Among the many confusing factors swirling around the whole ISIS phenomenon is the role, or roles, of Turkey in the situation. It might be helpful to tick off some of the major salient factors that compete to form Turkish policies towards ISIS under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at this point.
DEALING WITH ASSAD: First, Turkey fell into the same analytic error that most countries and most analysts, including myself did: the assumption that after Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, the Assad regime in Syria, now facing its own Arab Spring uprising, would be the next to fall. It did not happen. Erdoğan had been deeply and personally invested in mentoring Assad as a “younger brother” for nearly a decade, bringing him closer to western and especially EU ties, helping moderate a number of internal Syrian issues. After the uprising began in Syria, Assad then refused to follow Erdoğan’s strong advice about yielding some democratic concessions to the early anti-regime demonstrators in Syria; Erdoğan grew angry, felt he had lost face internationally with his claims to exert influence over Assad, and finally grew determined to overthrow Assad by force. The more difficult the task turned out to be, the more Erdoğan doubled down, determined to get him out using almost any means—now driven by deep personal grudge as well.
PREFERENCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC CHANGE. In fairness to Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu, Turkey had been gravitating towards a regional policy of general support to democratic movements against shaky dictators. It would indeed have been desirable to see Assad go—in principle—and Ankara had supported the previous four uprisings against entrenched dictatorship in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. There is consistency in his expectations—demands now—that Syria follow suit.
THE ROLE OF JIHADI FORCES. The Assad regime turned out to be more deeply entrenched institutionally than many guessed; large portions of its population dislike Assad, but fear even more the uncertainty, chaos and likely Islamist character of a successor regime. No Syrian could want an Iraq meltdown scenario taking place in Syria either. But the longer the anti-Assad struggle went on, the more it attracted ever more radical Jihadi forces—the most radical ones sadly being the most effective anti-Assad forces, as opposed to the feckless and divided ( if more congenial) moderate opposition. Erdoğan, feeling more desperate, became willing to cooperate with ever more radical forces—to the point of no longer rejecting out of hand the activities of pro-al-Qaeda or pro-ISIS forces in the nearby region. Ankara’s policy doesn’t represent outright support for ISIS, but it does demonstrate a willingness to overlook many ISIS activities in order to facilitate Assad’s overturn.
ERDOĞAN’S OWN ISLAMIC AGENDA. Erdoğan comes out of a tradition of Turkish Islamism. His party, the AKP, represents its most moderate face—perhaps indeed the most pragmatic and most successful Islamic political party in the world. The Turkish form of the AKP Islamic tradition can be compared, very roughly, to the Muslim Brotherhood—although the Turkish AKP is vastly more advanced, politically experienced, practical, and sophisticated. Nonetheless, Erdoğan and some others in the AKP, do seem to look with some sympathy on the struggle of Muslim Brotherhood movements in the Arab world as the most promising, moderately grounded Islamist/Islamic political movement out there. The MB is generally open to concepts of democracy, globalization, tolerance and dialog—although in line with their own understanding of these terms, and depending where and when. Thus Erdoğan is predisposed to some sympathy with the Brotherhood. This accounts for his massive falling out with Egypt’s Sisi who is now crushing the Brotherhood as his chief rival, and Saudi Arabia that similarly deems the Brotherhood to be a “terrorist organization.” Erdoğan has been more willing to cut many Islamist opposition movements some degree of slack, such as in Syria. Compared to almost any form of Turkish Islam, ISIS is essentially an extremist movement, well beyond the pale of mainstream Islam and Islamism; the lines have grown blurred, however, due to Erdoğan’s continuing obsession with overthrowing Assad by almost any means at hand.
THE KURDISH FACTOR. Erdoğan and the AKP government over the past decade has done more to accept “the Kurdish reality” and advance dialog with the Turkey’s Kurdish guerrilla movement (PKK) than any party before. There is still great promise here. Turkey has also reached an astonishingly swift accommodation and close working relations with Iraqi Kurdistan and its leaders in forging political, economic and strategic ties with the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government. But the chaos and unrest generated in every major war in the Middle East over the past two decades have generally benefited the regional Kurds first and foremost (except in Iran), creating the space for them to assume more de facto regional sovereignty. But Turkey’s negotiations with the PKK are complex and still underway—encouraging, but far from a done deal.
The newfound, vocal, de facto autonomy of the Syrian Kurds as well, now taking advantage of the Syrian civil war, has worried Ankara that perhaps all the Kurds may be now moving too far too fast in what could become a dangerous new Kurdish dynamic harder for Ankara to deal with. In any case, any kind of a pan-Kurdish state is still far down the road, if ever feasible. But Erdoğan is worried about anything that enhances the identity, role, profile and military proficiency of the Syrian Kurdish movement, especially since it will not officially sign on to the anti-Assad struggle. (That movement hates Assad, but also fears an even harsher anti-Kurdish regime under Islamists than it has had under secular Assad.) Ankara’s bottom line through all of this is fear of spreading armed Kurdish activism (such as against ISIS) that only enhances Kurdish armed strength and capabilities that can easily affect Turkey’s own negotiations with its own Kurds. It’s a tough call, and whatever happens, regional Kurds are gaining greater prominence and sense of identity with every passing month…
THE US FACTOR. Many US analysts still worry about Ankara not getting on board with Obama on fighting ISIS–as if relations are newly strained. The fact is, Ankara declared its foreign policy independence from the US a decade ago, in multiple areas. Turkey will never again play the role of “loyal US ally.” It has its own regional and global interests and will pursue them; Washington’s preferences will play only a modest role among the many factors influencing Turkish decision-making. Obama may help/persuade Erdoğan to back off from his reckless willingness to tolerate even the ISIS card to bring down Assad. But Erdoğan may well remain intractable on the Assad issue. That policy, among other things, has served to seriously damage Ankara’s relations with Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. So we should not look forward to much cordial cooperation between Ankara and Washington except to the extent that Washington changes its policies on Palestine, Israel, Iran, and overall military intervention in the region. The two countries essentially do not share a common regional strategic outlook.
These issues roughly summarize the complexity of the Turkish calculus on ISIS. Most important to note though, is that Ankara does not share at all the ISIS view of Islam or regional politics. But Ankara does not regard US military policies in the region as desirable either. Turkey’s best prospects lie in backing off from further support to the armed overthrow of Assad, cutting its losses, thereby improving its strained ties with Iran and Iraq, and in returning to the relatively successful “zero problems with neighbors” that marked the AKP’s first decade in office.
Photo Credit: Ra’ed Qutena/Flickr
This article was first published by Graham E. Fuller on his blog and was reprinted here with permission. Copyright Graham E. Fuller.
]]>Turkish-Iranian relations have been rocky since the deepening of the Syrian imbroglio. But the latest row suggests a new low. In no uncertain terms both the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, expressed displeasure with recent harsh statements coming out of Tehran regarding Turkish culpability in [...]]]>
Turkish-Iranian relations have been rocky since the deepening of the Syrian imbroglio. But the latest row suggests a new low. In no uncertain terms both the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, expressed displeasure with recent harsh statements coming out of Tehran regarding Turkish culpability in the quagmire Syria has become. The Turkish leadership was particularly upset with the recent remark by Iran’s chief of general staff who has said that “it will be its turn” if Turkey continues to “help advance the warmongering policies of the United States in Syria.”
Seeking Turkey’s help for the release of some 48 Iranians kidnapped by the insurgents in Syria, Iran’s foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi tried hard to soften the angry language that is coming out of Iran’s hawkish foreign policy wing. Davutoglu nevertheless warned him “in a frank and friendly manner” against blaming Ankara for violence in Syria.
On the ground, the reality in Syria is taking its toll on the relationship. Along with the exchange of unprecedented accusations, Iran has reportedly decided to suspend a visa-free travel arrangement with Turkey. This arrangement, in force since 1964, was suspended last week under the pretext of concerns for the run-up to the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which will commence at the end of August in Tehran. It will be reinstated after the NAM meeting in September, but the reasoning has been treated with suspicion by the Turkish press. Meanwhile, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç slammed Iran, implying that the recent surge of terror attacks in Turkey’s Southeast has Tehran’s backing. “We have received information that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] terrorists infiltrated from the Iranian side of the border and that they were stationed in the Şehidan camp [in Iran] and crossed into Turkey from the region of Harkuk in northern Iraq,” he said.
What explains Iran’s most recent vocal offensive against Turkey and the Erdogan government’s testy response? Tehran has obviously been unhappy with Ankara’s role in supporting the insurgency in Syria. But assessing that Erdogan’s Syria policy is not that popular at home – at least among some key stakeholders – Iran seems to have made the decision to highlight the dangers of what it considers to be a Turkish policy of reckless involvement in the Syrian crisis for Turkey itself and eventually for the political standing of the Justice and Development Party.
It should be noted that Tehran is not that off the mark regarding the unpopularity of Erdogan’s policy and as such, there is a method in the madness of offending a government that in Erdogan’s words “stood by Iran when no one was at its side.” Tehran is banking on the fact that with the spilling of the Syrian crisis into Turkey, Erdogan’s Islamist government will be facing increasing criticism from secular forces for jumping on the Assad bandwagon without thinking carefully about the implications of Syria’s disintegration as a country. Tehran is also banking on the belief that in a contested political environment like Turkey’s, public opinion matters.
Tehran’s logic in assessing Erdogan’s domestic vulnerability on his Syrian policy is simple. Bashar al-Assad’s fall may make Iran a loser in the proxy fight over Syria, but Turkey will be an even bigger loser if the motley crew of forces that have come together to dislodge Assad end up destabilizing the borders that were imposed by external forces in the first half of the twentieth century. (The Turkish border with Iraq was negotiated with the British government in 1926 and was established with Syria in 1938 when, after the expiration of the French mandate, the people of the border province of Hatay voted to be a part of Turkey rather than Syria).
Tehran thinks that insecurity resulting from ethnic and religious disputes in Syria and countries like Iraq will deal the greatest and most drastic blow to Turkey among all the regional countries. While Iran may eventually lose a key ally in Assad and find its position weakened in the region, it is Turkey that has to deal with its own angry Arab Alevis residing near the Syrian border (and potentially the much larger Turkish and Kurdish Alevi population frightened by aggressive Sunni acts), opportunistic Kurdish nationalism, and the mayhem that refugees invariably bring into border areas. Tehran feels that such potential costs – some of which are already in evidence – will be the source of political divisions within Turkey and that highlighting them may increase domestic pressure on Erdogan to change course.
Erdogan’s fierce response can also be understood with this domestic dynamic in mind. In fact, Erdogan has already issued other angry responses against the domestic critics of his Syrian policy, at times even calling them traitors for questioning his efforts. He took a dig at the Iranian leadership’s own domestic problems when he said last week that “250,000 Syrians have left the country [Syria]. Is this not the responsibility of Iran? Yet, before Iran takes responsibility for the situation in Syria, it must first hold itself accountable [for its own]. We always take responsibility for our actions.”
But Iran holding itself responsible will not solve Erdogan’s Syria angst at home. As Morton Abramowitz points out, Syria is a major domestic issue and there is significant complaining about Erdogan’s handling of the Syria crisis. There is nothing pretty for Turkey in the potential materialization of some form of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria and the emergence of a Syria mired in an ethnic and confessional civil war with different groups controlling different regions.
The activism of Iran in the past week (i.e. Saeed Jalili going to Syria, Salehi going to Turkey, and then the holding of an ambassadorial meeting on Syria in Tehran) must hence be understood as having the following objectives:
- 1. To make a public (and visually unsettling) case that Assad’s fall is not imminent as portrayed by his opponents. The intended message is that Assad may be in trouble, but pushing him out of power requires more than the current militarized approach. Jalili’s very public display of solidarity is reflective of the fact that the hawks in Iran really believe that the fight in Syria is as much a public relations war as a physical war. Jalili’s visit was in many ways a direct response to the US government’s public statement that the flight of the Syrian prime minister suggests Assad’s imminent fall.
2. To highlight Tehran’s position that continued support for the removal of Assad through foreign-backed armed insurgency is a wrong policy that is being pursued by other regional players as well as the US. The policy has so far failed to remove the regime but even if it does succeed, it will underwrite the country’s disintegration with no one having control over the regional implications. Hillary Clinton may be dreaming about keeping the Syrian state intact while getting rid of the regime, but the Iranians are making the case that this is a highly unlikely scenario unless the Assad-must-go-contingency – with Erdogan at its heart – reevaluates its policy.
3. To make the case that the resolution of the Syria problem will be not be possible without Iran’s involvement. Again, note that this is premised on the belief that the current imbroglio and escalation in Syria is much more of a problem for Syria’s immediate neighbors (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and even Israel) than Iran, which doesn’t have a border with Syria and more significantly, whose borders are not the result of the post-World War I imperial arrangement that is now in danger of being undermined.
Also note that Iran’s assessment of Turkey’s predicament is not that different from many US assessments regarding the threat that the lengthening of the conflict poses for neighboring countries. As Stephen Walt points out, it is difficult not to notice the slew of published opinions from the past couple of weeks – ranging from the always hawkish Washington Post editorial board to liberal interventionists (oops, sorry, I meant liberal internationalists) such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, to even the usually conflict-weary Nicholas Kristof – calling for increased US involvement in order to presumably prevent the post-Assad Syria from spinning out of control. In Walt’s words, for the US, the impulse for more action eventually wins even if in this case “we will almost certainly be fueling a sectarian war whose longer-term regional implications are deeply worrisome; we simply cannot resist the pressure to get involved.”
Unlike the United States, Iran does not have the resources to become directly involved in the expanding Syrian conflict. But it is trying to capitalize publicly on the costly but so far unsuccessful attempt to dislodge Assad. And for now, it is Turkish public opinion that is being conceived as a battleground.
Given the powerful allies that are prodding Turkey to remain committed to the “number-one goal…to hasten the end of the bloodshed and the Assad regime”, Iran’s play is a pretty weak one. But Erdogan’s Syria policy is also turning out to be a gamble that will only be redeemed if Syria does not disintegrate as a country.
]]>This would the first time an Israeli Prime Minister has ever agreed to a UN investigation into the actions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel had refused to cooperate with an investigation conducted by the UN Human Rights Council, headed by Richard Goldstone. Israel accused Goldstone, a renowned South African Jewish jurist, of focusing disproportionately on Israeli actions when the UNHRC report was released. The “Goldstone report” concluded that both Israel and Gaza’s militant Hamas rulers had committed war crimes.
Now, Netanyahu claims that it is “in Israel’s national interest to ensure that the factual truth regarding the flotilla incident would be exposed for the world to see.” When Ban originally proposed the investigative panel on the Gaza flotilla in early June, days after Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza-bound convoy, Haaretz reported that “Senior government officials said the Foreign Ministry recommends responding favorably to establishing the committee because Turkey will probably oppose it.”
Another opinion about why Israel agreed to be part of the investigative panel: as the Israeli say in Hebrew, Ayn breira–no choice.
“There was no choice but to agree to the international community’s demands, first and foremost those of the US and the UN,” one official source said.
“We could have been considered naysayers, or we could have done what we did, which was to take part in determining the mandate that will be given to the committee and affect its program.”
The source said the committee would have been established in any case, even without Israel’s consent. “Though Israel didn’t want another inquiry, there was no choice,” he said.
The panel will be authorized to review reports submitted by investigators in both Israel and Turkey, but will not have the authority to subpoena any witnesses. One of the concessions Israel won as a condition of its participation is that neither Israeli soldiers nor any Israeli citizens can be questioned by the panel. At most, political leaders may be allowed to give statements.
Turkey, which withdrew its ambassador to Israel and suspended joint military exercises with Israel in protest of the attack, has been demanding an international investigation into the attack on the flotilla all along. Eight Turks and one Turkish-American on the convoy’s flagship were killed by Israeli naval commandos determined to keep the flotilla’s Gaza-bound aid from reaching to shore. Just before Ban announced Israel’s acceptance of the UN panel of inquiry, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated in a phone conversation with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that Turkey insists on its right to an apology and compensation for the victims.
The UN Panel of Inquiry is to be chaired by former Prime Minister of New Zealand Sir Geoffrey Palmer, an international lawyer and an expert on maritime law. Palmer anticipates that chairing the inquiry be a “very challenging and demanding task.”
The outgoing President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, will be the panel’s Vice-Chair. Representatives of Israel and Turkey will also serve on the panel, which is to begin its work on August 10 and give Ban a progress report by mid-September.
The choice of Uribe for a prominent role on the investigative panel might seem curious. Tensions have been rising between Colombia and its neighbor Venezuela. Last week, Venezuela’s Ambassador Valero met with Ban, and presented him with a letter accusing Colombia of warlike acts. On July 23, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez severed diplomatic ties with Colombia.
The pro-American Uribe is viewed favorably by Israelis because of his criticism of Chavez, whom Uribe accuses of aiding FARC rebels. Chavez has taunted Colombia for being “the Israel of Latin America” and the US as the “evil empire.” Colombia, the largest recipient of US military and foreign aid in Latin America, granted the Pentagon the use of seven military bases last year after Ecuador refused to renew a 10 year lease on the US’s regional military base in Manta.
Colombia is one of Israel’s biggest customers in Latin America for military equipment. During a visit to Israel in at the end of April to promote expanded ties, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez told the Jerusalem Post:
Colombia and Israel have had a very long relationship and a very strong partnership, too. Both countries and our peoples have suffered and have endured, in a way, similar difficulties. At the same time, I would say that we both are resilient and determined, that we share somehow a lot in common. I would say that for us, it’s very important to make a partnership with Israel in several aspects.
Colombia employs former Israeli intelligence experts as mercenaries to fight against left wing guerillas. The UN Working Group holds mercenaries responsible for many of the human rights violations of which Colombia has been accused. Furthermore the use of mercenaries violates the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001.
In 2007, the American Jewish Committee presented Uribe with its “Light unto the Nations” Award:
“President Uribe is a staunch ally of the United States, a good friend of Israel and the Jewish people, and is a firm believer in human dignity and human development in Colombia and the Americas,” said AJC President E. Robert Goodkind, who presented the award at AJC’s Annual Dinner, held at the National Building Museum in Washington.
Under President Uribe’s tenure, Colombia has fought rebel guerillas and drug traffickers and has made a serious attempt at demobilizing the paramilitary. Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.
“Despite many odds, President Uribe has remained committed to the pursuit of security, peace and broad-based economic growth for all Colombians,” Goodkind said. Indeed, while President Uribe and his family have personally suffered due to the violence that has long plagued Colombia, he remains committed first and foremost to curbing violence and restoring peace and security.
Goodkind noted the shared experiences of Colombia and Israel. “Both Colombia and Israel have been forced for decades to face challenges regarding their survival and their citizens have suffered the threat of terror on a daily basis,” he said. “Nevertheless, Colombians like Israelis continue tirelessly to build democratic and prosperous societies, and remain passionate about achieving peace.”
[nb: In 2009, the AJC conferred its National Human Relations Award to media magnate Rupert Murdoch.]
It’s quite obvious why Israelis would want Uribe on the UN panel. What’s in it for the Turks?
Turkey has been seeking closer diplomatic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean since the late 1980s. An “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” was prepared and put into effect in 1998. The year 2006 was declared to be the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean.” Trade between Turkey and Latin America has more than quadrupled in the past decade. Turkey has resident embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela, but not in Colombia–as yet.
What Turkey does have going in Colombia (besides an Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group) is its participation in the advanced and cost-effective M60A1 battle tank, for which Colombia may be the first customer. A new joint venture announced this spring between Turkey’s procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, or Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi (SSM), and state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI), who are teaming up to ward off at least four competitors and to sell Columbia’s military an order of tanks worth about $250 million,
The defense ministries of the two countries approved the joint venture and requisite licensing issues at the height of tensions between the Islamist government of Turkish Prime Minister Recip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rightist coalition government over Israel’s early 2009 war in Gaza and disputes over Gaza, Iran and Syria.
The joint venture between IMI and Turkey’s Aselsan aims for a 50-50 work share based on Israeli electronics, subsystems and weaponry, with the bulk of production and assembly work to take place in Turkey and later under licensed production in customer countries.
So while Israeli and Turkish diplomats foreign ministry officials may be snarling at each other, it’s those guys at their respective Ministries of Defense who understand how important getting along is to the business of war.
Seen in this dim if somewhat perverse light, Uribe becomes a very suitable, if surprising, investigator and arbitrator, if not a particularly neutral one. While Uribe’s bias toward Israel is unquestionable, the participation of Colombia and Turkey on the panel may quietly yield improved ties between them, whatever the panel concludes about the Gaza flotilla.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, however, may be the most interesting panel participant and the one who most bears watching. Palmer , who served as New Zealand’s Prime Minister for about a year (1989-90) and was appointed to the International Whaling Commission in 2002, says he was asked to take the job because he is seen as “detached and evenhanded” and New Zealand as “impartial.” (Surely any investigative panel should have at least one of those, at least on principle.) Although the panel will be based in NY, Sir Geoffrey doesn’t plan on spending very much time there, although he will travel there soon to meet with Ban and define his mission.
Nonetheless, NZ Foreign Minister Murray McCully, welcoming Palmer’s appointment, took the trouble to point out:
“He will be acting entirely as an independent expert, and in no way as a representative of the New Zealand government. Sir Geoffrey is taking on a challenging and demanding task, and I wish him well in his work – the long-term goal for this government, and for others, is an enduring peace for all in the Middle East.”
As the old saying goes, still waters run deep. Palmer has stated that “”This is a very sensitive matter. It’s a quasi-judicial inquiry, so it is really very important to maintain a sense of detachment.” Is it possible that that the understated and aloof Sir Geoffrey might actually be the one person on the panel who will make some waves if he opines, even on the narrowest technical grounds, that according to the Law of the Sea, Israel’s interception of the Gaza flotilla in international waters, was a violation of international law for which it owes Turkey a mea culpa, however half-hearted, and some cash, however nominal? This has been the Turkish demand along.
Uribe’s job, on the other hand, may be to bring Turkey back on board with the US, Israel and Colombia, if not as a partner for peace, then at least a partner in war. Zvi Bar’el of Haaretz identifies Turkey as one of two contenders (the other is Bulgaria) to host a high powered American x-band radar system to counter the threat of Iranian-launched missiles, described in this past Sunday’s Washington Post. Furthermore, Bar’el writes, “Turkey could also receive Patriot anti-missile systems from the U.S., while Turkish press reports suggest plans in the country to acquire long-range offensive missiles from its American ally.”
There’s much more truth than humor in the old joke that advises a young lawyer starting out: “When the facts are on your side, pound the facts. When the law is on your side, pound the law. And when neither the facts or the law are on your side, pound the table.”
Israel has agreed to join the panel because it’s sure that the facts are on its side: not necessarily concerning what did or didn’t happen in the assault on the Mavi Marmara, but rather the fact that Israeli technology is inextricably embedded in almost every weapons system and piece of military technology the US produces and sells to its allies. Through Israel, Turkey has the opportunity to actively participate in that military technology network.
Turks are invoking the Law of the Sea in defense of the Turkish-led Gaza flotilla at the very point in the twenty-first century when maritime law is ripe for reinterpretation. The resurgence of piracy off the African coast; the sanctions against Iran that call for inspection of ships in the Persian Gulf that might be providing Iran with dual use good and other articles forbidden by western fiat; the damage done by oil companies to bodies of water and ecosystems far from their home offices; and the massive aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and giant oil tanker platforms that have been silently redefining the notion of territorial waters may give even the most modest interpretation about the actions of Gaza flotilla–and Israel’s handling of it–long-term and long-distance significance. The Washington Post reports that the US Navy has been deploying Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers equipped with ballistic missile defense systems in the Mediterranean Sea for the past year.
The ships, featuring octagonal Spy-1 radars and arsenals of Standard Missile-3 interceptors, will form the backbone of Obama’s shield in Europe.
Unlike fixed ground-based interceptors, which were the mainstay of the Bush missile defense plan for Europe, Aegis ships are mobile and can easily move to areas considered most at risk of attack.
Another advantage is that Aegis ships can still be used for other missions, such as hunting pirates or submarines, instead of waiting for a missile attack that may never materialize.
These are the facts that will underlie and shape the findings of the UN Panel.
Don’t like them? Pound the table.
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