by Shireen T. Hunter
In the past two weeks, relations between Tehran and Islamabad appear to have deteriorated again over border clashes and terrorist attacks in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province located close to the Pakistani-Iranian border. Unlike past tensions, which were caused by the activities of the Sunni extremist Baluchi group, Jundallah, and later by some of its offshoots including Jaish ul-Adl, the current trouble, according to Pakistani officials, resulted from the killing of a Pakistani Frontier Corps member last week by Iranian border forces.
Beyond this particular incident, which has raised the temperature between the two countries, the latest efforts by Sunni militants to enter Iran has caused greater concerns than in past because, according to statements by Iranian authorities, some Pakistani sympathizers of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) have been trying to join it by travelling through Iranian territories on their way to Iraq or Syria. Considering the fact that IS has declared its desire to attack Iran, the recent events have heightened Iranian fears.
Until recently, Iran contented itself by complaining to Pakistani authorities about the lax border security while demanding that the Pakistanis do a better job of preventing terrorist infiltration from their territory into Iran. However, after the abduction of several Iranian borders guards and the killing of one of them, some Iranian authorities warned that they may have to enter Pakistani territory in pursuit of the offenders—they have yet to do so.
This show of restraint by Iran occurred despite the fact that Jundallah, and its then-leader, Abdul Malik Rigi, who was responsible for killing hundreds of civilians and revolutionary guards through bomb attacks and abductions, had links with extremist Pakistani groups, and possibly even with Pakistani intelligence services.
For its part, Pakistan had, in the past, tried to placate Iran by saying that it did not have enough control in the border region and by promising to do a better job in the future—but without taking any real steps to prevent the infiltration of terrorists.
In response to the latest incident, however, Pakistan has reacted more strongly by summoning the Iranian ambassador to Islamabad and by publicly protesting the killing of a member of its Frontier Corps. Moreover, Pakistan has also demanded that Iran offer evidence that terrorists have infiltrated Iran form Pakistan or that they enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have also said that Iran should not blame Pakistan for its problems in the Sistan-Baluchistan province.
Nothing New
Attacks on Iranian interests and personnel deep inside Pakistan and terrorist-operations orchestrated from within Pakistan against Iran have been occuring since at least the early 1990s, if not earlier. These attacks and the resulting tensions in turn reflect the fundamental political and cultural changes that Iran and Pakistan have undergone as well as the changing patterns in their respective international and regional alliances since the time that they were close allies in the 1950s-60s, and the early 1970s.
The earliest signs of strains in Iranian-Pakistani relations emerged during the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1976. At that time, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who after the separation of East Pakistan had turned to Islam as a way of consolidating the remaining state, and was also courting Arab petro-dollars—invited Muammar Gaddafi to the Summit. The shah, who had steadfastly stood by Pakistan throughout its troubles, indicated that he would not attend the summit if Gaddafi attended. Pakistan’s answer essentially was: too bad.
The trend beginning under Bhutto gathered steam under General Zia ul-Haq, who assumed power in 1978 and set upon the policies of greater Islamization of Pakistan and forging closer ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—ties that were further consolidated during the Soviet-Afghan war.
One result of these policies, and the Soviet-Afghan war, was the growing influence of Wahhabi/Salafi Islam in Pakistan, which is anti-Shia and thus detrimental to Iran. This was also accompanied by a degree of Arabization or even Saudization of Pakistan’s culture and its turning away from its traditional Mogul culture with its heavy imprint of Persian culture and language. Today, for example, the Persian poetry of Allama Muhammad Iqbal is not valued—only his work in Urdu is promoted. There have also been efforts to eliminate Persian words from day-to-day usage. Thus, for instance, many in Pakistan are now saying farewell with Allah Hafiz, instead of the traditional Khoda Hafez because Khoda is the Persian word for God. This may sound trivial, but it is symbolic of Pakistan’s cultural shift.
The Iranian revolution also strained relations with Pakistan. First, the birth of the Islamic Republic in Iran emboldened Pakistani Shias who were unhappy with Zia’s changes in the country’s legal system and the increasing discrimination against them to become more active and demand more rights. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani elite and the Sunni majority did not view this development favorably.
Iran’s revolution also had a detrimental impact on Iranian-Pakistani cooperative relations, namely their joint friendly relations with the United States. Similarly, by causing tensions in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States with whom Pakistan shares close ties, the revolution further strained their bilateral ties. In fact, Saudi–Iranian animosity is a major cause of tension in Iranian-Pakistani relations especially under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is even closer to the Saudi monarchy than former PM Asif Ali Zardari. Indeed, Saudi Arabia supports Iran’s Sunni dissidents and is against increased economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also reportedly gave Pakistan one billion dollars so that it would not implement the agreement for the import of Iranian gas, even though the country is desperate for energy.
Meanwhile, after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the onset of the Afghan Civil War, Iranian-Pakistani interests further diverged. For instance, in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan backed different groups and competed over pipeline routes. Even today, Pakistan wants to limit, if not block, Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. This is at least part of the reason why Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would not have allowed a member of the Northern Alliance to become Afghanistan’s president: it would have resulted in better relations between Afghanistan and Iran. In this respect the two Sunni countries also have Turkey’s support, as reflected by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Kabul.
The US policy of trying to destabilize Iran by encouraging internal dissent, especially under the George W. Bush administration, also emboldened Pakistan to ignore incursions from its territory into Iran and dismiss Tehran’s protests knowing full well that Iran cannot afford to engage in armed conflict with a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
In short, some of the causes of the strained Iranian-Pakistani relationship are rooted in cultural changes in Pakistan and broader regional and political shifts. However, Pakistan’s ability to ignore with impunity—or possibly even encourage—transgressions against Iran from its territory is ultimately the consequence of Iran’s adamant refusal to acknowledge the realities of regional and international politics and to correctly assess its own vulnerabilities.
Indeed, If Iran had not alienated major international actors, none of the regional countries could have treated it as they have done in the last three decades. Therefore, unless Iran changes the course of its foreign policy and its leaders put national interests—including territorial integrity and national unity—ahead of revolutionary objectives, not only Pakistan but all of its neighbors will continue to take advantage of Iran’s vulnerabilities.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
Throughout the recent handwringing about how the US and other Western countries failed to foresee the emergence of ISIS, one factor has been totally ignored, either intentionally or inadvertently: the impact of Washington’s hostility towards Iran, especially its persistent tendency to treat any anti-Iranian movement or idea in the Middle East as either good or the lesser evil compared to dealing with Tehran. This attitude has been coupled with a consistent unwillingness to support positive forces for change and reform in Iran; indeed, actually undermining them by insisting on their meeting preconditions that the West knows can’t be met due to Iran’s internal political dynamics. Significantly, this Western and especially American attitude predated any dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.
The first Western mistake followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the coming to power of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. Instead of taking advantage of Iran’s vulnerability at the time, as well as Rafsanjani’s efforts both to move Iran towards moderation and openness domestically and internationally and to reach out to the West to help him achieve these goals, the United States chose to put all of its eggs into Saddam Hussein’s basket and adamantly refused to acknowledge his many transgressions—against Iraq’s neighbors and own people—until his fateful 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Nevertheless, with great difficulty—due to leftist opposition—Rafsanjani managed to secure Iran’s neutrality in the Persian Gulf War, a fact that facilitated US military operations. He also secured the release of the last of the Western hostages held in Lebanon. Yet, instead of encouraging the moderate political trends in Iran, the US under President George H. W. Bush embarked on a policy of containing Iran (soon to be replaced by the Clinton administration’s “dual containment” policy, which was then followed in 1996 by Congress’ enactment of the first oil sanctions against Iran at a time when Rafsanjani was actively encouraging American oil companies, notably Conoco, to invest). This policy of containment was first announced during a trip to Central Asia in 1992 by then-Secretary of State James Baker who declared containing Iran’s influence in the region would constitute a major goal of US policy.
Guided by this objective, the US subsequently bought into Pakistan’s argument that the Taliban would constitute a credible barrier to Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and, through it, in Central Asia as well. Hence Washington did not object to Pakistan’s arming and promoting the Taliban, a step that eventually led to the fall of the Afghan government of Burhaneddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, two leaders who supported a version of Islam far more moderate than that of the Taliban. It is forgotten today that the Afghan civil war began with attacks by the Pakistan-based and more radical Islamists, first through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and, when Islamabad judged him to be too difficult to control, through the Taliban.
Even after the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, followed by the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, which Iran directly and actively supported, Washington continued to rely on Pakistan as its key regional partner. Despite massive US aid, Islamabad actively—if covertly—undermined US strategy in Afghanistan while it scorned Iran’s offers to help stabilize the country.
Just as Washington ignored or rebuffed Rafsanjani’s efforts to moderate Iran’s domestic and international policies, it similarly declined to help his successor, President Mohammad Khatami, who promoted a tolerant and reformist Islam and a less confrontational approach to relations with the West and Iran’s neighbors. Thus, holding out for the best—namely, a secular, pro-western government in Tehran—the US lost the relatively good. And when Iran actively helped the US both to oust the Taliban and facilitate the transition that followed, it was rewarded by President George W. Bush with membership in the “axis of evil,” paving the way for new and ever more punitive sanctions.
After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Tehran quietly put forward an offer for a comprehensive deal with the US not only to cooperate on efforts to stabilize Washington’s latest conquest, but also to address all outstanding issues between the two countries, from acceptance of Israel and Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups to Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush administration did not even bother to respond. Moreover, fearful that Iran might become the unintended beneficiary of the Ba’ath regime’s removal, Washington essentially stood by as its regional Sunni allies worked to undermine the fledgling Shia-led government in Baghdad not only by denying it aid and formal diplomatic recognition, but also, in the case of some Gulf states, encouraging and supporting the burgeoning Sunni insurgency, including al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which did not hesitate to attack US personnel, as well as their Shia brethren. Ironically if predictably, Washington’s policy of ignoring Sunni extremists forced Iraq’s Shia government to move closer to Iran.
Of course, the unanticipated insurgency and the increasing sectarian violence that it fostered also derailed hopes by the Bush administration—especially its neoconservative faction—that its “success” in Iraq would lead to “regime change”—either through destabilization or an actual attack—as well. At the same time, however, the administration bought into the idea that the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict could also be used to curb Iran’s influence, notably by forging a de facto alliance between Israel and the Sunni-led states against Tehran and what Jordan’s King Abdullah ominously called the “Shia Crescent.” Of course, not only did Washington’s acceptance and even promotion of this idea contribute to rising sectarian tensions and extremism throughout the region, but it also failed to produce any progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once again, rather than working with Iran to stabilize Iraq, which would have required exerting real pressure on its Sunni allies that were supporting the insurgency, containing Iran’s influence remained Washington’s overriding priority.
It was in this context that the so-called Arab Spring blossomed and, with it, renewed hopes in Washington to reshape the Middle East, if not by achieving “regime change” in Iran, then at least by weakening its regional influence, particularly in the Levant. Even as the Obama administration publicly depicted the movement as the dawn of open and democratic societies, its closest regional partners—to which Washington had so often and so counter-productively deferred in Iraq—saw it as a way to redress the region’s strategic balance that had been upset by the 2003 invasion and the empowerment of Iraq’s Shia majority.
As the movement progressed from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya and the (thwarted) pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, it eventually reached Syria and the minority Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s most important regional ally. While the Gulf states and Turkey led the charge against the regime, the US and much of the West were not far behind. Predictably, however, in its desire to see Assad overthrown and Iran weakened, the US and its allies largely ignored the steadily growing influence of groups such as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and similar foreign-backed Sunni extremist groups whose violence toward Syrian Shias, Alawites, Alevis, and Christians has been exceeded only by AQI’s successor, the Islamic State (ISIS).
Thus, for the past 25 years or more, the West—especially the United States—has made containing Iran its overriding priority in the Gulf and has too often seen the Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam and its violent offshoots as an effective counterweight to Iranian influence. In doing so, it has unintentionally helped create monsters like Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and now Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.
This critique by no means absolves Iran, Syria, Shia militias, or Iraq’s Shia-led government of their own mistakes and crimes. They have their own not insignificant share of responsibility in creating the region’s current problems and conflicts. And they have to do their part if the region’s problems are to be resolved. But as great powers that claim the world’s moral and political leadership with the power to intervene at will in other countries, the US and other Western countries must be judged by higher standards.At the very least, they need to offer a coherent and positive vision of a functioning Middle East and South Asia.
This requires going beyond the platitudes about wanting to advance democracy and human rights.
While the Western powers do not have a clear vision of what kind of Middle East they want and even less how to achieve it, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra have their own regional plans, based on ethnic and sectarian cleansing as we have already seen in both Syria and Iraq.
In short, until the US and the West admit at least to themselves that they have made mistakes in the region in the last few decades, particularly in their efforts to isolate and weaken Iran, and learn from those mistakes and change course, their efforts at defeating extremism and stabilizing the region are bound to fail.
The West cannot get all that it desires in the region, because political engineering has its limits. But if it embarks on a strategy of conflict resolution—fostering regional cooperation, instead of fighting it; and promoting compromise instead of complete capitulation by Iran or any other local power—its interests and those of the region will be better served. Until such a strategy is adopted and seriously implemented, however, every day that passes will make it that much harder to end the violence in the Middle East and encourage compromise and reconciliation. The same is equally true for the regional players. By pursuing maximalist goals they will all end up losers.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
Another round of negotiations between world powers and Iran on its nuclear program ended without any agreement in sight last week in New York. Many causes for the failure to reach an agreement have been cited, including: the number of centrifuges Iran should be allowed to keep; the still ambiguous status of the Arak heavy water reactor; the few remaining unanswered questions posed by the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) to Iran; and last but not least, the question of when and how much of the sanctions imposed on Iran will be lifted, whether they will be lifted at all, or, as put by US negotiator Wendy Sherman, they will simply be suspended.
All of these issues have certainly impeded a comprehensive agreement. However, they are not the ultimate causes of the failure of the negotiations thus far. Nor is Iran’s nuclear program per se the reason for the tensions in its relations with the West. In fact, the dispute between the West and Iran’s nuclear program is just a symptom of more fundamental disagreements between the two, or, to put it more correctly, between hardliners within Iran and the West.
The real causes of the failure of the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 [US, UK, Russia, France, China, plus Germany] can be summarized as follows.
1. Diverging understanding of what non-proliferation is all about. An underlying problem between Iran and the P5+1 is that Iran sees the non-proliferation issue as a technical and legal question that can be resolved by working out the proper legal and technical solutions. Yet, both historically and today, as with any other arms limitation process, non-proliferation has never been primarily about technicalities. Rather it has always been about power and about securing and then locking in a balance of power that favors one side. In other words, a country or group of countries that have enjoyed military superiority have tried to freeze this balance and thus keep their advantage, whereas those in a less favorable position have opposed such measures until they could reach a more favorable balance of power before agreeing to any freeze.
In the case of Iran, the goal of the West and Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbors is to ensure that Iran would at no time have the capability to disrupt the regional balance of power. This is neither a new phenomenon nor is it solely nuclear-related. A sharp improvement in Iran’s conventional military power would also be viewed with alarm. Even when, under the Shah, Iran was a Western ally and while the Soviets were arming Saddam Hussein to the teeth, there were calls in the US by influential politicians to stop arms sales to Iran.
The nuclear issue is therefore just part of Iran’s containment, as are the sanctions. The dispute has allowed Western powers, as well as China and Russia, to impose sanctions on Iran to severely undermine its economy while sapping its people’s energies and creating social tensions with the aim of implosion and political change. China and Russia may not be interested in a political implosion in Iran, but they certainly prefer a moribund Iran, which they can flood with their goods and manipulate to their own ends.
2. Iran’s regional policies and its anti-imperialist rhetoric. The most important impediment to any agreement with Iran is its posture on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and especially its hostility towards Israel. Otherwise, why has there been no Western effort to rein in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal, which has been growing at a tremendous pace? If the risk of proliferation is a major concern, why has this concern not applied to Pakistan? This has largely been because Pakistan, despite its Islamic pretensions, does not interest itself in the Palestinian problem. In all other regions, Iran has pursued a pragmatic and even concessional policy towards its neighbors; but it has so far refused to openly and unequivocally change its posture on the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is hard to believe that any agreement can be reached with Iran before it is acceptable to Israel, and this is unlikely until some change has occurred in Iran’s approach. However, short of the dramatic act of recognizing Israel, today no softening of Iran’s tone will be sufficient for Israel or at least for its hawks. This is so because Iran has come to justify many of the strategies of Israel and other regional countries.
At the international level, Iran cannot hope to be treated as a full-fledged member of the community of states, while simultaneously calling for its fundamental disruption, even if Iran’s efforts have generally been limited to rhetoric. It is therefore difficult to see how there can be an understanding between Iran and the West until Iran stops its so-called anti-Imperialist crusade and pursues its efforts to reform a decidedly unjust international system through more accepted methods.
3. The Iranian threat as the excuse for many policies. The sad truth is that in the post-Soviet world, many countries have used the so-called Iranian threat to achieve a range of objectives. For regional countries, these objectives include justifying their value to the West and receiving financial and military support. Meanwhile, in Western countries, some entities use the Iranian threat to ask for more defense spending and to promote arms sales to regional countries. For all of these players, Iran’s return to the international community would leave them with an enemy vacuum. So they will do all they can to prevent this from happening.
4. The conflict with the West as an instrument of domestic politics in Iran. Meanwhile, in Iran too differences with the West, especially the US, have served to sustain a particular vision of what Iranian society and polity should be, and to serve the parochial interests of certain political groups and economic cliques, which benefit from the current conditions and enrich themselves while the country’s problems mount. Any reaching of a modus vivendi with the West would deprive them of their power and of their golden goose. Moreover, the cultural conservatives fear that Iran’s opening up to businesses, tourists and other exchanges would affect the country’s cultural dynamics and undermine their power base.
5. A more long-term Iranian question. Beneath all these issues lies a more fundamental cause of friction between Iran and the global powers, which is endemic to middle-sized powers, especially in geopolitically sensitive regions. Since the time of the Greeks and the Persians, the West has had an ambivalent view of Iran, both admiring and despising it. In more recent history, the West’s approach toward Iran was essentially developed by Britain and was based on the idea of keeping Iran “moribund”—alive enough to serve as a potential buffer but not strong enough to pose a challenge. The US has essentially pursued this British policy towards Iran.
This view of Iran today is reflected in Western demands that Tehran help defeat the radical group that calls itself the Islamic State (aka ISIS, ISIL or IS) while having no say in Iraq or Syria or Afghanistan—an unrealistic and unreasonable standard. The West and other big powers should decide what kind of Iran they could live with. Can they handle a progressive but strong and assertive Iran? Or is any kind of strong Iran unacceptable? If the latter is the case, then there is no chance that sanctions will be lifted. If the purpose were primarily to try moving Iran toward openness domestically and a more cooperative stance in the region, then pressures on it should have been eased long before now. It is sobering to reflect that the sanctioning of Iran gathered speed when reformist and pragmatic politicians were in power. While pressuring measures have likely helped push Iran to the bargaining table over its nuclear program, within Iran these pressures have so far only emboldened conservatives.
6. The Onus is on Iran. Every state is responsible for safeguarding its own interests and should not expect others to carry out its aims. Thus Iran’s leaders must now decide what they value most: the country and its people, some vague revolutionary objective, or, even less nobly, their own parochial interests. Life is not fair and international politics are particularly brutal, especially for the less powerful. Bemoaning this state of affairs and calling the system unjust will not get Iran anywhere. Its leaders have to grow wise and protect first and foremost their own country and people. Only then should they think about trying to reform the international system and liberate the oppressed!
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