by Wayne White
Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation of a new government by scrambling for ways to survive. Fortunately, IS most likely cannot seize much in the way of new territory, but the collective Iraqi political will and military heft needed to begin the daunting task of pushing IS back remains elusive.
Excessive IS Hubris
Naming al-Baghdadi “Caliph” of all Muslims by the newly branded IS at the beginning of Ramadan, a stunning act of hubris, probably expands the potential for driving wedges between IS and its Sunni Arab fellow travelers. The militant Sunni Arab Association of Muslim Scholars already has announced that IS “did not consult” with its “allies” or “their leaders,” and an “oath of allegiance” demanded by IS is “not binding on anyone.” In Mosul, evidently regarded by IS as mostly its own exclusive conquest (not ruled in cooperation with powerful allies), IS reportedly has asked those scattered allies on the scene to turn in their arms, another likely source of resistance and pushback.
Whether Sunni Arabs angry over Maliki’s abuses can be peeled away from IS is not the only matter relevant to the announcement of a Caliphate (doubtless considered blasphemous by many Muslims, Sunni and Shi’a). The IS declaration does nothing to alter military realities on the ground: although Baghdad’s efforts to wrest a few places like Tikrit from IS have been frustrated, IS itself also largely has been stalled.
Military Frustration in Baghdad
With politics weighing heavily on Maliki’s mind, his civilian and military leaders selected mainly for loyalty (not professionalism), and amidst endemic governmental dysfunction, Maliki’s ability to oversee a military rebound is iffy. Worse still, Maliki himself is a politician without any particular feel for military matters (despite retaining the defense ministry portfolio).
So far, his forces fighting in Tikrit and ringing Baghdad appear to be a hodge-podge of army units and Shi’a militiamen (many of the latter who took up arms against Sunni Arabs, U.S. troops and Iraqi authorities in 2004-2008). West of Baghdad, a sizeable contingent of veteran Shi’a volunteers who fought alongside regime forces in the Syrian civil war have been deployed, perhaps the strongest element overall. Without far greater air and heavy-weapons support, these forces are best suited to defense, as opposed to driving back IS fanatics occupying positions that are well dug in.
According to US officials, there are a number of militant Sunni Arab “sleeper cells” in Baghdad awaiting a call to arms. Yet, with the vast majority of the capital now Shi’a, attacks by Sunni Arab combatants would trigger Shi’a violence against the city’s greatly outnumbered Sunni Arab population. One or two Sunni Arab neighborhoods might fall under militant control, and acts of violence could be widespread for a while. However, the bulk of Baghdad would remain in government hands. Sadly, an outbreak of such bloodshed ultimately could result in another wave of sectarian cleansing, replete with atrocities, further reducing Baghdad’s dwindling Sunni Arab population.
Parliamentary Stand-off and Maliki’s Deception
Iraqi leaders cannot exploit opportunities to reach out to Sunni Arab tribes, former military officers, etc. without a new government. And should Maliki lead that new government, its ability to divide its enemies would be crippled.
The Shi’a National Alliance parliamentary bloc (dominated by Maliki’s State of Law coalition) failed to select Maliki or an alternative to Maliki prior to parliament’s July 1 session. Consequently, all Kurdish and Sunni Arab members left after a break in the proceedings (joined by a few Shi’a independents).
In a televised speech the next day, Maliki expressed hope that Iraq’s travails could be overcome through “openness” and “democratic mechanisms” (both of which Maliki has undermined as prime minister). He also lamely offered amnesty to tribes currently siding with IS — a promise of the kind to which he personally turned his back in the wake of the Sunni Arab “Awakening.” In any case, most disaffected Sunni Arabs do not want amnesty: they want comprehensive change in Baghdad’s exclusionary policies toward them.
There is a desire among some in State of Law to dump Maliki. Likewise, a shift away from Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s demands for a swifter decision on a new and inclusive government is unlikely (although Sistani may use tomorrow’s Friday prayers to clarify his position). Hopefully, despite Maliki’s machinations, he will soon be history.
US Military Reaction: Mission Creep
As some observers predicted, the Obama Administration’s initial deployment has been followed by more “boots on the ground.” Clearly alarmed by Iraqi governmental gridlock, several hundred more American troops have been sent to Baghdad to bolster the defense of the US Embassy in various ways.
The fumbling performance of the Iraqi military as it struggles to rebound also probably spurred this decision. There are, of course, risks. The more American troops inserted into an Iraq in crisis (particularly in varied locations, such as the placement of some US troops at Baghdad International Airport) increases their vulnerability. The likelihood of casualties somewhere down the road is rising ominously with each successive deployment.
Waiting for That Other Shoe to Drop
The military situation could fall into a pattern of heavy skirmishing roughly along the present front lines while the Baghdad political mill grinds on. Without greater incentives to defect, most Sunni Arab tribes, ex-officers, Ba’this, and others fed up with Baghdad are not likely to abandon IS — at least for now. Thus, the composition of Iraq’s next government will define the road ahead, making this year’s post-election jousting far more important than any in the past.
Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad, June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department photo/ Public Domain
]]>The bad news about Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s expanding constitutional powers in Egypt is the threat of another dictatorship in Egypt. The good news is that normal politics is returning to Egypt after decades of brutal authoritarian regimes.
Recent mass demonstrations in support of and opposition to Morsi’s new draft constitution [...]]]>
The bad news about Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s expanding constitutional powers in Egypt is the threat of another dictatorship in Egypt. The good news is that normal politics is returning to Egypt after decades of brutal authoritarian regimes.
Recent mass demonstrations in support of and opposition to Morsi’s new draft constitution and the political tug of war between Morsi and the judiciary — especially the Judges Club — signify healthy signs of democratic politics, which the Egyptian people fought for before and since Tahrir Square.
Egyptians are openly debating the meaning and implications of each of the 234 articles in the new constitution, ranging from the establishment of a four-year presidential term that can be served twice, to freedom of worship and social justice.
Opponents of the document correctly claim that it’s excessively religious, especially with the role assigned to al-Azhar Islamic University, and is barely inclusive. Rights of women and minorities are not clearly spelled out although followers of other Abrahamic religions have the right to select their own religious leaders and conduct their personal status matters according to their religious dictates.
These raucous and often turbulent constitutional debates and the verbal scuffles between the judiciary and the executive branch seem to signal the advent of rational politics and the promise of pragmatic political compromises. The upcoming popular referendum on the document will tell whether the Egyptian people support or oppose the draft document.
Egypt has not witnessed or enjoyed this type of political jockeying at the popular level since before the middle of the last century. Even if the draft constitution is adopted, Morsi can serve a maximum of two terms — something Egyptians have not known for generations.
The United States should not get involved in this debate and should allow the Egyptian people to sort out their political differences. Privately, Washington should point out to Morsi that tolerance, inclusion, and minority and women’s rights should be the hallmark of governance in the new Egypt.
Constitutional tensions in Egypt, however, should be viewed in the broader context of the emerging Arab Sunni order in the region. This new regional alignment is led by Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and tacitly supported by Turkey. It is perceived in the region and globally as a front to isolate Iran and diminish its regional influence, speed up Bashar al-Assad’s fall, and help break up the Iran-Syria-Hizballah “Axis of Resistance.”
This Sunni architecture could also pull Hamas away from the Iran-Syria camp and move it closer to the Sunni fold. The recent military confrontation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza had the unintended consequence of strengthening Hamas’ regional posture and cementing relations between it and Sunni Arab leaders, ranging from Qatar to Tunisia.
Although Washington has quietly endorsed the new regional Sunni politics, US policymakers and intelligence and policy analysts should consider the possibility that in the long run, the new order could also spell trouble for Arab democratic transitions and for the West. The short-term gains, while critical for the region, are already happening. Iran is becoming more isolated and its relations with Arab states and non-state actors are fraying.
Assad is on his way out, and within months or even weeks, Syria will begin to experience the convulsions of a new political order. Forceful Western warnings from President Barak Obama, Secretary Hillary Clinton and others against the possible use of chemical and biological weapons could be the prelude of Western military intervention in Syria.
The Hizballah alliance with Iran and Syria is already breaking up. Hizballah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah have lost much of their legitimacy as a symbol of resistance or “muqawama.” Nasrallah’s vocal and consistent support of Assad is viewed in the region as naked real politic, which has undercut his standing as a regional leader.
In the long run, the emerging Sunni order could undermine the gains of the Arab Spring and threaten the transition to democracy in post-authoritarian Arab countries. More importantly, the new order could embolden Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and elsewhere in their continued repression of their Shia communities and other ethnic and religious minorities.
While the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are pushing for Assad’s removal, they are not necessarily wedded to democratic principles or to granting their citizens, especially in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, equal rights. Nor are they enamored by the principles of “freedom and human dignity” highlighted in the Egyptian draft constitution.
Unless the emerging Arab Sunni order commits itself to the principles for which millions of Arab youth fought for two years ago, and unless it goes beyond just containing Iran and toppling Assad, it will remain problematic and fraught with uncertainty.
- Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at the CIA and author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World
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