by Farideh Farhi

On April 3 the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on EU Strategy towards Iran. It proposes the opening of a EU delegation in Tehran; cooperation in a number of areas such as the fight against narcotic drugs, environmental protection, and exchanges of students and academics; engaging [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

On April 3 the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on EU Strategy towards Iran. It proposes the opening of a EU delegation in Tehran; cooperation in a number of areas such as the fight against narcotic drugs, environmental protection, and exchanges of students and academics; engaging with Iran on ending the Syrian civil war; stabilising Afghanistan; and outlining the prospect of lifting nuclear-related sanctions against Iran once there is a final agreement on the nuclear issue.

The resolution was offered as a signal of the EP’s desire to embark on a new relationship with Iran, but its questioning of the legitimacy of Iran’s 2013 presidential election and recommendation for parliamentary delegations that visit Iran to meet with dissidents angered Tehran and led to the cancellation of a visit by an Iranian parliamentary delegation to Strasbourg in eastern France. Even Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was compelled to question the powers of the EP, saying it does not have the political and ethical standing to “preach to others.”

I contacted Eldar Mamedov to learn about the politics of this resolution and how it came to be after a couple of visits to Iran by the European Parliament’s delegation. Mamedov is the Political Advisor for the Social-Democratic Group in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. I saw him in Tehran last October when he accompanied a delegation from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats — this was the first European parliamentary delegation to visit Iran since 2007. He later accompanied the delegation headed by Tarja Cronberg who is a member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, its subcommittee on Security and Defence, and the Chair of the Iran delegation. It was this delegation that extended the now cancelled invitation to Iran’s parliamentary members to visit Europe. Mamedov agreed to talk to me in his private capacity and emphasized that the views expressed here are not necessarily the position of the Social-Democrat Group or the EP.

Farideh Farhi: Before discussing the politics of the EP resolution that was just passed, can you elaborate on the powers of the EP and the role it has in EU foreign policy decision-making? Does it have significant powers to influence the policy direction of the European Union or is the message mostly a statement of sentiments?

Eldar Mamedov: The EU, as a union of 28 nations, has a complex institutional architecture. All essential foreign policy decisions are taken by the Council of the EU, the institution representing EU member state governments. That’s where ministers from each member state meet and decide on laws and policies.

After the major reform of the EU in 2009 known as the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has acquired new powers on foreign policy. In addition to its power over the EU budget, including the foreign policy appropriations (which it already had before 2009), it can now grant or withdraw consent to international agreements concluded in the name of the EU with other countries. That means that if, for example, the EU signs a trade agreement with Iran it must be ratified by the EP.

But EP positions on foreign affairs carry weight, even if they are not legally binding, because they are expressed by the only directly elected body of the EU and therefore are considered important political messages.

Q: Since the election of Hassan Rouhani, two EP delegations have visited Iran. The EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton also visited Tehran in March. These visits suggested a desire to recalibrate Europe’s relationship with Iran. What explains the EP’s decision to adopt a resolution at this time?

This is not the first EP resolution regarding Iran. There have been many others that call on Iran to improve its human rights record. But this one tried to set a new tone.

The previous EP report on EU strategy on Iran, known as the Belder report, was adopted in 2011. It was a hawkish report drafted by a rapporteur known for his close links to Israel. It called to maintain and expand the sanctions regime against Iran, condemned Iran´s regional policies and scarcely outlined any areas of possible cooperation. The overall context — Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the post-2009 election crackdown — made it very difficult for supporters of engagement to press their case. After the election of Hassan Rouhani as the president of Iran, and especially after the Geneva interim nuclear deal on 24 November 2013, prospects for the normalization of relations between the West and Iran improved and it was felt that the time has come to adjust the EP’s position to the new situation and make a constructive contribution to EU policy on Iran. The Parliament is in a better position to do so than the European External Action Service (EEAS), which operates under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton or the Ministerial Council, where taking bold steps requires lengthy and complicated negotiations, and where some big countries, such as the UK and France, have a tough approach to Iran.

The Socialists & Democrats Group (S&D), the main progressive group in the Parliament, stepped in and assumed initiative on the Iranian file. In October 2013, even before the Geneva deal, a delegation of the S&D led by its president, Hannes Swoboda, visited Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials, including former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani. This was the first visit from the EP to Iran in 6 years. Subsequently the S&D’s Spanish member Maria Muniz became the rapporteur on Iran and prepared the first draft for consideration in the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q. The way you describe it, there was quite a bit of political wrangling regarding the language of the resolution, and the intent was to push for improved relations with Iran rather than reiterate the EP’s concerns regarding Iran’s domestic affairs. What was the process leading to the adoption of the report?

First, the rapporteur presented her draft. Then it was opened to amendments by different members representing their political groups. The method in the EP is to work on compromises between the original text and the amendments. Those amendments that cannot be deemed as covered by the compromise have to be voted on separately.

When the amendments were tabled, it became apparent that there were broadly two approaches: the forward-looking, constructive one advocated by the S&D rapporteur and other progressive groups, which included Liberals, Greens and United Left, and the one put forward by conservative groups such as the European People´s Party (EPP). The EPP includes Christian-Democrats and other mainstream centre-right political groups. It is the biggest group in the EP. Other conservative groups involved in this process included the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) with British Tories and associated right-wing allies, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), which includes far right groups such as the UKIP or Italy´s Northern League.

The conservative block sought to minimize or deny the positive elements of the resolution by using three strategies: 1) making any improvement in relations, however modest, conditional on a final and comprehensive nuclear agreement; 2) while welcoming the Geneva deal, emphasizing that Iran is still in violation of several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions; 3) questioning the legitimacy of Rouhani as the president of Iran by pointing to the “non-democratic nature” of Iran’s elections and associating him with the steady rise in executions during the last few months.

In its most extreme form, the conservative line dismissed the Geneva deal for allowing Iran to preserve its enrichment activities and called for continuing a “robust sanctions regime” (language used by the EFD). The EFD also asked to defend the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries from the Iranian threat. Interestingly, conservative group members (some of them with links to the exiled Iranian opposition group, the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), such as Spanish EPP member Alejo Vidal-Quadras and British ECR member Struan Stevenson) proposed amendments deleting the call for an opening of the EU office in Tehran, fully in line with the position of their supposed enemies — Iranian hardliners.

It must be said that not all in the EPP held such a hawkish position, but the hardliners were better mobilized to press their case than the moderates. This allowed them to win the internal EPP debate.

For the rapporteur and the progressives, the conservative strategies were not acceptable for several reasons. First, there are areas that require an urgent dialogue with Iran, such as ending the civil war in Syria and stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, which is why the EU can ill afford to postpone discussion of other issues except the nuclear one until after a final deal is reached. Besides, cooperation in areas of mutual interest may create trust and good will necessary for a successful final nuclear deal. Second, insisting on Iran´s violations of UNSC resolutions makes little sense when the same UNSC members plus Germany have negotiated the Geneva deal, which tacitly recognizes Iran´s right for limited enrichment. Thus, welcoming the Geneva deal and insisting on the UN resolutions is contradictory. Third, doubting the democratic credibility of Rouhani´s election serves no other purpose than to undermine his legitimacy, as does linking him with Iran’s sharp increase in executions, which is, by the way, under the purview of the judiciary, not the president.

Since the progressive and conservative blocks are roughly equal in the EP, there was a need to reach compromise on these issues to make the final text acceptable to the large majority.

Q: Can you explain the nature of compromises made in the final text?

The final text as adopted reflects the compromise achieved between the progressives and conservatives, but it is actually more progressive-leaning.

Here are some examples:

• The final text insists on simultaneous and reciprocal action from both sides to make sure the Geneva accord (the Joint Plan of Action) leads to a final deal. Reciprocity is the key notion here, instead of insisting on one-sided Iranian concessions.
• In a concession to the conservatives, the final text states that the presidential elections were not held in accordance with European democratic standards. But in the next sentence it refers to “President Hassan Rouhani” and acknowledges his readiness for more open and constructive relations between the EU and Iran. This means that the resolution recognizes Mr. Rouhani as the legitimate president of Iran.
• While the text does identify Iran’s nuclear activities as in contradiction to previous UNSC resolutions, it rejected (or did not include) the EPP/ECR amendment to the effect  that the Geneva accord does not change the fact that Iran is still in violation of those resolutions.
• The text vocalizes EP support for the Geneva agreement and considers it vital for the comprehensive agreement to be reached within the agreed time-frame. It gives clear support for continued diplomacy even though a defeated EFD amendment criticised the Geneva deal and called for a “robust sanctions regime.”
• The text stresses that there can be no alternative to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the nuclear issue and that Iranian security concerns and sensitivities should be taken into account. The EPP wanted instead to have “the peaceful solution as the best solution.” Little nuance, but an important one: “no alternative to a peaceful solution” is stronger language than merely stating that it would be the “best solution”. And the notion that Iran has legitimate security concerns is also recognized.
• The text welcomes the decisions of the EU [ministerial] Council to partially lift sanctions — it also outlines the prospect of lifting nuclear-related sanctions altogether after the final deal is agreed.
• The conservatives’ desire to introduce strict conditionality linking any further improvement of relations with Iran to a final agreement on the nuclear issue was rejected. The final text only states that more constructive relations with Iran are contingent merely on progress in the implementation of the Joint Action Plan.
• The call for the opening of the EU delegation in Tehran was opposed by the conservatives but was approved for the final text.
•  The final text calls on the Council of the EU to consider a number of important areas for cooperation with Iran such as a joint fight against drug trafficking, environmental protection, technology transfers, infrastructure development and planning, education, culture, and health. The EPP wanted to make this all conditional on a final agreement. But the text only states that it should be “subject to substantial progress in nuclear negotiations”, which is merely stating the obvious, but not adding new restrictive conditions.
• This text also expresses concerns over possible outbreaks of infectious diseases due to medicine shortages caused by the sanctions — a rather bold admission for an EP resolution.
• Concerns about the environmental situation in Iran are noted and there is a call for cooperation with Iranian scientists and environmental organisations.
• The importance of fostering trade with Iran is emphasized.
• The text calls on EU institutions not merely to increase exchanges of students and academics but to make a concerted effort to assist the process. This is meaningful, since too often different branches of the EU bureaucracy do not coordinate their actions sufficiently.
• The text calls for a more independent EU policy towards Iran. This is a very important statement, meaning mainly not to simply follow US policies.
• The text calls on Iran to be involved in all discussions on ending the Syrian civil war.  “All” implies Iran’s inclusion in the Geneva II process. Conservative amendments only condemned Iran for its support for the Assad regime.

• The text encourages the EU to facilitate dialogue between Iran and GCC countries. In contrast, a defeated EFD amendment called to protect the GCC from the Iranian threat.
•  The text calls for joint efforts in Afghanistan — again, an EPP amendment tried to delete this part.

Q: And what were the compromises related to human rights in Iran?

This is the most critical part of the resolution. Both progressives and conservatives agree that the human rights situation in Iran continues to be unacceptable. But there are still nuances. The text acknowledges the release of some political prisoners, including the Sakharov prize awardee Nasrin Sotoudeh, by the Rouhani government. It also “notes with interest” President Rouhani´s initiative on a new “citizenship chapter”.

It calls on Iran to issue a visa to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran Ahmad Shaheed, which Iran doesn´t like, since it doesn´t accept that its human rights record is bad enough to warrant the appointment of a special rapporteur. It also calls on the UN HR High Commissioner Navi Pillay to accept Iran´s invitation to visit the country.

The most offensive part according to the Iranians is the language interpreted as obliging EP delegations visiting Iran to meet with dissidents. But this is a standard practice in the EP, and Iran is not being singled out on this. Moreover, the resolution does not make any future visits to Iran conditional on such meetings, but merely recommends to future delegations “to be committed” to meeting the opposition and civil society representatives. This is a recommendation and a wish, not a condition. Besides, the next European Parliament will decide on future delegation visits on a case-by-case basis.

Q: How has the EP’s views on Iran’s human rights record been shaped?

The information used in the resolution comes from respected human rights organizations that focus on Iran, such as the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre, and the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation. 

While some EP members might have close ties with the Israeli government or the MEK, this had a negligible effect on the human rights chapter of the resolution. Iran’s high number of executions and discrimination against LGBT people and Bahais are universal concerns in the EP.

Q: Is Iran singled out on human rights?

No. The EP issues critical resolutions on human rights and democracy even on its own member states. Hungary is a case in point. Also on allies: in 2005-2006 there was a whole special committee to investigate Guantanamo and secret rendition flights and prisons in the context of the “war on terror”.

This March the EP adopted a strongly critical report on Saudi Arabia (with S&D MEP Ana Gomes as the Rapporteur). It was actually more critical than the recent resolution on Iran: it criticised Saudi Arabia for its role in promoting Wahhabism/Salafism worldwide and supporting extremist forces in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Q: But reports are different from resolutions, no?

The difference is merely procedural. Resolutions are prepared faster, but in terms of the political status and impact, there is no difference. The final text should be measured not against what would be ideal, but against the political realities and correlation of forces in the EP. As such, it is always a result of compromise and debate. From this point of view, this was the most forward-looking text on Iran that this Parliament has ever produced.

Q: Given that this is not the first time a resolution has been adopted, why do you think it created such uproar inside Iran this time while previous resolutions were ignored? Given the cancellation of the Iranian delegation’s visit, do you think the progressives’ efforts to pave the way for improved interactions with Iran may have ended up being counter-productive? The way it sounds, the intention was to change the direction of the EP, but perceptions in Iran, devoid of context, were otherwise. Is this a dilemma for EP progressives?

The reactions in Tehran were not surprising, but we now have dialogue, which didn’t occur in the past. When you talk to people, you also receive reactions. So, it might sound counter-intuitive, but in a way these reactions testify to the progress that we´ve been able to achieve in recent months.

That said, these reactions are mostly about politics in Iran. The conservatives use the resolution to embarrass the reformists and moderates who support engagement with Europe and US. We have exactly the same situation in Europe: our hardliners attack the progressives as the “appeasers of mullahs”. Both European and Iranian hardliners converge in one point: they don´t want a more constructive relationship between Europe and Iran. But Iranian conservatives and hardliners are not the only target audience of this resolution. The reformists and the moderates have noticed the positive elements in it. I think it would be a great idea to translate this resolution into Persian so that the Iranian people might draw their own conclusions.

In any case, even if some factions strongly disagree with the resolution, cancelling the visit of the Iranian parliamentarians to Europe was a bad idea. If you want to make a point, you have to talk. In the absence of dialogue, the only winners are groups like the MEK, who organised a conference in the European Parliament to use the reactions to the resolution as supposed “proof” that nothing has changed in Tehran.

Photo Credit: © European Union 2014 – European Parliament

by Farideh Farhi

Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the mother of Sattar Beheshti, a blogger who was tortured and died while in custody, during her recent visit to Iran.

I do not know if the reason given for the dinner cancellation is true. There are indications that Ashton may have been occupied in Brussels with discussions on EU sanctions against Russia, and her spokesperson said there were no plans for dinner in the first place. At some level, it is irrelevant whether this is true or not. It is now a “fact” and other reports that the respective deputies of these chiefs did have dinner together are irrelevant since this particular public dance and drama over human rights in Iran is not about policy but about appearances and posturing.

The released photo of Ashton’s meeting with the activists tells it all. Although there were other women in the room, Ashton is presented with only two (besides her translator) — Narges Mohammadi and Gohar Eshghi. The first is a human rights advocate whose inhumane treatment in prison while she was ill, and her quiet dignity in the midst of it all, became a legend; the second is an aggrieved mother from a working class neighborhood who carries a framed picture of Beheshti (her son) everywhere. I would like to know who released the photo and with what intent. But that may also be irrelevant because when it comes to Iranian politics, like elsewhere, what something turns into usually overtakes intent, many times even undermining it.

Ashton is gone and the political storm she ignited has been left behind. She has no EU parliamentarians asking questions about what she did in Iran. The symbolic photo is of good use for placating the constituencies who worry the EU will abandon human rights for the sake of a nuclear deal. She reportedly showed compassion. She told Eshghi that she sympathized because she is also a mother and that she would talk to authorities regarding her desire for a public trial on charges of first degree murder (a trial has been set for the accused in early April for second-degree murder). There is no evidence that Ashton actually carried out her promise of talking to an official before she flew out of Tehran. But the photo is for keeps.

In Tehran, though, pandemonium and controversy combined with quite a bit of comedic relief have been the order of the day. As was the case when a European Parliament delegation met with Sakharov Prize winners Nasrin Sotudeh and Jafar Panahi, no government official is taking responsibility for Ashton’s itinerary. Everyone is feigning aghast at what happened, but on the question of who allowed it to happen, the official response is more like mystification.

Meanwhile Iranian hard-liners could have limited themselves to making a big fuss and hurling insults at the appearance and age of the female leader, as they usually do in response to US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman’s statements. Additionally, the 40 or so hard-line MPs, generally close to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s Steadfastness Front, could yell at the foreign and intelligence ministers for either permitting the meeting or not preventing it; drag them in for questioning and explanations that would not be satisfactory in any case; warn against the rise of sedition yet again; and then move on to another controversy.

But for the opponents of Hassan Rouhani’s government, Ashton’s meeting was both an opportunity and challenge. An opportunity because Ashton’s sudden turn towards human rights, after so many years of being known solely as someone leading negotiations with Iran, was a timely confirmation of the point made again last week by Leader Ali Khamenei: Western pressure will not end even if the nuclear issue is resolved. He has repeatedly stated that they will come after us for other stuff including human rights. (One colorful cleric took this further during a Friday Prayer by saying that after human rights it’ll probably be animal rights).

Ashton’s photo gave hard-liners an opportunity for a twofer: questioning Western motives in nuclear talks and screaming sedition at domestic opponents. One MP announced thunderously that Iran is not Ukraine! But the photo also provided them a winning point regarding Western hypocrisy. A poster that showed up in Tehran, collating Ashton’s half-face with Saddam’s — highlighting the human costs of the chemical weapons supplied to Iraq by Europeans during the Iran-Iraq War — was intended to remind everyone that the humanitarian impulse is applied very selectively when state interests are involved.

The photo is nevertheless also a challenge since it exhibits what the defenders of doctrine fear most: a collusion of dissidents and the usually devoted, working-class poor against doctrine and injustice. So threatening is the photo that the Javan daily decided to do its own reframing. It simply used Photoshop to delete Eshghi’s image (state TV did the same a few days later) and then, when Javan was ridiculed (since the photo with Eshghi in it had already been published by a reformist paper) said it did not want to offend the aggrieved mother by placing her next to a “seditioner.” (The seditioner in question, Mohammadi, was even called a terrorist by a female MP, a charge Mohammadi responded to with her pen).

According to Javan’s explanation, the deletion had nothing to do with the discomfort caused by Eshghi’s appearance, which so resembles that of thousands of other mothers who saw their sons “martyred” in the Iran-Iraq War. Even more discomforting is that the photo of her son she carries everywhere brings to mind the images displayed throughout Iran of the many young Iranian “martyrs” who died in the Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Republic has celebrated the courage, endurance, patience, and piety of these mothers and sons unremittingly. Separating Eshghi from the mothers who sent their sons to the war front, who suffered quietly and longingly when their boys died but still took pride in what they died for, makes the digital elimination of her image the only possible solution to a very uneasy predicament.

In the words of the young and very funny Iranian satirist, Aydin Sayar, writing for the Qanun daily, all this explains why Photoshop is the greatest of human inventions: it allows us to visualize every desire. But Javan’s editorial staff should really be faulted for not using Photoshop to its full potential. In Sayar’s vision, they could have, for instance, transposed Eshghi to a photo of Ashton meeting with former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Eshghi and Jalili, meeting Ashton together, confirm doctrine and assure continued political clout.

My bet is that with the reported creation of a “truth commission” in the Parliament to examine the “issue of Ashton’s meeting with an element of sedition” this round of loud criticism directed at the foreign and intelligence ministries will likely last longer than the previous round involving members of the European Parliament. But it will also eventually pass, probably when a better opportunity arises. (It should be pointed out that Zarif is getting it from the other side as well. Mohammadi wrote a public letter criticizing him for calling her a seditioner in an interview; never mind that the reporting of Zarif’s statement was in Mashreq, a hard-line news site that’s not usually a reliable source for exact wording.)

Zarif, like other cabinet members in general, is in the process of perfecting the art of lying low and not reacting much. But he did increase the drama when he stated on his Facebook page that for the sake of the “national interest” he will remain silent for now. He also called on all to avoid hasty judgments and instead focus on the joy of the World Cup victory of the Iranian wrestling team in Los Angeles as the Iranian New Year approaches. Expressions of humility and positivity in the face of an aggressive opponent’s charge are as good as the foreign minister is going to give for now.

Beyond the immediate situation, though, the loud noise surrounding Ashton’s visit does reveal a point regarding the effectiveness of external pressure in relation to human rights. Her visit has been used by hard-liners to yell sedition ad nauseam but it has also stirred a conversation regarding whether foreign officials (including ambassadors) should be allowed — or are entitled — to meet with the opposition without controversy. After all, it is said that Iranian officials meet with opposition figures in other countries all the time. So the reality of Iran’s polity being contested, and its civil society alert, opens up the possibility of using external concerns for Iranian human rights to push for some sort of change.

But loudness may also undercut efficacy. For instance, in the past couple of months, several prominent Iranians, including former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and MP Ali Mottahari, have made the point that negotiations for the release of former presidential candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi (and his spouse Zahra Rahnavard) were getting somewhere but came to a halt when there was too much noise. According to Motthari, who has repeatedly called for the release or trial of these political leaders, the lifting of limitations on them was in the works in October but was derailed by discussions of the issue in the press and “the reformist claims of victory.” He went on to say that the intent is “to remove the limitations gradually in a way that is not really noticed.”

It is hard to see how such politically charged issues can be managed in an unnoticed way but the appeal for quiet diplomacy inside Iran as well as gradual and incremental (mini-steps, really) is nevertheless offered as a better alternative to making more drastic demands or moves that carry the potential of turning the hard-liners’ screams into reactionary policy. With the experience of the reformist era in everyone’s mind, the worry is that drastic moves or bold and unattainable demands at this point will end up frightening and again pushing the more middle of the road conservatives into the hard-liners’ arms.

Not surprisingly, there is evidence of the government’s preference for — and perhaps a degree of effectiveness in — quiet and incremental change. Last week the charismatic student leader Abdollah Momeni was released one day before his 5-year term was over. According to an interview his wife gave to the Europe-based Rooz Online, he was taken out of prison quietly and left in the middle of the street to find someone to take him to his home and spouse. She suggested that this was done to prevent a noisy greeting party the day he was supposed to be released. This was certainly not a decent thing to do, but the fact that no new charges to prevent the release of this political prisoner were made up could also be considered a quiet step.

Another tiny step was taken yesterday when Mousavi and his wife were allowed to visit Rahnavard’s old and ailing mother. When they encountered a dozen other visitors by chance, the guards, after some resistance, ultimately allowed the family to briefly talk to each other. This surprising event was seen as a sign of opening up made possible by Rouhani; minimal, but nevertheless a change.

The debate over how fast or how loudly to challenge the issue of political prisoners is also happening among the reformists. Even some reformist political prisoners who have in the past written public letters criticizing the conduct of the highest officials have gone quiet in the past couple of months, perhaps persuaded that quiet diplomacy will work better for now. Others have not.

Even if the government manages to persuade most of Iran’s citizens that this is the time for patience and tiny, step-by-step incremental change, it cannot convince everyone. Nor can it control the impatience of many networks outside of Iran that monitor Iran’s human rights situation on a daily basis with its slow pace of change and even occasional reversals. Any opening energizes them to call for more. This is just the way human rights activism works throughout the world.

This leaves the Rouhani government with a delicate balancing act between taking mini-steps for change and defending itself against pressures and charges that will come from forces on both sides of the political spectrum. So far, Rouhani is more or less managing the situation; Zarif met with Ashton this morning and it was all nuclear talk.

by Farideh Farhi

Let me begin by saying that I have been a long-standing critic of US sanctions against Iran. Irrespective of my distaste for Iran’s structure of governance, I have not been shy in calling out the sanctions regime as collective punishment of the Iranian people. I have also been [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Let me begin by saying that I have been a long-standing critic of US sanctions against Iran. Irrespective of my distaste for Iran’s structure of governance, I have not been shy in calling out the sanctions regime as collective punishment of the Iranian people. I have also been worried that they will eventually ensnare Iranians living in the United States.

The comprehensive, “crippling” nature of financial sanctions and the attempt to go for the jugular of the Iranian economy belies the boiler-plate argument that the sanctions are directed at the institutions of the Islamic Republic. Obvious to anyone who travels to Iran, the squeezed are the people who have lost jobs because of a contracting economy, those who have difficulty accessing or must pay atrocious prices for life-saving medicines, and the parents who suddenly have to generate three times as much income to support their children studying abroad. The list, which goes on, includes the sanctions-related difficulties some of Iran’s best and brightest students face when they seek admission to US universities, some of which were recently examined by Steven Ditto of the Washington Institute.

All this is to say I am not usually surprised when I hear about the problems Iranians face in order to study abroad, attend academic conferences, or send money for their children living abroad. But even I was taken aback when a friend showed me a letter sent at the end of December by the Bank of Hawai’i (BOH) to Iranian citizens residing in the state notifying them that their accounts will be closed due to US sanctions against Iran. To see this happen in the midst of negotiations between Iran and world powers — which may eventually lead to the lifting of at least some sanctions — is even more surprising and a telling example of the depth, breadth, and perhaps potential staying power of these sanctions even if the negotiations prove successful.

In retrospect, however, BOH — the largest independent financial institution in Hawai’i — is taking a confusing and harmful law to its logical conclusion: discrimination against Iranian nationals wherever they live, including the United States. I suppose one can even go as far as commending BOH for its honesty in acknowledging the transfer of its burden to its Iranian customers. Let me explain.

In December 2013, BOH began informing Iranians residing in Hawai’i of the unilateral termination of their accounts because of their “Iran citizenship.” The letter requests the BOH customer with Iranian citizenship to withdraw his or her money voluntarily or the bank will close their account by a certain date and send a check to the last address of record. Iranians who have received these notices include Green Card-holders who are residents of Hawai’i as well as Iranian students at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa and Hawai’i Pacific University. At least one Iranian-American also received a similar letter but proof of US citizenship prevented the closure of their account.

The argument used by BOH is that it is trying to address the predicament in which it has been placed in by US financial sanctions against Iran, administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The relevant directive that imposes the predicament on BOH can be found on page 2 of this explanatory Treasury Department document.

The regulation states that “U.S. depository institutions, including foreign branches, are prohibited from servicing accounts of the Government of Iran, including banks owned or controlled by the Government of Iran (as in Appendix A) or persons in Iran” (emphasis is mine). The OFAC directive does not explicitly require the closure of accounts owned by Iranian citizens residing in the United States. Indeed, this is something the BOH letter acknowledges by including the first word in the following sentence, “although we are aware that your account address in our records is a US address”, before attempting to justify the account closure because it is “not able to prevent the operation of your account if, or when, you are in Iran.”

In effect, fearing potential punishment by OFAC, the bank has chosen to take preemptive and discriminatory action against anyone who has Iranian citizenship. In order to avoid the hassle of figuring out exactly what this notion of “persons in Iran” means in its own dealings, the bank has chosen to broaden the category to include Iranian nationals in the United States. This is irrespective of the fact that, taken to its logical conclusion, the notion of “persons in Iran” can potentially include US citizens of any background; even presumably the “true blue” ones who do not carry a suspiciously Iranian name like I do. Most Iranian-Americans who travel to Iran these days know that they shouldn’t try to access their bank accounts from Iran for fear of their account being blocked. I certainly hope that the increasing number of American tourists who are going to Iran these days also know this.

Erich Ferrari, an attorney well-versed in Iran sanctions laws who I was put in touch with through the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC), told me via email that there have been other, similar cases of account closures by US banks. But in this case BOH has gone a step further. In the other cases there was always some bank-related activity conducted within Iran. In those instances, the banks “could make an argument that a particular account holder was being targeted due to the risk profile created by his or her activity in Iran.” But this BOH action, according to Ferrari, is “just a buck shot approach at anyone who has Iranian citizenship.” He goes on to state, “I have to say, this is as strong a case for discrimination as I have seen in any of these bank cases.”

BOH’s action becomes even more troubling when one considers the potential far-ranging repercussions for Americans of Iranian descent. Under Iran’s citizenship laws, all persons born in Iran automatically carry Iranian citizenship. Moreover, individuals born outside of Iran whose father is an Iranian national — including my Hawai’i-born children — also automatically carry Iranian citizenship. Indeed, Iran’s approach to citizenship leaves no other way for Iranian-Americans and their US-born children to travel to Iran without using their Iranian citizenship and passport — a fact recognized by the US Government and State Department. Taken to its logical conclusion, BOH’s focus on Iranian nationality can potentially place US citizens at risk as well.

The Bank of Hawai’i must be called out for its lazy reading or reaction to US sanctions law on Iran, but the complex and intimidating nature of the laws themselves are ultimately responsible. Indeed, numerous stories have appeared in the news over the past few years about financial institutions and other business entities being fined large amounts for violating US sanctions on Iran in one way or another. Taking this into consideration, it’s easy to see why this relatively small bank opted for the easiest and safest route in making sure it’s not violating OFAC rules (assuming no one launches a civil suit against them).

Attempts by Iranian-American residents of Hawai’i to convince BOH to reverse its clearly discriminatory policy have so far been unsuccessful. But state authorities and relevant civil rights groups have been informed, and watchful NIAC is thankfully communicating with the bank. As far as I know, BOH is the only bank in the nation that has chosen this discriminatory route. But its honest reasoning reveals the reckless, far-reaching, and prejudicial nature of US sanctions laws against Iranian nationals wherever they live, even in the Aloha State, which is known for extending its gracious and welcoming spirit to immigrants and visitors from all over the world.

by Farideh Farhi

The meeting between Javad Zarif and John Kerry on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 2 was reportedly mostly focused on nuclear negotiations. But this didn’t prevent a “senior US official” from telling reporters that Kerry also tried to bring in Syria.

According [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

The meeting between Javad Zarif and John Kerry on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 2 was reportedly mostly focused on nuclear negotiations. But this didn’t prevent a “senior US official” from telling reporters that Kerry also tried to bring in Syria.

According to this anonymous official, “Secretary Kerry raised his concerns about the delay in moving chemical weapons to the port in Latakia, and the humanitarian situation on the ground specifically in the besieged areas.” Iran was also urged “to show a willingness to play a constructive role in bringing an end to the conflict.”

Alas, again according to the US official, when Kerry raised the issue, Zarif indicated that he was not authorized to discuss Syria.

This is an interesting plant devoid of any context for the reader regarding why Zarif might not want to talk about Syria with Kerry. To be sure, Steven Erlanger of the New York Times did offer one line of context: Zarif apparently declined to participate in this conversation because “Iran’s policy on Syria is not controlled by the Foreign Ministry.”

Conveniently forgotten is Kerry’s condescension on Jan. 6 that Iran could “contribute from the sidelines… to help the process.” The spectacle of Iran’s invitation and then dis-invitation by Ban Ki-moon to Geneva II under pressure from the same Secretary of State is not mentioned either.

Even those who may be unfamiliar with Iranian politics will be able to discern that Zarif’s refusal had less to do with his lack of authorization to talk Syria policy and more with the decision of the political leadership in Iran, which now includes Zarif, to tell Kerry that he cannot have his cake and eat it too.

Ultimately, this event is telling commentary about the US leadership’s presumption that it can easily engage in public denigration of Iran and then have a closed-door conversation regarding the input Iran can — and should — have in a process that it was barred from participating in publicly.

Let’s be clear, the issue was not Zarif’s lack of authorization per se. The point was that if Iran is called upon to show a “willingness to play a constructive role,” then it should be treated like a stakeholder in the process. Kerry’s predicament was likely caused by a full-blown Saudi freak-out over Iran’s participation. But given the circumstances, there is really no reason for Iran to show understanding of Kerry’s predicament even behind closed doors.

Zarif has as much input in Iran’s Syria policy these days as Kerry does in the US’ Syria policy. The highly fluid dynamics on the ground limits them both; so does input by other institutions, including the military and security establishments, and domestic political actors. The difference lies in the current reality that the US’ Syria policy is confused, conflicted and under pressure while Iran’s is not.

Iran’s support for the Assad regime is odious and yet its long-standing warnings that the attempt to remove Bashar al-Assad will open the path for sectarian extremism and a deepening of the conflict — irrespective of whether the Assad regime or even the Iranian regime have fed extremism and the conflict — have proven correct. Tehran faces little pressure or conflict at home regarding its role in Syria and can rely on Moscow to make sure that Assad does not fall. Lest we forget: it was Russia that prevented UN Security Council resolutions against Assad’s regime. And despite all sorts of reports regarding Iranian arms shipments, technical and intelligence assistance, and even personnel support, Russia remains Assad’s much more consistent and robust arms supplier and supporter.

This is why Zarif reacted to Iran’s dis-invitation to Geneva II with a shrug. An invitation would have been nice and an official acknowledgment of Iran’s role as a key player in the region. It would have also made Iran a stakeholder in the resolution of the Syrian conflict through an internationally guided process. A behind-closed-doors conversation regarding what Iran can do to help, on the other hand, offers nothing.

Meanwhile back in the USA, if this report is correct, even Kerry has lost faith in his administration’s approach to the crisis in Syria. Laments are plenty: Assad is failing to uphold his promises on chemical weapons; Russia is not helpful and continues to supply arms (there is tellingly no reference to Iranian arms and support here); and Geneva II is not working. In the hawkish Senator Lindsey Graham’s rendition, Kerry “openly talked about supporting arming the rebels. He openly talked about forming a coalition against al Qaeda because it’s a direct threat.”

Graham is likely placing his wishes on Kerry’s tongue. Nevertheless, he stands at one pole pressuring an administration that is well aware of another pressure pole consisting of a general public that wants nothing to do with another mission creep in the Middle East. If the political process doesn’t go anywhere, pressures to do something else are bound to increase.

But as far as the US-Iran dynamic regarding Syria is concerned, the basic issue persists. If Iran is influential in sustaining the Assad regime, then turning it into a stakeholder in the political process makes eminent sense — but not behind closed doors or on a seat in the back of the room.

by Farideh Farhi

Speaking to CNN during the World Economic Forum in Davos this week Foreign Minister Javad Zarif got personal.

He chided the US president, though he only named the “the White House”, for playing fast and loose with facts.

The White House version of the first-phase deal reached [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Speaking to CNN during the World Economic Forum in Davos this week Foreign Minister Javad Zarif got personal.

He chided the US president, though he only named the “the White House”, for playing fast and loose with facts.

The White House version of the first-phase deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 in November both “underplays concessions” to Iran and “overplays Iranian commitments,” he said.

Zarif also subtly reminded viewers that it was only the White House that produced an English and Persian rendition of the accord, which it called a “Fact Sheet,” and immediately distributed it after the deal was signed rather than the text of the Joint Agreement.

“Why don’t we stick to what we agreed? Why do we need to produce different texts?” he asked.

Prodded to give a specific example of the differing interpretations Zarif referred to the term “dismantling,” which he said has become part of US “terminology” on the deal.

“The White House is trying to portray [the deal] as basically the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program,” but nothing even resembling dismantling is in text, he said. He challenged, “show me” a single word that even resembles dismantling or could be identified as such.

The Iranian negotiators and most Iranian politicians have been rather patient with the narrative that both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have been using to frame the interim accord.

A couple of politicians, such as conservative MP Ahmad Tavakoli, who runs the influential Alef website, initially even reasoned that the narrative is for US domestic consumption. A similar argument was made by the Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman, Marzieh Afkham, which is an interesting inversion of US discourse regarding Iranian domestic politics; suddenly it was the US President who had to play loose with facts in order to placate the hardliners in his country while maintaining the support of his flank.

But the repeated assertions and renditions of how little Iranians are getting in exchange for the “dismantling” of their nuclear program is turning into a headache for the Foreign Ministry.

While the hardline cries of surrender and “nuclear holocaust” can be ignored, the notion that the Iranian negotiators may be hiding extra concessions that they have not revealed to the Iranian public and the Parliament cannot.

On Wednesday, there were reports that 150 MPs had written a letter to Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani objecting to the “lack of detailed information” regarding the Joint Agreement. Ruhollah Hosseinian, a hardliner opposed to any kind of deal with the US, took the lack of information tack and objected to the negotiation team’s “hiding of facts.” He added that the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action does not serve Iran’s interest and will lead to the suspension of Iran’s nuclear program in its entirety.

Meanwhile, Iran’s senior negotiator Abbas Araghchi has been spending quite a bit of his time in Parliament arguing otherwise — to no avail. A few MPs keep saying that they are not satisfied with the Foreign Ministry’s explanations, probably causing him further trips to the legislative body.

In response, government spokesman Mohammad-Baqer Nobakht made clear that the Foreign Ministry remains fully in charge of the nuclear negotiations and rejected pretenses by various hardliners that some sort of oversight committee has been created because certain elements of the agreements are even worrisome to Leader Ali Khamenei — an assertion that prompted Afkham to demand “substantiation.” In fact, the critical MPs have so far been unable to create an oversight committee even within the Parliament. Still, this hasn’t stopped the many speculations and declarations regarding the hidden aspects of the Joint Agreement that fit better with the White House narrative. Araghchi and Zarif will undoubtedly have to keep explaining.

This headache is shared by the chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, who entered the fray last week by explaining that 20 percent enrichment is no longer needed, no facility has been closed, research on centrifuges continues and so does some construction at the Arak nuclear plant. On Wednesday he also had to deny publicly that he had written a letter to Khamenei criticizing aspects of the agreement.

One could argue that Zarif’s statements to CNN regarding Iran’s commitment — merely stopping the enrichment of uranium beyond 5% and zero dismantling — is payback; he is simply doing to Obama and Kerry what they are doing to him. Of course, he is also well aware of the way Iranian domestic politics impact pronouncements by Iranian politicians. After months of talking about the need for a “win-win scenario” for the resolution of the nuclear imbroglio, Zarif must have cringed when he heard President Hassan Rouhani declare the surrender of Iran’s negotiating partners last week. Regardless, Zarif’s approach to political haggling remains more understated and less pretentious.

Rightly or wrongly, Zarif is a believer in the power of international law and signed agreements; that’s why wrangling over a few words seriously endangered the success of the Geneva deal. His call for the Obama administration to avoid fact sheets and rely on the text of the Joint Plan of Action derives from this belief.

He can accordingly be seen as naïve or not cognizant of the privilege US politicians assume in only considering their own politics and being oblivious to the impact their words have on other countries. Or, he could just be displaying his ability to play the same game if the other side continues to ignore the Rouhani administration’s domestic predicament.

Zarif wants US officials to stop talking as though the Iranian side of the Geneva deal is not in the room. After all, the US government has invested sufficiently in Persian-language broadcasting to ensure that every single word uttered by US officials also reaches Iranian ears. Of course, getting what he wants is highly unlikely.

Photo Credit: ISNA/Mohsen Ghaemi

by Farideh Farhi

I have recently returned from a three-month trip to Iran. I arrived in Tehran in early September before the famous Rouhani/Obama phone call and departed last week as the mood was turning more skeptical regarding the potential for some sort of final nuclear deal, which, in the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

I have recently returned from a three-month trip to Iran. I arrived in Tehran in early September before the famous Rouhani/Obama phone call and departed last week as the mood was turning more skeptical regarding the potential for some sort of final nuclear deal, which, in the words of Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, would “normalize” the status of Iran’s nuclear program if it were to happen.

Frankly, sitting in Tehran, it was hard to listen to various Obama administration officials’ frenzied explanations to the US Congress and Israeli government regarding how, even with the first-step agreement, Iran will remain in dire straits. It was hard to listen without becoming skeptical about the US political environment allowing an agreement that would also be acceptable to Iran. From the receiving end of all the nuclear chatter, the whole American demeanor on Iran appears imperious, even outright uncivilized; like people speaking calmly about the taking of others’ lives and imposing further economic misery on them as options that are still very much on the table.

As I write this, news has broken that the Iranian experts engaged in talks in Vienna over the first phase of the “Joint Plan” were abruptly recalled to Tehran in reaction to the blacklisting of 19 Iranian companies by the US Treasury Department — a move that both Iran and Russia said violated the “spirit” of the Geneva accord. The spokesperson of Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Marzieh Afkham, in describing the “unconstructive moves” by the Obama Administration, regretted “serious confusion in the approach, decisions, and statements of US officials.”

When I was in Tehran, Iranian officials of various political persuasions were rather soft in their reaction to all the hard talk coming out of Washington. Several officials, including key members of the Parliament, expressed their understanding of the Obama administration’s predicament in trying to sell the Geneva agreement to the US Congress. Talk about continuing pressure on Iran did provide ammunition to folks like Hossein Shariatmadari, the hawkish chief editor of the well-known Iranian daily, Kayhan, but Washington’s verbal assaults were mostly tolerated, even if Foreign Minister Zarif acknowledged that they were making his efforts to maintain support for the agreement difficult. But it appears that the latest Treasury Department move, which followed a rather harsh op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by David Cohen, the Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, made looking the other way difficult. Lest we forget: Iran also has domestic politics. Unlike its reception in Washington, the Iranian nuclear agreement was mostly greeted positively in Tehran given the general consensus that it’s time to resolve the nuclear imbroglio. But there are limits to what Tehran can ignore.

I am inclined to view this event as an “enough is enough” public statement directed at Congress and aimed at limiting further moves by the Treasury Department. Both the Obama and Rouhani administrations have raised the stakes in the talks high enough to prevent unraveling at this early stage. Nevertheless, the chances of this are quite high, particularly if the Iranian context for the decision to engage in talks in the current manner is misunderstood or willfully misconstrued.

With this in mind, I offer observations from my three-month visit to Iran, where I was mostly in Tehran:

Iran does not look like a sanctioned Country. There are reasons for this. The sanctions regime has targeted production and investment but not consumption. In other words, it has directed its powerful force towards the foundations of Iran’s economy and not its external architecture. There is extensive discussion inside Iran regarding the impact of a dearth of investment, for instance, in Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure. But while everyone worries about deteriorating foundations, the hustle and bustle of the streets and improved amenities (such as no more electricity blackouts) at least partially hides the damage.

Government policies have encouraged consumption as well. The Iranian state, with all its institutional appendages, remains more or less a welfare state, with all sorts of means to provide some support to the population. Gasoline is still cheap, public transportation is decent and heavily subsidized, one can still rely on markets sponsored by municipalities to access cheaper (not cheap) food, and Samsung is everywhere. I went to several cities and neighborhoods during the first 10 days of Moharram, when the martyrdom of Imam Hussein is celebrated. Celebrated is the right word given the carnival-like atmosphere generated by street theaters and ritualized walks of performing groups and an even larger crowd watching them, and large quantities of food distributed freely to the rich and poor in Styrofoam cups and dishes. The political economy of so much food — great food — offered free was as mind-boggling to me as the waste and soiling of the environment by the disposed Styrofoam was depressing.

Finally, Iran’s diversified and complex internal market for goods and services also explains the dizzying number of small businesses that continue to exist despite the harsh economic environment. In Qom, for example, every other shop seemed to be related to car repair. I couldn’t get my head around this until someone explained that as a destination for relatively poor pilgrims who visit with old cars, the repair business makes perfect sense. This explanation also partially addresses Qom’s lower unemployment rate of 7.6 percent in comparison, for instance, to the whopping rate of 15.6 percent in Kohkilouyeh and Boyerahmadi province. (According to the Iran Statistical Center, the lowest unemployment rate of 6 percent is in the West Azerbaijan and Golestan provinces).

This is not to suggest a lack of economic hardship or impact on consumption patterns. People complain about rising prices and youth unemployment all the time — though due to a drop in the pace of inflation in the past few months, complaints have also somewhat slowed. (According to the Central Bank chief, Valiollah Seif, inflation for the Iranian month of Aban — October 21 to November 20 — was only 1 percent). Still, Iran does not look like a sanctioned country. Bazaars are packed with people; restaurants are fairly full at lunch time; stores are full of goods and all kinds of useless things. Really! This observation is not merely about northern Tehran, which is much more affluent, it includes the less privileged southern and southeastern parts of the city too.

At the same time, Iran feels like a country in limbo waiting for direction. The management of the presidential election and stabilization of the Iranian currency to between 20-25 percent above the lowest rial to dollar rate have returned considerable economic and political calm to the country. So has the disappearance of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s polarizing language and erratic policies. The Rouhani government’s greatest asset for at least the next couple of years is the dark memories of Ahmadinejad’s last few years. On the political front, one prominent human rights activist told me that while improved political conditions are real, just the mere absence of Ahmadinejad and his “buffoonish language and conduct” is enough to keep him energized and pleased for a while.

On the economic front, however, this calmness is described as a kind of hibernation. People are spending money on food, everyday items, even furniture, and from my point of view, there is grotesque conspicuous consumption on the part of the relatively well-to-do. But there are few major transactions on large assets. Housing prices have reportedly dropped as much as 20 percent (apparently in keeping with the revaluation of rial) but the more prominent economic conduct is reflected in a wait-and-see attitude.

No one is buying or selling, but most folks I spoke to believe that an agreement on the nuclear issue will solidify a new economic direction for the country. Rouhani has made clear that he sees the three wings of his campaign platform — improved economic conditions with an emphasis on the private sector, improved relations with the West, and the de-securitization of the political environment — as closely linked. His quick push for the resolution of the nuclear conflict would not have occurred had someone else been elected and, if successful, will impact the direction of Iran’s economic policy. In the words of Mohammad Quchani, the incisive editor of the reformist Aseman Weekly, Rouhani is not expected to bring about “secular democracy” or pursue “structural transgressions.” But the improvements he promised in economy, foreign policy and citizen rights are the “basis for an inter-linked package and cannot each be approached as a separate agenda.”

Waiting for some hints regarding where the country will be heading makes good economic sense for businesspeople and asset holders. The government has to make tough choices in the coming months, irrespective of the talks’ results. It is true that the Tehran Stock Exchange has risen by almost 130 percent since the beginning of the Iranian year (March 21) but this is in no way reflective of confidence in the country’s economic health.

The previous administration has imposed heavy economic burdens on the government, including massive commitments for the construction of inexpensive Mehr housing and cash subsidies, both funded mostly through the Central Bank’s cash printing machine with severe inflationary consequences. According to deputy Majles speaker Mohammadreza Bahonar, almost a quarter of Iran’s 40 percent inflation was caused by Ahmadinejad’s nationwide Mehr housing project, quite a bit of which remains unfinished.

Even if some financial assets flow into the country from the relaxation of financial sanctions, the government must still develop policies that balance tough austerity measures to counter inflation with spending that at least keeps some of the unfinished projects going in the hope of preventing worsening unemployment and providing people with some of what they were promised. Last week’s en masse resignations of all MPs from Khuzestan and Kordestan in protest to budget cuts of some of the unfinished development projects in their provinces was symbolic but reflective of the kind of pressures and demands that have been generated from 8 years of expansionary budgets. In the words of Massud Nili, a respected Iranian economist who advises Rouhani, “under these circumstances, how could the government tell people that because I want to bring inflation down I have decided to cut these [housing] loans.” Clearly the issue at hand for the new government is not merely reaching agreement over what medicine needs to be provided to the patient, but also the body politic’s social reaction to that medicine.

Among the general public, there is still neither full confidence in Rouhani’s external interlocutors responding positively to his nuclear gambit, nor full trust in the government’s capabilities. And yet, as Nili points out in an interview with Iran newspaper, the “paradoxical” situation is the demand on and expectation from the government to resolve the problem when it is itself among the “weakest” and “most inefficient” institutions of the country and has become more so in the past few years. In these “emergency” situation circumstances, the wait-and-see attitude toward the new team in the government’s driver seat makes sense. But this situation will not persist forever. No matter what happens with the nuclear talks, economic decisions under whatever circumstances Iranians think are there to stay will replace wait-and-see. Even emergencies have a way of becoming routine and adjusted to after a while. Zarif’s time frame of one year for the resolution of the nuclear conflict was issued for a reason. The country will move out of limbo one way or another even if by limping. The question is: in which direction.

The nuclear Agreement is a preference and not an existential necessity. There are folks in Iran — I would say a minority — who are gleefully betting that there won’t be a final agreement because the United States cannot come to terms with Iran’s bottom lines regarding enrichment and the right to be treated like every other member of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. I also met folks who saw the agreement as a bad deal for Iran. Some genuinely objected to the terms of the agreement and blamed the nuclear negotiators for making mistakes while others from the opposite end of the political spectrum saw this bad deal as a necessity for regime survival. Even though the folks in the latter category dispute the need for Iran’s nuclear program and regard it as a waste of time and resources as well as a dangerous gamble, they regard the support Leader Ali Khamenei has given to nuclear negotiations as a sign of desperation; a drinking from the poison chalice; a submission to an outside power for the sake of his and the regime’s political survival.

Most people I met, however, did not consider a final nuclear agreement as either inevitable or necessary for the survival of the Islamic Republic. They saw it as a preference and as mentioned above, instrumental in shaping the economic and political direction of the country. Reformist friends worried about the impact a failure to reach an agreement will have on tipping the political balance again in favor of those who want a more inwardly oriented Iran that prefers a closed political and cultural environment. Less political folks worried about the continuation of a limping economy unable to address the desires and ambitions of their children.

By presenting a nuclear agreement as a preference, the Rouhani administration has created stakeholders in the pursuit of a “good agreement” and not just any deal. The people I met understood that an agreement that is interpreted as submission domestically will not only worsen Iran’s conflicted domestic politics, it will also ultimately prevent economic re-direction. They understand that a deal which does not address Iran’s bottom lines will not endure and hence are quite pragmatically unwilling to accept just any deal either.

Iran’s more open political environment is solidifying support for the government’s negotiating team and posture. On this issue I relied on my journalist and civil rights activist friends who unanimously announced good riddance to the “dark years,” particularly since the 2009 election. This does not mean that there is an end to harassments, arrests, newspaper bans, or awful things like excessive executions. It simply means that a more open political environment that had all but vanished since 2009 now exists alongside all this again.

I called a prominent reformist upon my arrival. He laughed and asked me whether I thought I was visiting Switzerland since I was using his home phone line. Then he invited me to come over for a visit. Khayan’s Hossein Shariatmadari still refers to former President Mohammad Khatami as the ring-leader of “sedition.” But gone for now are the days when Khatami’s picture and words could not be on any newspapers or magazine. All in all, I found the conversation regarding the state of the country and even sensitive issues such as the nuclear negotiations or the role of the Revolutionary Guards in the economy or politics as quite frank, yet civil. The shouters — definitely now fewer — remain, but the sincere conversation about the state of the economy or what Iran can or should agree to in the nuclear talks is itself producing a calming effect on the country. It has also been relatively successful in keeping the Iranian citizens I met mostly content with their choice to participate in the presidential election. Many saw themselves as instrumental in bringing about change. Moreover, they seemed pleased with their choice of a gradual road to reform; political polarization now seemed quite dangerous in a region full of countries wrecked by extremism, domestic conflicts and external interventions. “Thank you, but no Syria for Iran” was a common refrain. And the most disdainful epithets were reserved for the names of two men who many in the Iranian public now identify with extremism: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bibi Netanyahu!

The call for “moderation” is real and not only coming from the government. The reformist experience during Khatami’s presidency and the 2009 election weighs heavily on everyone’s mind. It’s not only this new administration that wants to avoid past mistakes and laying the path, yet again, for the return of what is openly regarded as the extremism of Ahmadinejad’s second term. Reformists are also cautious and wary of moves that could threaten key stakeholders of the Islamic Republic or be perceived as too hasty or provocative by a population tired of — even bored with — fights at the top.

There is no doubt in my mind that the political calm that currently exists in Iran has been profoundly shaped by the extraordinary events of recent years and the utter failure of major political players from both sides of the spectrum to purge their opponents from the political process. Certain issues continue to weigh heavily on everyone’s mind and conscience, especially the continued detention of key politicians. I cannot even begin to tell you what a conflicted experience it was to join a good number of women activists in giving a raucous welcome to Shahindokht Mollaverdi, the new Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, during a ceremony held in the presidential building on Pasteur Street. These activists from across the political spectrum were very pleased with the appointment of Mollaverdi, an impressive lawyer and formidable promoter of women’s rights, and showed their joy loudly, completely ignoring Islamic decorum by whistling and shouting. The loudness inside the building, however, was a stark contrast to the silence everyone exhibited as we passed Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard’s home down the road across from the presidential building. Even the location of this home, enclosed by ugly aluminum barriers, is reflective of the imposing and expectant patience that characterizes the mood of Iran. Rouhani and his team have so far exceeded expectations and proven adept in their respect of this mood at least rhetorically. That mere respect has earned them kudos, but their heavy burdens linger.

Photo Credit: Fars/Farhad Kabarkohian

by Farideh Farhi & Jasmin Ramsey

Editor’s Note: Following is Jasmin Ramsey’s introduction and interview with Farideh Farhi, an independent scholar and expert on Iran from the University of Hawaii who has been in Tehran since the end of August. 

The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi & Jasmin Ramsey

Editor’s Note: Following is Jasmin Ramsey’s introduction and interview with Farideh Farhi, an independent scholar and expert on Iran from the University of Hawaii who has been in Tehran since the end of August. 

The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated just three months ago and two important historic events have already occurred under his watch: the private meeting between Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of September’s UN General Assembly in New York and President Barack Obama’s 15-minute phone conversation with Rouhani on Sept. 28.

The hope that was generated in New York — where Rouhani and Zarif effectively presented Iran’s new administration to the world — carried through into the Oct. 15-16 resumed talks in Geneva between Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 team. While all parties have remained officially silent on the details of those talks, Iran, the US and the EU concluded with positive statements.

At the very least, it was obvious that Iran’s new negotiating team, led by Zarif — a well-known diplomat with demonstrable knowledge of the US and how to solve political quagmires — has entered negotiations with a serious plan and intent to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all. Of course, Iran and the P5+1 insist on certain bottom lines and it remains to be seen whether the stars will align in Tehran and Washington enough to allow a deal to happen. With that in mind, I spoke by phone with the Iran expert Farideh Farhi, who’s currently in Tehran, to get a sense of where things stand ahead of the next round of talks scheduled for Nov. 7-8 in Geneva.

Jasmin Ramsey: What is the political environment like in Iran right now in relation to the nuclear issue?

Farideh Farhi: A good part of the Iranian political spectrum is supportive of their nuclear negotiating team’s different approach and efforts for resolving this issue. The folks who are not supportive of this effort are effectively marginalized because of the presidential election’s results; the only argument that they have at this particular moment is: “it’s not going to work.” They’re hedging so that if the talks fail, they can come back and say: “we told you so.”

Does that raise the stakes for the Rouhani administration?

This government has a lot riding on the resolution of the nuclear issue because it made it a campaign promise and priority. Had Mr. Rouhani’s rival, Tehran mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, been elected a failure on the nuclear diplomacy front would have posed less of a problem since Mr. Qalibaf’s campaign platform was more focused on the better management of Iran’s economy. But Rouhani’s campaign promise, as well as a quick jump on the nuclear issue, has raised the stakes for him and his foreign policy team (failure on this front may also end up impacting his promises on the domestic front). This is not to say that Rouhani is ready or desperate to make any deal in order to save his presidency or his other agenda items. The Iranian political environment continues to make the acceptance of an agreement that does not acknowledge Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) impossible. So, the acceptance of a bad deal is politically even more dangerous for Rouhani than not reaching an agreement.

Are the Iranians reasonable in terms of what they are expecting from the other side as part of a mutual deal?

While discussing the complex web of sanctions that have been imposed on Iran, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Europe and Americas, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, argued that in exchange for Iran’s confidence-building moves, at least one of these sanctions should be removed as a first step. This suggests that Iran will not be asking for the removal of all sanctions immediately, as it has done in the past, but is looking for something that will show a change of direction in the U.S. approach to this issue. A reversal of the sanctions trend is important for selling whatever compromises the Iranian nuclear team makes to its audience back home.

As I mentioned previously, this government has a lot riding on this issue and if it is unable to frame the results of the negotiations as also protective of Iran’s rights, then it will not only be unable to sell the agreement domestically, it will also begin to face serious challenges regarding its domestic agenda.

Can you elaborate? 

Mr. Rouhani’s election platform had three prongs. One was related to foreign policy; he promised a reduction of tensions with the Western world at least partly through successful nuclear negotiations. Then there was the economic prong, which has a management component. Against the backdrop of deteriorating economic conditions, Rouhani promised both better management of the economy and more rationalized state support for the private sector and productive activities. Finally, he called for the de-securitization of Iran’s political environment.

The continuation and further tightening of the sanctions regime will force the private sector and producers in Iran to rely even more on the state for protection against a deteriorating economic environment and the challenges of getting around sanctions. It will also increase the threat perception of the political system as a whole and as such make the further easing of political controls more difficult.

What about what’s happening in Iran domestically. Earlier this month the daughter of a key opposition figure, Mir Hossein Mousavi — who’s currently under house arrest — was reportedly harshly harassed by a guard outside of Mousavi’s home. Can movement on the nuclear issue aid the de-securitization of Iran’s domestic environment?

If a movement on the nuclear issue ends up reversing the economic war that has been waged and eliminate the threat of military attack that keeps being issued against Iran, then it is not too outlandish to think of the further opening of the Iranian political system. It should be noted that the high participation rate in the presidential election has already had some impact in terms of reducing the systemic fears that motivated the terribly restricted political environment of the past four years. In other words, on the domestic front the move towards the center, supported by the electorate, has already eased tensions within the country. The removal of external threats is likely to further this process. But if Mr. Rouhani’s foreign policy agenda is blocked by the United States taking a maximalist position, then there is no guarantee that this process will continue. In fact, it is more likely that old fears about outsiders — and particularly the US — trying to foment domestic disturbances will once again resurface.

So President Rouhani definitely wants to relax the state’s hand in the personal lives of Iranians?

He has certainly expressed his desire for a less interventionist state in the personal lives of the citizenry as well as a less repressive state in the treatment of critics and dissidents. His Intelligence Minister even said recently that dealing with security issues through securitizing the political environment is not something to boast about. So the expression of desire and/or pretense is there.

But there has been more than an expression of desire or hope. As I mentioned before, the political environment has also opened up considerably since the election. No doubt hundreds of political prisoners, including former presidential candidates, remain. Abuses such as the one you mentioned regarding Mousavi’s daughters also continue to occur. Just last week, a reformist newspaper was shut down for an article that should have been challenged through a critical engagement rather than shutting down a whole newspaper. Still, I arrived in Tehran two months ago and have yet to meet someone who does not acknowledge a vastly different political environment than prior to the election. This may be just temporary given how bad things were after the 2009 election, but there is nevertheless a palpable and acknowledged sense of relief and political release. 

President Rouhani and the Iranian nuclear negotiating team have referenced a limited timeline for reaching a deal. How long do you think it will be before they say too much time has passed?

The process has become accelerated, but I don’t think anyone is expecting the sanctions regime to crumble within 6 months. People have even talked about some sanctions remaining for a long time — they reference the sanctions on Iraq and the time it took for them to be lifted. Nevertheless, there is expectation or hope regarding a reversal of these deteriorating trends.

The bottom line is that a good part of the Iranian population as well as the leadership is ready for a compromise. Under these circumstances, there is readiness for a full-fledged process of give and take and as such, agreements to keep meeting are no longer deemed satisfactory. Hence the expectation that something needs to happen by the next meeting. I don’t think this necessarily means immediate major concessions from either side, but I do think that once the first step is taken, there is no reason why this process cannot become even more accelerated.

In a speech on Sunday, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei essentially voiced support for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team and told hardliners to hold back for now. Does this signal a shift on his part?

It does not signal a shift, but it does highlight two key elements of Iran’s approach to the nuclear talks. First, his words make clear that despite the noise made by the hardliners criticizing the negotiation team’s softness, excitement, and perhaps even gullibility, Zarif and his aides have full systemic support in their efforts to find a reasonable solution to the nuclear conflict — a solution that addresses both Iran’s bottom lines in relation to the right to peaceful uranium enrichment as well as western concerns regarding potential weaponization. Secondly, Khamenei’s words also made clear that Iran’s approach to negotiations is quite pragmatic. As he said, if the negotiations work, “so much for the better”, if not, Iran will carry on with a more inwardly oriented approach to its development. By giving full support to the negotiating team — led by the very popular Foreign Minister Javad Zarif — the Leader is positioning himself on the side of public opinion, which favors talks, while making sure that the same public opinion eventually does not consider him a stumbling block to a reasonable solution. Such a positioning will make it more likely that domestic public opinion will blame US unreasonableness, egged on by the Israeli government, and not inflexibility or lack of diplomatic acumen of a Zarif-led negotiating team if talks fail.

Do you sense that Iran’s hardliners are willing to support a nuclear deal?

It’s not a question of their willingness; despite the hardliners’ loud voices at this particular moment, they’re marginalized. A systemic go-ahead has been issued for the perusal of some sort of compromise that acknowledges Iran’s right to enrichment despite limitations on the levels and extent. The hardliners will come out of the margins if the Obama administration insists on the maximalist position of no enrichment that is being pushed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or is unable to offer any kind of meaningful sanctions relief in exchange for significant Iranian concessions.

So Rouhani is walking a fine line in trying to balance his foreign policy agenda on the nuclear issue with the tricky situation he’s dealing with politically at home?

No doubt, but I would say that at this particular moment, President Rouhani and his team have some leeway regarding how to frame an agreement because of the consensus that was generated by the election. I would even argue that their hands are less tied than President Obama’s, considering Congress’ hardline position on the sanctions regime.

On that point, it’s quite interesting, because on one hand there’s almost a sense among those who are hopeful here regarding negotiations that Obama needs help. But on the other hand there seems to be a tactical urge on the part of others to mirror US policy on Iran. So, while some would like to reduce expressions of anti-Americanism that have long been present in the Iranian public sphere through slogans, posters and so on, others argue that the pursuit of diplomacy while emphatically chanting “Death to America” is Iran’s version of the US’ dual-track policy of sanctions and diplomacy on Iran. 

Do you think the taking down of anti-US billboards earlier this month in Tehran is part of that?

Yes, they were taken down by the Tehran municipality and that was apparently on Mayor Qalibaf’s order. I saw smaller versions of those billboards, calling on the Iranian negotiators not to trust the American negotiators, being carried by demonstrators on Nov. 4, the anniversary of the US embassy takeover.

The protest rally in front of the former US embassy was more robust this year as well. Many people showed up or were bused in and instead of avoiding “Death to America” chants, Saeed Jalili, the former nuclear negotiator and presidential contender, made the case that it is perfectly fine to simultaneously negotiate and chant “Death to America.” He added that the chant is not directed at the American people, only at the US government. There was a clear rhetorical play on the US’ dual track of sanctions and diplomacy; the underlying point was that chants of “Death to America” are not directed at the US public in the same way that both the Obama administration and US Congress make the claim that sanctions are not directed at the Iranian people.

There have been several reports recently that foreign commercial actors such as oil companies are thinking about how they could return to Iran in the event of a nuclear deal. Are you seeing any of that on the ground?

Not yet. The sanctions regime is still in full force. I was talking to an Iranian businessman the other day and he told me that he can’t even receive brochures through the mail from German companies because they fear they would be violating sanctions. Of course, he then told me how he gets around that issue byway of Dubai.

Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Zaganeh has stated that the Petroleum Ministry is re-evaluating its terms and conditions for investment in the country’s oil and gas sector with an eye for offering better terms. He has also acknowledged conversations with some European companies but he said all of this is just at the level of initial talks. So, people do seem to be getting ready for something — the mood for now seems to be that things may work out well because people are also sensing some change in the Obama administration. That said, everybody remains extremely cautious; they know very well that things could also fall apart very quickly.

by Farideh Farhi

I read about the Obama-Rouhani phone call in Farsnews, the hardline Iranian agency sometimes referred to as False News for the way it manages to distort certain events. (The official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) was apparently the first to report the call). Feeling skeptical, I turned [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

I read about the Obama-Rouhani phone call in Farsnews, the hardline Iranian agency sometimes referred to as False News for the way it manages to distort certain events. (The official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) was apparently the first to report the call). Feeling skeptical, I turned to the New York Times where no mention of the event could be found as of yet. By the time I turned to CNN International — which, unlike its American counterpart, thinks its audience deserves better than frivolity and drama — Obama was already talking about Syria with the streaming headlines below his image confirming the phone call.

Obama’s words were not that different from his conciliatory speech at the UN General Assembly, but the news of the phone call between him and Hassan Rouhani has been met with silent awe by all and smiles from most, as documented here by Ali Reza Eshraghi.

I have been in Tehran since the beginning of this month, mostly absorbing conversations everywhere about what Rouhani can do, cannot do, and should do. But I have also heard plenty of talk and questions about Obama and his presumed lack of backbone.

Conversations usually begin with a question directed at me, the American political scientist in the room, about the rhymes and reasons of US policy on Iran. Of course, the questions are usually rhetorical since everyone in the room is more of a political “expert” than I am. This is Tehran, after all…

It usually takes a few seconds before the cacophonous discussion turns to the influence of Israel and Israeli lobbies in the US. “They would not allow it” is the repeated declaration and lament.

But Obama’s UN speech and phone call is raising eyebrows — even a momentary silence. It’s now time to watch and be cautiously optimistic about Obama’s ability for a pushback.

Meanwhile, the Iranian President is also impressing people with his presumed grit. I heard someone say yesterday that Rouhani probably would not have arranged to receive the phone call had the hardline press not acted so pleased with his refusal to shake Obama’s hand and not made fun of the reformist press for hoping for such an encounter.

Rouhani has accomplished more than what most expected from him both domestically and internationally. The release of some political prisoners; a returning degree of calm to economic expectations; the resurgence of a vibrant political press; the opening of the cultural arena; and public commitment to the resolution of the nuclear issue all confirm a re-direction at the top in response to public sensibilities. But few expected this re-direction to have palpable results so soon. The mood remains patient, but clearly pleased.

Yes, a shoe was thrown at Rouhani upon his return from New York City from a group of about 50 or so male demonstrators. But there were more supporters than detractors. It is also true that the intractable Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan has found 5 “lamentable” aspects of Rouhani’s trip and performance (including the way the President answered the Holocaust question, his reference to Israel instead of the Zionist regime, and of course, the phone call). But he has also had to defend himself against the charge of sounding more like Bibi Netanyahu than the Leader’s representative to the state-run newspaper.

No one expects Iranian opposition to the easing of tensions with the United States to go away. Over 4 million people voted for Saeed Jalili, Iran’s former nuclear negotiator deemed as the candidate who would continue Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s path. In fact, one of the anti-Rouhani demonstrators was identified as a senior worker on Jalili’s presidential campaign by a few websites. But there is also no denying that at least for now, the detractors are in the minority and mostly focused on the naïve nature of the current Rouhani policy and the presumed trust he may have in the possibility of real change.

They are preparing the ground for their “we told you so” six months from now. In the words of Mehdi Mohammadi, “then no one can say that not seeing the village chief is the problem. Now that they are sitting in front of the one they have called the village chief… If [the problem] is not resolved do we have the right to say that the problem lays elsewhere?”

This is why Obama is also intently watched in Iran. Most are hoping that he will sustain the unexpected fortitude he has shown while others are counting on his failure to overcome domestic and regional opposition to constructive bilateral talks to underwrite the ascent of their point of view that talking to the US is at best a pointless exercise.

Photo Credit: President Barack Obama talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran during a phone call in the Oval Office, Sept. 27, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

by Farideh Farhi

Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian disaster as cover. We should also know that given the “red line” he drew last year, America’s credibility is on the line. And of course we are reminded of the need for the US to be the protector of the global and civilized norm against the use of chemical weapons.

None of these arguments will convince the critics of military action.

President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel are hardly Dr. Strangeloves sitting on a bomb directed at Damascus, but the lack of clarity on what happens the day after seems reckless. If the Assad regime used chemicals weapons, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that half-hearted military action — designed to punish but not remove Assad from power — will encourage further use of the weapons and more devastation?

Yes, US credibility is on the line, but attaching credibility to martial muscle could entail the further loss of it in more important areas. The revelation that in the midst of a humanitarian crisis the political class in Washington seems focused on launching cruise missiles can itself reflect a serious lack of credibility and failure in global leadership; this one built upon moral and ideological bankruptcy.

There may be some people in Syria and elsewhere in the region who will cheer military action, but if the Obama administration is unable to use it to exhibit some sort of leadership and bring an end to Syria’s tragedy through a serious political process like in Egypt, the move will be despised by all sides.

It’s been suggested that Obama’s military action in Syria will pose a dilemma for Iran’s new moderate government as it contemplates what to do in a domestic environment in which Iran’s hardliners will be pushing for a response. It won’t. Jasmin has already pointed to the mild reaction from Tehran. The reality is that Obama’s military action will make the Syria tragedy his and not Iran’s. And in Iran’s post-election environment, in which the country has moved towards national reconciliation — both among the elite and between the government and population — nothing suits the Islamic Republic better than divesting itself from this issue quietly.

The hardline argument for strongly supporting the Assad regime won in Tehran when his downfall was stated as Washington’s — as well as Riyadh’s and Tel Aviv’s — desired outcome in the name of weakening the Islamic Republic. But events in Syria are now well beyond the proxy war stage. They are out of control and have spilled into adjacent countries. Of course, Iran does not share borders with Syria. Rather and more importantly, the ideology that the Syrian tragedy has spawned with ample support from Saudi and Qatari funds — one that is anti-Shia, anti-Iran, anti-US and anti-Semite (even if it may not necessarily be virulently anti-Israel for now) — is more of a problem for whichever country ends up owning this issue. And owning it is exactly what the Obama administration is about to do, even if it acts in the name of credibility and/or punishment and reportedly only through a barrage of Tomahawks for a few days.

by Farideh Farhi

Iran’s cabinet confirmation hearings this week were painful, but not for its new president Hassan Rouhani, despite the rejection of 3 out of his 18 ministerial nominees. They were painful for Iran’s hardliners, whose mismanagement of the country was spotlighted along with their weakening form of political speech.

A [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Iran’s cabinet confirmation hearings this week were painful, but not for its new president Hassan Rouhani, despite the rejection of 3 out of his 18 ministerial nominees. They were painful for Iran’s hardliners, whose mismanagement of the country was spotlighted along with their weakening form of political speech.

A good number of Iran’s political class and punditry must have watched in awe as the people who have been framing and dominating public discourse in Iran — particularly in the last 4 years — adopted the role of the opposition. As they spoke, what has gone wrong with the Islamic Republic became more and more evident: the ideological governance, which is quite distinct from ideological rule, that frames the Islamic Republic as a system. The tension between the ideological framing of the Islamic Republic and the technocratic exigencies of a developmentalist welfare state has existed in the Islamic Republic from day one. But it was dramatically on display in these public hearings.

The undoing of Iran’s hardliners

In rhetorical confrontations between national-level figures and parochial-like local politicians, it’s not hard for the former to outshine the latter. But something else was going on here as well. The questioning of the center-reformist cabinet nominees by the parliament’s hardliners was consumed with the relationship of the nominees to the so-called sedition (fetneh) and had nothing to do with the nominees’ proposed ministerial plans and polices. In other words, the nominees’ qualifications were overshadowed by a focus on what they did during Iran’s 2009 post-election unrest. To boot, the questioning was carried out in a street-talk manner, which is completely out of place in a public forum broadcast on national television. One member of parliament even spoke about the “club” Iranian Lurs use to treat those who do not walk a straight line. He had to apologize for imputing a tendency towards violence to his own ethnic group.

The contrast between the MPs and Rouhani’s nominees — who maintained their dignity while responding to their opponents without transgressing acceptable political speech — was striking. After all, if post-election protests are identified as fetneh in official discourse, one would have a hard time achieving a ministerial post while admitting they supported them. But one can defend one’s record while stating allegiance to the Islamic Republic and its institutions, including the office of the Leader Ali Khamenei. And although some were better than others, Rouhani’s nominees defended themselves well and even engaged in a degree of pushback regarding why they acted more properly and humanely than MPs who showed no sympathy for Iranian protesters who were harmed or even killed.

Again, the contrast between the way Rouhani’s nominees’ spoke in defense of their policies and political outlook and the accusatory language of the MPs was striking. Of course, public displays of official denunciatory language aren’t new for the Iranian public. Indeed, it has been the dominant form political speech in the past few years. What made the broadcasted hearings fascinating was the gradual public realization that the folks who have led Iran into disaster are now sitting in judgment of the folks the electorate voted for. They were voted in precisely because they promised to run the country with managerial expertise and to loosen the grip of ideology over decision-making.

As the hearings proceeded — on the first day sedition-related words were reportedly used over 1,600 times — it became clear that “sedition” is the only ammunition the hardliners have. A prominent conservative MP even said out loud that hardliners have become “merchants of sedition” who are making a living from applying the label. But the confirmation of four of Rouhani’s key nominees who were accused of cavorting with seditionists was a disaster for the discourse of sedition. It’s obvious that the hardliners’ favorite mode of attack is becoming increasingly weak.

Ultimately, out of the many effective speeches given by the nominees, two stand out for me because of the unraveling of tensions that accompanied them.

Iran’s new foreign minister

Mohammad Javad Zarif’s speech literally quieted the cacophonous parliament hall. Zarif has spent most of his adult life in the United States as a student and later as a diplomat. This by itself makes him suspect. He did not serve in the Iran-Iraq War even though he was at age for military service at the time. Among other things, he was accused of being educated in the West, meeting with American diplomats and Iranian civil society activists who reside in the US and even suspiciously losing a briefcase that included important documents while he was there. In short, he was portrayed as a man who lost his soul in the West. What Zarif said was not as important as the way he broke apart that image.

Many in the US have heard him publicly speak in English, which he is very good at, but neither the MPs nor the Iranian public had heard him give a speech in Persian. And they had never seen him recite so many Qoranic verses! But Zarif’s speech on Tuesday seamlessly combined expertise and religious rhetoric. In a rather blunt way, he also pushed backed against the accusations that were hurled against him. He reminded the MPs that the previous government had forced him into retirement at the age of 47 and even made teaching difficult for him but that he had not left the country in more than 6 years even for teaching opportunities that had arisen elsewhere. His body language, voice and speech-content confirmed that he was as much of a stakeholder in the Islamic Republic as those who were judging him and that he had every right to be the foreign minister of a president whose promises of a foreign policy involving both expertise and moderation aided his election. Zarif also made clear that the power of Iran’s foreign policy rests on the electorate’s popular confidence in their government at home. As I already mentioned, Zarif’s performance was so stunning that it quieted the Majles chamber — the only time this happened during the hearings.

A noteworthy loss

Another important speech was given by Mohammad Ali Najafi, Rouhani’s nominee for the Ministry of Education. Again, the contrast between his speech and demeanor and the accusations leveled against him was something to behold. His pushback was also telling. Najafi was accused of meeting the families of protestors who died in 2009, to which he essentially responded with: I went to see the aggrieved families in my capacity as a member of the Tehran City Council, which would have been unnecessary if you guys had done your job of at least comforting them.

Although Najafi failed to receive the required number of votes for confirmation, the yay votes outnumbered the nays and a one-vote switch would have made him the cabinet minister. This situates him as an important advisor or a candidate for other posts if he desires them.

Beyond this, Najafi’s near confirmation turned into an argument for some Tehrani voters. Had they not mostly abstained in the 2012 parliamentary election and, ignoring reformist disqualifications and disarray, voted for a moderate conservative slate — which did exist — Najafi would have been the education minister today. The leader of that moderate conservative slate — Ali Mottahari — was the only one who made it into Parliament in 2012 and was a key organizer of votes for the Rouhani cabinet. One more deputy from that slate — which was possible with more participation — would have made a small but important difference in the scheme of things. Of course, yesterday that difference didn’t appear as small to the many teachers who were hoping for Najafi’s successful appointment.

Several blunt exchanges involving the intelligence and judiciary ministries should also be listened to by anyone trying to understand the tensions and polarizations of today’s Iran. The focal point of these tensions is based on issues related to human and civil rights, dignity and the operation of Iran’s surveillance state.

Rouhani’s position

In his closing speech, Rouhani laid out his argument for how to leave behind or at least lessen the deep rifts that resulted from the 2009 election. He argued for an acknowledgment that both sides had made mistakes. He did this by mentioning two words in one sentence: Kahrizak and orduskeshi. He said both were mistakes, giving them equivalency.

Kahrizak is the prison in which many of Iran’s 2009 protesters were abused and several were killed. Ordukeshi is the word used by the Leader to negatively describe the 2009 protests. Instead of acknowledging the constitutionally protected right to peaceful protests, the term frames the events as something the losers of the election illegitimately did by turning the electoral competition into street confrontations. Rouhani surely knows that this is a highly offensive term to many people who voted for him particularly in the city of Tehran, in which protests lasted much longer than the rest of the country.

By saying that mistakes were made in both Kahrizad Prison and by ordukeshi, Rouhani’s message seemed clear: rightly or wrongly, neither side can play the game of political righteousness. Stop asking each other for apologies, which will not be forthcoming from either side; learn to live with this reality. Let’s just move on based on the premise that the time for the continuation of the purge game is over because it is a dangerous game to play when the country is in dire need of civil interactions in the face of external pressures. This was not moral posturing; it was a plea for all to search for their pragmatic side.

These words can only be taken as serious advice if there is some movement on the front of reintegrating those who were purged because of the events of 2009, which will be a challenge for Rouhani. The ministerial confirmation of several former advisors to Mir Hossein Mousavi, who is still under house arrest, is a step in that direction. But it is not enough even if public tolerance for gradualism and moderation — and taking things slowly — seems relatively high at the moment.

Photo Credit: Amir Kholousi