’s position more clearly than ever before during this marathon round of talks, which began on July 2.
First, Zarif offered details, for the first time, about Iran’s proposal in an interview with the New York Times.
Second, Zarif’s team published a document clearly outlining Iran’s view of its practical needs for its nuclear program in English, which it distributed through social media.
Prior to this latest round of talks, Zarif also again emphasized his country’s willingness to reach a comprehensive agreement with world powers in a video message released by the Foreign Ministry.
This commitment is based on a number of domestic incentives.
In order to gain more strength in his critical second year in office, President Hassan Rouhani needs a policy success story. Solving the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program was among his top campaign promises, and so far he has yet to achieve any of them.
A nuclear deal would embolden him to push for ambitious policy decisions to pursue his other campaign promises.
Rouhani — to use his own words — has to “break” the devastating sanctions imposed on Iran before any meaningful economic reconstruction and development can be implemented.
With a nuclear deal in his pocket, Rouhani could begin to counter Iranian hard-liners’ and conservatives’ deep-rooted scepticism towards the West. Indeed, a nuclear deal would fly in the face of those who argue that the West cannot be trusted. Rouhani could prove that moderation and reconciliation, when strategically applied, can be extremely beneficial.
A no-deal scenario, one could therefore conclude, would considerably weaken Rouhani while strengthening his opponents at home. But this train of thought is highly simplistic.
Framing the Outcome
Regardless of what these negotiations lead to, more than half the battle will involve controlling how the outcome is framed and perceived at home.
Rouhani and Zarif will have to respond to two forms of criticism: factual and ideological.
The factual criticism will be concerned with the actual details of the negotiations — particularly those determining the scope and future prospects of Iran’s nuclear program.
The ideological criticism will be related to Zarif’s negotiating strategy. For Iran’s far-right principlist faction, Zarif’s reconciliatory approach toward world powers is not in line with Iran’s revolutionary ideals.
Many of them former supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, these parliamentarians and archconservative clerics prefer a more confrontational foreign policy approach through which Iran maintains its position of resistance, is the main regional powerhouse and pursues its nuclear program without seeking approval from the international community.
The latter dimension was stressed in a follow-up meeting of the “We’re concerned” conference in Tehran, which I discussed in May. The very same figures who launched the first event gathered again in a “Red lines” session July 15 to set clear limits on what is and is not negotiable.
In many ways, these hard-liners resemble hawks in the US Congress. Both groups are trying hard to impose themselves into the negotiating process and express their discontent at being side-lined through emphatic opposition to reconciliation and prospects for normalized relations.
In fact, deal or no deal, Rouhani and Zarif will have to convince critics at home that they safeguarded Iran’s national interests — especially in terms of scientific progress and security — and maintained Iran’s position as an important regional actor.
Successfully framing the post-negotiations environment will mean that neither Rouhani nor Zarif will be able to maintain their considerable political capital even in a no-deal scenario.
A “Win-Win” for the Supreme Leader
Rouhani and Zarif have not only proven themselves as adept negotiators (Rouhani was Iran’s chief negotiator from 2003-05), they have also been skilfully manoeuvring Iran’s domestic political scene in the following ways:
- They know how to address criticism. Be it in media appearances, public speeches or during parliamentary questioning sessions, both of these men have demonstrated the perfect mix of responding to some concerns while strongly making their own cases. They have not allowed their critics to intimidate them.
- Whenever criticism has taken over, influential actors including former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, or Chief of staff of the Armed Forces, General Hassan Firouzabadi threw their political weight behind Rouhani and his foreign minister. This was only possible through Rouhani’s connections with various political factions prior to his presidential election and his approach to the presidency thus far. These key figures’ public approval of Zarif’s negotiating strategy has often been voiced with reference to the words of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
- Iran’s foreign minister has become one of the most popular politicians in Iran. Allowing him to go alone into the firing line of hard-line criticism — especially in the case of a no-deal scenario — could be too costly for the overall political atmosphere The Supreme Leader has therefore not allowed Zarif or Rouhani to be openly criticized too harshly.
- Finally, and most importantly, even in the case of a no-deal scenario, the Supreme Leader may, in the end, achieve one major goal: proving to the Iranian public that the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) stood in the way of a final agreement, and not him. While he has thus far supported Iran’s negotiating team, he has consistently decried the other side’s sincerity, which enables him to be right, deal or no deal.
“Khamenei’s personal win-win,” as a Tehran-based political analyst recently told me, would also eliminate a lot of pressure from the Supreme Leader’s shoulders, which — as the past 25 years have shown — has always led to less domestic turmoil.
Indeed, when under pressure, Supreme Leader Khamenei approves tighter security measures. Not only was this the case during the 2009 post-election crisis when crackdowns on protests and the arrests of prominent critics escalated, but also during the final year of the Ahmadinejad presidency when some of his aides were verbally and, in the case of Ali Akbar Javanfekr, even physically attacked.
Thus, Iran’s negotiating partners should keep in mind that while Zarif’s negotiating team is committed to achieving a comprehensive agreement, and Rouhani would gain considerable political clout in the event of one, it would be wrong to operate on the assumption that they are desperate for it. Their careers do not depend on the outcome of the talks.
]]>by Adnan Tabatabai
With the July 20 deadline for reaching a final deal on Iran’s nuclear program looming, Tehran and world powers will resume negotiations on May 13 in Vienna.
While the talks could theoretically be extended, efforts by Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia [...]]]>
by Adnan Tabatabai
With the July 20 deadline for reaching a final deal on Iran’s nuclear program looming, Tehran and world powers will resume negotiations on May 13 in Vienna.
While the talks could theoretically be extended, efforts by Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) to strike a final deal soon will be strong, given the considerable domestic pressure faced by the negotiating parties, particularly Iran and the United States.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif do not want to risk providing domestic hard-liners, the arch-conservative clerics and far-right principlist members of Parliament (MP) who have criticized the government’s negotiating strategy, with another target by asking for their patience until the end of 2014 or early 2015.
Hence, the Islamic Republic is well on track in complying with the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the historic interim deal reached in Geneva on November 24, 2013. But consequently, and as a dialectic effect, this progress has also stirred up anxiety among Iranian sceptics.
Hard-line opposition taking center stage in Iran
A public conference, entitled “We’re concerned” (“delvaapasim”), was held at the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran on May 3. The panellists included conservative and far-right leaning parliamentarians, former government officials and think-tankers.
The venue of the conference was obviously symbolic. The choice illustrates the ideological nature of the agenda, notwithstanding the actual substantial concerns raised by the participants.
For the most part, Iranian hardliners argue that Foreign Minister Zarif’s negotiating team is giving away too much, too soon and therefore risks selling out Iran’s national interests.
A joint statement issued by the conference’s key speakers includes specific demands for the negotiations that can be grouped into the following: preserve Iran’s rights to an independent, peaceful nuclear program according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); sanctions — particularly banking sanctions — must be lifted within a clear-cut timeline; and the negotiations should be transparent and opened to the public before the final agreement is signed as well as subject to approval by Iran’s Parliament and the Supreme National Security Council.
These demands indicate a sense, experienced by hard-liners, of being left in the dark about the details of the negotiations. Thus, not only are these influential stakeholders highly sceptical of the strategies adopted by the P5+1, but also of Iran’s very own negotiating team.
“What we are saying is that this [negotiating] team is entering the talks with a soft position and a diplomacy of smiling, which is not appreciated in a country like Iran that has given martyrs and struggled many years for the victory of its Islamic Revolution,” Mohammad Hossein Karimi-Ghadoosi, a parliamentarian and leading figure of the hard-line Islamic Endurance Front (Jebhe-ye paaydaari), told LobeLog.
Karimi-Ghadoosi also believes Iran might be perceived as weak with such a reconciliatory approach.
“Even though the spell of [failed] talks has been broken after eight years, we cannot see any meaningful progress if we look at all this rationally,” he said.
“Some disoriented media and those supporting the government are creating this positive atmosphere,” added Karimi-Ghadoosi, who is also a member of the important parliamentary committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs.
The concerns of critics like Karimi-Ghadoosi regarding the framework of the agreement may, in fact, be settled depending on how transparently and responsively Zarif’s team conducts the remaining negotiating sessions. With regard to Iran’s overall approach, however, these deeply conservative currents will be hard to satisfy.
Resistance as an intrinsic value
The political ideology promoted by this far-right conservative faction constantly reinvigorates the revolutionary spirit of the late 1970s. Enmity towards the West and the United States in particular is a raison d’être that will not be abandoned.
In order to flourish, this political spectrum needs tensions with the West and its allies. Isolation and segregation, rather than dialogue and integration, are what these groups prefer in Iran’s grand foreign policy strategy, which should be oriented towards furthering Iran’s status as a respected regional power.
“Negotiations on behalf of the system of the Islamic Republic must follow the path of Islamic ideals,” said Karimi-Ghadoosi in reply to my question about what negotiation strategy he prefers.
Hence this faction’s glorification of Saeed Jalili, Iran’s former lead nuclear negotiator under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Jalili was the recalcitrant figure preferring to lecture his negotiating partners on core Islamic values rather than emphasizing the importance of reaching common ground for resolving this conflict.
In contrast, Zarif’s reconciliatory approach, in the far-right principlists’ view, does not only lead to selling out on Iranian interests, but also contradicts the fundamentals of the nezaam — the system of the Islamic Republic.
One media outlet affiliated with the Endurance Front described the May 3 conference as an illustration of how various “revolutionary currents” are able to turn core ideals and concerns into “operational directives”.
This article also explicitly mentioned that “this gathering will not have matched the taste of reformists,” underlining the event’s purposefully factional nature.
Is Rouhani’s government responsive?
A successful Rouhani presidency depends on many factors, including the way it chooses to respond to these waves of criticism.
Warning remarks by political heavy-weights such as Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, add to on-going internal pressure for Rouhani to conform.
Anticipating more pressure by the P5+1 on Iran to dismantle its ballistic missile capacity, Boroujerdi recently declared that “Iran’s missile power is not an issue for negotiations,” in comments posted on the hard-line Fars News Agency.
One of the shortcomings of former President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) was the failure of his reformist camp to integrate and address public criticism from conservative factions — a phenomenon that was performed in reverse by the Ahmadinejad government in an even more distinct fashion.
President Rouhani, a centrist through and through, tried to reach out to critics during a recently televised live interview. It seemed, in fact, that this media appearance was used for an overall — though soft-toned — rebuttal against his adversaries.
“We have not kept and will not keep anything secret,” stressed Rouhani during the April 29 TV appearance.
The “red line”, the president held, “is the right of the nation,” which will be preserved by the “thoroughly experienced” negotiating team.
Rouhani also said that bold slogans alone would not lead to political outcomes.
“From the beginning we have said that our approach in the negotiations is that of a win-win approach,” he added.
There’s no indication as of yet that the president’s remarks will tame any of his most outspoken critics, such as Ruhollah Hosseinian, Mehdi Kouchakzadeh, Seyed Mohamad Nabavian or Hamid Rasaei, all parliamentarians who were key speakers at the May 3 conference. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for Rouhani is well recognized in those circles, but the hard-liners’ scepticism remains.
Rouhani and Zarif must effectively respond to these figures to avoid further radicalizing their positions. Since increasing pressure on the government would simultaneously lead to increasing pressure on the Supreme Leader, the latter’s support for the government could also become less vocal. Khamenei, too, must ultimately respond to his most loyal followers.
Photo: Participants of Tehran’s May 3 “We’re concerned” conference, which was held at the former U.S. embassy. Credit: SNN/Ali Mokhtari
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