by Derek Davison
If you’re looking for a one sentence indicator about the state of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics, consider this: the man who is expected to win next month’s presidential election (assuming it actually takes place) is a billionaire chocolatier named Petro Poroshenko, who served as foreign minister under [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
If you’re looking for a one sentence indicator about the state of post-Euromaidan Ukrainian politics, consider this: the man who is expected to win next month’s presidential election (assuming it actually takes place) is a billionaire chocolatier named Petro Poroshenko, who served as foreign minister under former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, and then as minister of trade and economic development for a government allied with Yushchenko’s rival and successor, Viktor Yanukovych, before becoming one of the leaders of the protest movement that forced Yanukovych from office in February.
Ukraine’s national politics since Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2005) have been dominated by the rivalry between two men: Yushckenko, who served as Kuchma’s prime minister from 1998-2001 before going into opposition, and then as Ukraine’s president from 2005-2010, and Yanukovych, who twice served as prime minister (under Kuchma from 2002-05 and then under Yushchenko from 2006-07) before being elected as president in 2010 and serving until Euromaidan removed him. Yushchenko was aligned with a broadly pro-EU, anti-Russia faction, while Yanukovych had closer ties to Moscow.
Both men are now out of Ukrainian politics. Yanukovych has the distinction of having twice been removed from the Ukrainian presidency by popular uprising. He was declared the winner of the 2004 presidential election, but allegations of fraud inspired the Orange Revolution, led by Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. The uprising forced a re-vote, which Yushchenko won. Yushchenko went on to suffer perhaps the worst electoral defeat for an incumbent president in modern history in 2010; he barely cleared 5% of the vote and was kept out of the run-off, in which Yanukovych defeated Tymoshenko. The third figure in this dysfunctional triumvirate, Tymoshenko, voted in 2009 with Yanukovych’s party to strip her erstwhile ally Yushchenko of his presidential powers, and then joined Yanukovych’s pro-Russian faction. After Yanukovych became president, he tried and convicted Tymoshenko (with the aid of Yushchenko’s testimony) on corruption charges in 2011. Since her release from prison, Tymoshenko seems to have appointed herself as one of the leaders of the anti-Russian (and anti-Yanukovych) movement.
In other words, if it’s consistency you’re after, Ukrainian politics probably aren’t for you. Frequent shifts in personal loyalty and party ideology, the ongoing tug of war between pro-European and pro-Russian factions, and high turnover in government (no fewer than eight different cabinets have been formed since Yanukovych’s first stint as prime minister began in 2002), have kept Ukraine from enjoying any semblance of political stability.
With Yanukovych and his Russian sympathies out of favor, the new divide in Ukrainian politics seems to be between neoliberalism and hard-right nationalism or even neo-fascism. A significant proportion of the Euromaidan movement consists of far-right Ukrainian nationalists led by the Svoboda Party, which has been given important posts in the interim Ukrainian cabinet. More troubling still is the degree to which the protests were escalated by neo-Nazi militias like “Right Sector.” It bears repeating that the first law passed by the Ukrainian parliament after Yanukovych was removed from office was an ultra-nationalistic repeal (which was not signed into law by interim President Oleksandr Turchynov) of a 2012 law giving semi-official status to languages deemed regionally important. For reasons that should be obvious by now, the presence of these far-right elements in the government only serves to divide Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in the east from the government in Kiev.
The rest of the Euromaidan leadership is largely neoliberal. The common thread binding Ukraine’s neoliberals is Kuchma. His administration implemented a number of neoliberal economic “reforms,” including rapid privatization and austerity measures intended to balance Ukraine’s budget. This was done in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to secure billions in IMF loans and to prepare Ukraine for membership in the EU. Coming at the height of the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, these “reforms” closely resembled the kind of radical “disaster capitalism” that will be familiar to readers of Naomi Klein’s book, The Shock Doctrine.
Yushchenko followed much the same set of neoliberal policies when he was elected president, and while his administration did preside over a growing Ukrainian economy, it also left Ukraine especially vulnerable to the 2008 global economic crisis, which wiped out most of the gains that had been made in previous years and led to Yushchenko’s historic defeat in 2010. Yanukovych, struggling to maintain closer ties to Moscow without abandoning the neoliberal IMF/EU agenda, failed to repair the damage, and the pro-EU Euromaidan movement began in response to the continued economic struggles.
While it’s too soon to speculate what Poroshenko’s economic policy would be, his past as a close Yushchenko ally hints at his neoliberal sympathies. The current interim government is dominated by figures from Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party, including Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a favorite of Victoria Nuland, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, who has ties to prominent neoconservatives. Nuland favors the kind of shock capitalism that is practiced by the IMF and that guided the economic policy of the Kuchma and Yushchenko administrations. Yatsenyuk has referred to the cabinet he heads as a “kamikaze” government because of the “extremely unpopular” financial policies it plans to implement, and has promised to follow IMF-dictated austerity measures. Considering the impact of these policies on Greece, it’s remarkable that Yatsenyuk has embraced them so whole-heartedly and unquestioningly.
Ukraine faces immense challenges. The threat of pro-Russian separatism in the east is the most immediate concern, closely followed by the related risk of hostile Russian action, be it military in nature, economic (e.g., shutting off natural gas exports), or both. But the economic crisis that brought down Yushchenko and helped to bring down Yanukovych has not been abated, and it will be impossible to stabilize potential breakaway regions if the Ukrainian economy continues to struggle. Ukraine desperately needs competent, stable governance right now, but based on its recent political history and on the choices it now faces between destructive ultra-nationalism and failed neoliberalism, there’s little reason for optimism on this front.
Photo: Demonstrators march and carry an EU flag during a protest in Kyiv, Ukraine, Nov. 24, 2013.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
When President Barack Obama meets Wednesday with the new Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk there are many things he must say regarding the crisis over Crimea. First is to reinforce some basic principles: that Ukraine’s sovereignty must be respected by everyone; that borders in Europe cannot [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
When President Barack Obama meets Wednesday with the new Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk there are many things he must say regarding the crisis over Crimea. First is to reinforce some basic principles: that Ukraine’s sovereignty must be respected by everyone; that borders in Europe cannot be changed by force (or threat of force); that the Crimean Parliament’s declaration of independence is illegitimate and invalid; that the United States is taking steps, both on its own and in league with European states, to impose economic sanctions on Russia and its leaders; and that Russian President Vladimir Putin needs to choose a path of compromise and conciliation, not of confrontation and unilateral actions. In fact, several of these principles have been accepted by Russia in the past. The president also needs to repeat his rejection of next Sunday’s referendum in Crimea on whether it wants to secede from Ukraine and, the Crimean Parliament has said, to then apply to become a constituent republic of the Russian Federation.
For public consumption Obama also needs to outline the reassurances being given to NATO allies bordering on Russia, especially the three Baltic States; the steps taken by the European Union; and the diplomatic efforts the US and others in the West are taking to defuse the crisis. He also needs to repeat the offer to have Secretary of State John Kerry visit Moscow, which has so far been sidetracked by the Kremlin.
So far, so good. But President Obama or lower-level US officials need to convey more to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk. The Ukrainian prime minister needs to understand that neither the US nor any other country will go to war over this issue and that economic sanctions against Russia will have little or no short-term impact, even if adopted by and abided by all outside countries, including all those in the European Union — which will not happen. At the same time, Obama needs to express confidence that, in the end, Russia in general and Putin in particular will be net losers. There are “existential sanctions” in the form of a collapse of trust in the Russian Federation and hence a drying up of economic opportunities in the Western world that must be based on some level of trust; and Putin himself is being discredited and thus in the longer term opportunities for Russia to take part fully in the outside world will be severely hampered. These are not Stalinist times, when the Soviet Union could choose the course of autarky. To foster prosperity at home, a requirement for anyone to remain long in power in the Kremlin, there has to be productive engagement with the outside world.
All this is cold comfort to Ukrainian right now, but they are nonetheless facts. And the economic realities, if nothing more, create incentives for Putin to look for some way out — assuming, as is a pretty good bet, that he is rational about his and Russia’s self-interests.
Furthermore, President Obama has to convey to the Ukrainian prime minister that he and his government will be expected to play their own necessary roles. These include reaching out to the Russian-speaking, Russian-ethnic, and Russian-oriented population of Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine and assuring them that they will have their own rights fully respected and that provisions for some autonomy will be augmented (some of these steps are already being taken). These roles include disciplining or preferably expelling members of the Ukrainian government who are ultra-nationalists, who are just playing into Putin’s hands and making matters worse.
Thus the prime minister should understand what the US and other Western states can and will do for his country and what they cannot and will not do — nor would be done by Mr. Obama’s harshest US critics if they were in power. Yatsenyuk must also understand what he and his interim government have to do and also refrain from doing.
Further, President Obama needs to revert to perspectives developed two decades ago, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inclusion of most Central European countries in NATO and the European Union (and all of them, including Russia and Ukraine, in NATO’s Partnership for Peace.) As part of President George H.W. Bush’s vision of fostering a “Europe whole and free” and at peace, then built upon by President Bill Clinton, one ambition was to abolish the concepts of balance of power and spheres of influence, both fully discredited in the 20th century. Yet geography has consigned Ukraine to a special place in a direct line between Russia and Western Europe, a locus of the three great wars of the 20th century. The objective in the 1990s, continuing today, is for Ukraine to be able to pursue a Western vocation as a free, independent, sovereign, democratic, and liberal-economic country. The same objective has also applied to Russia, if its leaders are smart enough to so choose. But trying to include Ukraine too soon into formal membership of either NATO or the EU would ignore the complex nature of its society — the Crimean people, for one, are almost entirely Russia and, but for an accident of history, would be in Russia, today. And such inclusion at this point would surely cause to be stillborn any reaching out to Russian to see if it also wants to develop in a liberal democratic way, with all the opportunities that come with a Western economic orientation.
Hence in 1997, NATO for its part created special arrangements with both countries: a Charter creating a Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine and a Founding Act with Russia. Both countries belong to councils that include the NATO allies, in which all parties meet as equals.
For now, however, if there is to be a chance to resume building a Europe whole and free and at peace — regrettably largely ignored by the last two US administrations, one factor leading to today’s crisis — nothing further can for now be on offer to Ukraine in terms of formal membership in either NATO or the EU. The perspective, the vision, and the efforts to make this possible sooner rather than later can and must continue; a massive injection of outside aid and investment are necessary — and Russia can be challenged to match it, and both “no (political) strings attached.” But on “rushing fences” — trying to pull Ukraine totally into the West as Putin wants to pull at least part of it totally into the East if not also into the Russian Federation — must remain out of bounds.
This does not mean violating another cardinal principle of the 1990s: that nothing must be decided over Ukraine’s head and without its agreement; that it and its legitimate government must be full participants in any negotiations. At the same time, the current crisis can only be resolved on terms that will be acceptable to all by reverting to the efforts of two decades ago, and seeking to create a truly encompassing European political, economic, and security system that will meet the goals of that time, to benefit everyone and penalize no one.
Perhaps Putin will not “play.” But this is the only hope for ending the current crisis on reasonable terms and, in the process, for Russia not being damaged over the long-term by the “existential sanctions” that are already beginning to develop, unbidden, because of Putin’s high-handed and ultimately self-defeating behavior.
Photo: President Barack Obama convenes a National Security Council meeting in the Situation Room of the White House to discuss the situation in Ukraine, March 3, 2014. Credit: Official White House Photo by Pete Souza
]]>This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.
Summary of Recent Events
This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in [...]]]>
This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.
Summary of Recent Events
This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in particular a reported attack by pro-Russian gunmen on a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol that ended when the gunmen retreated. Diplomatic efforts seem to have stalled, as Russia refused to speak directly with the new Ukrainian government, which it regards as illegitimate, and threatened that any sanctions against Russia would “boomerang” against the United States. The week’s biggest development was that Crimea’s parliament has voted to begin the process of seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia, a vote that the governments of Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union all termed “illegal.”
Secession movement
On March 6 the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia, pending the approval of the Russian government and the results of a referendum now scheduled for March 16. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin had said earlier in the week that he “did not foresee” Russia annexing Crimea, the leaders of both houses of Russia’s parliament publicly welcomed the Crimean assembly’s vote and pledged to honor the wishes of the Crimean people as expressed in the referendum. The draft referendum, which Kyiv Post revealed, offers two options: “joining Crimea with the Russian Federation” or “restoration of 1992 Crimean Constitution” (which declared Crimean independence, then was amended to declare its autonomy within Ukraine).
Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk criticized the Crimean vote as “illegitimate,” and its interim President, Oleksandr V. Turchynov, termed the vote “a farce.” Leaders of Crimea’s sizable Tatar minority also expressed opposition to the vote. Their sentiments were echoed by American and European leaders. US President Barack Obama characterized the vote as illegal under both the Ukrainian constitution and international law, and the EU envoy to Ukraine, Jan Tombinski, argued that a referendum on secession that was restricted to Crimea would violate Ukrainian law.
Attack on Ukrainian base, questions about the Russian forces
On Monday Ukrainian military sources reported that the commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, had given Ukrainian forces in Crimea until early Tuesday morning to surrender or face an attack. Russian officials denied that any such ultimatum had been issued, and the deadline passed without incident. On Friday, however, armed pro-Russian forces stormed a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol and occupied parts of it for several hours as they demanded the surrender of the Ukrainian soldiers inside. When the Ukrainian soldiers refused to surrender, the gunmen withdrew; thus far, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have not fired on one another. Russia continued to deny that the pro-Russian forces in Crimea were Russian military, insisting that they are local “self-defense units,” but considerable evidence has been found suggesting that they are, in fact, Russian military forces. The Ukrainian border guard service contended that roughly 30,000 Russian troops are now on the peninsula, and photographs allegedly taken near the southern Ukrainian city of Chonhar appear to show a freshly dug minefield along the approach from the Ukrainian mainland to Crimea. Deputy Crimean Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliev stated that Russian troops are the only legal soldiers in Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian soldiers still on their bases are considered illegal by the Crimean government. On Saturday, March 8, a bus carrying international observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) attempted to enter Crimea, but it turned back at the northern Crimean city of Armyansk when “warning shots” were fired at it.
Diplomacy sputters amid looming threat of sanctions from both sides
President Vladimir Putin gave a press conference on Tuesday that appeared to “hit pause” on the Crimea situation, though this characterization was obviously premature given events later in the week. Putin described the events that forced Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office as “an anti-constitutional coup” and claimed that Russian intervention was necessary to safeguard the ethnic Russians who are concentrated in Crimea and in major cities in the eastern part of Ukraine, though he reiterated the official Russian position that there has not been an invasion. US Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Kiev to offer the interim government $1 billion in loan guarantees, and while there he, in remarks that were echoed by Obama, accused Putin of “hiding behind falsehoods” to justify Russia’s actions, and called on him to return Russian forces to their barracks. Kerry failed in his efforts to arrange a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Ukrainian counterpart, with Lavrov refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Kiev government, but on Saturday one of Russia’s deputy foreign ministers did meet with the Ukrainian ambassador to Russia in Moscow.
Sanctions both by and against Russia were already being imposed by week’s end. On Thursday, President Obama ordered the imposition of sanctions against “individuals and entities” that were involved in Russia’s move into Crimea, which followed an earlier decision to suspend all US military cooperation with Russia. European Union leaders suspended talks with Russia on economic and travel issues but did not yet appear to be prepared to go any further. European leaders expressed concern that a Russian response could damage economies across Europe, and Lavrov warned that sanctions could “boomerang” against the United States and Europe. Russia announced that it was considering pulling out of arms control treaties with the US and the OSCE in response to American actions. More urgently, the Russian firm Gazprom hinted Friday that it may suspend gas shipments to Ukraine (and thus, potentially, through Ukraine and on to the rest of Europe) due to Kiev’s outstanding debt, which Gazprom estimates to be $1.89 billion.
Questions over legitimacy
Earlier this week Obama stressed that “[a]ny discussion about the future of Ukraine must include the legitimate government of Ukraine,” but the standoff is being driven in part by a disagreement over what the “legitimate” government of Ukraine actually is. Russia still recognizes Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate president of Ukraine, and claims that Yanukovych asked for Russian military assistance when he was ousted. The United States, on the other hand, has recognized the interim government in Kiev and says that Yanukovych’s actions in office “undermined” his claim to authority despite the fact that he was a democratically-elected leader. Russia’s continued refusal to deal directly with Kiev is couched in terms of the new government’s illegitimacy, at least in Russia’s view. Aid from the United States and from Europe is being offered to help stabilize the government in Kiev.
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