by Emile Nakhleh
The Bahraini Arabic language newspaper al-Wasat reported on April 9 that a Cairo court began to consider a case brought by an Egyptian lawyer against Qatar accusing it of being soft on terrorism. The “terrorism” charge is of course a euphemism for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt, Saudi [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
The Bahraini Arabic language newspaper al-Wasat reported on April 9 that a Cairo court began to consider a case brought by an Egyptian lawyer against Qatar accusing it of being soft on terrorism. The “terrorism” charge is of course a euphemism for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have designated a “terrorist” organization and have vowed to dismantle.
The two partners and the UAE also loathe Qatar for hosting and funding al-Jazeera satellite TV. The continued incarceration of the Al-Jazeera journalists and dozens of other journalists on trumped up charges is no coincidence.
The court case is symptomatic of the current Saudi-Egyptian relationship in their counter-revolution against the 2011 pro-democracy upheavals that toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his fellow autocrats in Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya.
The pro-autocracy partnership between the Egyptian military junta and the Saudi ruling family goes beyond their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the perceived threat of terrorism. It emanates from the autocrats’ visceral opposition to democracy and human rights, including minority and women’s rights.
What should be most critical to them as they contemplate the future of their coalition of counter-revolutionaries, however, is the growing Western conviction that dictators can no longer provide stability.
The Egyptian Field Marshall and the Saudi potentate also abhor the key demands of the Arab uprisings and reject their peoples’ calls for freedom, dignity, justice, and genuine economic and political reform.
They are equally terrified of the coming end of the authoritarian paradigm, which could bring about their demise or at least force them to share power with their people. The Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies, especially Bahrain and the UAE, are willing to trample on their people’s rights in order to safeguard family tribal rule.
The Saudi-Egyptian partnership is also directed at the Obama administration primarily because of Washington’s diplomatic engagement with Iran.
According to media and Human Rights Watch reports, at least 16,000 secular and Islamist activists are currently being held in Egyptian prisons, without having been charged or convicted. This number includes hundreds of MB leaders and activists and thousands of its supporters.
Many of them, including teenagers, have also been tortured and abused physically and psychologically. These mass arrests and summary trials and convictions of Islamists and liberals alike belie the Saudi-Egyptian claim that theirs is a campaign against terrorism.
A brief history of Egyptian-Saudi relations
Egyptian-Saudi relations in the past 60 years have been erratic, depending on leadership, ideology, and regional and world events. During the Nasser era in the 1950s and ‘60s, relations were very tense due to Saudi fears of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalist ideology.
The Saudis saw Nasser as a nationalist firebrand arousing Arab masses against colonialism and Arab monarchies. He supported national liberation movements and wars of independence against the French in North Africa and the British in the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf.
The Saudi monarchy viewed Nasser’s call for Arab unity “from the roaring ocean to the rebellious Gulf” as a threat to their survival and declared a war on “secular” Arab nationalism and “atheist” Communism. They perceived Nasser’s war in Yemen against the tribal monarchy as an existential threat at their door and began to fund and arm the royalists there against the Egyptian military campaign.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the two opposite poles of the “Arab cold war” during the 1950s and ‘60s. Nasser represented emerging Arab republicanism while Saudi Arabia epitomized traditional monarchies. Nasser turned to the Soviet Union; Saudi Arabia turned to the United States.
In the late 1960s, Saudi Arabia declared the proselytization of its brand of Islam as a cardinal principle of its foreign policy for the purpose of fighting Arab nationalism and Communism.
It’s ironic that Saudi Arabia is currently supporting and funding the military junta in Egypt at a time when the military-turned-civilian presidential shoe-in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is resurrecting the Nasserist brand of politics. In the next three to five years, the most intriguing analytic question will be whether this partnership would endure and how long the post-2011 generation of Arabs would tolerate a coalition of secular autocracy and a religious theocracy.
Saudi Arabia supported Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s war against Israel in 1973 but broke with him later in that decade after he visited Jerusalem and signed a peace treaty with Israel.
By the early 1980s, however, the two countries re-established close relations because of their common interest in supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and in pushing for the Saudi-articulated Arab Peace Initiative.
The Saudi King viewed President Hosni Mubarak warmly and was dismayed by his fall. He was particularly incensed by Washington’s seeming precipitous abandonment of Mubarak in January 2011.
The Saudi monarchy applauded General al-Sisi’s removal of President Muhammad Morsi and pumped billions of dollars into the Egyptian treasury. They also indicated they would make up any deficit in case American aid to Egypt is halted.
The Saudis have endorsed Sisi’s decision to run for president of Egypt and adopted similar harsh policies against the Muslim Brotherhood and all political dissent. Several factors seem to push Saudi Arabia closer to Egypt.
The Saudis are concerned about their growing loss of influence and prestige in the region, especially their failure in thwarting the interim nuclear agreement between the Iran and world powers known as the P5+1. Their policy in Syria is in shambles.
Initially, they encouraged jihadists to go to Syria to fight the Assad regime, but now they cannot control the pro-al-Qaeda radical Salafi jihadists fighting the Damascus tyrant.
The Saudis also failed in transforming the Gulf Cooperation Council into a more unified structure. Other than Bahrain, almost every other state has balked at the Saudi suggestion, viewing it as a power grab.
In an absurd form of retaliation against Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from that country. The Saudis are engaged in tribal vendettas against their fellow tribal ruling families, which is out of place in a 21st century globalized and well-connected world.
The oil wealth and the regime’s inspired religious fatwas by establishment clerics have a diminishing impact on the younger generation connected to the global social media.
Despite the heavy-handed crackdown, protests, demonstrations, and confrontations with the security forces are a daily occurrence in Egypt. It’s becoming very clear that dictatorial policies are producing more instability, less security, and greater appeal to terrorism.
It won’t be long before Western governments conclude that autocracy is bad for their moral sensibilities, destructive for business, and threatening for their presence in the region. The Saudi-Egyptian coalition of autocrats will soon be in the crosshairs.
In order to endure, such a coalition must be based on respect for their peoples, a genuine commitment to human rights, and a serious effort to address the “deficits” of liberty, education, and women’s rights that have afflicted Arab society for decades.
Photo: Photo released by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) shows Egypt’s Interim President Adly Mansour (L) listening to Saudi Crown Prince Salman after his arrival in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Jeddah on Oct. 7, 2013. Credit: Xinhua/SPA
]]>Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all recalled their ambassadors from Qatar last Wednesday, citing Qatar’s support for organizations and individuals that threaten “the security and stability of the Gulf states”:
The statement said they had withdrawn their envoys “to protect their security” because Qatar failed to fulfill vows [...]]]>
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain all recalled their ambassadors from Qatar last Wednesday, citing Qatar’s support for organizations and individuals that threaten “the security and stability of the Gulf states”:
The statement said they had withdrawn their envoys “to protect their security” because Qatar failed to fulfill vows “to refrain from supporting organizations or individuals who threaten the security and stability of the gulf states, through direct security work or through political influence,” and also “to refrain from supporting hostile media.”
This came on the heels of a UAE court sentencing Qatari doctor Mahmoud al-Jaidah to seven years in prison on Monday for the crime of aiding a banned opposition group called al-Islah, which the UAE alleges has operational ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Islah insists that any connection it has with the Brotherhood is purely ideological). As Emile Nakhleh writes, the decision by the three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to recall their ambassadors from a fourth member state illustrates quite clearly that the first “C” in “GCC” — “cooperation” — means virtually nothing at this point, if it ever did mean anything. This was a coordinated move, led by the Saudis, to punish Qatar for supporting Muslim Brotherhood interests around the Middle East (and also for assuming a more prominent role in pan-Arab politics), but beyond that it reflects the Saudis’ deep and ongoing concern about an Iranian resurgence in the Gulf. From the Saudi perspective the Qataris have been punching above their proper weight, and making nice with the wrong people.
Qatar’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood are clearly the public justification for this row; it is no mystery why Saudi Arabia followed up last Wednesday’s diplomatic swipe at Qatar with a decision on Friday to declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. The Saudis, while they share certain conservative Islamic principles with the Brotherhood, are more than a bit put off by the group’s opposition to dynastic rule. Despite that feature of the Brotherhood’s ideology, though, the very dynastic Qatari monarchy has been a strong supporter of Brotherhood-allied movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa, in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt (especially), and Syria. Their rationale for doing so has been two-fold: one, they feel that supporting the Brotherhood abroad should insulate them from the Brotherhood at home, and two, Qatar has been predicting that the Brotherhood would be the main beneficiary of the Arab Spring. Had they been right in their prediction, Qatar’s regional influence would have been significantly increased as a result, but by the looks of things, they were wrong. The Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party is now outlawed in Egypt, its Ennahda Party in Tunisia has voluntarily agreed to give up power, and it has lost most of its influence within the Syrian opposition. Last November’s reorganization of Syrian opposition groups from the Qatar-financed Syrian Islamic Liberation Front to the Saudi-backed Islamic Front can be seen as evidence of the Brotherhood’s — and thus Qatar’s — loss of stature.
A related complaint that these countries have with Qatar is with the country’s Al Jazeera television news network (the “hostile media”). Al Jazeera has continued to provide media access to Muslim Brotherhood figures in Egypt even as that organization was outlawed by the interim Egyptian government. Now several Al Jazeera journalists are currently on trial in Egypt for allegedly aiding the Brotherhood. These countries are also angry about the fact that Al Jazeera continues to give airtime to the controversial Brotherhood-affiliated cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Qaradawi is actually wanted for extradition to Egypt over his comments about the coup that removed the Brotherhood from power there, and he just recently lambasted, on Al Jazeera’s airwaves, the UAE, for “fighting everything Islamic.” The reported pressure being placed on Saudi and Emirati journalists working in Qatar to quit their jobs and return home undoubtedly has something to do with the overall irritation with Qatari media.
However, there is another factor at play here: Qatar’s close — too close for Saudi comfort — ties with Iran (the real “organization” that “threatens” Gulf — i.e., Saudi — security), which has to do largely with natural gas. Qatar shares its windfall natural gas reserves with Iran, in what’s known as the North Dome/South Pars Field in the Persian Gulf. The International Energy Agency estimates that it is the largest natural gas field on the planet. Qatar has been extracting gas from its side of the field considerably faster than Iran has been, for a couple of reasons.
For one thing, the North Dome side of the field (the part in Qatari waters) was discovered in the early 1970s, whereas the South Pars side was only discovered about 20 years later, so Qatar had a lot of time to get a head start on developing the field. For another thing, the North Dome field is pretty much the only game left in Qatar, whose Dukhan oil field is clearly on the decline. Qatar has a huge incentive, then, to develop as much of the North Dome as they can as fast as they can in order to fund the numerous development projects that, when all the oil and gas finally run out, will be what keeps Qatar from going back to the days when pearl diving was its biggest industry. There is a potential conflict here, though. Natural gas, like any other gas, tends to flow toward areas of low pressure. So when one end of a gas field is being drained of its gas faster than the other end, some of the gas in the less exploited end may flow to the more exploited end. This is fine when an entire field is controlled by one country, but in this case, one can easily envision a scenario in which, several years from now, the Iranian government is accusing Qatar of siphoning off its gas.
What this means is that Qatar has a strong incentive to maintain friendly relations with Iran, and on this they have considerable disagreement with their Saudi neighbors. To Saudi Arabia, Iran is a potential regional rival and must be countered at every turn; their opposition to easing international sanctions against Iran, for example, is not so much about the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon as it is about the fear of Iran escaping from the economic cage in which those sanctions have trapped it. The proxy war taking place between Saudi and Iranian interests in Syria is the most obvious example of the rivalry between the two nations, and the Saudi move against Qatar can be seen as another front in that war. Qatar — although it has backed elements of the Syrian opposition — sees things differently than the Saudis where Iran is concerned. In January, Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammad Al-Attiyah publicly called for an “inclusive” approach to Iran, which he argued “has a crucial role” in ending the crisis in Syria. There is enough historic tension between the Qataris and the Saudis for this kind of disagreement over foreign affairs to provide the basis for a wider fracturing of relations. For its part, Bahrain has every reason to go along with a Saudi diplomatic move against a suspected regional ally of Iran; after all, it was Saudi intervention that saved Bahrain’s ruling al-Khalifa family from a Shiʿa-led rebellion in 2011, a rebellion that Bahrain accuses Iran of fomenting.
Look, though, at the two GCC members that did not pull their ambassadors from Qatar: Kuwait, where the Brotherhood’s Hadas Party is out of favor, but whose relations with Iran are “excellent”; and Oman, where Sultan Qaboos has been critical of the Brotherhood, but who is close enough to Iran to have served as a go-between for back-channel US-Iran negotiations. If the issue were really Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood, and not its relationship with Iran, both of these countries may well have joined the others in recalling their ambassadors. The one country for which this explanation does not make sense is the UAE, whose relations with Iran are improving after the two countries recently reached an accord over the disposition of three disputed Gulf islands. In this case, it may really be that Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood, and especially the Jaidah case and Qaradawi’s criticisms, motivated their action.
The Saudi decision to break ties with Qatar is, as Thomas Lippmann notes, another in a line of recent “sulking” diplomatic moves by the oil giant. Qatar’s failed bet on the Muslim Brotherhood made this an opportune time for the Saudis to move against them, but Saudi fears about an Iranian resurgence may well have been the real reason behind their action.
Photo: Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani chats with Oman’s Sultan Qaboos Bin Said during a meeting in Tehran on August 25, 2013. Credit: ISNA/Mona Hoobefekr
]]>by Thomas W. Lippman
The rulers of Saudi Arabia are becoming masters of a diplomatic style best described as sulking in the tent. If a country or organization is not performing in a way that suits them, they issue a petulant statement and walk away. It’s easier than constructive engagement, but far [...]]]>
by Thomas W. Lippman
The rulers of Saudi Arabia are becoming masters of a diplomatic style best described as sulking in the tent. If a country or organization is not performing in a way that suits them, they issue a petulant statement and walk away. It’s easier than constructive engagement, but far less effective, as the Saudis are — or ought to be — learning.
A longstanding example is their refusal to do business with the government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq. Riyadh backed a rival candidate in Iraq’s election, and never accepted the outcome. The Saudis have no embassy in Iraq — two years ago they appointed an ambassador for the first time in 20 years but he was officially “nonresident,” living outside the country — and minimal economic investment. The result is that they forfeited the field of influence in Baghdad to the country they consider the greatest threat, Iran, even as they accuse Maliki of being an agent of Iranian ambitions.
Then came the decision to turn down a seat on the United Nations Security Council, a seat the Saudis had sought for years. The Saudis said they did it to protest the Security Council’s inability to deliver an Arab-Israeli peace settlement acceptable to the Palestinians, and its inability to halt the civil war in Syria. But nobody heard that tree when it fell in the forest. If there is any evidence that the Security Council or its individual members has adopted policies more to Riyadh’s liking as a result of this theatrical but futile gesture, it has not come to light. Meanwhile, the Saudis forfeited any chance they might have had to influence the Security Council from the inside. Jordan replaced Saudi Arabia, and life went on as before.
Now the Saudis, along with Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have announced the withdrawal of their ambassador from neighboring Qatar. The three released a long, murky statement that basically accused Qatar of failing to implement an agreement among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to work together to ensure their security, to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs, and to halt support for “hostile media.” That was a clear reference to Al Jazeera, the popular satellite news channel financed by Qatar’s ruling family, which among other things provides a forum for the popular preacher Youssef al-Qaradawi, a vocal critic of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The Saudis, who support the military government that took over in Egypt last year, have made no secret of their displeasure with Qatar’s backing of the previous government, which was headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohamed Morsi. The military government in Cairo joined Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain in withdrawing its ambassador from Doha, a hollow gesture since he had already left.
On Friday, Saudi Arabia formally designated the Brotherhood, many of whose members have found refuge in Qatar as Egypt cracked down on them, a terrorist organization. The Saudis’ quarrel with the Brotherhood is not about religious issues; their problem is the popularity of the Brotherhood as a political organization, which by its nature poses a threat to the al-Saud regime.
For Saudi Arabia, the public breakdown of comity within the GCC represents a sharp policy reversal. Just three months ago, at a GCC summit meeting, Saudi Arabia was promoting the idea of a formal political union among the six members. That plan was shot down by Oman, not by Qatar, but it is highly unlikely that Qatar would have supported it had it come to a vote. Although dwarfed by Saudi Arabia in size, Qatar has been playing an outsize role in regional affairs that is often out of synch with Riyadh, in Syria as well as in Egypt, and Doha would not have welcomed the inevitable Saudi dominance of a closer, formal union.
The Saudis might ask themselves how their diplomacy over the past three years or so has advanced their objectives. They wanted a friendly government in Iraq that would resist Iranian encroachment. They wanted the U.N. Security Council to turn up the heat on Israel in favor of the Palestinians. They demanded an end to the civil war in Syria even as they supported rebels fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad. And they espoused a political union of the GCC members. None of those goals appears within reach, nor is it apparent that Riyadh, having withdrawn from the diplomatic arena, has a Plan B for achieving any of them. Perhaps some new strategy will emerge after President Obama visits Riyadh later this month.
The GCC was not created to be a defense organization; it was created to promote political and economic solidarity among the Gulf monarchies. That objective has long been unrealistic as the members went their own way on everything from energy policy to relations with Iran. Now it appears to be entirely out of reach.
For the United States, the diplomatic spat within the GCC might seem to be a minor concern, except that Washington has been pumping advanced weapons into the member states in a longstanding effort to form an effective regional security force that would confront Iranian ambitions. Recognizing that the members would never agree on a joint military command, U.S. defense officials have promoted a policy of providing compatible equipment and communications systems that in the event of a direct threat could all function in coordination with each other and with the U.S. Central Command. Those efforts will continue, regardless of the tensions among the GCC’s leaders.
]]>Arab regimes mistakenly thought that autocracy, not democracy, was critical for fighting terrorism and that Western support for human rights in Arab countries would dilute such an effort. Because Arab autocrats were pliant partners, western governments, unfortunately, became addicted to autocracy, which in turn helped autocrats become more entrenched.
In the Inside Story Americas segment linked to above, the two former U.S. officials agree with investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill that their government’s approach to Yemen (and Pakistan) is fraught with problems and could easily lead to serious blowback such as terrorism against U.S. targets, but claim there’s not much else that can be done. Is that really what U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is about? Doing something that you know does more harm than good because you can’t think of anything better? Scahill, who has been traveling in and out of Yemen on assignment over the past two years had this to say:
We are actually making America less safe in our response in Yemen right now …. Our own policies, the drone strikes, the support for a corrupt regime, the lack of any substantial funding for civilian infrastructure … then all the money that’s needed for counter-terrorism, supporting military units in Yemen that are perceived as being the Saleh family military rather than the national military has sparked a response of blowback where you now have a situation that people who would not have been inclined to support al-Qaeda are actually joining with the AQAP in a kind of marriage of convenience to rise up against the central government.
Earlier in the month Grenier also argued in an AJE op-ed that the U.S. may be turning Yemen into a mini-Waziristan through drone attacks that kill civilians:
One wonders how many Yemenis may be moved in future to violent extremism in reaction to carelessly targeted missile strikes, and how many Yemeni militants with strictly local agendas will become dedicated enemies of the West in response to US military actions against them. AQAP and those whom it trains and motivates to strike against civilian targets must continue to be resisted by the joint efforts of the civilised world. But the US would be wise to calibrate its actions in Yemen in such a way as to avoid making that obscure and relatively limited and containable threat into the Arabian equivalent of Waziristan.
But despite these warnings, the U.S.’s drone warfare on Yemen is escalating, with AJE reporting at least 24 drone strikes in 2012 so far that have killed dozens. Too bad for Yemeni villagers and their families who suffer the consequences regardless of whether or not they are directly targeted, and Yemeni children who are starving at an atrocious rate. Too good for Al Qaeda operatives who welcome U.S. actions that assist their recruiting efforts. And yet, there’s nothing else that we can do…
]]>- Bahrain is not just another falling domino in the Arab Spring. Nor is it experiencing a surge of spontaneous resistance by its people against their rulers. Rather, Bahrain is the victim of a long cycle of intrigue and interference aimed at replacing the moderate and modernizing Khalifa regime with a theocracy under Tehran’s thumb.
That’s right, the wealthy al Khalifa ruling family, backed by the U.S. and GCC countries including Saudi Arabia which sent more than 1,000 troops to quell the protests, is the real victim. Belfer believes the tens of thousands of largely Shia protestors who took to the streets to face bullets, imprisonment and death were driven there by Iranian propaganda. Never mind the fact that they live in a country marked by the destructive effects of colonialism and within a system which reportedly discriminates against them on social and economic levels.
In fact, many Bahraini citizens disagree with Belfer’s views about what spurred the protests. Writing in the Guardian under a pseudonym in March one woman explained that
- Corruption, crony capitalism and a lack of transparency add up to uneven development and a vast disparity in wealth. By and large, Bahrain’s Shia are losing out in the country’s economic boom.
What this reflects, to a large extent, is the success of the Bahraini regime’s strategy to deal with challenges to its legitimacy by promoting and reinforcing identity politics within a system of privileges where certain groups and individuals are favoured over others. In a word: discrimination.
Prominent Middle East analyst Juan Cole has also pointed out that regardless of Iran’s hopes for Bahrain (which are real and require fact-based analysis and investigation before they can be properly identified and explained)
- Most Shiite clerics in Bahrain reject the Iranian doctrine that clerics should rule, as a 2008 State Department cable released by WikiLeaks makes clear. Many look to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf in Iraq as an opinion leader. Only a small group is oriented to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Did Belfer not know this or did he just forget to point it out? In deciding for yourself, consider his following statement, which makes a serious accusation while offering zero evidence:
- This spring, as protesters camped out in Manama’s Pearl Square by night and hurled stones by day, Iran mobilized its public-relations teams, which read scripted newscasts denouncing the Khalifa family. Meanwhile, Tehran’s military drafted intervention plans. Western observers and governments took the bait and shied away from addressing the true origins of the violence, instead urging Bahrain to show restraint.
Where are these alleged Iranian military intervention plans and what exactly did they say? If Belfer has them, he should present them to Bahrain and its allies including the U.S. which stated in 2008 that there is no evidence linking Iran to the country’s protest movement. Earlier this year Defense Secretary Robert Gates was also quoted in the New York Times reiterating this:
- I expressed the view that we had no evidence that suggested that Iran started any of these popular revolutions or demonstrations across the region.
Gates went on to say that the Iranians will try to take advantage of the unrest, another unsubstantiated claim which is far more plausible than Belfer’s points.
The absurdity of Belfer’s curious perspective does not stop there. He even claims that Bahrain has been ostracized by the international community:
- Thirty years of intransigence reveal the extent of Tehran’s determination to turn Bahrain into an Iranian satellite. So Iran’s machinations during this year’s protests should have had the international community rushing to support Bahrain, not ostracize it.
Really? You mean the international community sanctioned Bahrain like it has Iran and U.S. President Obama outright refused to sell the regime arms because of its human rights record? No, but who needs facts when you have Belfer’s assumptions. And can we really expect more from someone who thinks the idea that the Arab revolutions have been led by people fighting against oppression and for democracy is
- only partially correct in some cases and fundamentally erroneous in Bahrain.
It may be that I have given too much attention to an article that at best provides circumstantial evidence for its arguments (for more debunking see here), but considering how the al Khalifa family has been spending a minimum of $40,000 a month for its image to be bettered abroad and has been somewhat successful, I couldn’t just ignore it.
There are also wider implications for the way in which Bahrain’s ruling elite has dealt with the uprising. By refusing to accept that the protests resulted from flawed domestic policies, the real issues can’t be effectively addressed and the unrest will continue. This will lead to more human rights abuses and radicalization among the protestors. By refusing to recognize the protestors’ demands as homegrown and claiming that they have been inspired by an external adversary that has mobilized disloyal citizens, Bahrain’s government will further fan the flames of sectarian divide.
Al Jazeera English was harshly criticized by Qatari ally Bahrain for the documentary below which gives you at least one reason to watch it. “Shouting in the Dark” illustrates the ruthless way in which the protests were handled while demonstrators were mostly ignored by the world and international media. It’s disturbing and thought-provoking and should make anyone who accepts Belfer’s statements think twice.
]]>But I want to look at Lee Smith, just because he gave me a good laugh yesterday.
For years, the Weekly Standard correspondent [...]]]>
But I want to look at Lee Smith, just because he gave me a good laugh yesterday.
For years, the Weekly Standard correspondent and Hudson Institute fellow has been saying that Arabs respect only strength. Well, someone forgot to tell this to the Arabs. If Hosni Mubarak had been reading Smith, he must be wondering why he feels so much like Rodney Dangerfield right now.
Let’s look at some of Smith’s writing. Here’s a piece from just last month:
Western cyber-optimists argue that information technology like satellite television and the Internet will so inundate the Arabic-speaking Middle East with images and information that it will entirely reconfigure Arab societies. But this has it exactly wrong: Culture is more powerful than technology, and how a society uses any given technology is determined by its culture.
Now, who has it exactly wrong? Within a month of Smith’s screed, peaceful protesters used Facebook to organize what became the massive Egyptian protests that overthrew the “strong horse.” Once the Internet went down, they watched Al Jazeera and other satellite channels to figure out what was going on, who was saying what, and where to go next. The events of the past month represent an almost exact negative image of Smith’s sociological caricature.
I use the words “strong horse” above because this is how Smith refers to leaders that can move the Arab heart — not Facebook groups anonymously led by shrimpy Google execs. It’s even in the name of Smith’s book, “The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations,” which came out last year.
I haven’t read the book, but I have read an approbative review by Daniel Pipes in the National Review that appeared early last year:
[Smith] presents Pan-Arab nationalism as an effort to transform the mini-horses of the national states into a single super-horse and Islamism as an effort to make Muslims powerful again. Israel serves as “a proxy strong horse” for both the United States and the Saudi-Egyptian bloc in the latter’s Cold War rivalry with Iran’s bloc. In a strong-horse environment, militias appeal more than do elections.
Could this possibly be more wrong? Is the Islamist “single super-horse” theory the reason that the Muslim Brotherhood promptly rejected a call of solidarity from Tehran? The absurdity of Pipes’s last statement alone makes my head spin. Wait, wait. It gets better:
What Smith calls the strong-horse principle contains two banal elements: Seize power and then maintain it. This principle predominates because Arab public life has “no mechanism for peaceful transitions of authority or power sharing, and therefore [it] sees political conflict as a fight to the death between strong horses.” Violence, Smith observes is “central to the politics, society, and culture of the Arabic-speaking Middle East.”
That’s not all:
Smith’s simple and near-universal principle provides a tool to comprehend the Arabs’ cult of death, honor killings, terrorist attacks, despotism, warfare, and much else. He acknowledges that the strong-horse principle may strike Westerners as ineffably crude, but he correctly insists on its being a cold reality that outsiders must recognize, take into account, and respond to.
Now that Pipes and Smith have been proven wrong by events, will they go back and “recognize, take into account, and respond to” the undeniable new reality that doesn’t fit into their worldview? Probably not, because they’re ideologues, and that’s what ideologues, by definition, do. Reality is subservient to what they want to think about the world.
Now, go back and read Daniel Pipes’s review of Lee Smith’s book– and you tell me who is obsessed with Israel and the “strong horse.” Is it the Arabs who continue to flood the streets and demand freedom from their rulers? Or is it these neoconservatives?
]]>Right now, of course, it is Egypt’s moment. Many people’s elation over the [...]]]>
Right now, of course, it is Egypt’s moment. Many people’s elation over the past ten days has given way to guarded optimism that a relatively peaceful transition to a new government can be made. This will likely be a volatile, months-long process — at least — and the implications will be wide-ranging. We’ll, of course, be covering all of it, or as much of it as we can.
For good things to check out elsewhere, there are far too many places to list comprehensively. For starters, I’d point to Inter Press Service, the wire that hosts this blog. On the homepage, you’ll find articles by a host of correspondents on the ground in Egypt and all over the world, including LobeLog contributors like Emad Mekay, the IPS correspondent in Cairo who has been filing dispatches for us here (some by phone).
Listing other sources of news and analysis would take too much time, so I’ll just say you can follow us on Twitter (@LobeLog), where you can keep track of what I’m reading and, sometimes, thinking. Of course, I am still glued to Al Jazeera English. Other than that, I’ve been dashing off thoughts on Egypt and its ripples on my personal blog and occasionally on Mondoweiss.
The latter has been a damned good source of info on all things related to Egypt’s aftershocks in both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, perhaps more importantly to those of us who live here, the discourse in the U.S. If the U.S.’s strategic m.o. in the region is not under serious review, then, Houston, we have a problem.
Some rumblings of change have become perfectly clear from closely watching U.S. neoconservatives. The movement is split among itself, and cracks are forming between them and their usual allies in Israel’s Likud party. All about Earthquake Egypt.
But the movement remains strong and, most curiously, focused on Iran. This they still share with Israel’s Likud prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu. The general just appointed as IDF chief-of-staff has asserted Israel’s “moral right to act [against Iran]” and focused on the Iranian threat. Blogger Noam Sheizaf doesn’t know if the general falls in the attack camp or the “skeptics” camp; it’s “unclear.”
On the other hand, where neocons in the U.S. come down on Iran seems very clear. As Egypt unfolds all around them, they are out hawking “Iranium.”
Much more to come, I’m sure. And, of course, my vacation doesn’t mean that you won’t be getting Eli’s usual great reporting and analysis, as well as that of our long list of guest contributors.
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There’s constant action at #jan25 on Twitter, where I’ve been working away @LobeLog. And there’re many more amazing places to be getting reporting, information, and analysis.
Below this post is Emad Mekay’s dictated dispatch from Cairo by phone, which I worked into an IPS piece that included the big speeches from teetering (with one hand behind his back?) Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and, after a 30 minute delay, during which the two had their own phone chat, U.S. President Barack Obama.
For a focus on how U.S. officialdom is reaction — playing catch up, basically — check out the other IPS piece I co-authored, this one with Jim Lobe. Me? I’m going to get some sleep. But expect more soon.
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Slow-building protests started out with diverse crowds, including children
From the morning on, the number of protesters was increasing by the hour. Immediately after Friday morning Prayers at Sixth of October City, a suburb of Cairo, 3,000 people were out in the streets. By afternoon prayers, the number doubled. In the crowd there were many women, some with kids in tow.
The crowd appeared to traverse social lines, from people wearing the garb of door-guards to middle-class and affluent people. Even school girls were out.
I took it as a sign that people really want change when they risk taking their children out. But when things got out of hand, a lot of people pulled their kids out of protests.
Also soon after clashes started, residents began stocking up on food, and in the main area of Cairo, shops were closing their doors. People were unable to get around in cars.
Only the protesters, the police, and the army were left on the streets.
Of course, I got hungry. I stopped at a state-run bread distribution center and I jokingly asked the woman selling bread why she wasn’t protesting. She asked how many people were out, and I said about 4,000 so far. She said she’s waiting for more people. She’s technically a government employee.
In downtown Cairo, people in their homes and apartments looking out from their balconies and windows were throwing food and water to the protesters. Protesters were even allowed to go and make landline calls and go back down to the streets (mobile service is down in many areas and for many different services). This is in downtown Cairo, some of it in affluent areas. People would just open their doors to let people in.
Protesters going after symbols of the government
Before I went to Cairo, I was near the protest from a nearby main mosque. They were marching down and singing songs like ‘down with Mubarak.’ On the way, there was a police station. Some protesters tried to get in, but didn’t initially throw stones.
These are the symbols people are focusing on now: pictures of Mubarak, police stations, and NDP offices.
I don’t think there’s sympathy for the government — though people are worried about what’s next and whether things will get out of control.
The protesters are not looking outward at all and not mentioning Israel or the U.S.
They are concerned about better lives in Egypt. There were no religious slogans except for “alluhah akbar,” which is also a general expression of celebration.
Army presence in streets, perhaps military intelligence
The branch of the Army that came to downtown Cario to protect the (state-run) TV and Radio building were from the Republican guard, which is the presidential guard.
There were reports of tanks around the U.S. and other embassies, protecting those diplomatic installations.
There were cars around the city in strategic areas with tinted windows. It’s illegal for civilians in Egypt to have tinted windows. Usually, these cars are some kind of military intelligence.
There also appeared to be a communications tower being set up downtown (for police to communicate). But this sort of activity is usually conducted by the military.
Government blames the Muslim Brotherhood
Basically, what the government was trying to do was say that it was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) behind the unrest, but most of the leadership of the MB was arrested ahead of the protest.
Instead of having senior officials from Mubarak’s party come out and say its the Muslim Brotherhood, a parade of low-ranking governemnt officials came out and said the MB did this. They were blaming the Brotherhood for the “riots,” and for fires.
Unsubstantiated rumors flew that the government itself had set fires in order to blame the MB. People noted that it took nearly four hours for firetrucks to come and fight the fires; they guessed that the authorities could have easily called in services.
Communication breakdown
At home, people were watching satellite broadcasts like Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and even Al Hurra, the U.S. government-funded station, which all had good coverage.
Most forms of communicating out are down or suppressed. There is still no Internet service, and mobile phone services are still down. [Mekay was unable to dial the U.S. from his landline.]
People are complaining that landlines are often busy, too. People are phoning into Egypt in terror, trying to call their families.
The authorities cracking down and cutting all communications really infuriated everyone. It was a sign that they might be losing control.
Nervous excitement
When I came back here, there were some intellectuals who were blaming Mubarak for what’s happening.
Everybody’s nervous; you might hear it in my voice. I don’t know if it’s just excitement, but things are boiling. It’s scary in a way, too, because I personally don’t know what’s going to happen next.
There are reports on satellite television of two more protesters dead in Mansour, a city in the northeast Nile River Delta. Al Jazeera just reported that in the main city on the Suez, 11 people died today, on top of the three others that have died in recent days.
The government may react more violently.
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