by Peter Jenkins
The talks to resolve concern about Iran’s nuclear program will resume in early September. The negotiators will have had time to read and reflect on a well-informed and wise report that the International Crisis Group (ICG) published this week. Let us hope they will have done so.
The latest [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The talks to resolve concern about Iran’s nuclear program will resume in early September. The negotiators will have had time to read and reflect on a well-informed and wise report that the International Crisis Group (ICG) published this week. Let us hope they will have done so.
The latest negotiating deadline is November 24, which marks one year from the date the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) was signed in Geneva. A further extension may be possible but will not be what any of the parties desire. The alternatives to an agreement are deeply unattractive, as the ICG points out: “a return to the sanctions versus centrifuges race” or recourse to force to destroy Iranian installations, triggering a chain of unpredictable consequences in a region where, arguably, the West already has its hands full.
So the stakes are high.
The parties cannot have failed to realise that. Yet to date both Iran and the West have been reluctant to shift from maximalist demands that they know the other cannot afford, for domestic political reasons, to concede.
This is particularly true of the issue that is at the heart of the negotiation, the resolution of which can open the way to an agreement: Iran’s possession of a nuclear technology that can be used for both civil and military purposes but is not outlawed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—uranium enrichment. This is how the ICG sums up the problem:
Negotiators are bogged down in a worn-out debate over exactly why Iran insists on uranium enrichment; its economic logic or lack thereof; whether Iran should be subject to restrictions beyond those imposed on other members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and how to calculate the time Iran would need to enrich enough uranium for one weapon – which, assuming other abilities are present, measures its “breakout capacity”.
Their solution to the problem is as follows:
- Iran should accept more quantitative constraints on the number of its centrifuges; in return, the P5+1 should accept the continuation of nuclear research and development in Iran that would enable Tehran to make greater qualitative progress;
- Iran should commit to using Russian-supplied nuclear fuel for that plant’s lifetime in return for further Russian guarantees of that supply and P5+1 civil nuclear cooperation, especially on nuclear fuel fabrication, that gradually prepares it to assume such responsibility for a possible additional plant or plants by the end of the agreement, in eleven to sixteen years;
- Instead of subjective timelines dictated by the political calendar, both sides should agree to use objective measures, such as the time the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs to investigate Iran’s past nuclear activities, to determine the duration of the final agreement’s several phases.
These recommendations are based on a sound understanding of Iranian interests—the kind of understanding that is an essential prerequisite to an agreement that caters to the core needs of all parties.
But I am not sure that the understanding goes far enough. Might Iran want more than “a meaningful enrichment program, continued scientific advancement, and tangible sanctions relief” as the ICG says? I suspect the Iranians want to be spared the indignity of being thought dumb enough to try to break out under the eyes of international inspectors at either of their declared enrichment sites.
I also wonder whether the ICG’s recommendations are as balanced as possible. It seems to me that they entail asking rather more of Iran than of the US and its allies. The balance could be improved by the West abandoning its quest to minimize the risk of break out by reducing the number of operating centrifuges from the number agreed on last November, i.e. by imposing additional “quantitative constraints.”
The case for abandonment was strengthened on August 27 when the AFP reported that the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) is ready to test a far more efficient centrifuge than those currently installed. If Iran’s leaders were to decide to break out (there being as yet no evidence that they have), it would make more sense for them to use a small number of advanced centrifuges at a small, undeclared site than to use first-generation centrifuges at sites that are visited daily by inspectors.
So the access to centrifuge workshops that Iran conceded upon the signing of the JPA, and an Iranian commitment to refrain from deploying additional centrifuges during a confidence-building period look to be worth more than additional constraints on current capacity.
In any case, the US and Iran have come a long way since President Barack Obama and President Hassan Rouhani spoke by telephone last September. The ICG is to be commended for a report that can help them complete their journey.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry sits across from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Vienna, Austria, on July 13, 2014 before beginning a bilateral meeting focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Credit: State Department
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their closed-door dealings. However, judging by the tone of the briefings by the US and Iran coming out of the 5-day session that ended in Vienna last Friday, the pressure has increased as the self-imposed deadline looms. The negotiations can certainly be extended, but as a senior US official noted in a background briefing to the press:
We are all focused on reaching July 20th. As I’ve said before, if we get close and we need a few more days, I don’t think anyone will mind. But we are very focused on getting it done now. We have all agreed that time is not in anyone’s interest; it won’t help get there. And if indeed by the time we get to July 20th we are still very far apart, then I think we will all have to evaluate what that means and what is possible or not.
What are the odds of the now formally titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” being signed by Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) at the end of July? Independent scholar and LobeLog contributor Farideh Farhi offered her take during a June 21 interview with Iran Review:
Two factors work in favor of the eventual resolution of the nuclear dossier and transformation of US-Iran relations from a constant state of hostility and non-communication to interaction, even if not necessarily in constructive ways at all times. One is the seriousness of the negotiations and the political will on the part of the current administrations in both countries to prevent the nuclear dossier from becoming a pretext for war or spiraling into something uncontrollable. And the second is the high cost of failure now that both sides have invested so heavily in the talks.
But there are also factors that inhibit confidence in assuming a point of no return to status quo ante. First, in both countries there are political forces that oppose any type of interaction and lessening of tensions, although at this point my take is that opponents, encouraged by regional players, have more significant institutional power in the United States than Iran. In other words, along with political power, they have extensive policy instruments – the most important of which are legally embedded in the sanctions regime – that can be relied upon to undermine or prevent political accord between the two countries.
The second factor is the unequal power relationship between the two countries, which has consistently led various US administrations to be tempted by the argument that economic, political muscle, and military threats will eventually pay off and force various administrations in Iran to give in irrespective of domestic political equations and the stances they have taken within their own political environment. Currently, this second factor is part and parcel of broader indecision or uncertainty in the US’ strategic calculus regarding whether to come to terms with Iran as a prominent regional player or continue its three decade policy of containing it and alternatively Iran’s commitment to being an independent and powerful regional actor irrespective of fears in the neighborhood.
This dynamic of one side always wanting more than the other can give and/or alternatively being unwilling or incapable of matching concessions with what the other side deems as comparable concessions has been the source of impasse in negotiations. This is not to suggest that inflexibility or lack of realism only comes from one side. During the previous administration, Iran also miscalculated in its assessment of the leverage the United States could build through its ferocious sanctions regime in the same way the United States miscalculated in its assessment of the extent to which Iran could expand its nuclear program in the face of sanctions. As such, Iran’s expectation for the sanctions regime that took years to build to be lifted quickly and permanently is as unrealistic as the US expectation for Iran’s enrichment program to be significantly scaled back.
As to the impact of Iran-US direct talks, it is still possible for the unprecedented high profile direct engagement between the two countries in and of itself to lead to some sort of transformation in the relationship irrespective of the results of nuclear talks. If indeed the two countries’ foreign ministers or even presidents can continue to pick up the phone and talk to each other over matters of common concern or for the sake of de-escalating tensions, that by itself is an important achievement of nuclear talks and its significance should not be under-estimated. But this also depends on how the potential failure of nuclear talks is managed by both sides.
Read more here.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.
Photo: The Iranian nuclear negotiating team headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (center) and Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi (to Zarif’s right) and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.
]]>With bilateral US-Iran talks taking place in Geneva today, notably topped for the US by Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, who led earlier secret exchanges, negotiations between Iran and world powers might be entering their final phase — or not.
Such is the nature of difficult negotiations, involving countries that, in [...]]]>
With bilateral US-Iran talks taking place in Geneva today, notably topped for the US by Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, who led earlier secret exchanges, negotiations between Iran and world powers might be entering their final phase — or not.
Such is the nature of difficult negotiations, involving countries that, in the case of the United States and Iran, have a 35-year history of bad relations. Such is also the nature of negotiations where the stakes are so high.
Should the negotiations fail, at the extreme Iran might move toward developing nuclear weapons, though it stoutly denies this intention. To keep it from doing so, the US has pledged that the military option “remains on the table,” though it devoutly prefers not to use it or to have its hand forced by Israel.
The qualifier “or not” is necessary because the actual negotiations have been conducted more privately than one would have expected; because the notional deadline of July 20 isn’t a true deadline at all; and because, as happens with such hotly contested and highly complex issues as are involved here, there can be “many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip” even when everyone is acting with the best of intentions.
Counters to skepticism that this round of talks will produce a final agreement include the fact that just about every issue that could be raised has been talked virtually to death. A host of experts has been engaged. The finer points of all issues have long been on the table and have been masticated by all sides “from here to Sunday.”
Indeed, if there are any points where the interests of the parties are not crystal clear, it is not from lack of trying. That doesn’t mean that the different parties — perhaps all of them — have not held back that one last point in hopes of getting a slightly better deal at the 11th hour, in particular to be able to argue to critics back home, of which there is a plethora, that, in the end “we showed them [fill in the blank] that we are tough bargainers.”
Shades of the Cold War
This is not the first time that negotiations of this importance have come down to the wire in this fashion. During the Cold War, this was typically part of every set of US-Soviet arms control talks, which were just as abstruse, just as contentious to the last niggling detail, and just as freighted with the political need for each side to argue that it had obtained the best deal that was humanly possible.
The parallel is apt. In both cases, long before the negotiating end-game, the people sitting at the table across from one another have understood the terms, both great and small, of the deal that will best suit all claimants and can produce a diplomatic solution. But in both cases, US-Soviet arms control negotiations and talks on the Iranian nuclear program, the devil is very much not “in the details,” but in the politics, and not even in the last little compromises that each side needs in order to counter the critics back home.
The politics are about the nature of the basic relationships between the contending parties. In US-Soviet relations, the need was for both sides to be able to claim that they were equals, that the nuclear symbols of relative power were finely balanced. Whether one side or the other had a few more missiles or warheads or “throw weight” had no strategic significance in the event of conflict: utter destruction to both sides was guaranteed. But the symbols of “equality” or, more prosaically, of “face,” were critical.
Of course, Iran cannot represent itself as the equal of any of its interlocutors, by any relevant measure, but both it and its negotiating partners need to emerge from the talks with a clear sense that they have preserved what is politically essential to them.
There is a second parallel between the Cold War and now. Arms control talks between the US and Soviet Union were only partly about weapons themselves and being able to represent to publics and other countries that “parity” — a stand-in for perceptions of power — was achieved. At least as important was the experience of both sides in getting to know and understand one another in terms of interests, expectations, ambitions, hopes, and fears. The fact that US-Soviet arms control negotiations took place was as important as the results produced, and they played a central role in developing détente and eventually making possible the end of the Cold War.
That positive political result may not result from the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, Russia + Germany) negotiations with Iran, but it should not be ruled out. Already, with new leadership in both the United States (President Barack Obama) and Iran (President Hassan Rouhani, generally supported by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei) the possibilities for détente and perhaps an end to the US-Iran Cold War are being developed at the bargaining table. This is much to be hoped, given that, outside of contention over nuclear matters, there is a good deal that can move Iran and the West in similar directions, not least regarding Afghanistan’s future, possibly also Iraq’s, shared opposition to al-Qaeda and its ilk, and other interests like counter-piracy and freedom of navigation, especially through the Strait of Hormuz.
There is also a third parallel. In its arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, US presidents faced intense domestic political opposition to reaching agreements with the enemy. In retrospect, no American in his right mind can still declare his opposition to the détente with the Soviet Union pursued by several presidents. At the time, however, critics abounded, leaders were excoriated, and nay-sayers in Congress did their best to undercut the efforts of the White House.
The domestic politics factor
It is far from clear that President Rouhani can surmount opposition in Iran to reaching a deal with the “Great Satan,” even though, at last count, he seems to have the support of the Supreme Leader. Meanwhile, many powerful Iranians, especially in the clerical establishment, fervently hope that the current talks will collapse. Indeed, they would welcome the West raising the stakes so high in the diplomatic end-game that Rouhani will fail.
That is also true in the United States, and this may ultimately result in the undoing of a potential agreement, whatever proves to be possible at the bargaining table.
President Obama is under intense pressure, especially from a significant part of Congress, to be unyielding on a range of matters — the details of which are less relevant than their use to cause him to flounder. Indeed, he has struggled to keep Congress from pressing for increased economic sanctions against Iran, at the very moment when US bona fides are being tested in regard to implementing last November’s Joint Plan of Action and to offering sanctions relief indispensable to a final agreement.
The interests of others
The key to this struggle over the president’s capacity to act in the US national interest is the fact that, unlike the case of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, he must also consider the perspectives of a range of countries in the Middle East, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.
It’s not just that the US has to be certain that Iran cannot retain a capability at some point in the future to “break out” and move toward a bomb –which is also very much in the American interest. It is also that both Israel and most of the Gulf Arabs oppose, on any terms, potential reconciliation between Iran and the West and especially the United States. This element of their concern is not about security, per se, but about power, and especially Iran’s potential regional role, post-sanctions and post-isolation.
These states are concerned in particular by the prospect of normalized US-Iran relations. It is no surprise therefore, that several of America’s Middle East partners are, at best, ambivalent about signs of possible success in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. From their perspective, they would welcome the trammeling of Iran’s possible nuclear ambitions; but they oppose Iran’s remerging as a full-fledged competitor for power and influence in the region, potentially a collateral product of success in the negotiations.
The implications of such a development obviously need to be considered by the United States, as leader among Western states, both in the Middle East and beyond, as the possibility emerges of an end to the Iranian-Western Cold War.
As much as they would like the status quo to continue, some local states, notably some Gulf Arabs, are not sitting on their hands. They are already exploring the possibility of changed relations with Iran, as demonstrated by recent high-level exchanges of visits with Tehran. Egypt is also adjusting, symbolized by its invitation to Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei for President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s inauguration this week (Iran is sending its deputy foreign minister). China and Russia are meanwhile ready to step up economic and other ties; and the private sector throughout the West is restlessly waiting at the starting gate.
In the final analysis, if President Obama and his Iranian counterparts can weather domestic opposition to an agreement — where Obama faces congressional opposition that is heavily influenced by Israel — we will witness the beginning of fundamental change in the Middle East. It is far from clear, however, that the US government has begun to think through the consequences of this and started to plan accordingly.
Photo: Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman photographed here during last years negotiations in Geneva, will be among the top-level diplomats meeting for bilateral talks in the Swiss city today. June 9-10. Credit: ISNA
]]>by Farideh Farhi
Speaking to CNN during the World Economic Forum in Davos this week Foreign Minister Javad Zarif got personal.
He chided the US president, though he only named the “the White House”, for playing fast and loose with facts.
The White House version of the first-phase deal reached [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Speaking to CNN during the World Economic Forum in Davos this week Foreign Minister Javad Zarif got personal.
He chided the US president, though he only named the “the White House”, for playing fast and loose with facts.
The White House version of the first-phase deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 in November both “underplays concessions” to Iran and “overplays Iranian commitments,” he said.
Zarif also subtly reminded viewers that it was only the White House that produced an English and Persian rendition of the accord, which it called a “Fact Sheet,” and immediately distributed it after the deal was signed rather than the text of the Joint Agreement.
“Why don’t we stick to what we agreed? Why do we need to produce different texts?” he asked.
Prodded to give a specific example of the differing interpretations Zarif referred to the term “dismantling,” which he said has become part of US “terminology” on the deal.
“The White House is trying to portray [the deal] as basically the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program,” but nothing even resembling dismantling is in text, he said. He challenged, “show me” a single word that even resembles dismantling or could be identified as such.
The Iranian negotiators and most Iranian politicians have been rather patient with the narrative that both President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have been using to frame the interim accord.
A couple of politicians, such as conservative MP Ahmad Tavakoli, who runs the influential Alef website, initially even reasoned that the narrative is for US domestic consumption. A similar argument was made by the Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman, Marzieh Afkham, which is an interesting inversion of US discourse regarding Iranian domestic politics; suddenly it was the US President who had to play loose with facts in order to placate the hardliners in his country while maintaining the support of his flank.
But the repeated assertions and renditions of how little Iranians are getting in exchange for the “dismantling” of their nuclear program is turning into a headache for the Foreign Ministry.
While the hardline cries of surrender and “nuclear holocaust” can be ignored, the notion that the Iranian negotiators may be hiding extra concessions that they have not revealed to the Iranian public and the Parliament cannot.
On Wednesday, there were reports that 150 MPs had written a letter to Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani objecting to the “lack of detailed information” regarding the Joint Agreement. Ruhollah Hosseinian, a hardliner opposed to any kind of deal with the US, took the lack of information tack and objected to the negotiation team’s “hiding of facts.” He added that the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action does not serve Iran’s interest and will lead to the suspension of Iran’s nuclear program in its entirety.
Meanwhile, Iran’s senior negotiator Abbas Araghchi has been spending quite a bit of his time in Parliament arguing otherwise — to no avail. A few MPs keep saying that they are not satisfied with the Foreign Ministry’s explanations, probably causing him further trips to the legislative body.
In response, government spokesman Mohammad-Baqer Nobakht made clear that the Foreign Ministry remains fully in charge of the nuclear negotiations and rejected pretenses by various hardliners that some sort of oversight committee has been created because certain elements of the agreements are even worrisome to Leader Ali Khamenei — an assertion that prompted Afkham to demand “substantiation.” In fact, the critical MPs have so far been unable to create an oversight committee even within the Parliament. Still, this hasn’t stopped the many speculations and declarations regarding the hidden aspects of the Joint Agreement that fit better with the White House narrative. Araghchi and Zarif will undoubtedly have to keep explaining.
This headache is shared by the chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, who entered the fray last week by explaining that 20 percent enrichment is no longer needed, no facility has been closed, research on centrifuges continues and so does some construction at the Arak nuclear plant. On Wednesday he also had to deny publicly that he had written a letter to Khamenei criticizing aspects of the agreement.
One could argue that Zarif’s statements to CNN regarding Iran’s commitment — merely stopping the enrichment of uranium beyond 5% and zero dismantling — is payback; he is simply doing to Obama and Kerry what they are doing to him. Of course, he is also well aware of the way Iranian domestic politics impact pronouncements by Iranian politicians. After months of talking about the need for a “win-win scenario” for the resolution of the nuclear imbroglio, Zarif must have cringed when he heard President Hassan Rouhani declare the surrender of Iran’s negotiating partners last week. Regardless, Zarif’s approach to political haggling remains more understated and less pretentious.
Rightly or wrongly, Zarif is a believer in the power of international law and signed agreements; that’s why wrangling over a few words seriously endangered the success of the Geneva deal. His call for the Obama administration to avoid fact sheets and rely on the text of the Joint Plan of Action derives from this belief.
He can accordingly be seen as naïve or not cognizant of the privilege US politicians assume in only considering their own politics and being oblivious to the impact their words have on other countries. Or, he could just be displaying his ability to play the same game if the other side continues to ignore the Rouhani administration’s domestic predicament.
Zarif wants US officials to stop talking as though the Iranian side of the Geneva deal is not in the room. After all, the US government has invested sufficiently in Persian-language broadcasting to ensure that every single word uttered by US officials also reaches Iranian ears. Of course, getting what he wants is highly unlikely.
Photo Credit: ISNA/Mohsen Ghaemi
]]>by François Nicoullaud
Had the foreign ministers of the seven countries involved in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remained at home, the last round that were held in Geneva would have been presented as a success. At the end of that session, the two lead negotiators — Catherine Ashton for the [...]]]>
by François Nicoullaud
Had the foreign ministers of the seven countries involved in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remained at home, the last round that were held in Geneva would have been presented as a success. At the end of that session, the two lead negotiators — Catherine Ashton for the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), and Abbas Araqchi for Iran — would have issued a joint communiqué expressing their satisfaction with the important progress achieved and their hope to reach, with some more hard work, a complete agreement in one or two more meetings.
Ministers don’t usually join a complex negotiating process unless the agreement under discussion is all but finalized. One or two points of contention can be left to their discretion if they correspond to their level of responsibility, which is political, certainly not technical. This was not the case in Geneva’s last meeting. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, was already there from the outset. One day later, the US Secretary of State John Kerry abruptly modified his Middle East agenda so he could rush to Geneva. But, at that time, the text of the draft agreement still bore square brackets around language touching upon crucial points.
Why, then, was such a decision made? Perhaps it was Kerry’s initiative, or that of Catherine Ashton, or maybe it was the U.S. team in Geneva — or both — who told Mr. Kerry to come since the agreement was close to completion. (In any case, somewhere along the way there was a wrong assessment of the situation, and probably some dose of over-confidence in the American capacity to wrap up an agreement.) In still another hypothesis, perhaps the draft was practically finalized, thus authorizing the arrival of the ministers for signature, but the French unexpectedly reneged on their initial consent. This would have represented a grave breach of rules on France’s part. Until now, no evidence has confirmed such a scenario.
From then on, things could only go from bad to worse. The mere announcement of Kerry’s arrival created a wave of unfounded optimism. Informed of Kerry’s decision, the European ministers felt an obligation to come to Geneva, if only to be part of the game. Pressed by a crowd of journalists, the ministers could not keep silent for long. Most of them confined themselves to general, upbeat statements. But Laurent Fabius went the opposite way. His breaking of the rule of confidentiality and his visible annoyance at the turn of events made him, and France with him, the lightning rod, attracting all the frustrations created by the widening gap between high expectations and the practical hurdles of the negotiation process. And nothing could be changed by the last-minute arrival of the Russian and Chinese ministers. That session was already doomed.
If there was a mistake on Fabius’ side, it was to corner himself in the role of the bad cop. Of course, he could have also made a deliberate choice in favor of French interests in Israel and in the Arabian Peninsula; history will tell. But if it was indeed a matter of commercial interest, France should have positioned itself as the best friend of Iran — where 75 million consumers crave western goods and equipment — and appealed for an early lifting of sanctions. Indeed, Iran is a country where France could almost instantly sell at least one or two nuclear power plants, two or three dozen Airbuses, resume production of hundreds of thousands cars, regain the exploitation of major oil and gas fields, and even substantially upgrade a widely obsolete system of defense.
Coming back to diplomacy, in previous times, when officials empowered by their respective governments had reached an agreement on a common draft, they used to initial the text. This meant that the negotiation was closed. It was then up to the governments to approve or reject the document as it was. If all governments agreed on the text, it could be signed at the political level, usually through a meeting of foreign ministers. This was of course before cell phones, and government airliners that now enable ministers to rush instantly to any corner of the planet. But the participants to the current negotiations would be well advised to keep in mind at least the spirit of such time-proven procedures. This could indeed be useful for the rough ride still ahead of them, as the next round of talks will need to bypass several more difficult and tense stages beyond the first agreement, which will hopefully be signed soon.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Geneva – While Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are remaining secretive about the details of ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the Nov. 7-8 talks here have kicked off with official statements that some “progress” has already occurred.
After describing the negotiations as “extremely complex,” the spokesman for [...]]]>
by Jasmin
RamseyGeneva – While Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are remaining secretive about the details of ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the Nov. 7-8 talks here have kicked off with official statements that some “progress” has already occurred.
After describing the negotiations as “extremely complex,” the spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told reporters today that the discussions “are now heading into a serious phase.”
“We very much hope there will be concrete progress here over the next few days,” said Michael Mann.
Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi meanwhile told Iranian State TV this afternoon that the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) has agreed to Iran’s ”proposed negotiation framework” and that discussions about the content can now begin.
Revised Schedule
Earlier today Iranian press had reported that Iran’s Foreign Minister and chief nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif would be meeting his Italian counterpart in Rome after his working breakfast meeting with Ashton, but that meeting has been cancelled.
Zarif will now remain in Geneva while the Iranians attend several bilateral meetings today with their U.S., Chinese and Russian counterparts; he is also scheduled to meet with Ashton at 6pm tonight.
Secretary of State John Kerry and Zarif made history when they met bilaterally in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. That meeting was followed by the historic 15-minute telephone conversation between Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and US President Barack Obama.
The seeds for those events were planted months in advance according to a Wall Street Journal report on behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the Obama administration that involved “secret meetings and telephone calls and convening an assortment of Arab monarchs, Iranian exiles and former U.S. diplomats to clandestinely ferry messages between Washington and Tehran.”
Potential stumbling blocks
While developments have contributed at least in part to the clearly upbeat mood here now, reaching a mutual agreement on Iran’s insistence on what it considers its right to peacefully enrich uranium as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the extreme sanctions regime the Iranians have long been seeking relief from would be integral for a final deal.
Although the Obama administration has recently been lobbying for a temporary pause in the implementation of more sanctions on Iran while talks are in progress, key figures in Congress are resisting the effort.
A senior administration official told reporters yesterday that ”Our experts strongly believe that any forward progress on additional sanctions at this time would be harmful to and potentially undermine the negotiating process at a truly crucial moment.”
“In response to a first step agreed to by Iran that halts their program from advancing further, we are prepared to offer limited, targeted, and reversible sanctions relief.” said the official, who was speaking on the condition of anonymity.
That same day the top Republican senator on the Foreign Relations Committee said he was preparing legislation that would prevent the loosening of sanctions on Iran.
“We’ve crafted an amendment to freeze the administration in and make it so they are unable to reduce the sanctions unless certain things occur,” Sen. Bob Corker told the Daily Beast on Wednesday.
But some experts argue that adding more sanctions at this critical stage in the diplomatic progress with Iran could lead to counterproductive results.
“New sanctions passed before a true test of Iran’s intentions may result in a bleak future: a risky and costly war with Iran with no guarantee of success; or the acceptance of an increasingly embittered, isolated, repressive, and nuclear capable Islamic Republic,” wrote Alireza Nader, an Iran specialist at the Rand Corporation, in The Hill.
Majid Takht-e Ravanchi, another Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister who is part of the Iranian negotiating team here expressed a long-held Iranian view when he recently called all sanctions on his country “illegal”.
He added that some should be removed as part of an initial phase.
“We have frequently announced that to prove its goodwill, the opposite side can take steps to remove anti-Iran sanctions, even if sanctions removed in the first stages would not be so significant,” said Ravanchi in an Oct. 27 interview.
Photo Credit: European External Action Service
]]>Geneva – Abbas Aragchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister who is currently leading talks here between Iran and world powers known as the P5+1, told IPS News in an interview this morning at his hotel that Iran is willing to implement the Additional Protocol in the final stage of a mutually agreed upon [...]]]>
Geneva – Abbas Aragchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister who is currently leading talks here between Iran and world powers known as the P5+1, told IPS News in an interview this morning at his hotel that Iran is willing to implement the Additional Protocol in the final stage of a mutually agreed upon nuclear deal.
“The Additional Protocol is a part of the endgame,” Araghchi told IPS. “It’s on the table, but not for the time being, it’s a part of the final step,” he said.
According to the Arms Control Association, the Additional Protocol “is a legal document granting the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements.” The voluntary but advanced nuclear safeguards standard was accepted earlier by Iran in 2003 and was adhered to but not officially ratified by Iran’s parliament. “The Additional Protocol requires States to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities and grants the Agency broader rights of access to sites in the country,” according to the IAEA’s website.
Asked whether he was expecting any breakthroughs today after an initial positive first day of the two-day talks scheduled here in Geneva, Araghchi said, “Any break through depends on the other side.”
He also seemed to reiterate the “cautious optimism” that an EU official noted here yesterday after Iran presented its new proposal to the P5+1, the details of which remain under wraps.
“We made a very good, logical and balanced proposal yesterday,” said Araghchi, referring to the PowerPoint presentation that was presented yesterday morning by the official head of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who is Iran’s Foreign Minister.
“We are looking forward this morning to hearing from [the P5+1] on their counter proposal, what their reaction is today and their evaluation of our proposal,” noted Araghchi.
“It’s to soon to talk about whether we have made any progress but maybe this afternoon when we’ve heard from them we can come to a conclusion if everything is going well,” he added.
“I have a good feeling about it but I cannot judge now,” Araghchi told IPS. He then repeated Iran’s earlier call for identifying and establishing an “end game” for a nuclear deal.
“We believe to make an agreement now, we need to come to an agreement on the common objective, the end game, the final step and the first step,” Aragchi said.
“It’s not useful to decide only on the first step and take that without having a clear picture of the future and the destination,” he said.
“So it’s very important to set the common objective that both sides can agree on,” said Araghchi.
Araghchi also told IPS News that Iran is expecting to return to meet with the P5+1 in Geneva, but did not confirm when or whether the next round of talks would occur at the ministerial level.
“There is a common understanding that we have to meet again soon,” he said. “The level is not decided yet.”
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