Last week Paul Pillar wrote that our sanctions-happy Congress is hindering progress with Iran. This week three high-level former US officials are asking Congress to not lose sight of the end-goal — peacefully reaching a mutually acceptable settlement over Iran’s nuclear program — by strangling Iran to [...]]]>
Last week Paul Pillar wrote that our sanctions-happy Congress is hindering progress with Iran. This week three high-level former US officials are asking Congress to not lose sight of the end-goal — peacefully reaching a mutually acceptable settlement over Iran’s nuclear program — by strangling Iran to near-death with punitive measures while offering no relief. According to Lee Hamilton, Thomas Pickering and Anthony Zinni (all endorsers of a major recent report signed by 38 foreign policy luminaries on the costs and benefits of Iran sanctions):
]]>This spiderweb of sanctions and objectives, wrapped up in legislative hurdles, could restrict President Barack Obama’s options should he decide to offer incentives for Iran to cooperate at the negotiating table. If a bilateral meeting were arranged, American negotiators would need to select what to offer Iran in exchange for securing U.S. goals, the most important of which must be a serious reduction of, and greater transparency around, Iran’s nuclear program. Included in that offer would surely be some sanctions relief.
Our leaders must weigh the easy and appealing course of ever-greater sanctions as a way to force a ready-to-deal Iran to the table against testing the possibility that the existing sanctions have already done that work. The president should work with Congress to achieve the right mix of pressure and engagement to get Iran to negotiate on increasingly urgent and threatening differences. There should be talks between the president and senior senators to make sure there is a plan to strengthen or roll back sanctions as needed to get what we want from Iran in negotiations.
You can read the whole post for yourself, but here’s NSN’s list:
]]>Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “I worry, on the other hand, about striking Iran. I’ve been very public about that because of the unintended consequences of that…” [Admiral Michael Mullen, 4/18/10]
General David Petraeus, former CENTCOM commander: Warning that the military option risks unleashing a popular backlash that would play into the hands of the regime. “There is certainly a history, in other countries, of fairly autocratic regimes almost creating incidents that inflame nationalist sentiment,” said Petraeus. “So that could be among the many different, second, third, or even fourth order effects (of a strike),” [David Petraeus, 2/3/10]
General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM commander: “The problem with the strike is thinking through the consequences of Iranian reaction…You can see all these reactions that are problematic in so many ways. Economic impact, national security impact — it will drag us into a conflict. I think anybody that believes that it would be a clean strike and it would be over and there would be no reaction is foolish.” [Anthony Zinni, 8/04/09]
Ambassador Nicholas Burns, former Bush administration Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs: “Air strikes would undoubtedly lead Iran to hit back asymmetrically against us in Iraq, Afghanistan and the wider region, especially through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. This reminds us of Churchill’s maxim that, once a war starts, it is impossible to know how it will end.” [Nicholas Burns, 5/06/09]
Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East: In an interview with Think Progress, Kahl warned that even though any military strike could delay Iran’s nuclear program, it could also ‘incentivize the Iranians to go all the way to weaponize.’ [Colin Kahl, via Think Progress, 10/1/09]