by Peter Jenkins
Sometimes the fog of diplomacy can be as thick as the fog of battle. So it has been in the case of last week’s talks in Geneva — until, that is, the publication of an account in The Guardian by Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, which rings true, [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Sometimes the fog of diplomacy can be as thick as the fog of battle. So it has been in the case of last week’s talks in Geneva — until, that is, the publication of an account in The Guardian by Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, which rings true, to my mind at least.
On that basis a preliminary assessment of why hopes that had been raised high were dashed can be attempted.
The crucial factor appears to have been French insistence on re-opening a text that Iran believed to have been essentially agreed upon and pressing Iran on two points: the cessation of work on the Arak reactor for at least six months and state assurance about the future of Iran’s enrichment program.
On Arak, fairness requires conceding reason to France. The Arak reactor is a legitimate proliferation concern. An initial agreement that lacked any confidence-building provision in relation to Arak would be like a house without one of its walls.
On the end-state enrichment assurance point, however, the French intervention is hard to excuse. The E3+3 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) have known since last year’s meetings with Iran, if not longer, that Iran cannot volunteer confidence-building measures in the absence of such an assurance, for fear of being nickel-and-dimed. And some accounts of last week’s meetings suggest French officials raised no objection to the inclusion of an assurance when the text was being negotiated at an official level.
So what was the French Foreign Minister’s game? Some observers believe that this was an act of sabotage, intended to appease the Prime Minister of Israel and curry favour with the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in the hope of commercial gain.
That may be right. French diplomacy can be selfish. But French diplomacy is rarely stupid. So it is improbable that French Ministers and officials would imagine that their EU partners would forgive them for putting French commercial interests, or the appeasement of a state whose policies in the West Bank are considered deeply unjust by most Europeans, ahead of the interests of the EU as a whole. EU interests are to seize what may be a last opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear dispute peacefully, to reopen the Iranian market to hard-pressed EU traders and investors, and to give the global economy a boost from lower oil prices.
An alternative explanation could be that Mr. Laurent Fabius intended to trade an end-state assurance for a satisfactory provision on Arak, hoping perhaps to avoid having to pay for the latter with additional sanctions relief. If so, he misjudged his man. Iran’s Foreign Minister is happy if he can get others to pay twice for a concession but doesn’t go in for paying twice himself!
The Guardian account also prompts at least one question about US diplomacy. Why did Secretary of State John Kerry fail to point out to his French colleague that reopening the text on so vital a point to Iran was likely to prove a deal-spoiler? Around this question the fog remains dense.
Where does all this leave the outlook? Less promising than when I last wrote. US and UK public announcements that the E3+3 are united, and the tactless (and unfair) blaming of Iran for the break-down, suggest a lack of will to form up to France on the end-state assurance. This can be a recipe for failure when the parties reconvene on Nov. 20.
EU Ministers could come to the rescue by stressing that they expect France to put EU interests first and their conviction that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prohibit Iran from enriching uranium for peaceful purposes. But will they? Hitherto they have been reluctant to assert themselves on the Iranian nuclear question.
Were my advice requested (which I do not expect!) I would advocate that the parties look for a way out of these difficulties by dropping the idea of a two stage (initial/comprehensive) agreement and instead, over the next five weeks, aiming, through intensive negotiations, to produce a broad agreement that dispels all uncertainty on the points that are crucial to one side or the other.
Both sides have already given so much thought to the issues that such a goal would be realistic as long as political will to resolve this dispute peacefully continues to exist. An early broad agreement that was demonstrably in the interests of all parties (and of the global community) would strengthen the political positions of governments vis–à–vis opponents of a deal by attracting public support. There is much to be said for wrapping up the essentials of a peaceful settlement before the further round of US sanctions legislation that appears to be in the offing.
Photo Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated
Geneva — While diplomats involved in negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program here have been mostly tight-lipped about the details of their meetings, France — which along with Britain, China, Russia and the United States plus Germany composes the so-called P5+1 [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated
Geneva — While diplomats involved in negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program here have been mostly tight-lipped about the details of their meetings, France — which along with Britain, China, Russia and the United States plus Germany composes the so-called P5+1 — vocalized today some of its concerns.
Stating that he is interested in an agreement that is “serious and credible”, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius argued that the “initial text made progress but not enough” during an interview with France Inter radio.
According to François Nicoullaud, France’s former ambassador to Tehran (2001–05), the French position on Iran’s nuclear program has not changed since François Hollande replaced Nicolas Sarkozy on May 12 as President.
“We have a kind of continuity in the French administration where the people who advised Mr. Sarkozy are the same ones who advise the current administration,” the veteran French diplomat told IPS, adding that France’s relations with Iran were more positive during the Jacques Chirac administration.
“This is especially true for the Iranian nuclear case because it’s very technical and complex and the government really needs to be convinced before it changes its position,” he said.
Fabius expressed concerns earlier today over Iran’s enrichment of 20%-grade uranium and its Arak facility, which is not yet fully operational.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated that “If the news from Geneva is true, this is the deal of the century for #Iran,” on Nov. 7 from his official Twitter account, has previously accused Iran of trying to build a nuclear bomb byway of its Arak nuclear facility.
“[Iran] also continued work on the heavy water reactor in Arak; that’s in order to have another route to the bomb, a plutonium path,” said Netanyahu during his Oct. 1 speech at the UN General Assembly in New York.
Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), says its nuclear program is completely peaceful.
While the Obama administration has declared that it will prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, the US intelligence community has not officially assessed that Iran has made the decision to do so.
According to the 2013 US Worldwide Threat Assessment, Iran “has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.”
Daryl Kimball, the head of the Arms Control Association, says the Arak facility “is more than a year from being completed; it would have to be fully operational for a year to produce spent fuel that could be used to extract plutonium.”
“Iran does not have a reprocessing plant for plutonium separation; and Arak would be under IAEA safeguards the whole time,” he noted in comments printed in the Guardian.
“The Arak Reactor certainly presents a proliferation problem, but there is nothing urgent,” said Nicoullaud, a veteran diplomat who has previously authored analyses of Iran’s nuclear activities.
“The best solution would be to transform it before completion into a light-water research reactor, which would create less problems,” he said, adding: “This is perfectly feasible, with help from the outside.”
“Have we tried to sell this solution to the Iranians? I do not know,” said Nicoullaud.
The unexpected arrival of US Secretary of State John F. Kerry yesterday and all but one of the P5+1’s Foreign Ministers in Geneva — following positive EU and Iranian descriptions here at end of the first day of the Nov. 7-8 talks — led to speculation that some form of an agreement would soon be signed.
While diplomats involved in the talks have provided few details to the media, it’s now become clear that the approximately 6-hour meeting last night between Kerry, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton involved the consideration of a draft agreement presented by the Iranians.
That meeting also contributed to speculation that a document would soon be signed until the early morning hours of Nov. 9, when the LA Times reported that after reaching a critical stage, the negotiators were facing obstacles.
While Western and Iranian diplomats involved in the talks have stated that “progress” has been made, it’s not yet clear whether that has led to a mutually acceptable agreement.
“There has been some progress, but there is still a gap,” Zarif said to reporters earlier today according to the Fars News Agency.
While briefing Iranian media here this afternoon, Zarif acknowledged French concerns but insisted on Iran’s positions.
“We have an attitude and the French have theirs,” said Zarif in comments posted in Persian on the Iranian Student News Agency.
“Negotiation is an approach that is based on mutual respect. If not, they won’t be stable,” he said.
“We won’t allow anyone to compile a draft for us,” said Zarif.
Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva/Eric Bridiers
]]>via IPS News
Geneva — Against the backdrop of a cautiously optimistic environment, Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are reconvening here for talks (Nov. 7-8) over Tehran’s nuclear program.
While remaining tight-lipped about details, Iran and the United States have nonetheless expressed hopeful expectations [...]]]>
via IPS News
Geneva — Against the backdrop of a cautiously optimistic environment, Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are reconvening here for talks (Nov. 7-8) over Tehran’s nuclear program.
While remaining tight-lipped about details, Iran and the United States have nonetheless expressed hopeful expectations for what this next round may lead to.
“I believe it is possible to reach an agreement during this meeting,” said Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, adding that a failure to reach a settlement this time wouldn’t be a “disaster” in an Oct. 5 France 24 interview.
After acknowledging that the last round of talks here (Oct. 15-16) involved “some progress”, a senior US administration official argued tonight that Washington is now looking for “an initial understanding that stops Iran’s nuclear program from moving forward for the first time in decades and that potentially rolls part of it back.”
“I do see the potential for the outlines of a first step…I do think it can be written on a piece of paper,” said the official, who was speaking on the condition of anonymity.
The official did not elaborate on a timeline but added that the hope was for “sooner rather than later.”
Since Iran presented its new administration to the world in September at the UN General Assembly, it has also been expressing hope for an accelerated timeline for reaching a settlement.
“We think that the speedy settlement of this issue will benefit both sides,” said Iran’s new moderate President, Hassan Rouhani, on Sept. 26 in New York.
If the Zarif-led negotiating team is unable to bring home a negotiated “win” soon, those in Iran who oppose a warming of relations with the United States may soon regain the upper hand that they appear to have lost.
On Sunday, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — persistently suspicious and critical of US intentions with Iran — essentially told hardliners to allow Iran’s negotiating team to do their job unimpeded while rejecting optimism about the results of talks with the US.
“No one should see our negotiating team as compromisers,” said Khamenei in a speech to an audience at his residence.
“They have undertaken a difficult mission and no one should undermine an agent on a mission,” he said.
“I do not think the negotiations will produce the results expected by Iran,” added the Ayatollah a day before the anniversary of the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran.
“This government has a lot riding on the resolution of the nuclear issue because it made it a campaign promise and priority,” Farideh Farhi, an Iran expert at the Unversity of Hawaii, told IPS.
But she stressed that even if the Iranians were desperate for a deal, Iran won’t give up certain bottom lines.
“The acceptance of a bad deal is politically even more dangerous for Rouhani than not reaching an agreement,” she said from Tehran in a phone interview.
One of Iran’s bottom lines includes what it considers its right to peacefully enrich uranium as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Iran is currently enriching uranium at the 20% level; the United States has argued that it prefers to see no enrichment inside Iran.
“We believe Iran does not have a right [to enrich uranium]. We don’t believe any country has a right [to do that],” said the senior US administration official.
But the official did concede that regardless of the US position, Iran is effectively enriching uranium.
“There is a very big difference between right and program,” said the official.
The Rouhani government has promised to better manage Iran’s deteriorating economy, which has been plagued by a harsh sanctions regime as well as claims of mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration.
Obtaining sanctions relief, particularly from those impacting its oil revenues and banking sector, remains a key Iranian goal.
While insisting that the core sanctions regime would remain in place, the senior administration official said today that “we are prepared to offer limited, targeted and reversible sanctions relief” in exchange for a substantial first step on the part of the Iranians towards resolving the international community’s concerns over its nuclear program.
In recent days, the Obama administration has lobbied Congress to pause the implementation of further sanctions that were passed in the House in July while talks are in progress.
The senior official expressed gratitude for Congress’ resolve in aiding the negotiation process through sanctions, but added that to pile more on now could prove more harmful than helpful.
“For the first time, Iran appears to have committed to moving the negotiation process forward quickly,” said the official.
“It seems to me it’s worth a brief pause to test that notion,” the official added.
Unlike Israel and Congress, who appear adamant that pressure through sanctions must be maintained on Iran, some voices are arguing for a revision of current strategy.
Yesterday seven former European ambassadors to Iran urged all negotiating parties to operate on the premise that the time for reaching a deal is now and limited.
“The direction these negotiations take will determine whether Iran’s own situation will become even worse and its behavior more extreme, or whether it will make progress in welfare, civil liberties and human rights,” argued the ambassadors in the Israeli daily, Haaretz.
A group of prominent US foreign policy figures also applauded President Barack Obama’s attempt to pursue diplomacy with Iran and urged him to continue in a letter published today.
“Decades of distrust and lack of contact between the two countries will complicate the task of reaching agreements that will provide us the assurance we require that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes,” stated the 35 signatories, including the former ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, the veteran diplomat, William H. Luers, and the former diplomat and hostage in Iran, John Limbert.
“You will undoubtedly face opposition to your decision to engage Iran. We support this new policy and pledge to help our fellow Americans appreciate the ambitious and transformative course you have chosen to build a more peaceful and more cooperative environment in the Middle East,” they wrote.
*This report was made possible through the generous support of the Ploughshares Fund.
]]>via USIP
What steps would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?
President Obama has estimated that it would take Iran “over a year or so” for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. But that device would likely be crude and too large to fit on [...]]]>
via USIP
What steps would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?
President Obama has estimated that it would take Iran “over a year or so” for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. But that device would likely be crude and too large to fit on a ballistic missile. Producing a nuclear weapon that could be launched at Israel, Europe, or the United States would take substantially longer. Iran would need to complete three key steps.
Step 1: Produce Fissile Material
Fissile material is the most important component of a nuclear weapon. There are two types of fissile material: weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Tehran has worked primarily on uranium. There are three levels or enrichment to understand the controversy surrounding Iran’s program:
·90 percent enrichment: The most likely route for Iran to produce fissile material would be to enrich its growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 90 percent purity —or weapons-grade level. Western intelligence agencies suggest Iran has not decided to enrich uranium to 90 percent.
·3.5 percent enrichment: As of early 2013, Iran had approximately 18,000 pounds of “low-enriched uranium” enriched to the 3.5 percent level (the level used to fuel civilian nuclear power plants). This stockpile would be sufficient to produce up to seven nuclear bombs, but only if it were further enriched to weapons-grade level (above the 90 percent purity level). Experts estimate Iran would need at least four months to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb using 3.5 percent enriched uranium as the starting point.
·20 percent enrichment: In early 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. watchdog group that inspects Iranian nuclear facilities, said Iran also had a stockpile of 375 pounds of 20 percent low-enriched uranium, ostensibly to provide fuel for a medical research reactor. This stockpile is about two-thirds of the 551 pounds needed to produce one bomb’s worth of weapons-grade material if further enriched. If Iran accumulated sufficient quantities of 20 percent low-enriched uranium, it might be able to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb in a month or two.
The main issue is the status of the uranium enriched to 20 percent and the two production sites—at the Fordo plant outside the northern city of Qom and the Natanz facility in central Iran. U.N. inspectors visit these sites every week or two, however, so any move to produce weapons-grade uranium in an accelerated timeframe as short as a month would be detected. Knowing this, Iran is unlikely to act.
The speed of enrichment also depends on the centrifuges used, both their number and their quality. For a long time, Iran had used thousands of fairly slow IR-1 centrifuges to spin and then separate uranium isotopes. But since January 2013, it has started to install IR-2M centrifuges, which spin three to five times faster. In early 2013, Tehran claimed to be using about 200 IR-2Ms at the Natanz site.
Tehran might be able to enrich enough uranium for one bomb ― from 20 percent purity to 90 percent ― in as little as two weeks if it installs large numbers of advanced IR-2M centrifuges. Iran has announced its intention to eventually install as many as 3,000.
Step 2: Develop a Warhead
Iran would next have to build a nuclear device. It would need to build a warhead based on an “implosion” design if Iran wanted to deliver a nuclear device on a missile. It would include a core composed of weapons-grade uranium (or plutonium) and a neutron initiator surrounded by conventional high explosives designed to compress the core and set off a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.
IAEA documents claim, “Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly enriched uranium] as the fission fuel.” The IAEA has also expressed concerns that Iran may have conducted conventional high-explosive tests at its military facility at Parchin that could be used to develop a nuclear warhead.
There is no evidence, however, that Iran is currently working to design or construct such a warhead. Even if Iran made the decision, production of a warhead small enough, light enough, and reliable enough to mount on a ballistic missile is complicated. Iran would probably need at least a few years to accomplish this technological achievement.
Step 3: Marry the Warhead to an Effective Delivery System
If Iran built a nuclear warhead, it would need a way to deliver it. Tehran’s medium-range Shahab-3 has a range of up to 1,200 miles, long enough to strike anywhere in the Middle East, including Israel, and possibly southeastern Europe. These missiles are highly inaccurate, but they are theoretically capable of carrying a nuclear warhead if Iran is able to design one.
Iran’s Sajjil-2, another domestically produced medium-range ballistic missile, reportedly has a range of 1,375 miles when carrying a 1,650-pound warhead. Tehran is the only country to develop a missile with that range before a nuclear weapon. But the missile has only been tested once since 2009, which may mean it needs further fine-tuning before deployment. Iran also relies on foreign sources for a number of components for the Sajjil-2.
Iran is probably years away from developing a missile that could hit the United States. A 2012 Department of Defense report said Iran “may be technically capable” of flight testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015 if it receives foreign assistance. But in December 2012, a congressional report said Iran is unlikely to develop an ICBM in this timeframe, and many analysts estimate that Tehran would need until 2020.
Is the North Korean experience relevant?
The Clinton administration confronted a similar dilemma in 1993 on North Korea’s nuclear program. The intelligence community assessed that Pyongyang had one or two bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium. But the intelligence community could not tell the president with a high degree of certainty if North Korea had actually built operational nuclear weapons.
The mere existence of a few bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium seemed to have a powerful deterrent effect on the United States. Washington could not be sure where the material was stored, or if the North Koreans were close to producing a weapon.
The same concerns could apply to Iran if it developed the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium so quickly that it avoids detection even at declared facilities― or if it was able to enrich bomb-grade material at a secret facility. Then Iran might be able to hide the fissile material, making it more difficult for a military strike to destroy. All the other parts of the program, such as weapons design, preparing the uranium core, and fabrication and assembly of other key weapon components, could potentially be done in places dispersed across the country that are easier to conceal and more difficult to target.
Iran may be years away from being able to place a nuclear warhead on a reliable long-range missile. But many analysts are concerned that the game is up once Iran produces enough fissile material for a bomb.
Colin H. Kahl served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011. He is currently an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
]]>by Charles Naas
The second round of talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) and Iran ended just about where they started — no advance from the March talks and the glimmer of hope that perhaps some kind of momentum could be established. Unlike Almaty [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
The second round of talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) and Iran ended just about where they started — no advance from the March talks and the glimmer of hope that perhaps some kind of momentum could be established. Unlike Almaty I, no date was set for a continuation of the negotiations. Western diplomats offered mixed messages about what happened during the two lengthy sessions. In fact, there should be no mystery about the sick snail pace of the negotiations The two sides are not on the same page and are talking past each other. As long as this continues, an understanding will be highly unlikely.
The P5+1 are focused on an agreement that is limited to the nuclear issue and as restrictive as possible on Iran’s program in the future. When negotiations began during the Bush administration, the US demanded that Iran cease all uranium enrichment which Iran was producing at the reactor fuel level of 3.5-4% as a condition for the talks. That was a non-starter and quickly put aside when Iran decided to enrich uranium to 20% at its Fordow facility, which is buried deeply in a mountain near the holy city of Qom. Twenty percent enriched uranium can be enriched to explosive level in as quickly as 3 months or less if Iran decides to race for a bomb. Fordow has, therefore, become the central concern of the P5+1, though the revised proposal reportedly softened the demand for its total closure. It’s unclear whether the 6 powers have explicitly or implicitly recognized Iran’s right to enrich uranium to fuel its future power reactors. The Six have reportedly offered small-scale sanctions relief and the sale of selective goods to Iran, but otherwise continue to take a hard line on keeping the talks tightly tied to nuclear affairs.
It has become clear that Iran’s position is based on the principle that it’s a fully independent and equal member of the world community and will go to extreme lengths to avoid accepting a lesser status. Call it Iranian pride, self respect, history and ambitions for the future. The two times in modern history that Iran was forced to accept foreign dictate — the 1907 Russian-UK Agreement on spheres of influence and the World War II occupation — still rankle, as does the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadegh in 1953. In line with this principle, Iran insists that it has all the rights of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — to which it was an early member — and that this includes the full fuel-cycle from enrichment to reprocessing of spent fuel.
Iran has been consistent. In the mid-1970s, the US and Iran engaged in lengthy talks about a new treaty to permit US cooperation on the sale of reactors to the Shah’s very ambitious power reactor program. Iran’s negotiators adamantly assumed the same position that they operate on now: Iran should be regarded and treated as the proud and sovereign nation that it is. Iran has, therefore, rejected any restrictions on its civilian power reactor program but has apparently indicated some willingness to cooperate on the output of Fordow. But this was likely expressed in an ambiguous manner and remains insufficient for the P5+1. The Six’s offer of slight sanctions relief has also been implicitly spurned.
By its mere presence at the meetings, Iran has accepted the premise that its nuclear program is both important and contentious, but its objectives are far-reaching in contrast to the Six’s aim of restricting discussions to nuclear affairs. Iran will not move far, if at all, without significant sanctions relief, and, as a final step, the conclusion of all UN and other sanctions against it. Beyond these measurable aims, Iran has indicated that negotiations should be expanded to include an examination of the power realities within the region and on how Iran is perceived by major powers. The more ambitious Iranians who are involved with the country’s international concerns see Iran’s long history; its central geographic position; the size of its population; its realizable great wealth from petroleum; and the potential from its rapidly growing, educated population (particularly in the sciences), as inevitably leading it to a form of regional hegemony. These negotiators have carefully and with some subtlety melded their objectives.
The strenuous diplomatic process with Iran has been taking place in the background of more than thirty years of enmity and decades of steadily increasingly, painful sanctions. American threats of “all options are on the table”, cyber warfare directed at Iran’s enrichment facilities and substantial US and allied military forces in the Gulf, have added to ongoing tension and feed Iran’s concern that we really are aiming for regime change. Our strong ties with Israel, which compel us to support the notion that an Iranian ability to build a nuclear explosive poses an existential threat, also amplifies Iran’s distrust.
On the other hand, the US and others have alleged that Iran is a major supporter of international terrorism and that it has the intention of at least getting to the point where it could rapidly create a nuclear weapon. Iranian denials of such plans, and Leader Ali Khamenei’s Fatwa, have had no resonance in the Obama administration. Add to this an emerging friction in current political alliances within the Middle East. Iran — and the Russians – support the other Shi’a states, Syria and Iraq, and parties such as Hezbollah. The US, UK, France and Germany have sided with the Arab Sunni monarchies, the Syrian rebels and Israel.
At this point, neither side has moved significantly from its opening position. Unless both sides give their negotiators new and more flexible instructions, movement towards an agreement is highly unlikely. Meaningful change is domestically difficult, but it may be worth continuing talks simply to have an established site for future exchanges as problems arise. So far, perhaps the main positive result has been the seemingly successful process of breaking ice between Iran and the US.
]]>Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s recent comments indicating that Israel has delayed its attack-Iran timeline by 8-10 months is causing a stir among Iran watchers. From the Daily Telegraph:
Earlier this year, however, Iran delayed the arrival of that moment. Tehran has amassed 189kg of uranium enriched to 20 per cent [...]]]>
Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s recent comments indicating that Israel has delayed its attack-Iran timeline by 8-10 months is causing a stir among Iran watchers. From the Daily Telegraph:
Earlier this year, however, Iran delayed the arrival of that moment. Tehran has amassed 189kg of uranium enriched to 20 per cent purity, a vital step towards weapons-grade material. In August, the country’s experts took 38 per cent of this stockpile and converted it into fuel rods for a civilian research reactor, thus putting off the moment when they would be able to make uranium of sufficient purity for a nuclear bomb.
Mr Barak said this decision “allows contemplating delaying the moment of truth by eight to 10 months”. As for why Iran had drawn back, the minister said: “There could be at least three explanations. One is the public discourse about a possible Israeli or American operation deterred them from trying to come closer. It could probably be a diplomatic gambit that they have launched in order to avoid this issue culminating before the American election, just to gain some time. It could be a way of telling the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] ‘oh we comply with our commitments’.”
Mr Barak added: “Maybe it’s a combination of all these three elements. I cannot tell you for sure.”
The Arms Control Association has been pointing out the importance of Iran’s use of the 20% enriched material for TRR fuel plates ever since the August IAEA report.
But US-Iran relations expert Trita Parsi argues that Israel hasn’t backed down. In fact, Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has gotten everything he’s campaigned for so far:
]]>The choreography around Israel’s threats to attack—unless the U.S. and the EU further sanctioned Iran, did not strike a deal, and committed to take military action at some point—was elaborate, relentless and quite convincing. A never-ending stream of dramatic verbiage created the impression that this time around is different from the many threats Israel issued in the past. Israel cries wolf over and over again, yet escapes being held to account thanks to the fear in the West that Israel might just be serious this time around.
But whether the bizarre, open debate in Israel recently about bombing Iran—with cabinet ministers airing their opinions and former intelligence officers publicly attacking Netanyahu for his “messianic” tendencies—has been deliberate or accidental, Netanyahu and his team have been bluffing, not threatening.
Although the place and time of the next round of talks on Iran’s nuclear programme have not yet been announced, the manoeuvring by Iran and the United States to influence the outcome has already begun.
Iran sought support for a revised proposal to the talks during the United Nations General [...]]]>
Although the place and time of the next round of talks on Iran’s nuclear programme have not yet been announced, the manoeuvring by Iran and the United States to influence the outcome has already begun.
Iran sought support for a revised proposal to the talks during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) last month, according to a New York Times report Oct. 4. Then, only a few days later, the Barack Obama administration launched a preemptive attack on the proposal through New York Times reporter David Sanger.
The officials suggested the Iranian proposal would give Iran an easier route to a “breakout” to weapons grade uranium enrichment. But that claim flies in the face of some obvious realities.
An Oct. 4 story by Sanger reported that Iran had begun describing a “9-step plan” to diplomats at the UNGA and quoted administration officials as charging that the proposal would not “guarantee that Iran cannot produce a weapon”. Instead, the officials argued, it would allow Iran to keep the option of resuming 20-percent enriched uranium, thus being able to enrich to weapons grade levels much more quickly.
Iran’s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili issued a denial that Iran had “delivered any new proposal other than what had been put forward in talks with the P5+1″. But that statement did not constitute a denial that Iran was discussing such a proposal, because the Times story had said the proposal had been initially made to European officials during the P5+1 meeting in Istanbul in July.
Obama administration officials complained that, under the Iranian plan, Iran would carry out a “suspension” of 20-percent enrichment only after oil sanctions have been lifted and oil revenues are flowing again.
That description of the proposal is consistent with an Iranian “five-step plan”, presented during the talks with P5+1, the text of which was published by Arms Control Today last summer. In that proposal, the P5+1 would have ended all sanctions against Iran in steps one and two, but Iran would have ended its 20-percent enrichment only in the fifth step.
In that same final step, however, Iran also would have closed down the Fordow enrichment plant and transferred its entire stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium to “a third country under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) custody”.
Iran has made clear that it intends to use the 20-percent enrichment as bargaining leverage to achieve an end to the most damaging economic sanctions.
Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to 2005 and now a visiting scholar at Princeton University, told IPS, “Iran is prepared to stop 20-percent enrichment and go below five percent. The question is what will the P5+1 provide in return. As long as the end state of a comprehensive agreement is not clear for Iran, it will not consider halting enrichment at 20 percent.”
But the administration’s portrayal of the Iranian proposal as offering a sanctions-free path to continued 20-percent enrichment is highly misleading, according to close observers of the Iran nuclear issue. It also ignores elements of the proposal that would minimise the risk of a “breakout” to enrichment of uranium to weapons grade levels.
The Obama administration criticism of the proposal, as reported by Sanger, was couched in such a way as to justify the U.S. refusal to discuss lifting the sanctions on Iranian oil exports during the four rounds of talks with Iran. A senior administration official was quoted as saying that Iran “could restart the program in a nanosecond,” whereas “it would take years” to re-impose the sanctions.
Paul Pillar, national intelligence officer for Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, noted in a commentary in The National Interest that it is “far easier to impose sanctions on Iran than to lift them” and that if Iran reneged on a nuclear agreement, “it would be easier still.”
Peter Jenkins, British permanent representative to the IAEA from 2001 to 2006, noted in an e-mail to IPS that it took the EU only two months to agree to impose oil sanctions, and that “political resistance among the 27 (EU member states) to imposing oil sanctions would probably be less if re-imposition were required by an Iranian breach of a deal with the P5+1.”
Jenkins pointed out that EU oil purchases from Iran now have experience in getting supplies from other countries which could make re-imposing sanctions even easier.
One U.S. official was quoted by Sanger as complaining that the Iranian proposal would allow Iran to “move the fuel around, and it stays in the country”. That description appeared to hint that the purpose is to give Tehran the option of a breakout to weapons grade enrichment.
But the biggest difference between the proposal now being discussed by Iranian diplomats and the one offered last summer is that the new proposal reflects the reality that Iran began last spring to convert 20-percent enriched uranium into U308 in powdered form for fuel plates for its Tehran Research Reactor.
The conversion of 20 percent enriched uranium to U308, which was documented but not highlighted in the Aug. 30 IAEA report, makes it more difficult to use that same uranium for enrichment to weapons grade levels.
The new Iranian proposal evidently envisions U308 uranium remaining in the country for use by the Tehran Research Reactor rather than the entire stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium being shipped to another country as in its previous proposal.
Former State Department official Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, who has argued in the past that the only purpose Iran could have in enriching to 20 percent is a nuclear weapon, told the Times that the conversion “tends to confirm that there is civilian purpose in enriching to this level”.
But Fitzpatrick told the Times that the Iranians know how to reconvert the U308 powder back to a gaseous form that can then be used for weapons grade enrichment. “It would not take long to set it up,” Fitzpatrick said.
In an interview with IPS, Dr. Harold A. Feiveson, a senior research scientist at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson’s school and a specialist on nuclear weapons, said “it would not be super hard” to carry out such a reconversion.
But Feiveson admitted that he is not aware of anyone ever having done it. The reconversion to 20 percent enrichment “would be pretty visible” and “would take some time,” said Feiveson. “You would have to kick the (IAEA) inspectors out.”
Even Israeli policymakers have acknowledged that Iran’s diversion of 20-percent enriched uranium represents a step away from a breakout capability, as Haaretz reported Oct. 9.
Defence ministry sources told the Israeli daily that the Iran’s reduction of its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium had added “eight months at least” to what the Israeli government has cited as its “deadline” on Iran. The same sources said it was the justification for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s dropping the threat of attack on Iran in his U.N. speech.
The deep reduction in Iranian oil revenues from sanctions and the recent plunge in the value of Iran’s currency may well have made Iran more interested in compromise than when the talks with the P5+1 started in April.
Mousavian told IPS, “I am convinced that Iran is ready for a package deal based on recognition of two principles.” The first principle, he said, is that “Iran recognises the P5+1 concerns and will remove all such concerns”; the second is that the P5+1 “recognises the rights of Iran and gradually lifts sanctions”.
But Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has expressed serious doubts about whether the Obama administration is willing to end the sanctions on Iran under any circumstances. In an Oct. 10 speech, Khamenei said the Americans “lie” in suggesting sanctions would be lifted in return for Iran giving up its nuclear program.
U.S. officials “make decisions out of grudge and aversion (toward Iran)”, Khamenei said.
]]>A recent incident reminded me of the strong emotions that underlie thinking about Iran by some officials and ex-officials in the United States and parts of Europe.
In this instance, an academic who had questionedwhether Iran’s safeguards agreement gives the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) a right to demand that Iran [...]]]>
A recent incident reminded me of the strong emotions that underlie thinking about Iran by some officials and ex-officials in the United States and parts of Europe.
In this instance, an academic who had questionedwhether Iran’s safeguards agreement gives the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) a right to demand that Iran account for activities not involving nuclear material (a valid question, in my view) was accused of being “the Ayatollah’s lawyer.”
I have come across other instances in which experts declining to assume the worst of Iran’s nuclear intentions have been labelled “apologists” and accused of giving comfort to the enemy.
These incidents and experiences when I was still in active service, suggest to me the existence of a faction that considers Iran a hostile state and sees Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to national defense.
Is it reasonable to perceive Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to national defense? Since the end of 2007, the US intelligence community has told us that we cannot assume that Iran’s leaders are determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Other intelligence communities, including Israel’s, appear to have come around to the same view.
Iran’s nuclear research has allowed them to master a technology – enrichment – that can be used for both civil and military purposes, and they possess enough nuclear material to make dozens of nuclear weapons. But one cannot infer from this that they intend to acquire nuclear weapons and are therefore a threat. One can only infer that they have the potential to acquire weapons and are therefore a potential threat – in a world full of potential threats.
Is it reasonable to perceive Iran as hostile to the US and Europe? Iran’s interests and views diverge from ours at many points. Iran believes it was a mistake to tolerate the creation of an exclusively Jewish state in the Levant; we do not. Iran supports the right of Lebanese Shi’a to resort to force in self-defense; we consider Hezbollah terrorists. Iran has longstanding ties to the Syrian government; our sympathies are with the Syrian opposition. Iran is at odds with Saudi Arabia in Iraq and the Yemen; the Saudis are our friends. And so on.
But to be on opposite sides of a dispute taking place on neutral ground, so to speak, is not the same thing as being in a state of hostility. Nations can have conflicting interests and opposing views without being enemies. It happens all the time.
Iran’s official security doctrines imply a defensive, not an offensive orientation. Contacts with Iranian officials suggest that Iran’s leaders find political advantage in demonizing certain Western countries but are not bent on attacking them. If Western intelligence agencies are aware of Iranian plans to start a war against the US, Europe or Israel, it is surprising that this intelligence has not been leaked.
So perhaps one can legitimately say that the case for seeing Iran as an enemy and as a threat to our homelands is unproven.
So what? Perhaps it is unreasonable to see Iran in these terms, but does that matter? Yes, because it colors the Western approach to the nuclear problem. It leads us to place undue weight on the application of pressure to induce Iran to submit to our wishes; to misrepresent evidence to justify additional pressure; and to advance contentious interpretations of Iran’s safeguards agreement, the IAEA Statute, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the UN Charter, to prejudice the international community against Iran and justify measures that harm Iran.
Pressure can of course play a useful role in dispute resolution. It can be necessary. But the dose has to be right. Too much pressure can be counter-productive, stimulating defiance and a determination to concede nothing. Over-reliance on pressure can turn policy into a one-trick pony.
Misrepresenting evidence has been a recurrent feature of the last ten years. In 2002, for instance, we claimed that Iran had no intention of declaring the Natanz enrichment plant because no declaration had been made before construction began; yet at that time Iran was only obliged to declare plants 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material. Last year, we claimed the IAEA had found evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme; yet the evidence, still unconfirmed, was of research into how to make nuclear weapons, not of the construction of weapons.
As for contentious interpretations, they are too numerous to list. One of the most egregious, though, is the claim that Iran may not enrich because it is in non-compliance with the NPT. Not only would an impartial court (if such existed) be challenged to determine that Iran has been in NPT non-compliance since its pre-2004 safeguards failures were corrected; but the NPT is without provision for the forfeiting of rights, and in the 2003-5 period the Europeans fully accepted that Iran’s suspension of enrichment was a voluntary confidence-building measure, not an obligation, as did the IAEA Board of Governors.
A more dispassionate approach would allow us to see the Iranian nuclear problem more clearly, as an instance of past non-compliance with NPT safeguards obligations that has generated distrust in Iran’s nuclear intentions. The problem can be resolved by giving Iran an opportunity to rebuild confidence in its intentions, particularly in its future resolve to respect the NPT.
If the US and parts of Europe cannot bring themselves to take a dispassionate view, they should step aside and allow the lead to pass to states which can be dispassionate. NPT compliance is the business of all 189 states that are NPT parties; it ought not to be the preserve of a handful of states that have axes to grind, still less of a state – Israel – that is not even a party to the NPT.
]]>David E. Sanger reports for the New York Times that Iran sought to use its UN venue last week to “drum up support” for a negotiating strategy of lifting sanctions in tandem with a “nine-step plan” for “gradually suspending” uranium enrichment:
The Iranian plan is based on a proposal made [...]]]>
David E. Sanger reports for the New York Times that Iran sought to use its UN venue last week to “drum up support” for a negotiating strategy of lifting sanctions in tandem with a “nine-step plan” for “gradually suspending” uranium enrichment:
The Iranian plan is based on a proposal made to European officials in July. It essentially calls for a step-by-step dismantling of the sanctions while the Iranians end work at one of two sites where they are enriching what is known as “20 percent uranium.” Only when the Iranians reach step No. 9 — after all the sanctions are gone and badly depressed oil revenues have begun to flow again — would there be a “suspension” of the medium-enriched uranium production at the deep underground site called Fordow.
US officials, though, are not having it, claiming that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is merely stalling for time and hoping to break apart international support for sanctions:
]]>…. Obama administration officials say the deal is intended to generate headlines, but would not guarantee that Iran cannot produce a weapon. “The way they have structured it, you can move the fuel around, and it stays inside the country,” a senior Obama administration official said. “They could restart the program in a nanosecond. They don’t have to answer any questions from the inspectors” about evidence that they conducted research on nuclear weapons technology, but nonetheless would insist on a statement from the agency that all issues have been resolved.
…. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made it clear that the United States had no intention of relaxing the sanctions — particularly now, just as they show the first sign of forcing Iran’s leaders to rethink the costs of their nuclear program.
By Gary Sick
Every few months there is a concocted “crisis” involving suggestions that Israel is just on the verge of attacking Iran. This cycle started almost a decade ago, and it has repeated itself roughly annually, though sometimes more frequently.
In the early days, these alarms typically began with [...]]]>
By Gary Sick
Every few months there is a concocted “crisis” involving suggestions that Israel is just on the verge of attacking Iran. This cycle started almost a decade ago, and it has repeated itself roughly annually, though sometimes more frequently.
In the early days, these alarms typically began with a series of “leaks” by anonymous sources, usually to well connected Israeli or pro-Israeli reporters. For years it appeared that the US and world media would bite every time, with no apparent recollection that they had heard that tune before.
But when you have cried wolf so many times, even the main stream media, which loves an exciting story, begins to wonder if it is not being led by the nose. More important, over the past two years, as the veiled threats of an attack became ever more shrill, virtually the entire Israeli security establishment came out in opposition to such an operation. For a good summary, click here. Their reasoning was simple:
- Israel could not finish the job by itself; it could launch an attack by aircraft and cruise missile, which might do damage to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, but Israel could not finish the job. For that, they needed the United States.
- A unilateral Israel strike would very likely speed up Iran’s nuclear weapon development; Iran might well withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, kick out the IAEA inspectors who are our eyes and ears on the ground, and announce that, since they had been attacked by a nuclear weapons state, they were no longer bound by their pledge not to produce a weapon.
- The entire Persian Gulf region would be thrown into chaos and the price of oil would probably go sky high for some time. The costs to delicate world economies, still struggling to recover from the Great Recession, would be severe.
- The Iranian people, at least initially, would probably rally around their hard line leadership, as they have in the past when their national sovereignty was challenged. The Green reform movement would be undercut, since they would not dare associate themselves with external invaders.
- The United States would be blamed (and not only by Iran) for complicity in the attack, regardless of whether it was true. Iran and its allies might well retaliate against US military and civilian targets, in addition to Israel, thus sparking a much wider regional conflict.
- If an air strike did not work, the logical next step would be to go after the leadership. And, as we learned in Iraq, that means boots on the ground.
In short, an Israeli (or American) attack would very likely leave the situation much worse than it was before taking military action. Israel’s security would not be improved; in fact, it might be imperiled by the negative response of even Israel’s closest allies. And Iran’s creeping approach to nuclear capability might turn into a sprint.
This awareness of the “day after” effect has persuaded many security specialists that an Israeli attack would be the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.
It is worth remembering that Israel acquires significant leverage from this constant perception of imminent war. By keeping the Iranian nuclear case at the forefront of the world’s media, political leaders everywhere are more likely to pay a price in the form of lost revenues and political sparring with Iran, rather than facing the calamity of an outright war.
The problem is that economic sanctions and covert interference with Iran’s nuclear program have been pushed to such a level that they are morphing into outright economic and political warfare. Iran has lost roughly fifty percent of its national income in the past six months, in addition to a series of assassinations and cyber attacks on its infrastructure. Inflation and unemployment are soaring — affecting all levels of society, especially the poor. There is no longer even the pretense that these are “smart” sanctions directed only at Iran’s political and military leadership.
Iran has responded to this onslaught by entering into negotiations and offering some compromise positions, such as potentially terminating its uranium enrichment to the 20 percent level and eliminating its stockpile of such uranium. But the US and its allies have taken a hard line position that Iran must cease ALL enrichment if they want to see any relief from the sanctions.
It is doubtful that the US can make any significant concessions during an election year, and Iran has shown little willingness to yield to the pressure by terminating all uranium enrichment.
That is the context for the latest crisis about a possible Israeli attack.
Based on the experience of a decade of such crises, all of which faded away with no military action, I can only be skeptical. I am aware that “This is the Middle East…” i.e. that nations are capable of acting against their own interests in the hysteria of the moment.
My only concern is that Prime Minister Netanyahu, having made the case so often and so publicly for Israel’s right and even duty to attack, will have painted himself into a corner where there is no escape without actually risking national catastrophe.
Yes, that is a possibility. But I have sufficient confidence in the operation of Israeli democracy and the instinct for self preservation of its leaders to regard that possibility as vanishingly small.