by Wayne White
Instability and danger drove the international community to leave Libya to its own devices back in 2012, but Libya’s internal woes have only worsened.
NATO and its regional allies hoped spillover from Libyan strife could be kept to a minimum. Yet containment, not much of a coherent strategy in [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Instability and danger drove the international community to leave Libya to its own devices back in 2012, but Libya’s internal woes have only worsened.
NATO and its regional allies hoped spillover from Libyan strife could be kept to a minimum. Yet containment, not much of a coherent strategy in any case, has produced only limited success. Since there is no end in sight to Libya’s travails, the coalition that did so much heavy lifting to oust Muammar Qadhafi should explore whether external mediation can help his successors.
While seemingly endless rehashing of the September 2012 Benghazi attack continues to consume American political and media attention, Libya itself staggers from crisis to crisis, all woefully unreported. For weeks, Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and self-proclaimed eastern regional government chief Ibrahim al-Jathran have been involved in a face-off. Three key export terminals (west of the large eastern city of Benghazi) seized by Jathran last August have remained closed, cutting oil exports by more than a third. This has been compounded by closures elsewhere, reducing exports by about half, starving the shaky central government of much needed revenue.
Talks between the two sides continue, but so far without closure. Jathran, a former anti-Qadhafi rebel hero, has demanded a return to a regional oil revenue sharing ratio more favorable to the east that was in place during the pre-Qadhafi era, greater federalism to boost regional power, an inquiry into oil corruption, and an independent committee to oversee exports.
Meanwhile, parallel maneuvering continues. Several weeks ago Jathran tried to initiate exports directly to foreign markets bypassing Tripoli, but that was aborted when the government’s small navy fired warning shots toward a Maltese tanker seeking to load. For his part, Zeidan late last year negotiated the reopening of a major western Libyan oil field — closed by protesters — increasing Libyan oil that is getting out. In recent days, Zeidan also has been negotiating with a faction east of Jathran’s main area of control near Benghazi, hoping to reopen the Marsa al-Hariga terminal closer to the Egyptian border.
Both Zeidan and Jathran have their own separate problems. Some tribes previously supportive of Jathran’s eastern federalist cause have been grumbling that he is little more than a power hungry warlord, his shadow “cabinet” barely functions, and an Islamist leader within Jathran’s leadership quit at the end of 2013. Just today a Benghazi school was bombed, presumably by Ansar al-Sharia fanatics who remain at large in the city.
Unable to export oil independently because of the government’s naval presence and jitters among foreign buyers, Jathran’s regional government remains unfunded. Since late last month, formerly pro-Jathran Petroleum Facilities Guards at the closed terminals have been protesting his failure to replace their lost government pay.
Zeidan, from a small liberal party, has been beset with problems on various fronts. The two leading factions in Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC), want to replace him, but these nationalists on the one hand and Islamists on the other cannot agree on a candidate. Last week four Islamists resigned from Zeidan’s cabinet. Last Wednesday unknown assailants attempted to assassinate Zeidan’s Deputy Prime Minister in Tripoli, which remains the scene of frequent gunfights.
The extreme weakness of the government’s small army in training was underscored last month. To wrest control of a strategic airfield at Sebha in Libya’s Saharan southwest from various local armed factions, Zeidan had to persuade a battle-hardened northern militia controlling the port city of Misrata to go down and restore the situation for him.
The GNC announced last week that elections for a 60-member constitutional assembly will be held on Feb. 20. That body would have 120 days to draft a constitution for submission to a national referendum. If approved, elections for Libya’s first post-transitional parliament will be held later this year. With a backdrop of division, disarray and violence, it hardly seems likely that this process will unfold without a host of problems.
Meanwhile, a Libya in turmoil continues to export violence. French military intervention thwarted a jihadist attempt to overrun Mali last year. With France drawing down its troop presence, attacks against government targets continue there with most munitions coming across the border from southwestern Libya (largely beyond Tripoli’s control). In addition to militants and associated smugglers, Qadhafi supporters also reportedly play a role in cross-border activity. To the north in Tunisia, the one “Arab Spring” bright spot, a shoot-out took place on the 3rd in which 8 died when Tunisian National Guard cadres stormed a hideout of Tunisia’s own Ansar al-Sharia group filled with explosives, small arms, and RPGs (materiel probably smuggled in from Libya).
Egypt, however, may face the most serious Libyan overspill. The jihadist Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group, based in Sinai but generating a number of attacks in Egypt proper, appears to be receiving much of its arms and explosives from Libya. Some believe the group may have secured some surface-to-air missiles via the Libyan black market, posing a potential threat to both Egyptian and Israeli commercial airliners.
Cracking down on this flow is difficult. The latest attempt involved the arrest by Egyptian authorities of a Libyan militia leader involved in arms trafficking. In response, gunmen promptly kidnapped five Egyptian diplomats in Tripoli. Cairo was forced to release the militia kingpin in order to secure the release of its diplomats.
Aside from nuclear negotiations with Iran, UN, US and broader regional diplomacy has focused on Syria or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet, progress on Syria has been minimal and so long as the Netanyahu government remains in power and Palestinian divisions remain, there is only an extremely remote possibility that Secretary Kerry can break the impasse over core issues.
With such great difficulties facing Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian efforts, extending to Tripoli the opportunity to utilize the good offices of the UN with the backing of members of the international community seems reasonable. Ali Zeidan might shun such external involvement out of fear it would accord his rivals too much legitimacy. He might instead prefer to keep waiting out Jathran, hoping the latter will succumb to dissention within his own camp.
Nonetheless, even if Jathran caves, with Libya fast approaching a demanding political agenda related to elections and a permanent constitution (stacked alongside Zeidan’s own myriad problems), diplomacy could be useful in other respects. So, with Libyan-associated regional collateral damage considerable, little seems to be lost in offering an alternative, including the possibility of an overseas venue like Geneva for domestic dialogue.
]]>by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one area of notable recovery: oil exports. As an experiment in post-authoritarian nationhood, the Libyan situation may be more troubling than at any time since the end of the struggle against the Qadhafi regime.
The central government recently has been in a state of flux. Beleaguered Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced at the end of July he will decrease the number of cabinet positions or try to govern more effectively by meeting with a smaller group of core ministers. So far, however, the only notable result has been Deputy Prime Minister Awad al-Barasi’s resignation on August 3, blaming “a dysfunctional government where my powers are lost.” Meanwhile, despite the passage of time since the former regime’s demise, central authority has stagnated and instability has been on the rise.
Symptomatic of this problem is the continuation of various autonomous local governing entities centered on armed groups left over from the struggle against Qadhafi. They dominate various regions, one major city, many urban neighborhoods and frequently defy or hound portions of the central government even in the capital of Tripoli.
One salient ongoing dispute revolves around the status of literally thousands of political prisoners often languishing in miserable, improvised local holding pens outside government control. The most notorious case is that of Saif al-Qadhafi, the deceased dictator’s most important son and senior lieutenant. Despite repeated demands for custody on the part of the central government and the International Criminal Court (ICC), Saif remains in Zintan in Libya’s arid central mountains, a prisoner of the local Berber militia that originally captured him. The only outside contact he has had was a meeting last year with his Australian ICC-appointed defense attorney, who was then also detained for three weeks. Since then, new charges have been brought against Saif by authorities in Zintan: allegedly giving his ICC attorney “national security information.”
Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani recently declared that the central government would not allow “Mickey Mouse trials.” However, militias holding the real power in many locales claim the national judiciary remains dominated by officials from the former regime; they have stormed Marghani’s office in anger over delays and enforced their own justice in areas they control. To wit, the autonomous militia controlling Libya’s third largest city, Misrata, sentenced Qadhafi’s former Education Minister, Ahmad Ibrahim, to death on July 31. Technically, the Libyan Supreme Court must confirm such a sentence before he faces a firing squad, but whether that will happen is questionable.
It seems encouraging to many Americans that Washington finally handed down an indictment against some of those responsible for the Benghazi consulate attack last year, most notably local Benghazi militia chief Ahmad Abu Khattala. Yet, US authorities involved in the investigation such as the FBI have been hampered seriously by the woeful law enforcement situation across Libya — also the reason it took this long to bring charges against at least some of those involved in that infamous assault.
Such difficulties should come as no surprise. In a country flush with competing local and regional identities as well as all manner of weaponry in the hands of various armed groups, Benghazi alone has been hit with a wave of political killings over the past couple of weeks. Those murdered include judicial officials, lawyers, political activists, a senior police official and other members of the Libyan security services. Most recently, on August 9, the anchor of a popular Benghazi TV show was assassinated. Many of the victims spoke out against or sought to curb the power of local militias. At the end of July, there also were two bombings — one near a courthouse and the other close to a Justice Ministry office. Some of these incidents have triggered demonstrations or attacks by angry mobs against sites associated with Benghazi-based armed groups presumed responsible, in one case, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another glaring example of central government weakness came shortly after the attack on the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood: a riot inside and around Benghazi’s al-Kwafiya Prison that resulted in the breakout of roughly 1,200 prisoners. Most escaped inmates were accused of serious crimes or had been associated with the Qadhafi Regime; intervention to contain the situation by government special forces apparently had relatively little effect. The mass escape most likely reinforced the determination of autonomous local authorities and militias not to turn over their prisoners to the government.
Despite the unrest, the unexpectedly rapid rebound of Libya’s oil export capabilities had been one major success. Yet, since July, a wave of protests and strikes by oil workers and guards has shut down two key oil export terminals, Libya’s largest refinery, and threatened to reduce production at inland oil fields. Oil exports for July were down 20 percent; so far August exports are down a staggering 50 percent. Workers are reacting to management and pay issues.
A resolution to this crisis does not yet seem imminent, in part because Oil Minister Abelbari al-Arusa initially took a defiant stance. Now, however, Prime Minister Zeidan has warned that Libya’s national budget is imperiled, and there are talks. In fact, the two terminals re-opened over the weekend, only to close only hours later today without any oil being lifted. Meanwhile, foreign investors already reluctant to inject money into an unstable Libya have been further shaken.
The overriding question at this point may not be how a way out of this maelstrom can be charted, but whether any truly game-changing progress can be made in the near-term. Most all Libya’s challenges today are deeply enmeshed in the complex fractured politics of a country with the least developed sense of national identity and civil society among the five key Arab North African states. So the ability of the international community to help is limited (compounded by drawdowns in diplomatic personnel and curtailed travel inside Libya in view of the dangers now posed by serving there).
Consequently, there is the very real possibility Libya could remain unstable for quite a while. Such a situation would, of course, continue to provide havens for extremist elements both foreign and domestic stemming from exceedingly weak, insufficiently coherent and geographically constrained national governance (as with the recent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb intrusions into southeast Libya and last year’s Benghazi consulate assault).
]]>My dear friend and colleague, Henry Precht, in his discussion Wednesday about the sad path of US-Iran affairs in the last 30 years, did not mention that a day after his snowy trip to the State Department, the Embassy in Tehran was under heavy [...]]]>
The attack was not totally unexpected because there was evidence of someone listening to our Marines’ communications and a small compound that we had considered retreating to in the event of attack was destroyed by bombing two days previously. Not much preparation, however, could realistically be done in the chaos of early revolutionary enthusiasm. The Iranian police guard force that had been with us for years had been removed. Cinema was useless guidance; there was no cavalry riding hard in our direction nor flight of additional marines landing with flags flying. As Ambassador William Sullivan said to me, we had to suck it up and pray.
The previous evening in his office, the Ambassador reviewed instructions to the small marine force that basically had the marines retreat slowly from guard posts without engaging in combat against the heavily armed invaders and to fall back into the chancery. We were aware that many years previously, when the Russian embassy was invaded, they had fought and perished.
Within the Embassy, the Ambassador and the Lieutenant General in charge of the assistance program very narrowly escaped being killed as bullets swept through the front office. Shock, fear and near panic. And then widespread telephoning to just about any person you might happen to have come to know in the five days of the new post-revolutionary government. In the meantime, we were letting onto the second floor staff and marines who went through clouds of tea gas as the invaders slipped into the basement and first floor. Documents that had not been destroyed and sensitive communications were being torn apart. Finally when the attackers, who were standing outside a 1/4 inch steel door that had been repeatedly penetrated by gunfire, threatened to set the chancery on fire, we opened the door and two Keffiyeh-clad young men entered with their kalashnikovs. Not long later, an informal rescue force was sent by Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim Yazdi and after a bit of palaver the leftists departed.
We were extraordinarily lucky that the official from a five day-old government recognized the danger we were in, the possibility that any ties with the US were at stake and that he had the courage to send a force from his party element to save us — Americans, of all people.
Ten months later, when hundreds of students again invaded the chancery grounds, that same government was not in a political position to repeat their act of courage and the hostages endured their long imprisonment. This became known as the Iran hostage crisis.
These two examples of the seizure of the same embassy with a few of the same people and with the same government in power and other actual take-overs made me wonder whether the Senate had learned anything from past experiences and whether in the Benghazi hearings they even called upon those who have been unfortunate enough to be caught in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Senator McCain has been a man of true guts and perhaps the others close to him are as well, but quite obviously they were more interested in trying to make political points from the tragedy, which they hoped might affect the election. McCain at one point appeared indignant that we apparently were not certain about the identity of the group that was firing all sorts of weapons. Well, Senators, no one was going to go out into the street and enquire; keeping your head down and figuring how to survive and hoping some friendly force might arrive in time was, I imagine, the driving force.
The number of appalling questions on this tragedy was quite disturbing. It has not been a shining period by the Senate; perhaps their official background makes it all somewhat understandable. When they make their trips abroad, they are met at the plane, and hastened to town by armed convoy trying to avoid all dangerous and unpleasant spots in the itinerary.
Another more serious problem we face is the unwillingness of so many on the hill to realize that we are going through a period of great transformation of power and attitudes toward the United States. They can fight it all they want but that only adds to the difficulty of life abroad.
In recent decades, the destruction by bombing or the attacks by cadres of anti-American terroists have neared common-place; Pakistan, Beirut, East Africa, Kuwait, Bogota, Ankara the other day (check google, the list is too long to produce here.) Rather than spending time looking for some avoidance of responsibility and threatening to hold up the appointment of John Kerry as Secretary of State, the Senate Committee could have taken a serious look at the entire range of possible help that was available.
One thing remains clear and deserves repetition: if the government to which our envoys are accredited finds itself unable or not daring enough to risk sending counter forces, your embassy is as good as gone. There may be an example awaiting us of dispatching a well-armed rescue force, but that will be the unusual one. Bombing can only be avoided if the chancery is isolated and immune from daily traffic. Some governments are very reluctant to agree to special traffic arrangements since our embassies are frequently located in busy neighborhoods. When governments are dealing with major political disorder, our facilities are in danger and that seems to cover much of the Middle East and areas further east.
Two issues should predominate in our search for more safety. When we are aware of local insecurity and there is some history of anti-Americanism sentiment, do we try to continue to maintain normal relations, reduce staff, or in extremis close the facility? Budget questions may also intrude.
In pre-revolutionary Tehran I recommended a sort of half-staff that would permit much of the more important duties to be met, but one experienced political officer thought that three men and a vicious dog would suffice! In view of the course of events there, he may have been right.
What do you do when a government like Pakistan sits idly by until the embassy staff was in dire danger from fire. Should we continue any special programs with a country that does little to help? Should we take commensurate military action? There are many variations of these questions that deserve careful thought, but this will not occur if political maneuvering is the main ambition.
Photo: President Barack Obama and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton honor the Benghazi victims at the Transfer of Remains Ceremony held at Andrews Air Force Base, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, September 14, 2012. An attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya claimed the lives of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, Information Management Officer Sean Smith, and security personnel Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty on September 11, 2012. [State Department photo/ Public Domain]
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