by Emile Nakhleh
The State Department’s Inspector General’s report on the US Embassy in Bahrain, which I have been asked to comment on, has generated much reaction, both among the pro-government factions and within the opposition.
The opposition fears that a report critical of the US ambassador’s job and managerial [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
The State Department’s Inspector General’s report on the US Embassy in Bahrain, which I have been asked to comment on, has generated much reaction, both among the pro-government factions and within the opposition.
The opposition fears that a report critical of the US ambassador’s job and managerial performance might denote a change in US policy toward Bahrain in favor of the ruling family and away from demands for a genuine dialogue with the opposition. The report also has caused some anti-Shia, pro-regime, Sunni talking heads in Bahrain, like Abd al-Latif Mahmud, head of al-Tajamu’, to be gleeful about the harsh criticism of Ambassador Thomas Krajeski’s performance.
Both feelings are misplaced. The report does not denote a change in American policy toward Bahrain, nor is it a rejection of US standing policy in favor of human rights, even if it is being spun in some circles.
Background
Every US government department (ministry, in the parlance of other countries) by law has an in-house Office of Inspector General (OIG), which is required periodically to inspect the operations of different entities in that department, domestically and overseas, and the job performance of key personnel in that entity. These reports are known around Washington as “IG Reports.”
The IG reports, by law must stay clear of politics and policy. The recent State Department IG report is no exception. Their primary purpose is “to promote effective management, accountability, and positive change” in whatever entity that’s being inspected.
The IG reports usually make key judgments and recommendations to the secretary (minister) or other senior leaders in the department relevant to the report. In this case, the recommendations are made to the secretary of state.
The department’s senior leadership is not bound to accept the report in toto; it can accept some recommendations, take others under consideration, and still reject others. When the State Department’s spokeswoman was asked at a March 28 daily press briefing about the report’s recommendations, she gave the following answer:
The State Department values the oversight provided by our inspector general and we take IG recommendations seriously and rely on them to make improvements in how we operate. With regard to this specific inspection report, Department official are reviewing the report and its recommendations and will respond to the inspector general formally. While we agree with some recommendations, we disagree with others… But we believe the report contains a number of factual inaccuracies and take issue with several of the report’s assertions. Our ambassador in Bahrain is qualified, highly capable, and we have full confidence in his leadership of the mission. He has served with distinction for over 35 years in some of our most challenging missions, including Iraq and as our ambassador in Yemen; has repeatedly been recognized for his service and leadership, including multiple Superior Honor Awards and the President’s Distinguished Service Award.
Takeaways
The first key judgment in the IG report states the following: “The embassy has two competing policies: to maintain strong bilateral military cooperation and to advance human rights. The Ambassador has forged strong relationships with U.S. military leaders based in Bahrain to promote common goals.”
On the other hand, the IG report has strongly criticized the ambassador’s management style within the embassy, his dealings with the staff, and his ad hoc management approach to the on-going human rights crisis in Bahrain. Due to the two diametrically opposed US goals in Bahrain, it is a no brainer for the IG report to assess that “Embassy Bahrain faces significant challenges balancing U.S. military interests with U.S. human rights policies.”
The IG report praised the ambassador for forging “a strong relationship with the heads of U.S. Naval forces Central Command and U.S. Marine Forces Central Command to promote consistent U.S. policy messaging. He is respected by many Bahraini officials and is well liked by mission staff.” On the other hand, the ambassador’s “lack of access to some key government officials, his poor media image, and the lack of an effective strategy to address these issues have created friction with principal officials in Washington.”
Most of the recommendations focus on embassy operations regarding personnel, finances, housing, property, etc. but NOT on US policy toward Bahrain.
Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski is a seasoned, experienced, and distinguished diplomat who has served his country for over three decades. The report has failed to recognize the fact that the ambassador’s “lack of access to key government officials” in Bahrain has been caused by his strong stance on human rights and constant and justifiable criticism of the Al Khalifas’ dismissive attitude and repressive policies toward its Shia majority.
The report should have pointed out that the ambassador’s “poor media image” was primarily caused by the fact that most Bahraini media is either pro-government or government supported and directed. Some pro-government media outlets have even cancelled the ambassador’s appearance when he was planning to discuss one of his hobbies, gourmet cooking!
Since he went out on a limb in pointing out the damaging policies of the ruling family, he found himself in “friction with principal officials in Washington,” according to the report. The report, however, failed to identify who those “principal officials” were.
The ambassador serves at the pleasure of the president of the United States and the secretary of state. It stands to reason, therefore, that his continued service in Bahrain as head of the mission means he still commands the respect and confidence of both “key principals.” I have seen many of these IG inspection reports during my service in the government, and like the State Department spokeswoman, I accepted some of those reports’ recommendations and rejected others. That’s the nature of the beast!
My bottom-line judgment
The report was not written for, or driven by, political or policy reasons. It’s primarily an “Inside the Beltway” Washington report. Pro-government talking heads in Bahrain would be mistaken to take comfort from the report. The criticisms of the ambassador pertain primarily to his managerial style and the internal operations within the embassy, not to his rightful stance on human rights violations in Bahrain.
Abd al-Latif Mahmud and others should take another look at the report. If they continue to misread it, then they don’t understand Washington or the nature of the American political system. I hope Al Khalifa leaders do not make a similar mistake.
Photo: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel meets with Bahraini Lieutenant General Sheikh Mohammed Al Khalifa, Minister of State for Defense Affiars, US Ambassador to Bahrain Thomas C. Krajeski and US Army General Lloyd Austin, upon his arrival in Bahrain on December 5, 2013. Credit: Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo
]]>Bahraini, Arab, and international media have assessed the dialogue meetings Crown Prince Salman held with opposition representatives Jan. 15 positively and expressed cautious optimism about his ability to bring about genuine civic peace in that embattled country.
In a Jan. 15 column in al-Wasat newspaper, Mansoor al-Jamri hailed the meetings as a [...]]]>
Bahraini, Arab, and international media have assessed the dialogue meetings Crown Prince Salman held with opposition representatives Jan. 15 positively and expressed cautious optimism about his ability to bring about genuine civic peace in that embattled country.
In a Jan. 15 column in al-Wasat newspaper, Mansoor al-Jamri hailed the meetings as a very important event in the annals of modern Bahrain. He cautioned, however, that only time will tell whether the Crown Prince’s efforts would resolve the current “suffocating” political crisis in Bahrain. Such a resolution will have to based on “respecting human rights for all, full citizenship, social justice, and equality before the law,” he added.
American, British, and French diplomats in Bahrain praised the initiative and urged the Bahraini government to open participation in the dialogue to representatives from all segments of society.
The Crown Prince’s meeting with the two representatives from al-Wefaq offered an intriguing photo-op. Here you have the future King of Bahrain meeting with Khalil al-Marzooq, who is awaiting his sentence, and Sheikh Ali Salman, who is banned from traveling out of the country, discussing the future of a peaceful, inclusive Bahrain. While sitting in Salman’s palatial office and enjoying his hospitality, these two interlocutors were only recently accused by the government of inciting “hatred against the King” and promoting “terrorism.”
The Bahrain Mirror news site addressed the Crown Prince in an editorial stating, “It is not sufficient for you to pursue dialogue by yourself.” To drive this point home, the international ail organization Human Rights First (HRF) called on the United States Government “to urge the government of Bahrain to include in the meetings the principal leaders who are still in jail.” HRF added, “No settlement between the government and the opposition will succeed unless the government stops human rights violations, releases political prisoners, and accepts accountability of previous violations.”
Cause for Optimism
According to media reports, the Crown Prince promised to raise the level of government participation in the dialogue and to discuss some of the core demands of the opposition. It’s interesting to note that the minister of interior Rashid bin Abdallah Al Khalifa, and former minister of labor, Dr. Majid al-Alawi, were present at the meeting.
Following Salman’s meeting with al-Wefaq leaders, the five opposition groups (Wa’d, al-Minbar, al-Ikha’, al-Tajammu’, and al-Wefaq) described the atmosphere as one of “candor and complete transparency.” But they cautioned, “a positive outcome of the meetings would depend on whether there is a genuine partnership” with the people.
According to Bahraini government spokesperson Samira Rajab, the Crown Prince identified five key agenda items for dialogue. In addition to raising the level of official representation, the items would include the legislature, the judiciary, the executive branch, electoral districts, and security for all the people. The Crown Prince also promised that the forthcoming discussions would be “serious, transparent, and truthful.”
Cause for Caution
Despite the optimistic reaction to Salman’s Jan. 15 meeting with al-Wefaq leaders, several factors could dampen and perhaps torpedo the dialogue process.
First, the Crown Prince identified fewer items than what he raised in his 2011 initiative. Also, he did not elaborate on how he and his government would approach each item.
Second, Salman’s agenda items fall short of what the opposition groups had demanded in the October 2011 “Manama Document” to which they remain committed. Among other things, they have called for a nationally elected unicameral legislature with full legislative powers, a representative and accountable government, a just electoral system, and a trustworthy judiciary.
Third, it would be difficult for the proposed dialogue to move forward while illegal arrests, sham trials, and harsh imprisonment of mostly Shia men, women, and youth continues unabated. Sectarian discrimination and massive human rights violations in the midst of the purported granting of “political” citizenship to Sunni foreigners, from Pakistan, Jordan, and elsewhere, create a toxic environment for dialogue.
The “sixty four million dollar” question revolves around how much leeway the hardliners within the ruling family will give the Crown Prince as he pursues serious dialogue with the opposition. Will King Hamad go out on a limb in support of his son’s initiative?
Where do the Prime Minister and his supporters among the “Khawalids” stand on his great nephew’s initiative and will they tolerate seeing jailed opposition leaders, who only very recently were accused of crimes against the state and of spreading sedition or fitna, be set free? To repeat the words of Mansoor al-Jamri, “The coming days, weeks, and months will tell.”
]]>A few days ago, Bahraini officials announced they “foiled an attempt to smuggle explosives and arms, some made in Iran and Syria, into the country by boat.” Around the same time, the government also contended it had defused a car bomb and seized weapons in different locations in the country.
[...]]]>A few days ago, Bahraini officials announced they “foiled an attempt to smuggle explosives and arms, some made in Iran and Syria, into the country by boat.” Around the same time, the government also contended it had defused a car bomb and seized weapons in different locations in the country.
The Al Khalifa regime maintains it is fighting terrorism, which it unabashedly equates with pro-reform activists. The regime accuses Iran of plotting and driving acts of “terrorism” on the island. Regardless of Iran’s perceived involvement in the smuggling of weapons, it is important to put this latest episode in context.
First, although Iran might benefit from continued instability in Bahrain, since Bahrain became independent in 1971 Iran has not engaged in any activity to remove the Sunni Al Khalifa from power. In 1970-71, the Shah of Iran accepted the United Nations’ special plebiscite in Bahrain, which resulted in granting the country independence. Successive Iranian governments under the Ayatollahs since the fall of the Shah have not questioned Bahrain’s independence.
Furthermore, over the years most Bahraini Shia looked for Iraqi and other Arab, not Iranian, grand Ayatollahs as sources of emulation or marja’ taqlid. The Shia al-Wefaq political party, which some elements within the Al Khalifa ruling family have accused of being a conduit for Iran, has consistently supported genuine reform through peaceful means.
Al-Wefaq leaders, some of whom have studied and lived in Iran in recent decades, have supported the government’s call for dialogue with the opposition and have endorsed the government’s call for dialogue with the opposition and the Crown Prince’s initiative for reform and dialogue. The Al Khalifa’s response to al-Wefaq’s peaceful position has been to arrest its two most prominent leaders, Sheikh Ali Salman and Khalil al-Marzooq.
Second, regardless of the public relations campaign the Bahraini regime is waging against Iran, it continues its arrests and sham trials and convictions of Bahraini citizens. This includes doctors and health providers, young and old peaceful protesters, and more recently athletes. Their only “sin” is that they are members of the Shia majority in a country ruled by a Sunni minority regime.
In a recent article, James Dorsey of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies detailed the large number of Shia athletes, players and champions — soccer, handball, tennis, jiu-jitsu, gymnastics, beach volleyball, and car racing — who have been arrested and given lengthy jail sentences. Many of these players, who hail from Diraz and other neighboring Shia villages, were hastily tried and convicted for expressing pro-reform views.
Third, in a recent interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Qabas, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who headed the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), expressed his disappointment at the government’s failure to implement some of the key recommendations in the report. As a reminder, King Hamad had created BICI and formally and publicly received and accepted its final report.
No one within the regime has been held accountable for the unlawful acts and crimes detailed in the BICI report. According to Bassiouni, the government’s inaction on the recommendation has raised serious doubts within “civil society institutions and human rights organizations” about the regime’s commitment to genuine reform.
Fourth, the Bahraini regime, like its Saudi counterpart, is stoking a deadly sectarian war in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region. The ruling family is very concerned that should Iran conclude a deal with the international community on its nuclear program, Al Khalifa would become marginalized as a Gulf player.
The regime is particularly worried that as a small island country with minuscule oil production, Bahrain might become a marginal player in regional and international politics. It behooves the Al Khalifa regime to know that if it fails to work with its people to bring stability to the country, it will lose its standing in Washington and other Western capitals.
As the Bahraini majority loses confidence in the regime, it would not be unthinkable for Saudi Arabia and other regional and international powers, including the United States, to consider Al Khalifa a liability. The key mission of the Bahrain-based US Fifth Fleet is not to protect the repressive Al Khalifa regime. It serves regional stability, strategic waterways, and other global US interests. Its commitment to Al Khalifa or to the Bahrain port is neither central nor irrevocable.
As the Bahraini regime continues its campaign against Iran, it should remember that by refusing to engage the largely peaceful opposition for meaningful reform, it has created an environment for Sunni extremism and anti-Shia radicalism. The recent history of intolerant religious proselytization instructs us that such an environment invariably leads to terrorism. This is a domestic phenomenon regardless of whether the intercepted arms came from Iran or not. One also should recognize that growing frustration among dissidents will drive some of the youth to become more radicalized and turn to violence.
If regimes are willing to tear their countries apart in order to stay in power as the Al Khalifa ruling family seems to be doing, domestic terrorism is an assured outcome. Today, we see this phenomenon in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) did not emerge in a vacuum. Radical, intolerant, Sunni jihadism, which Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been pushing in Syria, and before that in Iraq, is the kernel from which terrorism sprouts. Eventually it will come home to roost.
As I wrote previously, the Al Khalifa regime’s survival remains possible only if the ruling family stops playing its repressive apartheid game and engage its people with an eye toward power sharing and genuine reform.
King Hamad still has an opportunity to implement the BICI recommendations comprehensively and transparently. He could assemble a group of distinguished Bahrainis, Sunni and Shia, and task them with writing a new constitution that would include a nationally elected parliament with full legislative powers and checks and balances over the executive branch. This should be done soon because the King and the ruling family are running out of time.
Photo: Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa meets with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, on Sept. 30, 2013 in New York.
]]>The recent collapse of the British Serious Fraud Office court case against Victor Dahdaleh has left the Bahraini prime minister’s reputation for corruption intact.
The case has been widely covered in British media reports, including the Guardian, the Financial Times, and the Independent. Reuters has also reported extensively on the [...]]]>
The recent collapse of the British Serious Fraud Office court case against Victor Dahdaleh has left the Bahraini prime minister’s reputation for corruption intact.
The case has been widely covered in British media reports, including the Guardian, the Financial Times, and the Independent. Reuters has also reported extensively on the case.
Without going into the details, suffice it to say the case collapsed before any witnesses were called, sparing Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa the public spectacle of being presented in the trial, at least virtually, as the most vivid face of corruption in Bahrain. He escaped that for now, but this is a Pyrrhic victory.
The SFO mishandling of the case, the Bahraini government’s admission that illicit payments were made to the state-run aluminium company ALBA with the prime minister’s knowledge and approval, the changing testimony of key witnesses, and the refusal of others to testify all contributed to the prosecutor’s inability to proceed against the defendant.
Having his uncle and prime minister saved from public humiliation, in British courts no less, King Hamad cannot possibly pretend that all is well with his prime minister or some of the family ministers who were tainted by the case. The formal admission by one of the prime minister’s deputies presented in a letter to the British court that the multi-million-dollar payments were made with Khalifa’s knowledge and approval will have serious, long-term implications for the ruling family.
According to media reports, this admission corroborated the defendant’s claims that he made the payments in response to the request of ALBA’s board chairman at the time. The chairman, Shaikh Isa Al Khalifa, was the minister of oil and is a close relative of the prime minister.
In fact, according to British media, the court case focused on the Bahraini government culture of “Pay for Play” and on the prime minister’s role in promoting such practices. Simply put, if a foreign businessman intended to do business in Bahrain on a large scale, he would have to pay. The bigger the “Play,” the higher the “Pay,” and the more senior the official involved.
Although the court cleared the defendant of all charges, the Bahraini prime minister has cast a long shadow of corruption on the case. The defendant will walk free, but the prime minister will be saddled by this story for years to come. The Bahraini public do not need to look at leaked diplomatic cables to know about the private life of the prime minister. As his deputy’s letter alluded to, it’s all out there in the public record.
Most observers believe there would have been no way for ALBA’s board chairman to receive such illicit payments from an international businessman without Prime Minister Khalifa knowing about it. Most successful Bahraini businessmen, Sunni and Shia, who hail from the country’s prominent Sunni and Shia families, knew of Khalifa’s practices.
They all agreed that Khalifa drove, practiced, and benefited from the “Pay for Play” insidious culture. They often disagreed on whether to call him “Mr. 10%”, “Mr. 30%” or “Mr. 50%.”
Businessmen told me over the years that several office buildings and hotels were known as “Shaikh Khalifa’s buildings.” His claim to ownership of reclaimed lands, which are dredged at public expense, is another sorry tale of corruption.
At the very least, the case has undermined the legitimacy of Al Khalifa rule, especially at this juncture when the king is touting the family’s “conquest” of the island over 200 years ago.
If the king hopes to retain a modicum of credibility, he should jettison his prime minister and clean up the corrupt culture that has underpinned the ruling family’s business practices at the highest levels. As the king is feverishly trying to endear himself to the British government, in an apparent snub to Washington, his efforts will be severely undermined by Khalifa remaining in the post of prime minister.
Bahraini law does not condone “Pay for Play” practices, but high-level official practices have trumped the law and set up a shadowy system of illicit financial transactions. If the king wishes to encourage international businessmen to invest in his country without violating their countries’ laws on corruption, he should clean up the system in word and in deed.
Under the 1906 British Prevention of Corruption Act, which covered Dahdaleh’s case, if the defendant could prove the payments were made with the knowledge and approval of senior government officials, he could be acquitted of the charges. New anti-corruption laws in Britain and the U.S., however, do not allow potential defendants such a luxury.
It’s somewhat ironic that the prime minister’s downfall could be brought about by corruption rather than repression and abuse of power. Dahdaleh’s case offers a clear lesson to multinational corporations and businessmen and to justice departments in Western and other countries that do not condone corrupt practices. The lesson should also be equally clear to the Bahraini king.
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