Within a few days we will know whether President Obama’s efforts to negotiate an agreement with Iran over the latter’s nuclear power ambitions have proven successful or not and, if final compromises are not reached, whether the talks can be continued. The tens of thousands of words devoted to these efforts by negotiators over the last year have naturally focused on the details of an agreed protocol on the number of operating centrifuges in Iran and the pace of sanctions relief.
The president has invested much political capital into this endeavor and the failure to reach a final accord could end his aim of trying to alter the political and military balance of power in the Middle East. The effort has been so arduous and controversial that he has very carefully avoided a full explication of his strategic aims. The recent letter he reportedly sent to Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—the full text of which has not been released—in which he is said to have suggested working together in battling Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, might be the closest we could get to Obama’s reasoning.
The long freeze in US-Iranian affairs is softening but where that process is headed is yet to be determined. The election last year of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and the delegation of authority to him of testing US intent by the supreme leader reflects not only the pressures of broad economic sanctions but also the slight easing of revolutionary strictures, as well as the shared concern by both countries that events were threatening to run out of control. The US policy of aligning with Israel and the Sunni monarchies has long required adjusting, and President Obama has taken on that initiative with Iran in mind.
Every area of the globe presents a complex mix of old and new frictions, serious and minor conflicts of interests, and the rise of new and challenging issues that further the sense of confusion and helplessness. More than anywhere else, the Middle East evades a clear US strategy or a broad domestic political consensus on clear, rational, and practical interests. In the Middle East the United States contends today with the consequences of its failure to bring democratic governments to old societies; the rise of well-armed militias based in part on extremist Islam; severe tensions between political and religious divisions within Islam; waves of anti-western and anti-American sentiment; the regional antagonism to the close US-Israeli relationship; and the regional efforts to adjust the political boundaries of a post-Ottoman world. American financial assistance to the Sunni militias from the Arab monarchies has meanwhile created a monster that defies our interests.
The Bush administration’s efforts to cope with new and old adversaries and challenges typically were military—the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both have had, charitably, very limited success and have further distorted the political landscape. At the moment, there is no recognizable and acceptable balance of power, no consensus on limits of national rights and no regional institutions to cope with shared questions.
President Obama has recognized this hapless and dangerous condition and accordingly tried to adjust American policies in the region. He has tried to withdraw militarily from Iraq and Afghanistan while pursuing a more diplomatic posture, starting with the Israel-Palestine conflict. Until recently this year, he was also reluctant to engage militarily in Syria, having understood that the collapse of the country’s government would introduce an array of additional threats to regional peace.
Ending the 35-year-long cold war with Iran has also been a top priority in Obama’s vision of America’s future, but resolving fears, both regional and domestic, over Iran’s putative ambitions for nuclear weaponry has been the prerequisite. Beyond allaying fears of regional nuclear proliferation is the hope that over time, a new relationship will constitute a path to political realignments—a new direction for us and the nations of the area.
Of course, the president still has to contend with his predecessors legacy in Iraq. Following the withdrawal of US forces in 2011, Obama repeatedly said that there would be no more US boots on the ground in that country, yet nearly all his military officers have been quoted saying that without ground forces, air power will be insufficient in thwarting the new militant force of Islamic State (ISIS or IS). If not us, then who? Turkey, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt? Wishful thinking; they are hardly equipped for the job.
Iraq, of course, has its own vision and demands. What is necessary is the very ephemeral realization of greater cooperation and coordination of those who recognize a common threat to their well being—if not their existence. Like it or not, Iran can play a significant part in the attempts to defeat IS and find an acceptable solution for Syria, which is currently the most affected by the rise of Islamic militancy.
Quarantining Syria makes little sense; it’s domestic politics may be loathsome but its leaders are not causing American casualties and losses. It may be time for a realistic debate over the role of Syria in its own defense and the struggles against IS and the other extremist forces ravaging the country.
Unfortunately, nothing is easy in the Middle East, and such initiatives will also continue to meet the strong opposition of American conservatives who do not trust Iran and are subject to lobbying pressure from Israel, the Sunni Arab states and Turkey. In this light, the reach for a greater rationality may simply prove impossible.
]]>by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually disciplined in terms of leaks but official briefings have indicated that some major technical issues are on the way to being settled. Encouraging? Yes, but from the beginning of the talks it was realized, or should have been, that the day would come when Iran’s long term plans for a sizable nuclear energy program and the need for large amounts of enriched uranium would be front and center.
The past is prologue. Roughly 5 decades ago, we negotiated for several years with Iran over future nuclear cooperation until there was little hope left and went aground for some time over who would control the possible reprocessing of spent fuel from the US supplied enriched uranium. In the reprocessing of spent fuel, small quantities of plutonium could be separated and used in power plants or nuclear bombs.
The US side offered a variety of solutions, such as a bilateral plant; buy-back of the fuel; shipping the spent fuel for reprocessing to European facilities; and multi-national enrichment and reprocessing firms. Iran, however, refused all such ideas until President Jimmy Carter and the Shah directly reached a compromise agreement. The president was able to satisfy the Persian monarch’s personal and national pride that Iran would not be treated unfairly. The success of the Iranian Revolution in February of 1979 prevented the legal enactment of that treaty.
Now the concerns over reprocessing have been replaced by deep concerns over enrichment. The present Iranian government, like its royal predecessor, has planned a substantial civilian power program that has tentatively selected 16 areas for the construction of 1000 MW reactors. None, it is believed, has had a shovel of earth removed as yet, however in the view of the lengthy construction time and the vast expenditures required for reactors, issues such as security and supply for sufficient enriched uranium are vital.
At present Iran has 9,000 first stage and 10,000 second stage — IR2 — centrifuges. In all the years that some of them have been operating, Iran has been provided a little over 11,000 kilograms — roughly 5 tonnes — of enriched uranium. This supply is sufficient for 5-7 bombs if further enriched but is totally insufficient for civil reactor needs.
For example, Iran’s one completed reactor at Bushehr needs roughly 21 tonnes of enriched uranium as yearly replacement fuel that will be sold by Russia. The new reactors — which are at least a decade away — will require roughly 70-80,000 tonnes of fuel to start power production, and annual replacement fuel of about 21-25,000 tonnes per reactor. Iran’s negotiators have proclaimed that to meet its future requirements, Iran will need at least 100,000 advanced centrifuges. If in fact Iran pursues its civilian objectives, that figure is modest.
So far Iran has insisted that its future needs must rely on domestic production and depending on imports would make Iran highly vulnerable to political differences and crises. This position is given added weight by the fact that the six powers across the table have been imposing sanctions for a decade.
The position of the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) has been that Iran should reduce its current centrifuges to a number that can only provide enriched material for medical research and isotopes, and depend on imports from reliable producers for future reactor fueling.
The parties are an ocean apart. In response to the negotiating crisis, emergency bilateral sessions took place between Iran and each of the P5+1 members to examine whether there is enough “give” to hold out the hope that compromises can emerge. (Unhappily, as with Carter and the Shah, we do not have leaders who understand or trust each other.) The bilateral talks also give Iran opportunities to test whether cracks are possible within the six. If each side holds to its position, the negotiating effort could be extended for at least a six month period or end.
One potential way forward that requires careful study would be to stipulate that a specific number of additional centrifuges may operate and that the enriched uranium should be put aside under especially rigorous security for a particular future reactor. Whether the US Congress, Israel and Iran’s conservative cabal, not to mention the other five powers, could live with this kind of solution is questionable. But each leader, especially Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, have put great effort into this possible opening of modest relations after three decades of mistrust.
Presumably neither views failure with equanimity, although Obama has consistently said that success was no more than 50% likely.
If failure seems likely, there are many questions that have to be addressed now and not await a crisis:
These are parlous times. Are we doing every thing possible to strengthen our hand?
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: US President Jimmy Carter and Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi share a drink in 1977, two years before the monarch would be overthrown by a popular revolution.
]]>by Charles Naas
President Barack Obama and the United Nations have again warned President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan that, unless he signs a bilateral security agreement, which gives all foreign troops complete immunity from Afghan law, these troops will be withdrawn at the end of the year. To do so would leave the Afghan military, [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
President Barack Obama and the United Nations have again warned President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan that, unless he signs a bilateral security agreement, which gives all foreign troops complete immunity from Afghan law, these troops will be withdrawn at the end of the year. To do so would leave the Afghan military, a force that now numbers over 300,000, without further western training programs, especially in the maintenance of modern equipment, infantry/special forces tactics and communications but still facing a continued Taliban opposition.
Last year the Loya Jirga, a traditional body of eminent tribal leaders including many from Pashtun areas along the border with Pakistan — the center of Afghan Taliban strength — recommended approval of the agreement, but Karzai said the President who takes over after the April election should be responsible for an action with such long-term consequences. He has withstood allied pressure for over a year and relations between the western allies and the Afghan government are gravely frayed. Karzai’s action may seem on the surface self-defeating in light of the military’s continued need for assistance, but lets go more deeply into his dilemma.
Over 100,000 American and allied forces have been in Afghanistan for over a decade and there has been heavy fighting in localized areas with substantial civilian casualties. We have used our highly aggressive Special Forces and drones that have had some success militarily but frequently produced civilian losses. And, the Taliban usually move back in once the foreign forces depart and reportedly have a strong presence in over half of the provinces. There is no sign that the struggle is near a successful conclusion. The on-again, off-again political negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban — aimed at finding political compromises — have apparently made little progress.
Perhaps more important is that the country has become highly divided politically over the US presence. We have poured billions of dollars into our efforts to modernize parts of the country, which includes military expenditures, Afghanistan’s educational and legal systems, and its roads and medical facilities. Following the draconian rule by the Taliban, much of this aid was welcomed by major parts of the population but it also deepened the gulf between the traditional rural tribal society and the urban population. The latter have borne the brunt of the daily presence of road blocks, convoys roaring through the streets and suicide bombings. The villages have been subjected to intrusive and terrifying night raids often directed by faulty intelligence. Not to mention the fact that many of the US-led reforms in Afghan society have violate religious beliefs and long-held customs.
In Afghanistan, a nation weary from the current conflict as well as its long civil war and resistance to the Soviet Union, the US is looked upon by many as the occupier, the enemy. Karzai recognizes this fact and has been responsive by criticizing many aspects of our use of arms and refusing to sign the agreement. Any leader in Afghanistan is also cognizant of the historical fate of those who have been identified with the presence of foreign forces. All the important communist leaders who came to power as a result of the 1973 coup and the Soviet invasion met dire fates.
It’s a rough and tough country and, contrary to our own society, history is a living and breathing thing. The Afghan leaders are also fully aware that in Iran a status of forces agreement caused massive demonstrations and marked the political emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini. Karzai may have simply had enough of us and his domestic burdens.
With his warnings, President Obama has established a politically defensible basis for ending the US presence in Afghanistan and implementing a full withdrawal at the end of this year; that may well be his purpose.
But, would a status of forces agreement, which cannot be signed until the security agreement is finalized, and the retention of 3-10,000 troops ensure Afghanistan’s prosperity? Very unlikely. Whoever is elected as the new Afghan president must continue to deal with a Taliban that has shown little inclination to bargain seriously, cope with all the ethnic and cultural tensions that beset that country and depend economically on foreign assistance.
Let us not expect the victory parade. We can at least hope that the activities of the remnants al-Qaeda, the reason we first invaded the country, will be minimized and that, as in years past, the country can slog along day-to-day. The Pakistan government has announced a military intervention into its part of the tribal area but, unless it is very substantial and near permanent, the impact in Afghanistan will be years in coming.
As one who values dearly his four years served in that country several decades ago, I deeply regret my pessimism.
]]>by Charles Naas
The slog to a possible historic agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) has concluded for now in Vienna and will reconvene there on March 17. The major problems facing the participants are by now well-known. We can accordingly expect both sides to [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
The slog to a possible historic agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) has concluded for now in Vienna and will reconvene there on March 17. The major problems facing the participants are by now well-known. We can accordingly expect both sides to at first deliver their basic positions and any subsequent movement to be laid out in bilateral discussions to assess reactions before anything is made public and formal.
Missing so far from all this is any firm indication of what middle and long-term aims Washington holds. The negotiators and supporting staff at State and the White House have, quite miraculously, maintained considerable discipline and not leaked information. Although the latest round in Vienna ended on a positive note, the administration continues to warn that success in the talks is by no means a sure thing. This somberness may be traditional and wise negotiating tactics but there is little basis for optimism at this point.
When the US finally joined the Europeans in their effort to control Iran’s nuclear program in 2006, its motivations were not at all clear. Obviously the secret talks in Oman (2011-12) and at the UN in 2013 supported the notion that indeed it might be worth our while to test the negotiating waters with Iran more intensely. In time, other secret exchanges will probably be revealed. However, looking ahead, did we enter the talks primarily and largely out of non-proliferation concerns? Were Israeli threats of destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and the real possibility of our being dragged into another crisis or war the principal motivations? At the time, President Barack Obama had indicated he recognized that the American population had no heart for further conflict in the Middle East and was attempting to severely reduce our forces and our aims in Afghanistan.
For a President now well into his second term and facing a Congress in which his own party does not fully support him and a House of Representatives that opposes all his actions, any initiative concerning the Middle East, particularly involving Iran, seems ambitious. He could just let the matter drift and wait until 2016 and go back home to Chicago. But doing so or even just restricting our aims with Iran to the nuclear issue, as important and difficult as it is, is too limiting when the scope of other regional challenges are taken into account.
Iran and Turkey are the largest and — along with Israel — the strongest and most influential nations in the area. Politically, Israel has for some time had an informal semi-alliance relationship with the Arab monarchies — Egypt, Syria and Libya — which were/are torn by currently unsolvable violence. Turkey has meanwhile reduced its ties with Israel, has been forced to limit its hopes of becoming accepted as part of Europe and has been forced to secure its borders with Syria and take care of thousands of Syrian refugees.
Iran has been a missing part of the calculus for us, except for its opposition to our efforts to get through this lengthy period of regional instability in the Middle East. Our relations with Iran historically have gone through the ouster of its Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, which we orchestrated; an allied relationship — CENTO and the 1959 bilateral treaty –; the sale of enormous quantities of modern arms in return for very significant aid in the Cold War (ties that became too close to be maintained); and three decades of no official relations brought on by the turmoil of its 1979 revolution. We have experienced the highs and the lows during this time. Have we learned much?
No matter from what direction one views the Middle East, Iran is presently very important. It is a player in the Persian Gulf and in a dominant military position; it is heavily engaged in the Syrian conflict; its influence with Hezbollah and Lebanon is significant; and it’s as concerned as we are over the revival of the Taliban and Sunni Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Has the administration explored the more obvious areas of mutual interest it shares with Iran, such as security and stability in Afghanistan? Are we looking at ways our ties with Israel do not dominate our Mideast policies and are there ways that Iranian-Israeli hostility can be modified? Little things like President Hassan Rouhani’s public Rosh Hashanah greeting last year and the fact that Iran and Israel stayed in their seats at recent conferences while the other talked may have a larger meaning. The Iranians are sophisticated enough to know that Israeli worries are a major factor within Congress and the general public. For its part, the Iranian government — at least the element to which Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif belong — has indicated that it perceives the solution to the nuclear issues as the opening act of a new relationship. That position, which Zarif has held for number of years, could be an artful “come-on” in an effort to get concessions in the nuclear agreement. But I think not. The sanctions are hurting and Iran is in a period where pragmatic objectives are taking a slim lead over ideology.
Much of this might appear to be useless speculation but it’s all part and parcel of what will take place in Vienna. Either side may be influenced in the nuclear discussions by future hopes. The optimists are already prematurely suggesting opening an Interests Section –one step below an Embassy– to manage our affairs in Tehran. We are approaching a crucial point that will determine whether a strong Iran can become moderate and helpful in addressing the serious matters now blazing from the Mediterranean to the Indus River. Following a failure to get to a nuclear agreement and move on to other matters, it would be difficult to pick up the pieces. That’s why it’s important to begin talking with Iran about areas of mutual interest now.
]]>by Charles Naas
The negotiators of the P5+1 and Iran will convene again this month to see whether the nuclear agreement of November can be developed into a formal treaty laying out in detail the commitments by the parties. What a distance we have come in less than a year of overt [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
The negotiators of the P5+1 and Iran will convene again this month to see whether the nuclear agreement of November can be developed into a formal treaty laying out in detail the commitments by the parties. What a distance we have come in less than a year of overt and secret discussions! But let’s not get too far ahead of ourselves. Many difficult issues are yet to be resolved — for example, how much uranium will Iran be able to enrich per year? What happens to its civilian nuclear power program? What is done to the Arak complex?
Any agreement also faces serious domestic opposition. In the US, the senators most concerned about Israeli security simply don’t trust this reversal of policy by Iran and assert that increased sanctions are still necessary to bring Iran to heel. Iran has responded that any increase in sanctions will sink the diplomatic process. In Tehran, there are the powerful conservative elements who don’t trust the West, particularly the US, and fear that increased ties with the West will slowly undermine the basis of the religious autocracy.
Despite these hurdles, there is a palpable change in attitudes among area specialists and business executives who are wagering that the agreement will be signed. For them, the big questions are: what trade and business opportunities would become available; how can US-Iran relations develop to increase each other’s regional security interests; what do both countries get out of a break in the enmity of the last 35 years; and what impact would an agreement have on the larger Middle East issues? Failure to agree would likely result in, as a minimum, additional sanctions and military action by Israel and possibly the US to destroy the nuclear facilities.
For many Americans, the principle images of Iran are still the humiliating taking of our diplomats as hostages during its revolution, acts of terrorism in Lebanon, the spewing of “Death To America” by huge crowds in Iranian cities, and a religious conservative government that exhibits little mercy for its opponents.
Forgotten history
But Iran was once a keystone in the policy of resistance to the expansion of the Soviet Union during the cold war. It had a bilateral treaty toward this objective with the US, was an original member of the Central Treaty Organization, provided the CIA with invaluable electronic listening stations in the North, and was the recipient of the sale of over $10 billion in sophisticated arms including F-5s,-F-4s, F-14s, helicopters and ground and naval equipment. Within the Middle East, Iran was conceived in the Nixon Doctrine as the regional nation that would be first in line to assume responsibility for defense of the region, particularly the Persian Gulf’s petroleum resources.
An integral part of the relationship was a trilateral understanding between the US, Iran and Israel that encompassed exchanges of intelligence, the repair of Iran’s American military equipment in Israel, Iran’s provision of oil to Israel, Israeli agricultural aid, their cooperation in opposing Saddam Hussain in Kurdistan, and plans to coordinate missile development.
There was considerable geo-political sense to this arrangement. Iran in the East was the largest regional state, it was not Arab and not obsessed with Israeli-Palestinian issues, was worried about Russian aims, was a major petroleum producer, and had a political leader who tended to see the threat to world peace and local stability in terms similar to us. Israel saw Iran as a supplier of oil and as a counterpoise to Iraq, that had on occasion threatened to invade Israel, and to the Arab monarchies. The US, Iran and Israel were in a sense the “outsiders” and drawn together by this.
For Iranians born during and shortly after WWII, its ties with the US arouse very mixed feelings. The US assisted getting the Russians to leave occupied areas in the North, provided extensive economic aid, opened its educational institutions, and provide security against the USSR. In apposition was the galling presence of 50,000 Americans who had little or no understanding of Persian culture, the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh with the aid of the CIA, the major economic problems caused by the excess arms purchases, the increasing megalomania of the Shah and his ignoring the nation’s religion and culture, and the long list of young Iranians who were imprisoned for political activities without serious American objections.
In the decades since the Iranian Revolution, there has been a number of occasions when efforts to heal or just paper over the differences were ventured but both sides could not agree at the same time.
A Rebalancing?
The election of President Hassan Rouhani and his nomination of Mohammad Javad Zarif as Foreign Minister — both holding extensive experience with the West — was the major overt indication that Iran might be on the edge of important political change. Factors influencing this softening of attitudes perhaps were the economic pain of the sanctions, the chaotic political conditions in the Middle East that were not in Iran’s favor, the instability of Iran’s neighbors, Afghanistan and Iraq, and most significantly, Iran’s isolation in the world. Saudi and Gulf monarchies strident support of Sunni insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, and assistance to anti-Shi’a activities from Pakistan to Lebanon have also been particularly irksome and worrying. In addition to the political realities facing the nation was the need to avoid conflict over its nuclear program and to set it on an accepted and secure path.
The American press and many of its politicians decry the US “retreat” from its near hegemony in the Middle East as well as worry over Israeli security. But the US remains the most powerful economic and military power in the world and every country must contend with that fact. President Obama’s sincere and obvious reluctance to reintroduce military force in the region has probably encouraged Iran’s politicians to fear us less and to recognize that there are many significant parallel interests from Pakistan to the Mediterranean to provide grist for a newer and more balanced relationship. The differences are many, of course, but they are manageable and it is highly unlikely that we have traveled this far without some understandings with Israel. President Rouhani and Zarif are much too experienced to underestimate the ties that bind us to Israel and not to see the value for Iran of decreasing tension with that country.
Looking ahead, we are far from a reestablishment of the old trilateral axis and it might be wise not to seek it. But the sharing of strategic interests and keeping anchors in the East and West while the Arab countries attempt to settle their domestic problems of governance and their external rivalries and tensions is highly attractive, if fraught with serious differences.
]]>by Charles Naas
Ten days have passed since the much-anticipated agreement between the P5+1 (US, France, UK, Russia and China plus Germany) and Iran was signed in Geneva. The world’s media has been flooded with hundreds of exaggerated expressions of hope that Iran has now rejoined the international community of nations and [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Ten days have passed since the much-anticipated agreement between the P5+1 (US, France, UK, Russia and China plus Germany) and Iran was signed in Geneva. The world’s media has been flooded with hundreds of exaggerated expressions of hope that Iran has now rejoined the international community of nations and that perhaps the long, cold winter of US-Iran hostility might be drawing to a close. Israel and a few proliferation hawks have warned that the agreement has brought the world closer to nuclear war at some future point in light of what they perceive as Iranian gains in the first-phase accord. In a joint column Tuesday, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have taken positions that appear closer to those of the deal’s Senate critics, although, at the same time, they don’t suggest the imposition of new sanctions pending further negotiations.
In fact, this six-month “interim” agreement is already subject to disagreements by Iran and the US as to the literal content of the accord itself. Iran has released its version of the “text,” while the White House put out a lengthy Fact Sheet. They are not entirely consistent. The six-month term of the agreement apparently starts in January 2014 and will be supervised by a Joint Commission to ensure that the particulars of the Agreement are observed, as well as to test the political waters in each country to ascertain how much flexibility key domestic constituencies are willing to give them as they move forward. In the event that full agreement is not reached by the end of June, another six-month extension, possibly embodied in a new accord, is expected. The differences in interpretation do not bode well for early conclusion. One has to address the Agreement, therefore, from this still conflicting state.
It is safe to assume that in the many negotiations that have taken place over the last couple of years just about every issue — from small technical ones to the larger policy ones — have at least been addressed, if not entirely agreed upon. In many respects, the specifics of the Geneva pact, as difficult as it was to reach, became the lower-hanging fruit once it became clear Iran was prepared to freeze and even roll back some critical components of its nuclear program as part of the deal.
Whether or not Iran has the “right” to enrich uranium seems moot since the principal concessions by the P5+1 include the understanding that Tehran may continue to enrich uranium under “mutually defined enrichment programmes with mutually agreed parameters consistent with present real needs,” Perhaps of greater significance, they also agreed that Iran will be treated “in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state” — in effect, “the most favored nation” concept taken from economic treaties.
Perhaps the biggest challenge ahead is what to do with Iran’s clearly ambitious civilian nuclear power program. It’s entirely possible that this matter could scuttle any long-term agreement. Tehran has not yet formally presented those plans, and, thus far, what is publicly known rests with Bushehr Two and the less significant reactor at Darkhova. But officials have in the recent past mentioned 16 planned reactors — the sites for which are still unknown — while others have cited the earlier plans, first announced by the Shah’s government in the mid-1970’s, to build 20-24 reactors. Either plan amounts to an enormous undertaking that would take decades to implement and also raises the question of the source of the uranium fuel needed to run the plants. If Iran plans to enrich its own original fuel, it needs roughly 80 tons of enriched uranium to produce electricity. At present, Iran possesses roughly seven tons of low enriched uranium (LEU) in its stockpile, but each reactor would need approximately 25 tons of fuel replacement annually. To meet these requirements locally, Iran would need large amounts of ore (which might not be available from its current mines) and thousands of additional centrifuges of the most advanced kind.
Bushehr’s start-up fuel rods have been sold to Iran by Russia, which also is committed to take control of spent fuel and supply yearly its fuel requirements. It is possible that Iran could reach similar agreements with western suppliers, as well as Russia, to fuel its reactors, but that would leave Iran’s current enrichment facilities, Natanz and Fordow, with no apparent task. The closure of these facilities would meet Israel’s demands and no doubt come as a relief to other powers. But, having spent billions of dollars in their construction, how likely is Iran to settle for no indigenous source of enriched fuel, particularly since their officials now contend that their “right to enrich” has been recognized? As a minimum, Iran will insist that the rubric, “a mutually defined enrichment programme,” binds all signatories to cooperate with, or permit, Iran’s nuclear activities in the future. While Iran’s pride and security of supply are at stake, how will Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others react if Iran’s enrichment facilities commence their work at an increased pace?
Other difficult nuclear problems that remain to be addressed include: what will be done with the spent fuel from future reactors or medical isotopes; will any reprocessing be permitted and, if so, under what conditions and whose auspices? The timing and progression of relief from UN, US, and European sanctions will likely provoke discord: all at once? First applied, first relieved, or most harmful to Iran’s economy first to be lifted? And what occurs if Congress increases sanctions and/or refuses to lift already levied sanctions?
In other words, Geneva was a magnificent diplomatic achievement. But to get to a final resolution will require traversing potentially lethal minefields. The unity of the six could yet collapse under the pressure, while other nations that have observed the sanctions would likely strike out on their own in defiance of Washington’s wishes. As many seasoned diplomats have already warned, we’re still at the beginning of a long and difficult process.
]]>by Charles Naas
The negotiations last week in Geneva over Iran’s nuclear program — the second effort since the June election of President Hassan Rouhani — stumbled at the final session and will resume later this month. The first serious break among the 6-world power P5+1 team apparently occurred when the French [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
The negotiations last week in Geneva over Iran’s nuclear program — the second effort since the June election of President Hassan Rouhani — stumbled at the final session and will resume later this month. The first serious break among the 6-world power P5+1 team apparently occurred when the French objected to some of the sections in the agreement. Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry plans to go before the relevant bodies of Congress to start the very difficult task of convincing them that the current draft, which involves a first step of six months to test Iran’s willingness and ability to control its domestic opponents to any agreement is a safe and secure breakthrough on this matter. The basic outline of an agreement has been clear for some time, but the US Congress, Iran’s radical right and the fervent opposition to any agreement by Israel have not allowed either side much, if any, flexibility. (See Marsha Cohen’s recent piece on the divisions within the Israeli Government.)
In fact, after over 30 years of deep distrust the stars may be aligned between the West and Iran to start the long and very difficult process of normalizing relations. The new Iranian team, with the support of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and, so far, Iran’s security organizations, has moved quickly on a number of fronts to see whether a nuclear agreement is possible. It has made a special effort to convince the Obama administration that there has been a major change of tone in Tehran with respect to the negotiations and its view of the United States. Rouhani took the unprecedented step of greeting the Israelis on Rosh Hashanah. Unsure of what all this entails, the US has conceived an agreement on a first step to be followed by a final settlement — if all goes well in the six month testing period. These developments raise a number of important questions, including: why has Iran now accepted that the US has an important role with respect to its position regionally and further abroad?
The primary incentives for Iran are undoubtedly some early sanctions relief, an effort to prevent more sanctions by the US Congress and the eventual removal of all economic restrictions. Over the decades, Iran has undoubtedly found ways to import denied goods and has learned to produce domestically some former imports. But, the hits its taken due to sanctions — particularly through foreign exchange and international banking restrictions and the prevention of vital imports such as medicines and raw materials — has caused it great suffering. It currency, the rial, resembles the post-WWI German Marks. However, Iran has endured sanctions until now and sanction relief would not be sufficient to force it to give up its basic rights to enrichment and a peaceful nuclear power program. Rather, a convergence of regional, foreign and domestic developments underlie the present marked improvement in the tone emanating from Tehran.
The election of Rouhani is a resumption of the leadership of Iran’s more moderate “reformist” tendency and is in line with Presidents Rafsanjani, Khatami, and, earlier, Prime Minister Mousavi. The eight years of Ahmadinejad were internationally and domestically pretty much a dead loss for the country as he added to the friction with Israel and most of the western world. His economic policy, to the extent he had one, was populist with little understanding of broad economic factors. Before assuming the presidency his understanding of foreign matters was strictly limited. In contrast, Rouhani was educated in Scotland and Mohammad Javad Zarif, his active Foreign Minister, was educated in the United States; both have had extensive foreign policy experience. They are comfortable with foreigners and, as importantly, with themselves. The election of Rouhani was in itself strong evidence that the Iranian people hope for change as long as Iran’s interests are protected. The Revolution was too costly to give away what the clergy and its supporters struggled so hard to achieve. This peaceful election was proof that counter-revolution was interred for now. Zarif has noted his objective is to conclude the talks with an agreement within a year and then to move on to other matters of mutual concern. The draft 2003 agreement of which Zarif was the principal drafter of has the substance of where he hopes to go.
In his long period as the Leader, Khamenei has permitted Presidents and other officials considerable latitude in policies. What he has not allowed is any challenge to the Republic’s existence or nature of its government. Mir Hossein Mousavi was seen as joining the extremists for change that could have undermined the state and has been shunted out of politics. Rouhani has been a part of the inner circle for many years and has earned the Leader’s confidence.
Perhaps after the satisfaction of winning Iran’s presidential election by a majority of the Iranian people, the leadership took stock of Iran’s position regionally and internationally. There are some plusses in this area but several serious worries, too. The principal satisfaction is the US departure from Iraq and the scheduled end of its combat role in Afghanistan. Under Obama, the US is less intrusive. Yet, all is not positive for Iran, which now contends with an unstable Iraq and the rise again of a number of Salafist Sunni groups. The Taliban threatens to become a major factor to the east again, and in the southeastern region, the new government continues to face a minority insurrection. The Shi’a in Pakistan are the frequent victims of violence by Sunni extremist organizations and in Afghanistan, the large Hazara population suffered during Taliban rule and undoubtedly will face it again. Thus, while Iran does not face existential problems beyond its Eastern borders, they are nevertheless very worrisome. The one country with common concerns and possibly the ability to be of assistance is the United States.
The Arab Spring has affected Iran’s role in the area considerably. From Iraq to Libya, the rise of Salafist governments and movements have become threats to Iran’s ability to carry on normal intercourse. Just a little more than two years ago, a stable Syria, ruled by the Assad family, provided a near right of passage for Iranian military aid to Hezbollah, which Iran has viewed as its small strategic counterpoise to Israeli threats to Iran’s nuclear power facilities. Today, the rule of Assad and the Alawite Shi’a minority is increasingly in doubt; Iran has pragmatically accepted this and is ready — if invited — to join the Geneva conference. Invitations must be approved by both the US and Russia. Added to all these difficult issues is the question of what happens to Iran’s Kurds at a time when Syria’s and Iraq’s Kurdish population are gaining greater self-rule.
Encompassing these problems for Iran’s new leaders is its general isolation and the widely held view of Iran as a pariah state, a perpetrator of terrorism with nuclear ambitions. It can be safely conjectured that Iran is uneasy without a countervailing power to the increased reliance on Russia, its historical opponent. The Arab states are all Sunni majority and aiding the Syrian rebels. Israel is an existential threat, the western countries have joined the sanctions regime (either that of the UN Security Council or those of the US) and many do not have diplomatic relations or a presence in Tehran. For at least the foreseeable future, key decisions on sanctions and diplomatic acceptability will be strongly influenced by the US. Historically, Iran’s diplomats have been pragmatists regardless of ideological thought and some 30 years since the revolution may now be turning back to practical ways to defend the nation’s security in an uncertain future.
The US has perhaps this one opportunity to put aside — with great caution — the decades of distrust and move step by difficult step to see just how far Iran’s new openness will take us. There actually is little to lose. But, we have to expect Iran to persist that it has rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to a full peaceful nuclear program including enrichment. We may have to swallow hard, accept the Iranian position in principle, but agree on a variety of restrictions and inspections that provide security against a nuclear weapon.
Photo Credit: FARS News/Majid Asgaripour
]]>by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama is currently besieged on his Middle East policy — or lack thereof — by both liberals and conservatives.
The noise of the critics is not unusual. In the last couple of decades there has rarely been a national consensus on the role of the US [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama is currently besieged on his Middle East policy — or lack thereof — by both liberals and conservatives.
The noise of the critics is not unusual. In the last couple of decades there has rarely been a national consensus on the role of the US in foreign affairs, particularly in the Middle East, where there is a strong domestic pressure group that rides roughshod over differing views. The president’s cautious approach to any overt stance of action is, however, fully defensible and by no means feckless and directionless as his critics hold.
It wasn’t always like this. From the end of World War II until the late 80′s and 90′s, the Cold War dominated our policies. Rarely did most Americans find fault with the overriding strategy of opposition to the ideology and expansionism of the Soviet Union. There were at times bitter arguments over specific actions or failure to follow a preferred path by one pressure group or another, but not with our aims.
In the Middle East, the US and the Soviet Union sought regional governmental backing for their policies. We used the full, complex panoply of actions expanding upon the Truman Doctrine; the Central Treaty Organization; the bilateral treaties of 1959 with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey; large economic and military assistance programs; special relationships and cooperation in intelligence; state visits; entry visas for university studies; and much more.
The US was most influential in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the gulf Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Israel. Iraq, Egypt (under Nasser), Syria and Libya accepted Soviet assistance. India and Afghanistan joined the non-aligned nations. Many of the governments tried to use their favoured statuses to garner our support for their regional rivalries.
In return, we received political support, military base rights, special intelligence facilities and the consideration of our wishes when these governments decided upon controversial domestic decisions.
In days past, all of the countries except Turkey were governed by monarchs or authoritarian rulers who, with the support and loyalty of their military, permitted little public opposition to their decisions. Today, a substantial number of these leaders are gone — the Shah of Iran, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saddam Hussain in Iraq, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya.
The 9/11 tragedy was pretty much the last time of marked national unity. The invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and search for Osama bin Ladin was widely approved by the populace. Soon thereafter the Iraq conflict sharply divided the nation and Obama inherited a nation in doubt over our economy and questioning our overall strategy. What do we want to accomplish? What are our clear national interests? And, if they are definable, how do we achieve them? In addressing these questions, Obama has faced a more perplexing conundrum than any of his predecessors.
Today there is no overarching understanding of strategy nor policy priorities for the Middle East. Each nation faces severe internal regional rivalries; religion versus state issues; the old struggle of Shiism and Sunnism; democracy versus a return to one-man rule; very young populations; faltering economies; and more.
Whatever action Obama opts for in one nation is unacceptable in others and our domestic pressure groups continue to insist on the importance of their own hobby horse.
We swallowed hard when confronted with the electoral victory of the Brotherhood, an Islamist organization feared for decades. But we recognized the new government chosen in an honest election and started to try to work with it based on mutual interests. The overthrow a week ago of Mohamed Morsi has forced the Obama administration to face the dichotomy of continuing our support of the democratic decision of the Egyptian people a year ago or backing the military-takeover brought on by the millions of Egyptians who again filled the streets of Cairo protesting Morsi’s actions.
The decisions before Obama with respect to Syria are equally difficult with probably no national consensus. Do we arm the Syrian National Army faction alone or include other factions and, if so, only small arms or heavy arms? How do we ensure that the Islamic extremist al-Nusra Front does not gain control of the arms? Roughly a week ago, the Syrian National Army and al-Nusra had a serious armed clash that highlighted this issue.
US military and economic power and the appeal of our principles will always ensure that our views and assistance will be sought. But the president must deal with the fact that US influence upon governments in the Middle East and the surrounding region has significantly changed. A quick review is convincing evidence. In Pakistan, less than 10% of the population looks favourably on the US; Iran and the US have been at loggerheads for over thirty years; Nour al-Maliki in Iraq has turned down a continuing presence of the US military and is generally impervious to our advice regarding the civil conflict tearing his country apart; in Syria no one faction of the dozens of separate religious/ethnic and tribal elements speak for the revolutionaries (some want a strong US intercession and just as many factions condemn US involvement); Shia-Sunni divisions have engulfed the region; the Gulf states make decisions at times with no reference to American wishes; Egypt’s trauma is self evident; and in Tunisia — so far a success in advancing to democracy — difficult divisions remain over the issue of religiously conservative governance.
There are no simple answers to demands for a long-term strategy that comes close to being satisfactory to our domestic pressure groups or, for that matter, to the countries in the region.
Perhaps the first requirement is to search for some sort of domestic understanding of the nature of the challenges we face and the range of possible reactions. Our Congress may be too divided for the responsible Committees to undertake the effort. The Senate, however, showed the other day with the “nuclear option” on voting practices that hard as it was, compromise can be reached on tenacious matters. It remains to be seen if the same holds true for foreign affairs.
In the meantime, the president does not have the luxury of ignoring his domestic critics or the life and death trials of our strength throughout the region. He has no option but to continue to side with the informal association of Israel and the monarchical Arab states, even if the possibility of slowly improving relations with Iran’s new government on nuclear and regional issues should be at the top of his list. Although the idea of a conference on Syria has not yet gone far, there is little to lose and much to gain by continuing to advocate it. Otherwise we should understand that most of the Middle East is in a post-colonial, post-Cold War era and they must find their own solutions to the key questions and crises they face.
We can aid on the margins — only when invited.
]]>At last the Obama Administration has found a reasonable Syria policy. The critics will continue to insist that the US provide arms to the rebels, but it will be difficult to get more traction for this while the initiative with the Russians holds out hopes, although slender, for the beginning of [...]]]>
At last the Obama Administration has found a reasonable Syria policy. The critics will continue to insist that the US provide arms to the rebels, but it will be difficult to get more traction for this while the initiative with the Russians holds out hopes, although slender, for the beginning of a process that could halt the slaughter of Syrian civilians. The present course of events is untenable and at least the President has been given a little breathing room from the charges that his policy has no substance nor evident purpose. Talk is an advance over conflict.
The conference, when it gets underway, will gather in the long shadow of Versailles at the end of WW l that determined the fate from European and American eyes of the vast Ottoman Empire and its multi-ethnic provinces. It could implicitly be a serious examination of the Sykes-Picot treaty that added to Versailles the division of spoils to the French and British empires.The conference, in other words, could be the opportunity for the inhabitants to redress old errors and egregious mistakes that were imposed upon them. Such daunting challenges will not be resolved at the outset nor easily but addressing them is a step forward.
But, before the opening of the conference is even firmly scheduled, the organizers — presumably the US and Russia — face major political and administrative tasks that could threaten its fate. Points of apparent agreement will, like Sisyphus’ burden, need to go up the hill again and again. Seemingly, little matters such as the size of the table, who sits where, allowed time for each participant’s statements, the right of reply and so on can roil the waters (recall the Paris peace talks on Vietnam).
Happily, there are experts who can deal with purely administration issues but the overt and subliminal political issues that will threaten the course of the labours right from the outset need top-level decisions and flexibility from domestic political forces.
The first issue to be handled is agreement by the US and its co-chair, Russia, on how to coordinate their responsibilities — never an easy task and particularly difficult at a time of renewed tension in the bilateral relationship. For Russia, the confab is a golden opportunity to become once again an important player in the Middle East, to reverse, if it can, its loss of influence with the ending of the Cold War. For the US, there is another chance to “lead from behind”, exhibit its renewed relevance in the affairs of this critical area and avoid the decision whether or not to supply lethal weapons to the rebels.
Beyond agreeing on how to divide their joint responsibilities, the parties must also decide on who will be invited to participate either as a principal or in observer status. There is no satisfactory solution to this conundrum. The battle in the conference room will mirror the deadly one within Syria. The representation from the Syrian rebels is a rats’ nest defying any rational decision. There are at least four or more main fighting groups and probably a dozen or more additional armed elements ranging from al-Qaeda terrorists to every shade of Salafist thought, and regional/ethnic loyalty to a local leader. How many seats must be reserved for this babel? How will participation of these disparate groups be established?
How is Hezbollah, along with Iran and Russia — the main outside supporters of the Assad government — to be handled?
Finally, what nations indisputably must be included as participants in addition to the Syrian Government? As a start, the neighboring states, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan will be on the list and it will likely include the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia could face Russian obstruction to balance our likely efforts to deny Iran a seat at the table.
The US faces an extraordinarily difficult dilemma with respect to Iran. Russia has already announced that it will insist that Iran be seated as a full participant and the Chinese might side with the Russians. Will the US risk the future of the conference to keep Iran excluded or will Congress take action demanding our non-appearance if Iran is invited? It could, of course, be an opportunity to recognize the regional importance of Iran and provide, as with the nuclear talks, a pattern of diplomatic contact.
Within the next two years a similar decision will probably be required, if before our departure, the US takes the initiative to get regional assistance for Afghanistan. James Dobbins, the recently appointed Special Envoy for Afghan-Pakistan matters, has indicated in past statements that he believes Iran must be a part of any multilateral determination on Afghanistan’s future.
In recent years, China has invested in the Middle East and is a major petroleum purchaser, particularly from Iran; its actions at the conference will be of special interest. Other than at the United Nations, this will be an opportunity for the the Chinese to play a special role in this turbulent area, once considered as the prerogative of the US with Russia on the edge striving to push-in and become strategically relevant. China may have its own policy of pivot — to the west.
In the weeks before the calling to order, we can expect each element in this vicious struggle to attempt to improve its military position to speak from a position of greater strength. Syrian government forces will undoubtedly continue recent efforts to create an area of firm control along the Mediterranean coast and show the rebels and the nations supporting them that the government has the necessary wherewithal to back its insistence that Assad and the Alawites will not surrender. The rebels will meanwhile continue to clamor for more arms and make an effort to seize more critical territories.
The negotiators, in sum, have a Herculean task in even launching the talks, but hopes for at least an end to the violence and for an uneasy peace are at stake.
Photo: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (left) holds joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
]]>by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama’s Middle East policies can be described as bipartisan or even multi-factional since no one, liberal nor conservative, Republican nor Democrat, seems very understanding of nor totally satisfied with his actions or failures to take action.
But if one adopts a broader perspective rather than focusing [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama’s Middle East policies can be described as bipartisan or even multi-factional since no one, liberal nor conservative, Republican nor Democrat, seems very understanding of nor totally satisfied with his actions or failures to take action.
But if one adopts a broader perspective rather than focusing on one or two issues, the direction of the president’s policies become quite clear. Obama has so far maintained some of the policies of the Bush period while putting the country on important paths of his own devices, but none so dramatic as to arouse significant domestic opposition — except his first encounter with Israel where the breach of confidence has been resolved.
The first step toward an understanding requires viewing Obama as a President who sees his historical imprint in solutions to domestic problems and needs. His beginning as an urban activist is key; he worked within a culture of the down-to-earth needs of thousands of people. He saw grave poverty and despair first hand. There is little evidence that foreign affairs were prominent in his thinking. His early vote as a Senator against the war with Iraq was highly indicative of his basic approach to our extensive involvement and commitments in the volatile Middle East. The economic and financial crises that he faced on assuming office and the generally parlous state of day-to-day economic conditions undoubtedly gave impetus to his domestic priorities. The American public was growing weary with the costs — human and economic — of wars.
When first elected in 2008, the president’s inclination was to strive for some advance in the Israel-Palestine conflict. He called for an end to further Israeli settlements on Palestinian land in the West Bank and gave speeches in Turkey and Egypt encouraging regional nations to seek peace and cooperation between Islamic nations and the west. He also promised an active approach to Palestinian concerns. The Arab reaction was nominal, but the Israeli government’s was fiercely negative. This early venture was a bitter failure for Obama and the power of the Israeli lobby showed that his powers in the area were limited as well by domestic opposition. His recent visit — his first to Israel as President — revealed that he has learned his lesson if his strong backing of Israel against Iran had not made it clear earlier.
A few years ago, Israel, Egypt and the conservative Sunni Arab monarchies without publicity and formality came to an understanding that their interests were not dissimilar. Thus far they have quietly cooperated on Syria, each viewing the overthrow of the Shi’a regime of Bashar al-Assad by Sunni rebels favorably. The president has indicated sympathy with the aims of this informal regional state grouping and has sent Secretary John Kerry to examine the possibilities of future progress on the West Bank. This has the added benefit of giving the Arab states domestic cover for taking actions elsewhere that are similar to those of the US and Israel.
Within this informal alliance structure Obama has established a number of general — very general — guidelines or principles, many of which will satisfy Israel and the monarchies but others that are singular and quite independent. The primary aim or principle has been to end — as soon as is practical — the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which he inherited from the Bush administration. He was indirectly aided by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who refused to sign a Status of Forces treaty that would have set the legal terms for the troops who would have remained for an indefinite period. Obama presumably saw that the war in Afghanistan was highly complex with no obvious ending, but in response to the military’s requests for more troops — the surge — he agreed with the understanding that this would be a one-time increase. At that time, the public was more supportive of a further build-up to defeat the Taliban and to create more time for the destruction of al-Qaeda in the Pakistan tribal belt. But, in conformance with Obama’s basic principle, he has set 2014 as a firm date to end our combat role in that benighted land.
The continuous pursuit of the destruction of al-Qaeda – the original purpose of our invasion — has been partially successful with the drone bombing in the Pakistan tribal area and the death of Bin Laden. The struggle against the Taliban and tribal militias like the Haqqani group continues with less success. The general of the allied military coalition has urged that the remaining force after 2014 be substantial and able to have an impact throughout Afghanistan. The White House has not announced as yet its policy for this distant event but a denial or compromise on troop levels is likely.
A natural concomitant of the first principle is the avoidance of new military commitments. The Middle East from Pakistan to Libya has major domestic security problems that could invite a less cautious President than Obama to get involved, but he has so far deflected substantial pressures, foreign and domestic, to become a participant.
Two crises clearly mark this principle; Libya and Syria. The phrase “lead from behind’ has been belittled by liberals and conservatives alike, but it was a succinct statement of the president’s intent to avoid placing ground troops in the Libyan conflict.The US gave air support, intelligence and humanitarian aid to the Libyan rebels; the European nations did the heavy lifting militarily in the successful effort to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi.
The same principle is currently at work in Syria. No country in the Middle East is more complex than Syria, which encompasses just about every social, religious and ethnic perplexity of the area. As in Libya, the US reaction has been carefully measured. Obama has directed more assistance to the civilian economy than any other country, but, military aid has been essentially non-lethal equipment such as communications and advice. Despite facing much criticism, Obama has not provided air support to the rebellion. A key marker for greater future involvement rests on whether Assad has actually used chemical weapons; the administration has indicated that such use might alter current policy. The Syrian civil conflict is immeasurably complicated by the roles of outsiders: Russia, Iran and Hezbollah who support Assad, whereas the Arab monarchies, the US (quietly), and the European nations (openly), arm and favor the rebel forces. A further problem for those aiding the secular moderate Islamic groups is that a strong element within the anti-Assad forces has ties to al-Qaeda.
The two Bush presidents sought and welcomed the approval and direct assistance of other countries in the two wars with Iraq, in the Afghan conflict, and with the Iranian diplomatic process, but under Obama’s second principle they have taken the lead in Libya and Syria. Obama has realistically recognized that the former colonial powers and neighbours on the Mediterranean rim have special obligations and security interests, and that their leadership should take precedence while we would help “from behind”. In the past, European efforts to become more involved in these types of affairs were regarded as unwelcome intrusions upon our interests.
Notable in his various speeches has been Obama’s restraint in describing or hectoring specific governments on their domestic matters. A third principle appears to be to assume careful distance from the insoluble problems each government faces. The overriding sentiment seems to be: it’s their problem, they created the situation, if they can’t solve these issues, neither can we. Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to control its domestic salafists or its border militants, Iranian opposition to the rule of the Ayatollahs, the Shi’a-Sunni struggle in Bahrain, the mess in Syria,and the internal crisis in Egypt, all exemplify this principle. Obama has been criticized with some heat for his lacking focus on human rights violations.
One area that has been singularly out front in the administration’s concerns is Iran’s nuclear policies. It is unclear what drives the president’s policy of steadily increasing sanctions and unbending demands that Iran change its uranium enrichment actions. Israel’s belief that an Iranian bomb would be an existential threat to that state’s existence, and that Persian Gulf states would possibly also move to nuclear capability, have likely been determining Obama’s directives to our negotiating team. Although the President has shown deep reluctance to use force against Iran, he may face the test of direct military engagement within the next two years if Israel calls for joint efforts to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Domestic pressures could be too strong to resist.
Looking ahead to current and future crises, the President has revealed a great reluctance to exercise overt use of our military power; a practical and conservative approach to the insoluble problems of the area; a careful understanding of Israel’s security needs as well as the Gulf monarchies and Egypt; and a strong desire to concentrate on the many domestic problems we face. He will continue to seek multilateral involvement as crises emerge. Rash or risky initiatives are very unlikely. Obama will likely remain as Mr. Cool in the months and years ahead.
Photo: President Barack Obama walks to his desk in-between meetings in the Oval Office, Oct. 20, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
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