by Emile Nakhleh
Bahrain’s national election planned for this Saturday portends no change in the al-Khalifa regime’s anti-Shi’a stance and is yet another futile exercise in sham democracy. Even the mainstream al-Wefaq Shi’a opposition party has decided to boycott the election because of perceived bias in the recently gerrymandered electoral districts.
Most observers view the election as another public relations ploy by the minority Sunni regime to convince the outside world, especially Western countries, that all is well in the tiny kingdom. The regime is betting, perhaps correctly, that the West would not criticize its game of superficial electoral politics because of Bahrain’s participation in the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and Saudi Arabia’s influence in the process.
The regime’s sectarian repression of the Shi’a majority is deeply grounded in the same radical Sunni ideology espoused by Islamic State (ISIS or IS). In fact, extremist Sunni rhetoric has been tolerated in Bahrain in the name of fighting the Shi’a opposition and Iran.
IS enjoys significant backing in Bahrain among some pro-regime Sunni factions. Such ideological support, which is widely spread out among certain Sunni groups in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, is a key driver of IS in Iraq and Syria. This also explains why many IS jihadists come from the family-ruled Gulf states.
Promoting extremist Sunni ideology at home while ostensibly fighting IS in the Levant is a cynical ploy by the Khalifas’ to justify their continued suppression of Shi’a rights and policy of turning a blind eye to the poor living conditions in Shi’a villages and towns. Sitra, a tiny Shi’a island just south of the capital city of Manama, is indeed a world apart from the glitzy Khalifa strongholds in other parts of the island country.
Stoking sectarianism might be a winning strategy in the short term; it is certainly a losing proposition in the long run. It’s equally foolish for the Bahraini regime to believe that Western support, which is currently driven by the war against IS, would be sufficient to save them from the wrath of their people should a radical Shi’a uprising erupt.
Wefaq and the Election
The regime, and US policymakers for that matter, should take Wefaq’s boycott of the election very seriously. As a mainstream opposition political party, Wefaq has been willing to cooperate with the Sunni regime under the umbrella of the Khalifas as long as genuine reform is implemented.
For the party, meaningful reform includes free elections; reinstating the 1973 constitution; government accountability (particularly at the level of the prime minister); ending economic, political, and employment discrimination, especially in security and defense; and halting illegal arrests, trials, and convictions.
In fact, Wefaq supported the reform initiative of then-Emir Hamad in 2001-02 and endorsed the so-called National Charter believing that Hamad was committed to genuine reform. Several opposition figures came back from exile to cooperate with the new initiative.
Unfortunately, however, the only “reform” that resulted from Hamad’s initiative was changing the name of the country to the “Kingdom of Bahrain” and replacing his title of “Emir” with “King.” The reform initiative stalled because of opposition from Prime Minister Khalifa and the “Khawalids” in the office of the emir in Gulf countries, and defense, and judicial branches of government.
Overturning the Bahraini regime’s unconstitutional step of stripping Shi’a citizens of their citizenship has become a key reform demand for Wefaq. Despite the constitutional prohibition, a total of 40 Bahrainis have been stripped of their citizenship in the past two years—31 in November 2012 and nine in August 2014.
Article 17 of the Bahraini constitution states that a Bahraini citizen “cannot be stripped of his nationality except in case of treason. It is prohibited to banish a citizen from Bahrain or prevent him from returning to it.” Article 18 states, “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties.”
Wefaq is the largest, most prominent and pragmatic opposition political party in the country. Its 18 members resigned from parliament three years ago to protest the draconian measures the ruling family has adopted against the opposition, particularly the Shi’a community.
Wefaq believes the regime will use the skewed election results to justify its massive human rights violations and continued campaign of harassment, arrests, and illegal detentions. Wefaq and other opposition groups—including Wa’d, al-Tajjamu,’ and al-Ikha’—decided to boycott the election, refusing to take part in what some of them call a pseudo-democratic political charade.
Jamil Kathim, who heads Wefaq’s Shura Council, said the election “does not represent the popular will and will not provide security for the country.” Matar Ibrahim Matar, a former Wefaq Member of Parliament who is currently living in Washington, DC, called on the government to postpone the election “until a national path forward has been agreed on.”
The opposition groups also urged King Hamad to “seek a national consensus to resolve the serious national issues that have bedeviled the nation since 2011 before holding elections.”
The mainstream opposition includes several leading figures with whom the regime could work with if it’s seriously interested in becoming more inclusive. These include Ali Salman, Secretary General of Al-Wifaq, Jamil Kathim, Abd al-Jalil al-Khalil, Ali al-Marzook, Matar Ibrahim Matar, Jasim Hussain, Mansoor al-Jamri, Nabil Rajab, Lamis Dhaif, Maryam al-Khawaja, Ali al-Ikri, and several others.
The regime, in defiance, has gone all out to publicize the elections based on Crown Prince Salman’s so-called “Common Ground” framework. In addition to “Electoral Districts,” the other four parts of the framework include “Legislative Authority,” “Cabinet Formation,” “Judicial Reform,” and “Security.”
Is There a Way Forward?
The regime is pressing ahead with the election while ignoring the pragmatic demands of the opposition. Human rights Watch and Human Rights First have frequently identified the egregious human rights violations committed by the regime against innocent civilians and political activists.
But Bahrain has waged a fierce public relations campaign to dissuade Western governments from raising the human rights issue in the country. The Khalifa regime has used an army of “access” academics, former diplomats, retired senior military officers, corporate executive think-tankers, and pliant media influential figures to act as informal advisers to “lobby” policymakers in Western capitals on behalf of the Bahraini regime.
What we are seeing now is a minority Sunni regime refusing to share the political process with the country’s Shi’a majority on the basis of fairness, equity, and justice. If the United States believes continued tensions in Bahrain and in the wider Gulf are harmful to its strategic regional interests, it cannot remain oblivious to these violations and to the possibility of radicalization in Bahrain.
Due to the Khalifas’ refusal to seriously act on the concerns of the country’s Shi’a majority, the elections on Saturday will not move the reconciliation process forward. Washington may be hoping to stabilize its relations with Iran through an agreement on the nuclear issue and to understand the regional factors that led to the rise of IS to speed up its defeat, but the growing chance of vicious sectarianism in Bahrain could undermine its search for regional stability.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
Throughout the recent handwringing about how the US and other Western countries failed to foresee the emergence of ISIS, one factor has been totally ignored, either intentionally or inadvertently: the impact of Washington’s hostility towards Iran, especially its persistent tendency to treat any anti-Iranian movement or idea in the Middle East as either good or the lesser evil compared to dealing with Tehran. This attitude has been coupled with a consistent unwillingness to support positive forces for change and reform in Iran; indeed, actually undermining them by insisting on their meeting preconditions that the West knows can’t be met due to Iran’s internal political dynamics. Significantly, this Western and especially American attitude predated any dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.
The first Western mistake followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the coming to power of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. Instead of taking advantage of Iran’s vulnerability at the time, as well as Rafsanjani’s efforts both to move Iran towards moderation and openness domestically and internationally and to reach out to the West to help him achieve these goals, the United States chose to put all of its eggs into Saddam Hussein’s basket and adamantly refused to acknowledge his many transgressions—against Iraq’s neighbors and own people—until his fateful 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Nevertheless, with great difficulty—due to leftist opposition—Rafsanjani managed to secure Iran’s neutrality in the Persian Gulf War, a fact that facilitated US military operations. He also secured the release of the last of the Western hostages held in Lebanon. Yet, instead of encouraging the moderate political trends in Iran, the US under President George H. W. Bush embarked on a policy of containing Iran (soon to be replaced by the Clinton administration’s “dual containment” policy, which was then followed in 1996 by Congress’ enactment of the first oil sanctions against Iran at a time when Rafsanjani was actively encouraging American oil companies, notably Conoco, to invest). This policy of containment was first announced during a trip to Central Asia in 1992 by then-Secretary of State James Baker who declared containing Iran’s influence in the region would constitute a major goal of US policy.
Guided by this objective, the US subsequently bought into Pakistan’s argument that the Taliban would constitute a credible barrier to Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and, through it, in Central Asia as well. Hence Washington did not object to Pakistan’s arming and promoting the Taliban, a step that eventually led to the fall of the Afghan government of Burhaneddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, two leaders who supported a version of Islam far more moderate than that of the Taliban. It is forgotten today that the Afghan civil war began with attacks by the Pakistan-based and more radical Islamists, first through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and, when Islamabad judged him to be too difficult to control, through the Taliban.
Even after the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, followed by the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, which Iran directly and actively supported, Washington continued to rely on Pakistan as its key regional partner. Despite massive US aid, Islamabad actively—if covertly—undermined US strategy in Afghanistan while it scorned Iran’s offers to help stabilize the country.
Just as Washington ignored or rebuffed Rafsanjani’s efforts to moderate Iran’s domestic and international policies, it similarly declined to help his successor, President Mohammad Khatami, who promoted a tolerant and reformist Islam and a less confrontational approach to relations with the West and Iran’s neighbors. Thus, holding out for the best—namely, a secular, pro-western government in Tehran—the US lost the relatively good. And when Iran actively helped the US both to oust the Taliban and facilitate the transition that followed, it was rewarded by President George W. Bush with membership in the “axis of evil,” paving the way for new and ever more punitive sanctions.
After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Tehran quietly put forward an offer for a comprehensive deal with the US not only to cooperate on efforts to stabilize Washington’s latest conquest, but also to address all outstanding issues between the two countries, from acceptance of Israel and Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups to Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush administration did not even bother to respond. Moreover, fearful that Iran might become the unintended beneficiary of the Ba’ath regime’s removal, Washington essentially stood by as its regional Sunni allies worked to undermine the fledgling Shia-led government in Baghdad not only by denying it aid and formal diplomatic recognition, but also, in the case of some Gulf states, encouraging and supporting the burgeoning Sunni insurgency, including al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which did not hesitate to attack US personnel, as well as their Shia brethren. Ironically if predictably, Washington’s policy of ignoring Sunni extremists forced Iraq’s Shia government to move closer to Iran.
Of course, the unanticipated insurgency and the increasing sectarian violence that it fostered also derailed hopes by the Bush administration—especially its neoconservative faction—that its “success” in Iraq would lead to “regime change”—either through destabilization or an actual attack—as well. At the same time, however, the administration bought into the idea that the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict could also be used to curb Iran’s influence, notably by forging a de facto alliance between Israel and the Sunni-led states against Tehran and what Jordan’s King Abdullah ominously called the “Shia Crescent.” Of course, not only did Washington’s acceptance and even promotion of this idea contribute to rising sectarian tensions and extremism throughout the region, but it also failed to produce any progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once again, rather than working with Iran to stabilize Iraq, which would have required exerting real pressure on its Sunni allies that were supporting the insurgency, containing Iran’s influence remained Washington’s overriding priority.
It was in this context that the so-called Arab Spring blossomed and, with it, renewed hopes in Washington to reshape the Middle East, if not by achieving “regime change” in Iran, then at least by weakening its regional influence, particularly in the Levant. Even as the Obama administration publicly depicted the movement as the dawn of open and democratic societies, its closest regional partners—to which Washington had so often and so counter-productively deferred in Iraq—saw it as a way to redress the region’s strategic balance that had been upset by the 2003 invasion and the empowerment of Iraq’s Shia majority.
As the movement progressed from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya and the (thwarted) pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, it eventually reached Syria and the minority Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s most important regional ally. While the Gulf states and Turkey led the charge against the regime, the US and much of the West were not far behind. Predictably, however, in its desire to see Assad overthrown and Iran weakened, the US and its allies largely ignored the steadily growing influence of groups such as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and similar foreign-backed Sunni extremist groups whose violence toward Syrian Shias, Alawites, Alevis, and Christians has been exceeded only by AQI’s successor, the Islamic State (ISIS).
Thus, for the past 25 years or more, the West—especially the United States—has made containing Iran its overriding priority in the Gulf and has too often seen the Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam and its violent offshoots as an effective counterweight to Iranian influence. In doing so, it has unintentionally helped create monsters like Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and now Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.
This critique by no means absolves Iran, Syria, Shia militias, or Iraq’s Shia-led government of their own mistakes and crimes. They have their own not insignificant share of responsibility in creating the region’s current problems and conflicts. And they have to do their part if the region’s problems are to be resolved. But as great powers that claim the world’s moral and political leadership with the power to intervene at will in other countries, the US and other Western countries must be judged by higher standards.At the very least, they need to offer a coherent and positive vision of a functioning Middle East and South Asia.
This requires going beyond the platitudes about wanting to advance democracy and human rights.
While the Western powers do not have a clear vision of what kind of Middle East they want and even less how to achieve it, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra have their own regional plans, based on ethnic and sectarian cleansing as we have already seen in both Syria and Iraq.
In short, until the US and the West admit at least to themselves that they have made mistakes in the region in the last few decades, particularly in their efforts to isolate and weaken Iran, and learn from those mistakes and change course, their efforts at defeating extremism and stabilizing the region are bound to fail.
The West cannot get all that it desires in the region, because political engineering has its limits. But if it embarks on a strategy of conflict resolution—fostering regional cooperation, instead of fighting it; and promoting compromise instead of complete capitulation by Iran or any other local power—its interests and those of the region will be better served. Until such a strategy is adopted and seriously implemented, however, every day that passes will make it that much harder to end the violence in the Middle East and encourage compromise and reconciliation. The same is equally true for the regional players. By pursuing maximalist goals they will all end up losers.
]]>ISIS and Bahrain’s F-16
by Matar E. Matar
For the second time in recent history, the United States is trading away support for democracy and fundamental human rights protections in Bahrain as part of an effort to establish democracy and human rights protections in another Muslim country.
In March 2011, while the Obama administration was building a coalition to defeat Qaddafi in Libya, Saudi and Emirati troops were rolling toward Bahrain to reinforce a massive crackdown against unarmed pro-democracy protesters.
In her book, Hard Choices, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reveals how a very senior Emirati official pressed her to mute US opposition to this invasion if she wanted the UAE to join the anti-Qaddafi campaign. “Frankly, when we have a situation with our armed forces in Bahrain it’s hard to participate in another operation if our armed forces’ commitment in Bahrain is questioned by our main ally,” she quotes him as saying. It worked. Later that same day, in stark contrast to the US State Department’s response to the Russian intervention in the Crimea, Clinton issued a statement intended to soothe Saudi/Emirati concerns, saying in essence that their intervention in Bahrain was legitimate.
At that same time, large parts of the Bahraini population were being subjected to beatings, torture and imprisonment that had never occurred in the history of our country. Given our inability to protect our people from such abuse, several colleagues and I decided to resign our positions in Parliament in protest. I was then arrested while trying to inform the world about the casualties from excessive force and extensive torture. But Secretary Clinton was at peace with the trade-off: “I felt comfortable that we had not sacrificed our values or credibility,” she wrote in her memoir.
Today Bahrain is facing a similar situation. The US needs the appearance of strong Arab cooperation against the Islamic State (not because the US actually needs assistance from Bahraini F-16s), giving the Bahraini regime an opportune time to force bad deals on the people of Bahrain without criticism from Washington.
This time the regime is moving ahead, claiming that it has achieved consensus through what has clearly been a phony “National Dialogue”—the government’s response to international pressure for reconciliation after the repression of the pro-democracy movement.
The country’s absolute monarch, King Hamad bin Isa, dominates all power centers. He appoints all senior judges, members of the upper house of Parliament, and members of the cabinet, which is headed by the world’s longest-serving prime minister, Khalifa bin Salman (first appointed when Nixon was president). In addition, the King has given himself the right to grant public lands and citizenship to whomever he wants. He has abused these powers in a wide and systematic manner by concentrating wealth among his family and allies including within Bahrain’s minority Sunni population.
On October 12, 2011, half a year after the Bahraini uprising, opposition parties representing well over half of the country’s population issued a blueprint for democratic reform in Bahrain, the Manama Document. This paper identified a path toward an orderly transition to a constitutional monarchy, ensuring an inclusive government that represents all Bahrainis in the cabinet, parliament, and security and judicial institutions. Specifically, it called for the establishment of representative electoral districts; free elections; a single elected chamber in Parliament instead of the current bi-cameral arrangement, where the upper house is appointed by the king and only the lower house is elected; an independent judiciary; and the inclusion of Shia among all ranks of the military and security forces.
Instead of embracing any of these ideas, the unaccountable king has offered up pretend reforms, and the US government, with an eye to keeping the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain and now on keeping Bahraini F-16s in the air over Iraq and Syria, pretends that these reforms are real. Central to this pretense is the “national dialogue” that has been running in fits and starts since July 2011. In reality, it has been a one-sided conversation, since key leaders of the opposition have been systematically arrested.
Last month, the king tapped Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad to assume his first real political role in the government—namely taking the lead in closing the door on the dialogue and submitting what he considered to be its “common ground.” Among other things, the crown prince proposed a meaningless plan for redistricting that was later imposed by the king by royal decree. Under this plan, Shia constituencies, which comprise about 65% of the total population, would receive only about 45% of the seats in Parliament. The redistricting plan was apparently designed to reduce the variation in the size of districts by scattering the opposition throughout majority loyalist districts. Moreover, the variation in the size of districts would remain huge. For example, a loyalist-majority district of less than 1,000 voters would elect one MP while an opposition-majority district with more than 10,000 voters would receive the same representation in Parliament—a ratio of more than ten to one. In fact, 13 opposition-majority districts with more than 10,000 voters each would be treated this way under the plan.
Another part of the supposed “common ground” relates to the formation of the cabinet, which must be approved by the majority of the elected chamber of Parliament. If Parliament fails to approve the appointed government three times, then Parliament would be dissolved.
Thousands of Bahrainis rejected this proposal Sept. 19 by marching in western Manama in a demonstration of determination on the part of pro-democracy forces that have not diminished despite the repression of the last three and a half years.
Nonetheless, based on the purported “common ground,” the government now intends to hold elections on Nov. 22.
Time is short for constructive engagement between the opposition and the regime to resolve these political disputes, and the US needs to be heard. Washington should not think that its interests require it to remain silent about the need for real democratic reform in Bahrain. In fact, failing to speak out is detrimental to its own stated interests in Iraq and Syria. While the regime in Bahrain is participating in F-16 sorties against the Islamic State, its policies of systematic discrimination against its majority Shia population and its ongoing incitement in the media against Bahraini Shia (as agents of Iran and the US at the same time!) create a perfect environment for incubating terrorists who consider Americans and Shia their greatest enemy. Moreover, while the US government trains Bahraini “security forces” that exclude Shia (on sectarian grounds), it appears that some Bahrainis working for these same forces have left to fight with the Islamic State.
Yet when Nabeel Rajab, a prominent human rights activist, recently tweeted that the security institutions were the ideological incubator of sectarianism and anti-American attitudes in Bahrain, he was arrested on the grounds that he had “denigrated government institutions.”
Bahrain is a small country, but it represents a major test for US credibility. The Obama administration has traded Bahraini democracy away once before. Three years of bloodshed in Bahrain has not only radicalized elements of the opposition there but has also instilled a culture of abuse and impunity in Bahrain’s government and security forces, some of whom are now looking to the Islamic State to satiate their new-found appetite for violence. Any potential benefit the US thinks it might gain from an unaccountable (Sunni) autocrat’s F16s in the bombing campaign against the Islamic State is more than offset by the sectarian extremism that these alleged allies continue to provoke (and promote) at home.
Washington should not sell out democracy in Bahrain again. With a little attention and encouragement, President Obama could help bring democracy to this Arab country and claim at least one good result for his (currently empty) “win” category.
Matar Ebrahim Matar is a former Member of Parliament who served as Bahrain’s youngest MP representing its largest constituency. In February 2011, along with 18 other members from his Al-Wefaq political party, he resigned from Parliament to protest the regime’s crackdown against pro-reform demonstrators. During the Feb. 14 uprising, he served as a major spokesman for the pro-democracy movement. Matar was subsequently arbitrarily detained, and, after his release, left Bahrain for exile in the United States. In 2012, he received the “Leaders for Democracy Award” from the Project on Middle Democracy (POMED).
]]>by Jay Romano
“These kids were killed by the police during our revolution.”
A week ago I landed in Bahrain. After exiting the comfort of the air-conditioned airport into the harsh desert heat, I jumped into a cab and sped from Muharraq to the capital, Manama, a major financial hub [...]]]>
by Jay Romano
“These kids were killed by the police during our revolution.”
A week ago I landed in Bahrain. After exiting the comfort of the air-conditioned airport into the harsh desert heat, I jumped into a cab and sped from Muharraq to the capital, Manama, a major financial hub for the region. The lightning fast sports cars, extravagant shopping malls, and bright lights beaming from the five-star hotels were my first impression of this tiny island kingdom. I felt as if I had arrived in a Middle Eastern Las Vegas.
While separated from Saudi Arabia by only a 16-mile causeway that links the two monarchies, Bahrain is truly a world apart in terms of social norms. By western standards, Bahrain is socially conservative, yet it is the most liberal Gulf state with respect to alcohol and gender norms.
Manama’s female drivers, live rock bands, easily available prostitutes, and bikini-clad women are publicly visible. Salafists from across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states mock the country, frequently referring to it as the “brothel of the Gulf.” For Saudis looking for a weekend getaway from Sharia law, Manama is indeed their Las Vegas. But I had visited Bahrain for a different reason: I wanted to understand the country’s political and social affairs.
I was determined to visit Sitra, a tiny island situated south of Manama and connected to the main island by a short causeway. While Bahrain’s Shia and Sunni Muslims live side by side throughout the country, Sitra’s native population is nearly 100 percent Shia. Bahrain’s Shia, who constitute 70 percent of the native population, say they suffer from job discrimination, political exclusion, and human rights abuses under the rule of the Sunni-dominated government, led by the al-Khalifa family since independence in 1971. Sitra is considered the heart of the Shia resistance to the Sunni monarchy. Since 2011, much of Bahrain’s violent unrest has taken place there.
Everyone—ranging from the US Department of State to all of my contacts in Manama—
advised me to avoid Sitra’s villages due to the risk of being caught in the crossfire of the relatively frequent violent clashes. Despite these warnings, I visited Sitra.
I took a taxi from one side of the causeway to the other and was dropped off at the Sitra Mall, adjacent to several car dealerships on the outskirts of the island’s villages. After walking along the side of the road for 15 minutes, I approached a major intersection. I immediately noticed government tanks and armored jeeps patrolling the main street.
I walked down a street littered with shards of broken glass. Countless vacant properties that appeared abandoned surrounded me. Absent in Sitra were the flashy skyscrapers and bright lights that Sitra’s residents are reminded of each day by simply turning their heads and looking across the water.
I headed off the main road to explore the villages. I soon approached a graveyard. While I stood there, two teenagers walked up behind me. I turned around and asked them if they spoke English. One said that he did.
“Can you tell me who is buried here?” I asked.
He replied, “These kids were killed by the police during our revolution.”
I asked him if I could get closer to take a better look. He responded, “Please do so.” The two continued down the road as I neared the graves.
Several minutes later I saw even more graveyards. I entered one and noticed a crying veiled woman. I departed in order to give her space to mourn her loss.
As I walked through the village, every car slowed down and the drivers and passengers stared at me. Along the dirt roads were trucks and sedans packed with people. What a contrast to the flashy Porsches and Lamborghinis that race through Manama’s first-world infrastructure.
By 2pm the afternoon heat prompted me to buy some water and juice at a nearby store. As I quenched my thirst, a local man slowly cruised by in his SUV before putting on the brakes. He rolled down his window and asked me in excellent English if I were a sailor in the US Navy (the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is stationed in Bahrain). Given that the US supports Bahrain’s government—which, according to Amnesty International, kills, tortures, and detains Shia men, women and children for their alleged role in threatening the kingdom’s security—I lied and told the man that I was an Italian tourist. We conversed for several minutes before I jumped in his SUV and accepted his generous offer for a tour.
We drove down the narrow dirt roads of Sitra’s villages. While most of the cement walls were covered with graffiti written in Arabic, we drove past one tag I could understand: “We will gain freedom with our blood.”
Huge rocks blocked off many roads. My guide explained that the locals had put them up “to protect their families from the police.”
Posters of Sayed Mahmood Sayed Mohsen, who was shot and killed by security forces dispersing an anti-government protest on May 21, 2014, are found on buildings across Sitra. Credit: Jay Romano
I saw hundreds of posters on the walls of buildings, most with the faces of Shia who were killed in 2011 by Bahraini and other GCC security forces that had entered the kingdom to crush anti-government demonstrations. One poster showed Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Another showed a Saudi Shia cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, who has been sentenced to execution. Twelve days earlier, scores of Bahraini Shia had gathered on the streets of Sitra to hold a solidarity protest for Nimr.
Moments later we drove by the police station in Sitra. The compound was surrounded by a cement wall, tanks, roadblocks, and armed police sitting on folding chairs.
My companion drove me to more graves, all adjacent to small mosques scattered throughout Sitra’s villages. The man claimed either to have known all those who died during the uprising, or to have had contact with someone connected to the various Shia whose graves we visited. As we walked past the graves, he explained the gruesome details of their deaths, pointing out on his own body where the bullets had hit each person. He also described the hardship (poverty, unemployment, etc.) that had prompted them to take their grievances to the street, where they lost their lives.
While we were standing in one graveyard, he placed his hand on my shoulder and pointed across the water to the Manama skyline. “Jay, in Bahrain we have two countries. There is one country there with the lights, money, and tourists, and then there is Sitra. The western tourists whose governments back the king have no interest in coming to this Bahrain.”
Still pointing across the water he continued, “They only care about that Bahrain. Those people mean nothing to me, and I have nothing to offer them. However, I thank you for leaving your hotel in Manama to walk around Sitra.”
During the drive back to my hotel I demanded that he accept some money for his time. But as a pious man, he refused. Eventually he gave in after I stuffed some cash in his glove compartment.
As he dropped me off at my hotel he said, “Jay, you have a friend in Bahrain, so please tell me when you return to this country.” At that point I confessed that I was actually from the United States. He laughed and told me that he had suspected I was American. Before we parted he said, “Thank you for your money but I did not give you the tour to receive your money. I gave you the tour because I want you to return home and tell as many people as possible about the difference between the two Bahrains. Also, do not forget to show everyone your pictures because the BBC will never show its viewers the graves of Sitra.”
– Jay Romano (a pseudonym) is a freelance foreign affairs analyst in Washington, DC.
Photo: The grave of a child near the village of al-Kharijiya. Credit: Jay Romano
]]>by Derek Davison
The resurgence of “Salafi-jihadist” terrorist groups is once again at the forefront of national security thinking in Washington. A report released this week by the RAND Corporation, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” explains why.
There were 20 active “Salafi-jihadist groups” around [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The resurgence of “Salafi-jihadist” terrorist groups is once again at the forefront of national security thinking in Washington. A report released this week by the RAND Corporation, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” explains why.
There were 20 active “Salafi-jihadist groups” around the world in 2001, according to Rand; last year this number was 49. In 2007 there were around 100 attacks around the world by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups; in 2013 there were over 900. The report offers many of the same dire assessments as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s (CEIP) May 30 conference, “Al-Qaeda Transformed,” which featured a talk by Georgetown professor and terrorism expert, Bruce Hoffman, titled “Al-Qaeda’s Curious Comeback.” Not only is the number of terrorist groups at unprecedented levels, but their geographic reach has expanded as well, particularly into Africa.
What explains this turn of events? The key lies in the word the CEIP used in the title of its conference: transformation. Al-Qaeda is no longer the single, hierarchical group that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. That hierarchy still exists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but its direct role in carrying out terror attacks is negligible and its function is more an ideological totem than an active terror network. In its place is a network of local terror groups, who share a similar Salafi ideology and who to varying degrees have chosen to align themselves with al-Qaeda’s reputation or “brand.” These local groups may be directly affiliated with “core” al-Qaeda (like Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra) or may share only the barest of connections (like Nigeria’s Boko Haram). But the overall result is a global, ideologically similar, collection of terrorist “franchises” that can exploit any local opportunity to expand their reach and capabilities. The Arab Spring, which was arguably a repudiation of violent Salafi extremism in favor of civil protest and reform movements, has actually enabled the rise and development of many of these local groups. It has led to lawless chaos and anti-government violence in places like Syria and eastern Libya, and Salafi terror groups have thrived in those conditions.
The other conclusion that can be drawn from this resurgence of Salafi terrorism, and the reemergence of al-Qaeda in its new, atomized form, is that the US’ “War on Terror” is failing. Every face of America’s counterterrorism policy has to be called into question, from the War in Afghanistan, to drone strikes (which have very likely created more terrorists than they killed), to the indefinite detention and torture of suspected terrorists (which have only served as rallying cries for terror groups).
Yes, America has managed to avoid another 9/11-style attack, but the decentralization of terror networks explains that as well. Al-Qaeda has always had two targets: the “far enemy” (America, the West) and the “near enemy” (hostile and/or secular governments in the Middle East). As al-Qaeda’s organization has decentralized, its local networks have refocused their attention on the “near enemy,” sparing America the brunt of their efforts. These regional al-Qaeda affiliates recruit new followers based on local conditions, to join a local fight. But the danger is that, as their capabilities grow, these locally focused groups will shift their attention to the far enemy. The fact that so many Salafi groups see a benefit to being connected to Al-Qaeda’s name, its cause, and its reputation shows that al-Qaeda’s core ideology still has resonance with potential recruits, so the chance that at least some of these affiliates will eventually take up Al-Qaeda’s fight against the West is not insignificant.
Both Hoffman and Rand suggest a number of policies to counter the rising Salafi tide. They range from direct US military action to countering Salafi propaganda online, to the increasingly popular idea of aiding Middle Eastern governments as they try to develop governing institutions, to improve their internal security situations, and to stabilize regions (eastern Libya, for example) that are currently outside government control. The latter is the focus of President Barack Obama’s newly proposed “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund,” a $5 billion program aimed at training local security forces to respond to internal threats. While improving governance and security is a worthwhile goal in the abstract, these funds should not be misused. It’s a cliché to say, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” but if US counterterrorism resources are used by authoritarian regimes to stifle legitimate political opposition, then this program, too, will only damage America’s reputation and work against its long-term national security goals.
After 9/11, George W. Bush informed Americans that “they [the terrorists] hate our freedoms.” That notion, ridiculous when it was first uttered, appears all the more ridiculous today, after we’ve watched Arabs, Iranians, and Turks take to the streets to fight — and in some cases die — for their personal freedom over the past five years. It is accordingly past time for the US to reckon with how its own policies have legitimized Salafi/Al-Qaeda propaganda about “the far enemy.” Drones, detention, and torture may well have created more terrorists than they’ve killed or otherwise prevented, but there is more to it than that. A foreign policy that supports Israel regardless of what Israel does to Palestinians trapped in Gaza or forced into Bantustans in the West Bank creates anti-US sentiment. When US weaponry, whether wielded by American forces or by American clients, is killing civilians in places like eastern Libya, Gaza, and Sinai, anti-US sentiment will increase. American patronage of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes absolutely creates anti-American sentiment. That sentiment is what will allow currently localized terror networks to shift their attention from the enemy at home to America, the enemy abroad.
It’s easy to rattle sabers about “freedom” and “human rights” when the target has already been cast as the villain, so it’s no surprise that US foreign policy has emphasized these issues when it comes to Bashar al-Assad, or Saddam Hussein, or the Iranian clerical regime. But unless America embarks on some hard choices about holding its allies to the same standards it demands of its enemies, its reputation will continue to suffer. The Leahy Amendment, a 1997 law that requires the US to cut off aid to foreign security forces that are suspects of human rights violations, ought to force these hard choices, but it needs to be applied consistently rather than ignored when it becomes inconvenient (as in, for example, Bahrain). The US military establishment chafes against Leahy’s restrictions, arguing that it constrains them from aiding foreign militaries that are confronting potential threats to the US, but this criticism is short-sighted. It’s far better for US security in the long-term if it can avoid links to acts of oppression or violence perpetrated by authoritarian regimes.
When US actions contradict US rhetoric, it damages America’s stature in the world and gives more ammunition to the message of groups like al-Qaeda. Without the political willingness to frankly and honestly examine America’s role in the world and the impact of US policy choices, then Salafi terrorism in all its forms will remain a potential threat.
Photo: Sinai militia carrying al-Qaeda flags head for a funeral of killed militants on August 10, 2013. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS.
]]>by Daniel Wagner, Giorgio Cafiero, and Sufyan bin Uzayr*
Since the revolutions that swept across the Middle East in 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government has arrested dozens of Emirati and Egyptian nationals allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Declaring the MB a threat to the UAE’s [...]]]>
by Daniel Wagner, Giorgio Cafiero, and Sufyan bin Uzayr*
Since the revolutions that swept across the Middle East in 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government has arrested dozens of Emirati and Egyptian nationals allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Declaring the MB a threat to the UAE’s ruling order, social fabric, and economic prosperity, Emirati authorities have since 2011 waged a crackdown on Al-Islah (AI), a MB-influenced group. Throughout the Arab Awakening movement, Abu Dhabi has deepened partnerships with other states determined to eradicate the MB. Given that the UAE and Kuwait support Saudi Arabia’s efforts to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an MB-free zone, shared hostility toward this Sunni movement appears to unite the GCC members more effectively than fears of Shi’ite Iran.
The MB’s activity in the UAE dates back to the 1960s when scores of Egyptian MB members fled Nasser’s Egypt to take haven in the Gulf. These Egyptians were sophisticated, educated, upwardly mobile, and they gained high-ranking posts in the UAE’s public and private sectors, playing an important role in the nation’s judicial and education systems. The Egyptian MB followers influenced scores of conservative UAE nationals who founded AI, which became an official NGO in 1974.
Initially, AI was heavily involved in the UAE’s educational, religious, and social affairs. In time, however, its orientation grew increasingly political, and relations with the government grew tense. The government’s belief that AI was loyal to a transnational Islamist movement, rather than the UAE, has been a primary source of tension. Since the 1990s the state has prohibited AI members from holding public office or making calls for political reform.
The UAE maintains that AI is an armed group with 20,000 followers determined to overthrow the federation of seven emirates and establish a caliphate in the Gulf. AI claims that it rejects violence while supporting peaceful reforms in the country. Regardless of what constitutes reality, the potential for instability and the threat of ending a relatively harmonious status quo between the Gulf state’s diverse ethnic and sectarian communities have contributed to the support the government is receiving from many Emiratis who credit their rulers with maintaining stability as chaos destabilizes many Arab nations.
When Mohamed Morsi and the Egyptian MB’s newly-established political party — the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) — won the 2011/2012 elections, authorities in the UAE became deeply unsettled. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was a close UAE ally and the prospect of democratic revolutions spreading from Egypt into the GCC was a central concern for all Gulf monarchies.
Egypt-UAE relations were marked by tense diplomatic spats throughout Morsi’s presidency. In July 2012, Dubai’s Police Chief accused the MB of plotting to topple the government in order to seize its sovereign wealth. In October 2012, the UAE Foreign Minister alleged that the MB was “encroach[ing] upon the sovereignty and integrity of other nations.” After UAE authorities arrested 11 Egyptians in January 2013, accusing them of training local Islamists to overthrow the government, an FJP spokesperson dismissed such allegations, stating that UAE officials were conducting an “unfair campaign” against Egyptians that had “no basis whatsoever”.
The UAE viewed Morsi’s downfall as a strategic opportunity to reset the course of events since 2011. Since the coup, Abu Dhabi has not been shy in showing support for Egypt’s military-backed interim government. In October 2013, Emirati officials announced a $4.9 billion aid package to Egypt that included cash, petroleum products, and funds for clinics, education, housing, and infrastructure. This, along with aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has made a significant difference in Field Marshal Abdul Fatah el-Sisi’s ability to govern effectively by delivering on some of his promises to the Egyptian people.
Sisi’s visit to the GCC in March 2014 was rich in geopolitical context. While in the UAE, the two countries’ militaries conducted joint training exercises and the UAE-based contractor Arabtec signed a memorandum of understanding to construct approximately one million housing units across Egypt, costing $40 billion. It was understood at the time that this deal, supported by the UAE government, was another part of the Egyptian military’s effort to garner greater support for Sisi among low-income Egyptians, with presidential elections scheduled for May 2014.
Egypt’s military has for decades asserted greater power by playing an increasingly important economic role. Since the coup, Egypt’s generals have made power grabs by designating their allies to major economic posts while securing contracts for major infrastructure deals, and a lucrative Suez Canal project. As Egypt’s military is determined to seize even greater control of the national economy, the billions of dollars in aid from the UAE will aid Sisi’s efforts toward this outcome.
In March 2014, immediately after Saudi Arabia’s government declared the MB a “terrorist organization”, the UAE’s government expressed support for Riyadh’s decision, calling it a “significant step”. This declaration came in the aftermath of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar on the grounds that Doha did not implement a security pact regarding non-intervention in fellow GCC states’ affairs. Among other motivations, the move was largely intended to signal a message to Qatar about supporting the MB in Egypt and elsewhere. Doha’s relationship with MB branches has contributed to the tense state of relations between the UAE and Qatar.
Ongoing sectarian violence in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia showcases how the GCC is not immune to the Arab Awakening. Although calls for political or social change in the UAE have been minimal since 2011, the potential for income disparities to fuel unrest in the UAE is a concern for the ruling order. Given that AI has functioned as a charity and social welfare organization for decades, the government believes there is potential for the group to gain influence in the UAE’s poorer emirates.
While sectarian fault lines largely define the Middle East’s geopolitical order, a “Sunni Cold War” is simultaneously influencing the regional network of alliances. On one side, the distinctly undemocratic polity in Saudi Arabia vehemently opposes Islamist political parties that promote democratic institutions. On the other, Turkey and Qatar support the spread of ‘democratic Islamism’ throughout the region.
In this struggle, the UAE has made its position abundantly clear. While Abu Dhabi will continue to use its massive natural resource wealth to attempt to neutralize its citizens’ aspirations for democratic reforms, the UAE appears determined to conduct an increasingly activist foreign policy that counters the MB throughout the region while seeking to prevent the organization from gaining any foothold in the GCC. In doing so, the UAE underscores its intention to preserve the status quo power structure in the Gulf and Egypt.
*Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and Senior Advisor with Gnarus Advisors. Giorgio Cafiero is co-founder of Gulf State Analytics (GSA). Sufyan bin Uzayr is an analyst with GSA.
]]>by Derek Davison
Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is a danger that these elections will ratify a resurgent authoritarian tendency that has developed, in part, as a reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” movement.
The most obvious example of this phenomenon is in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarianism has remained constant despite the ongoing civil war it has sparked. Assad recently declared his intention to stand for reelection in June. In an interesting but certainly symbolic gesture, this year’s vote will be contested, as opposed to previous presidential elections in 2000 and 2007 that were conducted as referenda in which Assad’s name was the only one on the ballot. There is little reason to believe that this election will be any more legitimate than those were, and in many ways it will be much worse. The vote will only be permitted in areas of the country that are under government control, and there is no indication that the millions of Syrians who have been displaced by the war will be able to cast ballots. UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has argued that elections will only further hamper efforts to reach a negotiated settlement in the three-year old conflict, though progress toward such a settlement has been imperceptible.
Turks have already voted once this year in municipal elections, where Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won a clear, albeit not overwhelming victory. Erdogan is expected to run in August’s presidential election, where he is the presumptive favorite. Since ordering a violent crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters (whose protest movement is still active) last summer, Erdogan has been governing with an increasingly authoritarian bent by limiting press freedoms, increasing his direct control over Turkey’s judiciary, quashing a corruption probe that targeted his aides, and even banning social media inside Turkey. Although Turkey’s constitution establishes a parliamentary system with limited presidential authority and Erdogan tried and failed to change the constitution to increase that authority in 2012, he has pledged to use “all [his] constitutional powers” if he becomes president, which suggests he will assert the authority of the presidency as far as he can within constitutional bounds.
For Americans, the resurgence of authoritarianism in Iraq may be the most difficult pill to swallow, given the blood and treasure the United States expended, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives it took, in a war that resulted in the only tangible result (since pre-war threats of Iraqi nuclear weapons turned out to be completely empty) of the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. But since he was elected Prime Minister in 2006, Nuri al-Maliki has increasingly consolidated his authority over the Iraqi state, particularly by oppressing Iraq’s Sunni population, whose recent uprising has given Maliki an excuse to accelerate his accumulation of power. Maliki has governed in fear of a Baathist revival among the Sunnis, and has manipulated the state security apparatus to consolidate his hold on power even as the security situation in Iraq has collapsed, and while Iraqi infrastructure continues to crumble, Maliki’s attention seems to be focused solely on retaining power. The results of Iraq’s April 30 parliamentary elections are not yet known, and there is a chance that Maliki will have to make some concessions in order to form a coalition government, but the likeliest outcome is that Maliki’s State of Law Coalition will come away victorious and he will retain the premiership with a free hand.
In Egypt, the resurgence of authoritarianism hasn’t waited for Field Marshal-turned-civilian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s likely election in May. It began, arguably, with the coup that removed former President Mohamed Morsi from power, but certainly revealed itself in August of last year, when Egypt’s interim government launched a violent crackdown against protesters and Muslim Brotherhood figures. That crackdown claimed 638 lives in a single day (August 14, 2013), with almost 4,000 injured, and has led to over 3,000 deaths in total (the majority in clashes between protesters and security forces), with another 17,000 injured and nearly 19,000 Egyptians imprisoned. The government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December, a move with obvious ramifications in terms of stamping out political opposition and one that experts have warned could become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by driving Brotherhood members toward terrorism as their only remaining means of opposition. Last month, an Egyptian judge sentenced 529 people, most or all of them Brotherhood supporters, to death over an attack on Egyptian police in August. This month, that same judge commuted all but 37 of the death sentences to 25-year prison terms — and then sentenced an additional 683 men to death. There is a possibility that the upcoming campaign will somehow put Egypt on a path toward democratic reform, but it seems more likely that Sisi’s election will cement Egypt’s complete return to authoritarian repression.
Each of these cases illustrates the limits and challenges facing US foreign policy in the region. The US’ unwillingness to take a strong stance on Egyptian repression was made clear when it refused to admit that the coup which removed Morsi from power was, in fact, a coup, because doing so would have triggered automatic cuts in US aid. Now, while it condemns the death sentences handed to hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters as “unconscionable,” America continues to send military aid to Egypt (though not without Congressional opposition) because its security priorities (fighting Sinai terrorism, maintaining close Egypt-Israel ties, and ensuring that the Suez Canal remains open) require it. Turkey is a NATO ally whose collaboration is important to American policy on Syria, Iran, and even Russia, so there is little that Americas can do to rein in Erdogan even as the White House criticizes his more repressive policies. It’s been apparent for some time now that the US has little leverage with which to hasten Assad’s ouster, and given the makeup of the Syrian opposition, it’s not clear that a post-Assad Syria would actually be preferable from an American viewpoint, though millions of Syrians would disagree. Finally, as far as Maliki is concerned, it seems that Washington is content to remain relatively quiet as Maliki consolidates his power, as long as he keeps up the fight against jihadist forces like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which have used the discord among Iraqi Sunnis to expand their regional influence.
]]>
by Adnan Tabatabai
Several developments and incidents in the past three decades have led to a deep rift between Tehran and Riyadh. This rivalry has mounted into antagonism. Today, the possible breakthrough in the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program has caused anxiety in the Saudi kingdom.
Observers and experts alike maintain that [...]]]>
by Adnan Tabatabai
Several developments and incidents in the past three decades have led to a deep rift between Tehran and Riyadh. This rivalry has mounted into antagonism. Today, the possible breakthrough in the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program has caused anxiety in the Saudi kingdom.
Observers and experts alike maintain that a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) — and US-Iran rapprochement in particular — would critically undermine Saudi Arabia’s interests. But this conventional wisdom overlooks important recent developments.
Iran now capable of bold diplomacy
The new administration in Tehran is both willing and able to adopt bold steps in foreign relations. While the self-perception of being a or the regional power is as well-defined now as it was under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a new approach is now in place. The strategy is no longer to confront, provoke and humiliate competitors and to proclaim strength through isolation, but to seek cooperation through a reconciliatory approach leading to the creation of “win-win solutions,” to use the language of President Hassan Rouhani.
This political mindset is being promoted by Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. His foreign policy approach is based on both a strong popular mandate as well as the backing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Indeed, whenever Zarif’s critics at home have become too outspoken, Khamenei has supported Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, calling them, for example, “soldiers of the revolution”. This enables the Rouhani government to define ambitious foreign policy goals.
Saudi Arabia in a state of weakness
In contrast to Iran’s relative stability following the exit of Ahmadinejad, the Saudi ruling elite is going through a critical evolutionary process and is, therefore, situated in a state of confusion and weakness. The urgent question of succession has already led King Abdullah to circumvent the prerogative of the 34-membered Allegiance Council and designate the 68-year-old Prince Muqrin bin Abdelaziz as deputy crown prince and possible future king. Yet some doubt whether Muqrin is capable of steering the kingdom through the challenges ahead.
The removal of Prince Bandar bin Sultan as intelligence chief has been of similar significance. Iranian officials welcomed this move and read it as a sign of failed Saudi strategies particularly in Syria. With Prince Mohammed Nayef taking over the Syrian file, a possible shift in Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy seems possible. Recent reports of Saudi-US cooperation to provide advanced anti-tank missiles to Syrian rebels, however, show that this possible shift may still divert significantly from Tehran’s position.
The kingdom will nevertheless have to pinpoint its alliances. The current rift with Qatar may indicate disintegrative processes in the Gulf. Former Assistant Secretary General for the Shura Council in Oman, Ahmad Ali M. al-Mukhaini, has been supportive of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seeking multi-level arrangements with Iran. He has even written: “We need to have a counterweight to Saudi Arabia along commercial, energy and security lines. Would this be a role for Iran? The answer is yes.”
Furthermore, the Arab Youth Survey 2014 has shown that the population of the Gulf sees regional neighbours as their biggest allies. Even polls from 2011, when the provocative Ahmadinejad was still president, also show that despite anti-Iran rhetoric by Gulf monarchy leaders, Iran came third (18%) by a large margin after Israel (71%) and the US (59%) when respondents were asked which country poses the biggest threat to regional stability. The Saudi kingdom might, therefore, be aware of the dangers of solely relying on its Western allies or exploring cooperation with Israel. In short, seeking cooperation with Iran may, after all, be less costly.
Iran’s track record of good relations
Many of President Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet members were ministers, deputies or advisors during the presidencies of Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989-97) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Throughout those years, and particularly the 90s, Iran-Saudi relations improved before reaching a new low under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13).
Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 and its expansionist ambitions caused grave concern in the Gulf region over the threat of possible Shia uprisings. The revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini angered the Saudis by calling monarchies “un-Islamic” governments. Saudi Arabia’s desire to counter and contain revolutionary Iran also resulted in Saudi support for Saddam Hussein during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war.
After a decade of open hostility, tensions cooled down during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami. Strategic and economic cooperation took shape, some of which even lasted until the early years of Ahmadinejad. But the latter’s increasingly radical rhetoric, his close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG), and Iran’s growing influence particularly in Iraq and Lebanon through the IRGC infuriated the Saudi kingdom, even to a point of supporting military action against Iran to halt its nuclear program.
For months, there has been talk of an Iranian high-rank delegation visit to Saudi Arabia, but it has not yet happened. Meanwhile at numerous speeches and interviews, Zarif has stressed the need to “build networks, not blocs” to tackle the many challenges the region faces. He has also repeatedly reached out to Riyadh.
An Iran-Saudi rapprochement would immediately ease the proxification of the many fragile contexts of the region ranging from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Pakistan. The respective strategic interests must be settled; the rhetoric that accentuates the sectarian divide — a discourse that has created dangerous realities on the ground in terms of identity politics particularly in Iraq and Syria – must be halted.
Saudi Arabia’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, the recent decree by the King to criminalize “home-made” jihadists who fight in Syria, and tensions with Qatar regarding these issues indicate the the kingdom is trying to come to terms with Sunni extremism beyond its control. Rapprochement with Iran would, at least, minimize the dangers coming from the Shia fronts and, potentially, even lead to joint efforts to tame militant jihadist forces.
How the US can help
It’s time to convey the idea that Middle East powers must shape the future of their own neighbourhood — an idea that was chanted by protesters throughout the region during the wave of Arab uprisings that began in 2011. A gradual withdrawal of the US presence would encourage and strengthen a sense of ownership and shared responsibilities.
Asked about the major objective for the US to support Iran-Saudi rapprochement, Gary Sick, who served as an Iran specialist on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan told LobeLog: “Ideally, what the United States would want — and what every other responsible power with interests in the region should want — is for both of these key players to focus their efforts on resolving regional disputes.”
“That means that Iran needs to visibly temper its involvement with proxy forces and to actively seek rapprochement with the GCC states. Similarly, Saudi Arabia needs to turn away from its recent excursions into self-defeating and even irrational policies and return to the more cautious and pragmatic policies that have served it so well since its inception,” said Sick, now a professor at Columbia University in New York.
“Admittedly, that is asking a lot, and I doubt that it will happen overnight. Still, it describes approximately the strategic relationships that existed in the Persian Gulf in the mid-1970s and again in the early 1990s,” he said.
In order to minimize Saudi scepticism, “the United States and its allies need to bring Saudi Arabia more into the actual decision-making process on regional affairs while providing constant and persuasive reassurance of sensitivity to Saudi interests,” he said.
Considering the regional policies of the Rouhani government, it is plausible to assume that any opening signals from Riyadh will be echoed in Tehran.
– Adnan Tabatabai is a Berlin-based political analyst on Iran affairs and a PhD candidate at the University of Duisburg-Essen
Photo: Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (R) meets with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdel Aziz, 09 December in Tehran, on the sidelines of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summit. Credit:AFP/Getty Images
]]>by Emile Nakhleh
The Bahraini Arabic language newspaper al-Wasat reported on April 9 that a Cairo court began to consider a case brought by an Egyptian lawyer against Qatar accusing it of being soft on terrorism. The “terrorism” charge is of course a euphemism for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt, Saudi [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
The Bahraini Arabic language newspaper al-Wasat reported on April 9 that a Cairo court began to consider a case brought by an Egyptian lawyer against Qatar accusing it of being soft on terrorism. The “terrorism” charge is of course a euphemism for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have designated a “terrorist” organization and have vowed to dismantle.
The two partners and the UAE also loathe Qatar for hosting and funding al-Jazeera satellite TV. The continued incarceration of the Al-Jazeera journalists and dozens of other journalists on trumped up charges is no coincidence.
The court case is symptomatic of the current Saudi-Egyptian relationship in their counter-revolution against the 2011 pro-democracy upheavals that toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his fellow autocrats in Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya.
The pro-autocracy partnership between the Egyptian military junta and the Saudi ruling family goes beyond their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and the perceived threat of terrorism. It emanates from the autocrats’ visceral opposition to democracy and human rights, including minority and women’s rights.
What should be most critical to them as they contemplate the future of their coalition of counter-revolutionaries, however, is the growing Western conviction that dictators can no longer provide stability.
The Egyptian Field Marshall and the Saudi potentate also abhor the key demands of the Arab uprisings and reject their peoples’ calls for freedom, dignity, justice, and genuine economic and political reform.
They are equally terrified of the coming end of the authoritarian paradigm, which could bring about their demise or at least force them to share power with their people. The Saudis and their Gulf Arab allies, especially Bahrain and the UAE, are willing to trample on their people’s rights in order to safeguard family tribal rule.
The Saudi-Egyptian partnership is also directed at the Obama administration primarily because of Washington’s diplomatic engagement with Iran.
According to media and Human Rights Watch reports, at least 16,000 secular and Islamist activists are currently being held in Egyptian prisons, without having been charged or convicted. This number includes hundreds of MB leaders and activists and thousands of its supporters.
Many of them, including teenagers, have also been tortured and abused physically and psychologically. These mass arrests and summary trials and convictions of Islamists and liberals alike belie the Saudi-Egyptian claim that theirs is a campaign against terrorism.
A brief history of Egyptian-Saudi relations
Egyptian-Saudi relations in the past 60 years have been erratic, depending on leadership, ideology, and regional and world events. During the Nasser era in the 1950s and ‘60s, relations were very tense due to Saudi fears of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalist ideology.
The Saudis saw Nasser as a nationalist firebrand arousing Arab masses against colonialism and Arab monarchies. He supported national liberation movements and wars of independence against the French in North Africa and the British in the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf.
The Saudi monarchy viewed Nasser’s call for Arab unity “from the roaring ocean to the rebellious Gulf” as a threat to their survival and declared a war on “secular” Arab nationalism and “atheist” Communism. They perceived Nasser’s war in Yemen against the tribal monarchy as an existential threat at their door and began to fund and arm the royalists there against the Egyptian military campaign.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the two opposite poles of the “Arab cold war” during the 1950s and ‘60s. Nasser represented emerging Arab republicanism while Saudi Arabia epitomized traditional monarchies. Nasser turned to the Soviet Union; Saudi Arabia turned to the United States.
In the late 1960s, Saudi Arabia declared the proselytization of its brand of Islam as a cardinal principle of its foreign policy for the purpose of fighting Arab nationalism and Communism.
It’s ironic that Saudi Arabia is currently supporting and funding the military junta in Egypt at a time when the military-turned-civilian presidential shoe-in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is resurrecting the Nasserist brand of politics. In the next three to five years, the most intriguing analytic question will be whether this partnership would endure and how long the post-2011 generation of Arabs would tolerate a coalition of secular autocracy and a religious theocracy.
Saudi Arabia supported Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s war against Israel in 1973 but broke with him later in that decade after he visited Jerusalem and signed a peace treaty with Israel.
By the early 1980s, however, the two countries re-established close relations because of their common interest in supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and in pushing for the Saudi-articulated Arab Peace Initiative.
The Saudi King viewed President Hosni Mubarak warmly and was dismayed by his fall. He was particularly incensed by Washington’s seeming precipitous abandonment of Mubarak in January 2011.
The Saudi monarchy applauded General al-Sisi’s removal of President Muhammad Morsi and pumped billions of dollars into the Egyptian treasury. They also indicated they would make up any deficit in case American aid to Egypt is halted.
The Saudis have endorsed Sisi’s decision to run for president of Egypt and adopted similar harsh policies against the Muslim Brotherhood and all political dissent. Several factors seem to push Saudi Arabia closer to Egypt.
The Saudis are concerned about their growing loss of influence and prestige in the region, especially their failure in thwarting the interim nuclear agreement between the Iran and world powers known as the P5+1. Their policy in Syria is in shambles.
Initially, they encouraged jihadists to go to Syria to fight the Assad regime, but now they cannot control the pro-al-Qaeda radical Salafi jihadists fighting the Damascus tyrant.
The Saudis also failed in transforming the Gulf Cooperation Council into a more unified structure. Other than Bahrain, almost every other state has balked at the Saudi suggestion, viewing it as a power grab.
In an absurd form of retaliation against Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from that country. The Saudis are engaged in tribal vendettas against their fellow tribal ruling families, which is out of place in a 21st century globalized and well-connected world.
The oil wealth and the regime’s inspired religious fatwas by establishment clerics have a diminishing impact on the younger generation connected to the global social media.
Despite the heavy-handed crackdown, protests, demonstrations, and confrontations with the security forces are a daily occurrence in Egypt. It’s becoming very clear that dictatorial policies are producing more instability, less security, and greater appeal to terrorism.
It won’t be long before Western governments conclude that autocracy is bad for their moral sensibilities, destructive for business, and threatening for their presence in the region. The Saudi-Egyptian coalition of autocrats will soon be in the crosshairs.
In order to endure, such a coalition must be based on respect for their peoples, a genuine commitment to human rights, and a serious effort to address the “deficits” of liberty, education, and women’s rights that have afflicted Arab society for decades.
Photo: Photo released by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) shows Egypt’s Interim President Adly Mansour (L) listening to Saudi Crown Prince Salman after his arrival in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Jeddah on Oct. 7, 2013. Credit: Xinhua/SPA
]]>by Wayne White
When I first walked the streets of Algiers back in 1975, the city was decked out in banners heralding a visit from North Korean tyrant Kim Il Sung. Algeria’s foreign policy radicalism of those days shifted to a far more moderate pragmatism over 25 years ago, but surprisingly, little [...]]]>
by Wayne White
When I first walked the streets of Algiers back in 1975, the city was decked out in banners heralding a visit from North Korean tyrant Kim Il Sung. Algeria’s foreign policy radicalism of those days shifted to a far more moderate pragmatism over 25 years ago, but surprisingly, little parallel evolution has occurred domestically. Over 50 years since independence from France, Algeria retains a heavy handed, relatively socialist, military-dominated, exclusively secular ruling elite. Turnover in terms of those wielding power has been determined by ongoing rivalries within that privileged elite, as well as the limited life expectancies of its geriatric kingpins.
With a populace still traumatized over the bloodletting of the 1990s civil war pitting the authorities against armed Islamists, seeing chaos as near as neighboring Libya following the so-called “Arab Spring”, and harsh regime crackdowns on demonstrations in 2011, there has been great reluctance to mount a strong challenge since then. More sure of itself again, the regime remains notoriously resistant to outside criticism or diplomatic entreaties urging greater transparency and more restraint.
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, just announced his intent to run for a 4th term. Early on, Bouteflika, another aging veteran of Algeria’s war of independence against France from the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, had relatively limited power compared to the military. His election in 1999 and re-elections in 2004 and 2009 were tainted by manipulation, the withdrawal of other candidates, other political party and Berber boycotts, as well as considerable voter apathy.
In fact, for Bouteflika to run in 2009, the FLN-dominated legislature had to amend the constitution to allow for more than two presidential terms. Not surprisingly, his last victory, by a highly suspicious 90% of the vote, was characterized by one opposition party as a “tsunami of fraud.”
But Bouteflika accumulated more power, building alliances with key military factions behind the scenes. By the end of his 1st term, he succeeded in using his allies to defeat former army chief of staff, FLN Secretary General, and rival Ali Benflis in the election, and then forced the resignation of army chief of staff General Mohammed Lamari a few months later. Subsequently, senior military officers not aligned with Bouteflika were shuffled to less important posts or forced to resign. Even after returning last year from treatment abroad for a stroke, Bouteflika and his allies succeeded in weakening the chief of Algeria’s formidable Intelligence and Security Department (DRS), General Mohammed Mediene.
Still, the 77-year-old Bouteflika’s decision to run for a 4th term on April 17 came as a surprise to many. Since the stroke, he has been seen only rarely in public or on TV. Underscoring doubts about his health, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal has commented that Bouteflika does not need to campaign because there are others who could do so for him. The news sparked a protest in Algiers, broken up by club-wielding police. The Algerian newspaper El-Watan (operating despite past closures and harassment) ran a cartoon in which one Hollywood Oscar nominee for special effects was “The Fourth Term” from Algeria.
Yet, defeating Bouteflika seems near impossible, with opposition parties so weak, the FLN’s electoral machinery so formidable, and his allies in the military establishment on top. The latter probably hope to prolong overall stability by doing whatever is needed to keep Bouteflika in office, whether Bouteflika remains fully effective or not.
As one would expect, sustained authoritarianism with little transparency has bred an immense amount of official corruption and dysfunction. Within the military, even sales of soft drinks, cigarettes and other commodities have been divvied up by municipality so rake-offs can be assigned systematically. The judiciary is also subject to unwarranted official, business or individual interference. In 2004, Algeria established the National Body for Preventing and Combating Corruption, but Bouteflika failed to appoint its governing members for 6 years! Naturally, its impact has been nil.
Moreover, although Algeria has sizeable oil and gas exports, running up foreign exchange reserves of roughly $200 billion (3 years of imports), the plight of the average Algerian continues to stagnate. Despite well over $100 billion said to have been allotted to alleviate problems like Algeria’s appalling housing shortage, lagging education, and shoddy health care during Bouteflika’s presidency, actual performance has changed little.
The worst of its bloody civil war ended 15 years ago, but Algeria still trails its less wealthy neighbors Morocco and Tunisia in growth. Most recently, the World Bank ranked Algeria a rather poor 153rd out of 189 countries globally in ease of doing business. So, foreign investors largely shun Algeria as a locale for generating industrial, commercial, service or other enterprises. It is not surprising that unemployment — officially cited among youth as 21% — is far higher than admitted, a situation worsened by widespread underemployment.
Why then is Algeria relatively stable? First, there are the dark memories of the worst years of the Algerian Civil War (1992-1998) when as many as 200,000 Algerians may have perished. Not lost to those who lived through that horror, despite the overwhelming international focus on the savagery of Muslim extremist groups in the war’s closing years, was the brutality of regime forces in crushing the rebellion (ironically mirroring that of the French during the Algerian liberation war of 1954-1962).
The impact of the “Arab Spring” (which did in fact generate some hope for change in Algeria) has been tempered by the grim fate of Syria, Egypt and Libya — the last abutting Algeria’s borders. The January 2013 terrorist attack and hostage crisis at a southern Algerian gas facility near Ain Amenas was launched from Libya. Algerians know, however, that the origins of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM), and some related terrorist elements active in southwestern Libya, Mali, southern Algeria, and northern Niger stem from the last extremist spawn of the Algerian Civil War: the ruthless and fanatical Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (or GSPC).
Still, the Arab Spring was not without impact. Localized protests had occurred during 2007-2010 over various issues such as food, housing, and infrastructure. In 2008, US Ambassador Robert Ford described Algeria as an “unhappy country” in a leaked cable.
In January 2011, however, the pot boiled over with far larger demonstrations — including riots and attacks on government offices all over the country triggered first by a rise in food prices and then by Tunisian President Ben Ali’s resignation. Bouteflika temporarily cut in taxes on sugar and cooking oil, and security forces cracked down hard on larger protests.
Nonetheless, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned, the opposition gained renewed vigor in February despite a promise by Bouteflika to end the 1992 “State of Emergency,” with the parliament doing so later that month. Security forces responded far more harshly, banned demonstrations, and in one instance arrested close to 10,000 in Algiers using possibly as many as 30,000 police. Occasional demonstrations continued through April, when Bouteflika promised on TV to seek constitutional amendments to “reinforce representative democracy.”
Despite the failure of the regime to follow through on some promises (like constitutional change, which Bouteflika also promised in 2006), the situation has settled down substantially since mid-2011. The continuation of harsh government crackdowns exhausted various opposition elements while ugly developments in Syria, Libya and Egypt doubtless alarmed many oppositionists too. In fact, Bouteflika & Co. publicly support the Assad regime’s struggle in Syria, though not materially. It did likewise toward Muammar Qadhafi until his overthrow, providing sanctuary for Qadhafi’s son Mohmammed and daughter Aisha.
Sad to say, no meaningful change is likely anytime soon in what has been a sort of governmental Jurassic Park. Even after President Bouteflika cannot be propped up anymore, only establishment stalwarts like Bouteflika allies Prime Minister Sellal or the national police chief, General Abdelghani Hamel, appear to wait in the wings.
Meanwhile, major world capitals wrestling with instability and uncertainty wrought by the “Arab Awakening” in other important regional states, along with their pervasive fear of terrorism, probably will not be too disappointed to see more of the same in Algiers so long as the country remains stable. The regime’s huge governmental failings will be reported, critiqued, and duly frowned upon. There will, however, be few adverse consequences from abroad for this self-serving cabal of heavy-handed old men who lead a country in which 70% of the population is now under the age of 30.
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