by Shireen T. Hunter

The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Shireen T. Hunter

The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at the root of Iraq’s problems, including its latest troubles with extremist Islamic militants.

Clearly, Maliki has not been a successful prime minister. Yet have his very real and assumed flaws been the only, or even the main, cause of Iraq’s problems today? Could a different person have done a better job? Or have the real culprits been structural problems, Iraq’s long and more recent history, and the policies of regional and international actors? A further question: are the grievances of Iraq’s Sunnis solely attributable to the Shias’ desire to monopolize power? What about the Sunnis’ inability to come to terms with any type of government in which the Shias have a real rather than ceremonial function?

These questions are by no means posed to minimize or underestimate the impact of the current leadership’s mismanagement and mistakes, or the corrosive influence of dissension within Shia ranks among the supporters of Maliki, the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Islamic Council of Iraq. But if viewed impartially, the weight of evidence shows that other factors have played more substantial roles in causing Iraq’s previous problems and the latest crisis than Maliki’s incompetence and dictatorial tendencies.

The most significant factor behind Iraq’s problems has been the inability of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and its Sunni neighbors to come to terms with a government in which the Shias, by virtue of their considerable majority in Iraq’s population, hold the leading role. This inability was displayed early on, when Iraq’s Sunnis refused to take part in Iraq’s first parliamentary elections, and resorted to insurgency almost immediately after the US invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein. All along, the goal of Iraqi Sunnis has been to prove that the Shias are not capable of governing Iraq. Indeed, Iraq’s Sunni deputy prime minister, Osama al Najafi, recently verbalized this view. The Sunnis see political leadership and governance to be their birthright and resent the Shia interlopers.

The Sunnis’ psychological difficulty in accepting a mostly Shia government is understandable. After ruling the country for centuries, both under the Ottomans and after independence, and after oppressing the Shias and viewing them as heretics and dregs of society, the Sunnis find Shia rule to sit heavily on them. It is thus difficult to imagine what any Shia prime minister could have done — or could now do — to satisfy the Sunnis. For example, during the early years after Saddam’s fall, once they had realized their mistake of abstaining from politics, the Sunnis made unreasonable demands as the price of cooperation, such as taking the defense portfolio. Yet considering what the Shias had suffered under Saddam, there was no possibility that they could agree.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs have not been alone in undermining the authority of the country’s Shia leadership. Masood Barzani, who dreams of an independent Kurdistan, has also done what he can to undermine the authority of the government in Baghdad, by essentially running his own economic, oil, and foreign policies. A factor in Barzani’s attitude has been his anti-Iran sentiments, which go back to the troubles that his father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had with the Shah.

Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also Qatar, also cannot countenance a Shia government in Baghdad. In addition to the anti-Shia impact of the Wahhabi creed that is dominant in Saudi Arabia and among the Qatari leadership, this Sunni animosity has derived from the perception that a Shia government in Iraq would change the balance of regional power in Iran’s favor. Yet Maliki is the least pro-Iranian of Iraq’s Shia leaders, with the possible exception of the now-notorious Ahmad Chalabi. During Saddam’s time, Maliki belonged to the Dawa party, a rival of Iraq’s Islamic Revolutionary Council that was supported by Iran, and he spent more time in Syria than in Iran. This is one reason why the US preferred Maliki to personalities like Ibrahim Jafari.

Moreover, Maliki tried to reach out to Turkey and to other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. But Turkey snubbed him and supported his rival, Tariq al-Hashimi. The Arab states have also shunned him. Under these circumstances, Maliki had no choice but to move closer to Iran. Yet the idea that he has thus become an Iranian pawn is a myth with no foundation in reality. Even now, Iraq has not reestablished the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that regularized Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an agreement which, before attacking Kuwait in 1990, Saddam had accepted. Iraq has not signed a peace treaty with Iran and competes with it in courting clients for oil exports. Iraq also has more extensive trade relations with Turkey than with Iran.

In short, by exaggerating the sectarian factor, Iraq’s Sunni neighbors have exacerbated Shia fears and made it more difficult for them to pursue a more inclusive policy vis-à-vis the Sunnis. Further, most killings in Iraq have been in Shia areas, undertaken by Sunni extremists of various kinds who are funded by Sunni governments in the region. The plight of the Shias has also not been limited to Iraq. Similar mistreatment in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan has gone unnoticed by the West, while the exclusion of Iraq’s Sunnis from leadership posts in Baghdad has been blown out of proportion. Western and especially US dislike of Iran has been a major cause for the disregarding of mass killings and assassination of Shias.

America’s conflicting policy objectives in the region have also led it to pursue policies in Iraq that have contributed to current US dilemmas. The most glaring example was the US courting of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, both of which were thus emboldened to commit acts such as attacking the Shia shrines in Samara in 2006 and frightening the Shias that America would again betray them as it did at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Wanting to isolate Iran and perhaps to bring about regime change there, the US has also done virtually nothing to reign in the Saudis and others, including Turkey and Qatar, to prevent them from funding Sunni insurgents. Instead, Washington has blamed Iraqi unrest solely on Iranian meddling. Even today, there is no acknowledgement by the United States that the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) cannot achieve what it has been doing without outside help.

At an even more fundamental level, America’s efforts to achieve too many contradictory and incompatible goals have been at the root of Iraq’s crisis. To date, it has proved to be difficult — indeed impossible — to eliminate Saddam but produce a stable Iraq; to isolate Iran and possibly change its regime; to get rid of Assad in Syria without exacerbating its civil war; to forge a Sunni-Israeli alliance against Shia Iran; and to convince other Shias throughout the region to continue playing second fiddle to the Sunnis.

To summarize, Nouri al-Maliki is certainly flawed and has made many mistakes. But the real culprits have been Iraq’s considerable fault lines, contradictory policies pursued by the West, and the predatory approach of Iraq’s neighbors. Thus even if Maliki is removed from office, Iraq’s situation will not improve unless these fault lines are dealt with and the policies pursued by outside states in Iraq are remedied. Rather, the situation will get much worse because the Shias are most unlikely to once again accept living under a regime that can be characterized as “Saddamism without Saddam” or, worse, what they would consider a Salafi-Takfiri government that considers them heathens deserving death.

This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.

Photo: President Barack Obama greets Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the Oval Office of the White House on July 22, 2009. Credit: White House/Pete Souza

Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

by Jim Lobe

After listening to the various statements, press conferences, and background briefings by “senior administration officials,” and initial reactions that followed tonight’s announcement about the interim accord between the P5+1 and Iran, it occurred to me that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may alter his recent course of repeatedly [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

After listening to the various statements, press conferences, and background briefings by “senior administration officials,” and initial reactions that followed tonight’s announcement about the interim accord between the P5+1 and Iran, it occurred to me that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may alter his recent course of repeatedly and quite publicly denouncing the agreement as a “bad” or “very bad deal.” Bibi certainly has shown a pragmatic side in the past, and I suspect we may see it again, particularly because the deal appears to be somewhat tougher than had been expected.

After all, when Jeff Goldberg tweets that “The Israeli government position that any Iran agreement is a bad agreement simply isn’t credible,” even Bibi’s new, hard-line ambassador here, Ron Dermer, has to assess seriously the implications.

So it would not surprise me, at this point at least, if Bibi says that this is not as bad a deal as he had expected and then tries to take credit for the tougher-than-exected terms that it appears to include. That’s the only way he can hope to get a serious hearing at the White House at this point. Moreover, Hollande’s endorsement of the deal has really painted him into a very tight corner. After all, he can’t claim so soon after giving the French president a hero’s welcome in Tel Aviv for Paris’s rejection of the proposed agreement two weeks ago that his “sincere” friend has just signed on to a “sucker’s deal.” And, as has been shown in recent months regarding his fears about the hardening of European opposition to — and increasing exasperation at –  Jewish settlements on the West Bank, he has to be careful about giving offense to the EU3, as well as to the White House, however politically weak he may perceive Obama to be at the moment. Indeed, I suspect he may come under pressure from the Euros,  Israel’s most important trading partners by far, to keep his mouth shut. Finally, this deal was made, as Wolf Blitzer put it tonight, between Iran and the “international community” in whose name Bibi often purports to speak. To continue to vehemently denounce the deal is to put himself outside that “community,” thus further exposing Israel’s international isolation. With Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain as virtually his only “allies” on this question, his position is not an enviable one.

Of course, none of this means that he won’t try to derail the deal by working with the Israel lobby (which must be very concerned about its own vulnerabilities given both the degree of public support for an Iran deal that the recent Washington Post and CNN polls have shown and comments like Goldberg’s) to get new sanctions legislation through Congress or by resorting to some kind of provocation (short of attacking Iran as he and his ministers have so often threatened to do). But, assuming Iranian compliance with the deal, including the significantly enhanced inspections provisions,  I think he’s going to have to be much more discreet than he has been, at least for the time being.

On the other hand, he’s never been a particularly subtle guy.

We’ll see soon enough.

via IPS News

Despite the start of a government-inspired dialogue with the opposition Sunday, the Bahraini government continues to jail dissidents, arrest demonstrators, and use a rigged judicial system to convict them.

Although the Al-Khalifa regime officially is not a party to the dialogue, Western governments welcomed the justice ministry’s call [...]]]> by Emile Nakhleh

via IPS News

Despite the start of a government-inspired dialogue with the opposition Sunday, the Bahraini government continues to jail dissidents, arrest demonstrators, and use a rigged judicial system to convict them.

Although the Al-Khalifa regime officially is not a party to the dialogue, Western governments welcomed the justice ministry’s call for dialogue, hoping the process will silence the opposition and relieve the West of the moral responsibility to address human rights abuses in Bahrain. According to initial media reports, the so-called “national dialogue” does not seem promising.

The Al-Khalifa regime not only has banned Shias from working in the national security sector; it has pressured private companies to fire Shia employees and replace them with Sunni workers. Security forces frequently storm into activists’ homes and arrest them without arrest warrants or specific charges. The regime is enforcing a Sunni apartheid system on the Shia majority.

King Hamad and his uncle, the prime minister, have relied on Saudi military and economic support to enforce their anti-Shia policies. According to recent media reports, “Desert Shield” enforcements, presumably Saudi, have entered Bahrain.

The regime also has enlisted Sunni leaders in the region, including the Egyptian Grand Mufti of al-Azhar, to implicitly support the Sunni crackdown on the Shia opposition. The Grand Mufti and other anti-Shia figures have used Iran as a pretext.

A recent report by the Washington-based think tank Project for Middle East Democracy has concluded that the regime has not implemented the six key recommendations of the Bassiouni BICI report. These recommendations – 1719, 1722b, 1722d, 1722h, 1724a, and 1724c – focus on torture, convictions, illegal arrests and lengthy incarcerations, censorship, and regime incitement of hatred, violence, and sectarianism.

Washington’s continued refusal to force the Al-Khalifa to institute real reforms is endangering the personal security of our diplomats, military personnel, and civilians in Bahrain. The killing of Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi in the midst of chaos and terrorism should not be lost on anyone.

Al-Khalifa’s refusal to respond to their people’s rightful demands would spell the end of their tribal rule. It will also harm U.S. interests in the Gulf region.

The stalemate has pushed many Bahraini activists to replace their demands for reform with calls for regime change. Once the regime loses the reform game, its demise become inevitable. Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia offer a sobering lesson.

The dialogue meeting that was held Feb. 10 and is supposed to occur on successive Sundays and Wednesdays included a majority of pro-government participants and only eight representatives of the opposition groups. Since the government has not agreed to the nine demands of the opposition, some media reports already view the government dialogue initiative as merely a public relations stunt.

The situation in Bahrain is becoming unsustainable. It is time for Obama’s new Secretary of State John Kerry to employ the full range of U.S. diplomacy and power to change it.

What to do?

As the Bahraini opposition marks its second anniversary on Feb. 14, President Obama and Secretary Kerry should take a hard look at Bahrain and decide whether the survival of Al-Khalifa rule is in the best interests of the U S.

If it is, the administration should pursue a proactive policy to save the regime. President Obama and Secretary Kerry should impress on Bahrain’s King Hamad the necessity to implement the following steps:

First, initiate genuine, inclusive dialogue with representatives of all opposition groups. The dialogue should be led by Crown Prince Salman and should focus on substantive reforms and not become mired in process and media sound bites.

Second, the king should relieve Prime Minister Khalifa of his position and replace him temporarily with the crown prince until a permanent prime minister is appointed.

Third, the king should set a date certain for national elections to a parliament with full legislative powers. International monitors should be invited to supervise the elections. Following the parliamentary elections, the king should appoint a new prime minister subject to parliamentary approval.

Fourth, the king and the crown prince as an interim prime minister should implement the six key recommendations in the BICI report, referred to above. The crown prince should also establish a special commission to include government and opposition representative to oversee the implementation of all the recommendations highlighted in the BICI report.

Fifth, the crown prince should review the employment discriminatory policies against the Shia, especially in the armed forces and the security services, and provide equal access opportunities for all qualified Bahraini citizens to apply for jobs in these sectors regardless of religious affiliation.

These urgent steps must be taken to satisfy the legitimate demands of the opposition if the regime is to save itself.

Photo: A pro-democracy demonstration in the Bahraini capital Manama on 4 March 2011. Credit: Mahmood Al-Yousif/Flickr  

Lobe Log contributor Emile Nakhleh, an expert on political Islam and Middle Eastern society, recently provided a fascinating primer on Bahrain to the Bahrain Mirror (Arabic version), an e-newspaper run by Bahraini dissidents. As discussed in the Mirror’s introduction, prior to becoming the CIA’s former chief regional analyst, Dr. [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log contributor Emile Nakhleh, an expert on political Islam and Middle Eastern society, recently provided a fascinating primer on Bahrain to the Bahrain Mirror (Arabic version), an e-newspaper run by Bahraini dissidents. As discussed in the Mirror’s introduction, prior to becoming the CIA’s former chief regional analyst, Dr. Nakhleh conducted field research in Bahrain from 1972-73 as the first US scholar to do so, with complete access to the country’s societal benchmarks. This ultimately resulted in Nakhleh’s book, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society, one of the most important references on Bahrain to date. Following is the unedited interview, which has been translated into English from Arabic by the Mirror.

Bahrain Mirror: Does the “Urban Tribalism” model that you discussed in your Bahrain book in the 1970s still
apply today?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Despite the passage of 40 years since I researched and wrote my book on Bahrain, the tribal model, unfortunately, still applies to the rule of Al Khalifa family in the country. The hopes that Bahraini citizens—Shia and Sunni—had pinned on the elections of the Constituent Assembly and the National Assembly in 1972-73 and on the constitution which the late Amir Shaykh Issa bin Salman Al Khalifa promulgated in 1974, were dashed two years later. By 1975, the Al Khalifa reverted to its autocratic rule of the country without any input from the citizens. After 1975, when the National Assembly was dissolved and the constitution was frozen, the ruling family continued to view the country and its people as part of Al Khalifa domain.

In fact, many of the key posts—including in the Royal Diwan, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, etc—are currently held by children and grand children of the early founders of Al Khalifa rule. Bahrainis have generally expressed loyalty and allegiance to the head of the Al Khalifa tribe because of at least four reasons. First, Bahrainis generally liked and respected Shaykh ‘Issa. Second, the people were committed to the nationalist idea of an independent Bahrain. Third, many human rights activists in the 1970s, both Shia and Sunnis, remained hopeful that Shaykh ‘Issa would resurrect the National Assembly and re-instate the constitution. Fourth, most human rights activists and a majority of Bahrainis did not view calls for political reform and government accountability as a reflection of a sectarian divide in the country. On the contrary, most activists called for freedoms of speech and assembly and an accountable and transparent government for all Bahrainis. My field research at the time showed that many Bahraini business people resented the pervasive political and financial control that Shaykh Khalifa, the Prime Minister and brother of the Amir, exercised over contracts, dealerships, and projects—from hotel construction to land reclamation and development.

Many of them privately described him as “Mr. 10 percent, 40 percent, or 50 percent” depending on the perceived percentage they thought he got from specific contracts. Pro-reform dissidents maintained the Al Khalifa tribe ran Bahrain as a fiefdom without accountability to the public. After the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, Shaykh Khalifa and his security forces justified their control as a way to thwart what they perceived as Iran’s support of Shia activism on the Arab side of the Gulf.

Mirror: How will the Arab Spring touch the Gulf Arab states? The 2001 National Charter promised a new reformist constitution, but unfortunately, the people were disappointed because the Amir (renamed King after 2002) reneged on the reform promises he made to the people in 1999. What trajectory will the pro-reform movement take and what impact will it have on the country?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Despite the tribal and dynastic nature of rule in Bahrain, the Arab Spring has touched the country, whether the ruling family likes it or not. Demands for dignity, respect, equality, and freedom of expression know no national boundaries. In a sense, the ruling family has been fortunate in that the key demands of the Bahraini opposition initially did not call for regime change. They focused on establishing a nationally elected parliament with full legislative powers, re-instating the 1974 constitution, replacing the Prime Minister, an independent judiciary, a transparent and accountable government, and an end to discriminatory practices against the Shia majority, especially in employment in the security services, the armed forces, hospitals, universities, and government-controlled corporations and financial institutions.

Those demands were neither sectarian nor driven by Iran. Continued regime repression and unlawful arrests of demonstrators have caused some protesters to raise the slogan of “regime change.” Whereas popular upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now in Syria from day one called for regime change, in Bahrain the regime change demand is very recent. If wise heads and pro-reform leaders within the ruling family do not prevail, and if the King and the Crown Prince remain marginalized, Al Khalifa rule would become much more tenuous, violence would spread, more Bahraini blood would be shed, and radical elements would become a stronger voice within the pro-reform opposition. What is more troubling is that the authority of the King and his son the Crown Prince is slowly eroding and the anti-reform faction within the ruling family, whether the older generation represented by the Prime Minister or some of the younger senior ministers represented by the so-called “al-Khawalid,” are becoming more rabidly anti-Shia and more influential.

This faction is following the Saudi guidelines on how to oppose democratic reforms. Once Saudi troops entered Bahrain under the guise of the GCC security agreement, Bahrain for all intents and purposes fell under Saudi suzerainty. While the Al Khalifa old guard has welcomed this intervention, pro-reform elements within and outside the ruling family resented the Saudi military presence and accused the Prime Minister of engineering it. Although the Saudi military presence might serve Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iran and anti-Shia policy, in the long run it will bring immense harm to Bahraini stability, society, and government. Egypt’s more powerful military and security services failed to silence the youthful awakening at Tahrir Square. Bahraini security forces would equally fail to silence the opposition. The window for genuine dialogue between the King and the opposition over meaningful political reform is rapidly closing. Once the window closes, Bahrain will find itself in real economic and political trouble, and Al Khalifa leadership would lose the bay’ah of its people–Sunni and Shia.

Mirror: How do you assess US-Saudi troubled relations over democracy and reform in the region and how do you
envision the relationship to evolve?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Saudi-American relations over Arab Spring uprisings upheavals and democratic transitions
became soured since the US President endorsed the pro-democracy movement in Egypt and urged the Egyptian dictator to abdicate. Because of their close relations with Mubarak, the Saudis were angered by the US position and claimed the President was too quick to “throw Mubarak under the bus.” President Obama’s position was that the US would support a leader as long as he enjoys the confidence of his people. Once he loses that, he should go. That was the case with Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Qadhaffi in Libya, and now Assad in Syria. The Saudis find it difficult to accept any meaningful role for the people in determining what type of government they should have and who the country’s leader should be. Despite the decades-old strategic relationship between Washington and Riyadh, the Saudi leadership has yet to get over what happened to Mubarak.

This strategic relationship is grounded in a shared American-Saudi view about regional stability, strong military cooperation, oil exports, and Iran’s perceived hegemonic posture in the Gulf region. The US and Saudi Arabia work closely in the military-to military area, coordinate regularly on Iran, and generally see eye to eye on Syria. They disagree on government response to unrest in Bahrain and on the harsh crackdown by Al Khalifa against the Shia majority. Washington did not support the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain and believed such a step would inflame the situation further and would foment sectarianism. Riyadh has not shown any willingness to start a genuine dialogue between Al Khalifa and the opposition, nor does it to envision any meaningful role for the Shia majority in government. Because of concern over Iran’s nuclear program, the horrendous violence in Syria, the presence of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and the 2012 presidential election campaign in the US, the uprising in Bahrain was put on the backburner, at least for the time being. Washington, however, has consistently pushed the Bahraini government, albeit ever so gently, toward a dialogue with the pro-democracy movement and has encouraged the Crown Prince to play a more active role in promoting such dialogue. On the other hand, the US maintains a robust military presence throughout the Gulf and coordinates with Gulf governments in fighting terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, and in countering potential destabilizing actions by Iran.

The US so far has not used its considerable leverage with Al Khalifa to force a dialogue with the opposition. As many analysts had anticipated, the Saudi military intervention has failed to quash the uprising despite the virulent attitude toward the Shia community. On the contrary, it has energized the opposition despite continued regime repression, has empowered the anti-Shia hardliners within the Al Khalifa family, and has indirectly marginalized the King and his son the Crown Prince.

Mirror: Has Saudi Arabia used US dependence on Saudi oil and the huge US arms sales to the Kingdom to blackmail the US into taking a seemingly more tolerant attitude toward the Al Khalifa harsh tactics against pro-democracy activists? Is it possible to divorce US-Bahraini relations from Saudi-American relations?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Saudi Arabia has not attempted to influence US foreign policy toward the Bahraini uprising through blackmail. Such an attempt, if ever done, would be futile and will certainly backfire. As the US becomes self-sufficient in energy, as the war in Afghanistan winds down, and as Iran searches for a negotiated compromise with the international community over its nuclear program, the US would begin to explore strategies to reduce its military presence in the region.

Budgetary and fiscal decisions within the US government could also reduce US American military presence in the Gulf, to include the Fifth Fleet. According to some reports, in a decade and a half from now Saudi Arabia is expected to need between 6-8 million barrels of oil a day for domestic consumption, mainly in power generation and desalination. Consequently, the Kingdom would have less oil to export and less oil revenues. Within the same timeframe, the Saudi government would need more money to provide for the welfare of its citizens, especially in unemployment assistance, education, and health. With less money to spend and a potentially more peaceful relationship with Iran, The Saudi government would be less inclined to spend on massive arms purchases from the US or anywhere else. The government also would be unable to spend billions of dollars on pacifying the restive segments of its population, as King Abdallah did in response to the Arab Spring in 2011. If these projections materialize, the Saudi government would be forced to minimize its support for Sunni hardliners in Bahrain.

Al Khalifa would then be forced to respond to their people’s calls for democracy and justice without Saudi support. Currently, US-Bahraini relations seem to be tied closely to US-Saudi relations because of the pervasive Saudi economic and security influence in Bahrain. As the balance of power changes in the region over the next decade, and as the US reviews its strategic interests and commitments in the region, Al Khalifa would need to explore strategies for genuine reform and economic and social justice. The main challenge would be whether Al Khalifa would have the luxury of time to wait until then. The window of dialogue might close much sooner. If that happens, calls for regime change would trump calls for dialogue. Bahrain has assumed more significance than its size in the past two years because of the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia; once, this struggle abates, Bahrain would again revert to being a small player in regional power configurations.

Mirror: How do you assess the pro-democracy forces and the democracy movement in Bahrain?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Like every Arab protest movement in the past two years, Bahrain’s pro-democracy uprising started peacefully demanding genuine political reform and government accountability. Like every regime where protests occurred, Al Khalifa resorted to violence and repression. As the government crackdown turned harsher and bloodier, and as the Al Khalifa Sunni government began to whip up the flames of anti-Shia sectarianism and shoot and beat peaceful protesters and torture prisoners, some in the pro-democracy movement began to question whether the ruling family was at all interested in reaching a compromise with the opposition. Calls for justice and dignity in Duwwar al-Lu’lu’ in Manama were not different from those in Tahrir Square in Cairo.

The responses of the Egyptian dictator and the Al Khalifa, however, differed significantly. Mubarak was convinced to abdicate before much blood was shed , while Al Khalifa, especially the Prime Minister, continue to cling to power. Although the Bahraini pro-democracy movement is indigenous and genuine, it is not monolithic. It consists of numerous Shia and Sunni religious and secular groups ranging from al-Wifaq to al-Wa’ad, al-Minbar, and al-Haqq, among others. As confrontations with government became more violent, some within the opposition began to opt for violence as a justified response to government repression. Others rejected violence and responded positively to some government calls for dialogue. There is also a generational divide within the uprising, with the youthful generation becoming more supportive of violence and opposed to dialogue. Al-Wifaq seems to have lost some of its influence, and the Sunni secular movements are becoming more marginalized.

The democracy movement is divided ideologically and generationally. Some factions still hope for a democratically reformed Bahrain under the umbrella of a “constitutional” Al Khalifa monarchy but without the current Prime Minister. Others, who consider the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as highly improbable, have come out for regime change. Despite the deep disagreements within the democracy movement over which strategies to pursue, most factions agree the current situation in Bahrain is unsustainable. The Al Khalifa dynasty can no longer maintain its grip on power as it did before February 2011.

Mirror: How do you assess the regime use of Iran as a scare tactic to gain Western support for its crackdown against the opposition?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: The democracy and human rights movement in Bahrain has never been about Shia or about Iran despite regime claims to the contrary. Calls for political reform and labor rights started decades ago while Iran was still under the Shah. Most Bahraini Shia do not turn to Iranian Grand ayatollahs as their marja’. In fact, Bahraini Shia for the most part have followed Iraqi religious leaders in Najaf and Karbala as their source of emulation. Since the advent of the Arab Spring, the Al Khalifa government has parroted the argument of their Saudi benefactors that Iran was behind the protest movement in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The West believes human rights advocates in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Abu Dhabi, and elsewhere are indigenous groups and not necessarily directed or controlled by Tehran. While continued unrest on the Arab side of the Gulf could benefit Iran’s short-term interests, the current Iranian regime is wary of pro-democracy protests lest they spread to Iran.

The Islamic Republic would not want to see a repeat of the June 2009 massive protests that followed the elections. Iran has already lost much of its influence in the Arab world because of its support of the Assad regime in Syria. Even Shia Hezbollah has lost much of its luster in the Arab street that was built following the 2006 Lebanon war because of its support of Assad. The Bahraini government’s argument that Iran is behind the unrest has not gotten any traction among policymakers in Washington, London, and other Western capitals. The West’s disagreements with Iran and international sanctions against that country are driven by Iran’s nuclear program, not by its perceived support of domestic unrest in Sunni Arab countries. The specter of the so-called Shia Crescent that was raised by Saudi Arabia, Mubarak’s Egypt, and Jordan a few years back has all but faded. In fact, many analysts in the West t now argue that a “Sunni Crescent” is on the ascendancy in the Arab world, and that Iran is becoming more isolated in the region.

Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial system is little more than theater. The courts are sites in which freedoms are not assured, but where they are subordinated to the whims of centralized tyranny. Over the last two years, Bahrain has blithely ignored almost all of its domestic and international commitments to refrain from torture, to protect free speech and to honor due process, all conventions that the country has ostensibly built into its “constitutional” order.

In the most recent instance, the country’s highest court upheld lengthy prison sentences for 13 prominent human rights and political activists, including life imprisonment in some of the world’s most brutal dungeons. Having already been subjected to late night abductions, military tribunals, torture, and false accusation, it is hardly surprising that the imprisoned were unable to find relief in Bahrain’s sham appeals process.

More remarkable is the unwillingness of Bahrain’s most important Western patron, the United States, to openly acknowledge that its partner and host to the 5^th Fleet is not merely managing its way through a crisis, but building a regime of fear and violence all while claiming the opposite. In her comments yesterday at the State Department’s daily briefing, spokesperson Victoria Nuland offered what has become a familiar refrain — a mild rebuke dressed up in principle, but one that makes clear that the US is unwilling to say or do more.

The US position on Bahrain’s excesses, in ways that are eerily similar to the island country’s own theatrical posturing, is more histrionic than substantive. Clearly, in spite of their claims otherwise, American leaders are mostly content with the status quo. Nuland expressed “regret” and “concern” about Bahrain’s high court’s decision to uphold the convictions of key opposition figures yesterday. She added “that this decision further restricts freedom of expression and compromises the atmosphere within Bahrain for reconciliation.”

The reality is that there is nothing further to restrict. The only clear willingness for reconciliation has come from the country’s opposition, not the government. In also calling for further investigations into torture and accountability, Ms. Nuland asks her listeners to suspend disbelief and to consider seriously that Bahrain has any real interest in the pursuit of a meaningful resolution. It has been clear for two years that Bahrain’s leaders desire victory and vengeance, the total destruction of the democratic opposition.

While American leaders almost certainly would prefer a political resolution to Bahrain’s challenges, they have done little to help advance the cause. Bahrain’s leaders have learned that mild admonishment is a small price to pay while they consolidate a new era of authoritarianism. They understand that the American approach is feeble and feckless, if often justified, because of Bahrain’s strategic significance. Long a reliable partner in the US mission to police and patrol the Persian Gulf and to ensure the “flow of oil,” American unwillingness to come down too hard on Manama is also a sign of deference to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has little interest in seeing Bahrain’s opposition enjoy political gain.

It is, however, well past time to think seriously about whether US strategy in the Gulf is working or, instead, whether it helps abet the very conditions of instability that threaten the region and prospects for more open and durable regional politics. The reality is that oil’s flow does not need protecting. Bahrain does not deserve a pass because it is home to American military facilities.

Several critical issues of unfinished business in the Middle East face President Barack Obama as he begins his second term. Washington must become more engaged come January because these issues will directly impact regional stability and security and U.S. interests and personnel in the region.

The issues include the Syrian [...]]]> via IPS News

Several critical issues of unfinished business in the Middle East face President Barack Obama as he begins his second term. Washington must become more engaged come January because these issues will directly impact regional stability and security and U.S. interests and personnel in the region.

The issues include the Syrian uprising and increasing atrocities by extremist elements within the uprising, the Arab Spring and the future of democratic transitions, the growing influence of radical Salafi “jihadism” across the Arab world, Bahrain, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Guantanamo and global terrorism.

The Obama administration’s engagement in these issues in the past year has been marginal and uneven, influenced largely by domestic politics and to some degree the ghost of Libya. Washington’s public support for democracy following the start of the Arab Spring was welcomed in the region, especially as dictators in Tunisia and Egypt fell precipitously.

The U.S. image became more tarnished, however, as repression escalated in Bahrain against the Shia majority and as Assad’s killing machine became more vicious, and Syria descended into a civil war.

Washington’s benign response to repression and torture in Bahrain, according to advocates of this policy, is justified by the presence of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the special relationship with Saudi Arabia. Yet, the U.S. and its Western allies have not used their significant leverage in either country to advance democracy. Nor has the Fleet deterred the Al Khalifa regime from repressing the pro-democracy movement.

The ghost of Libya and the U.S. presidential election also drove Obama’s hesitancy to act against the Syrian dictator. During the foreign policy presidential debate before the U.S. elections, President Obama and Governor Mitt Romney argued lamely that Syria was different from Libya, and therefore the U.S. military even under the NATO umbrella should not be used against Assad.

The fate of emerging Arab democracies and the legitimate aspirations of millions of Arab youth, which the U.S. and many countries worldwide have endorsed, should not be held hostage to political expediency or become a casualty of electoral politics.

U.S. prestige and Obama’s credibility at home and abroad will be tested by whether Washington stands with the peoples of the region against their entrenched dictators, regardless of the so-called Libyan model. Calls for justice and dignity in the Arab uprisings signaled a historic moment that resonated across the globe. The U.S. should embrace this moment and place itself on the right side of history.

President Obama was hailed across the Arab Muslim world in June 2009 when he called for engaging credible indigenous communities on the basis of common interests and mutual respect. A retreat from those ideals would be disastrous for the U.S. and its allies, especially as regime remnants and radical Salafis endeavour to derail the democratic process.

An autocratic tribal ruler in Manama, who has just revoked the citizenship of 31 Bahraini nationals, or a brutal dictator in Damascus should not turn the clock back on the moral inroads that Washington made in the region in the post-Bush era.

The unfolding of events at a dizzying speed and increasing threats to U.S. interests and personnel demand serious attempts to address theses critical issues. In his second-term, President Obama cannot remain oblivious to rising sectarianism, growing Salafi extremism, continued repression, and suppression of minorities and women.

On day one after taking office, the president must turn his full attention to Syria.

Assad must be forced out, and soon. Over 25,000 Syrians have been killed since the uprising began in early 2011, and equal numbers have been “disappeared” by the regime. Hundreds of thousands have become refugees. Atrocities committed by the regime and by some of the rebels are inflicting untold suffering on innocent civilians in Syria.

The Syrian uprising, like those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, started peacefully. Regime intransigence and repression, however, forced the uprising to become violent. Lawlessness and the porous borders have opened Syria to radical “jihadists” from neighbouring Arab countries.

Whereas, the uprising was initially non-ideological and non-religious, the incoming “jihadists” are Sunni Salafis bent on fighting a religious war against an “infidel” dictator. These “jihadists” have exploited the factionalism of the opposition for their intolerant religious extremism.

They also gained acceptance by the poorly armed rebels because they brought in weapons and money from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and elsewhere. The rise of violent “jihadism” in Syria had been a direct consequence of continued regime intransigence.

A prolonged proxy war between Iran, which supports Assad, and Saudi Arabia, which supports the uprising, over Syria and a resurgent radical Salafi “jihad” within the insurgency cannot be good for regional stability and for the international community.

How to speed up Assad’s exit? Short of putting boots on the ground, Washington and its NATO allies, especially the UK, France, and Turkey, should declare a no-fly zone and provide the Free Syrian Army with adequate anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to fight the regime’s military machine. NATO should seek the consent of Arab and Asian countries for the Syria initiative, including patrolling the no-fly zone.

Media reports reveal that Turkey, with U.S. approval, has deployed Patriot missiles close to the Syrian border. This action seems to signal Turkey’s intention to create and possibly defend a no-fly zone. President Obama and other NATO leaders should vigorously push this action forward.

Syrian refugees cannot spend another winter in tents and under intolerable conditions.

NATO partners also should help streamline the opposition groups and recognise whatever group emerges as a legitimate political representative of Syria. Admittedly, factionalism among the rebel groups on the ground and within the Syrian National Council outside the country is a major impediment to diplomatic recognition and international action.

Once a unified leadership emerges, NATO should provide it with logistics, intelligence, and command and control training. Furthermore, Washington and London should put the Assad regime on notice that attacking Syria’s neighbours or using chemical and biological weapons in any form against any target will result in a massive military response.

Lakhdar Brahimi’s U.N.-Arab mission to Syria has failed to persuade Assad to stop the killing, and any talk of a temporary ceasefire is no more than wishful thinking. Russian and Chinese obduracy in the U.N. Security Council on Syria justifies an immediate and more robust NATO action against the regime. The Syrian dictator has already rejected British Prime Minister David Cameron’s offer for a safe passage out of Syria.

It’s morally reprehensible for the international community to remain insensitive to the continued atrocities against the Syrian people, whether by the regime or the opposition. Moral platitudes no longer cut it.

Once the regime is toppled, the international community should help the post-Assad government with economic recovery and empower the Syrian business community and entrepreneurial civil society to start creating jobs. When that happens, the “Arab Spring” would rightfully claim its fifth trophy.

*Emile Nakhleh is former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at CIA and author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim world.

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would [...]]]> via IPS News

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would not interfere in the proceedings of their “independent judiciary”.

Despite the threat to U.S. national interests and the security of U.S. citizens in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, Washington remains oblivious to the ruling family’s violent crackdown against peaceful protesters in the name of fighting “foreign elements”. Pro-democracy Bahrainis are wondering what we are waiting for.

Because of our muted reaction to what’s happening in Bahrain, the ruling family and their Saudi benefactors have not taken seriously Western support for democratic transitions in the Middle East.

The United States and Britain maintain deep economic and security relations with these states but also enjoy strong leverage, including the U.S. Navy’s Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, which they must revisit in the face of continued egregious violations of basic human rights by some of these regimes. Bahraini civil rights organisations and activists are expecting the United States to use its leverage to end regime repression.

Despite their pro-Western stance, there is nothing exceptional about the autocratic Gulf Arab regimes. And they should no longer be given a pass on the importance of democratic reform.

Staying in power will require Bahrain’s Al Khalifas and other Gulf tribal family rulers to do more than push a vicious sectarian policy and employ slick public relations firms. Their cynical and deadly game might buy them some time, but, in the end, they will not be able to escape their peoples’ wrath.

In the absence of genuine reforms in the next three years, the Gulf’s autocratic regimes will be swept aside by their peoples. The “people power” that emerged from the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria, cannot be kept out of these tribal states. In reality, they all have been touched by peoples’ demands for dignity and justice.

While Iran might be exploiting the protest movement to discredit these regimes, the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain goes back to the 1960s and 1970s – way before the Islamic Republic came on the scene.

Even more troubling for U.S. national security are the continued efforts by Al Khalifa to whip up anti-American attitudes among Bahrain’s more rabidly anti-Shia and xenophobic Sunnis. Bahrain and some of their Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies perceive the growing rapprochement between the U.S. and the new Islamic democrats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, as a sign of tacit opposition to Gulf autocrats.

They believe the U.S will throw them under the bus if their peoples rise up against them. They also worry that if the nuclear issue in Iran is resolved, a possible U.S. rapprochement with Tehran would embolden their Shia communities in their struggle for equality and justice.

For 40 years, Prime Minister Khalifa has been the key opponent to reform in Bahrain. In recent ears, however, a new generation within the ruling family, known as the “Khawalids,” has taken up the anti-Shia, anti-reform, and anti-American cry.

They have used pro-government newspapers, blogs, and social media to vilify the Shia, the United States, and the pro-democracy movement. With tacit government encouragement, they frequently describe elements of the opposition as “diseased cells” that must be removed from society.

In the process, they have encouraged extremist Salafi and other Sunni groups to spread their message of divisiveness, sectarianism, and hate.

What Bahrain and the other Gulf sheikhdoms fail to realise is that when they encourage extremist groups to fight the “enemies” of the regime, a time will come when radical Salafi “jihadists” will turn against the regime. The Saudi experience in Afghanistan and Iraq should offer them a sobering lesson. This dangerous game does not bode well for their survival.

As domestic challenges also grow in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s interest in Bahraini domestic policy will diminish. Recent estimates indicate Saudi oil exports over the next decade and a half will shrink significantly because of growing domestic needs for energy to generate power and desalinate seawater.

When this happens, Al Khalifa will have to face their people on their own.

- Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

I am hearing the drumbeats of war again. They sound so much like the drumbeats of 2002 that I have to wonder whether the old drummers have been brought out of storage to play the same music to a new audience.

This time the drums are directed at Iran. Surely, [...]]]> via Lobe Log

I am hearing the drumbeats of war again. They sound so much like the drumbeats of 2002 that I have to wonder whether the old drummers have been brought out of storage to play the same music to a new audience.

This time the drums are directed at Iran. Surely, the Iranian leadership has not done their people any good with their arrogant defiance and bellicosity in the face of potential massive firepower from the other side. They have also made the situation much worse with some of their comments about Israel, the United States, NATO and others. The Iranian outreach to Hugo Chavez and other unseemly dictators has not helped their cause. Nor has their cause been helped by their interferences in Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon and more. Threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz ratcheted things up. Having fast boats play chicken with warships that could take out the entire coastline of Iran has not been a smart thing to do. Being ambiguous and cagey about their nuclear program gives a lot of verbal ammunition to their enemies.

Indeed, the situation does not look good. The increasing storms in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, northern Saudi Arabia and Southeastern Turkey could whip up even more trouble in the region.

What are the drums calling for? It seems they are calling for ostensibly tougher sanctions on Iran. However, some of them are calling for the sanctions to be placed in the dustbin of history followed by an attack on Iran.

What do these drums tell us about what might happen after the sorties have attacked Iran? Not much. That part of the percussion piece is almost absent, much like “after Saddam” was barely considered since war on Iraq was seen as a “cakewalk”, “costing $100 billon dollars at most”, and a “slam dunk”.

A strike on Iran will not stop at the strike. Iran will respond. It may even respond globally, according to statements from elements of Iran’s leadership. They could easily respond in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and beyond. They could have their sleepers go kinetic in Europe, Latin America and more. They could counterstrike on the oil fields and facilities of other Gulf countries.

Iran could help turn the Strait of Hormuz into a battlefield even if they could not shut it down physically. The price of oil could skyrocket to $250 to $350 per barrel. The world could be plunged into a deeper recession than what happened after 2008.

The world economy is fragile as it is. Ask any Greek, Spaniard, Portuguese, Irish person or Italian. Ask anyone in the US who knows about the potential fiscal cliff, and the possible follow-on recession.

The scenarios of this war could work up massive oil price spikes that could end up producing “new” oil price levels in the medium runs if major facilities and fields are significantly damaged. Then there is the potential nuclear fallout from the attack on Iran that so few want to even whisper about, or even know about.

The drums I am hearing are calling for war. Those playing them don’t seem to want to think about what is on the other side of an attack or, even worse, what a war that protracts and pulls others into it could look like.

Sunni-Shia tensions point to the chances that many could be pulled in. Other factors on the ground in Iran, other Gulf States, the Eastern Mediterranean and more point to a potential disaster than many could hardly imagine at this moment.

How many of those who pushed for war imagined that we would still be in Afghanistan today? Did they predict then, the thousands of lives that have been lost and damaged in Iraq?

War is uncertain. War is much more about fog, blood, pain and shattered lives than armchair strategic thinking. War is about people. It is about young men and women being put in harm’s way and coming back damaged, or not coming back at all.

I am not a pacifist. Sometimes wars are needed. However, I am someone who after decades of studying, living in, working in and worrying about the Middle East and North Africa, can see a potentially massive storm of epic proportions resulting if more missteps are taken.

I cannot sit quietly and idly as the storm builds.

If I don’t speak and write what I believe is the truth to power then I am a failure. I do not intend to be so.

- Paul Sullivan is an internationally recognized expert on security issues including energy security, water security and food security in the Middle East and North Africa. He is an economist by training and a multidisciplinary public intellectual by choice. He is an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University.

Bahrain remains a repressive state, and civil rights are violated daily. Forty-one years ago, Bahrain celebrated its first year independence as a budding democracy.  This December it will celebrate its forty-second independence as a practitioner of repression and reprehensible autocracy. For all intents and purposes, Washington unfortunately continues to tolerate [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Bahrain remains a repressive state, and civil rights are violated daily. Forty-one years ago, Bahrain celebrated its first year independence as a budding democracy.  This December it will celebrate its forty-second independence as a practitioner of repression and reprehensible autocracy. For all intents and purposes, Washington unfortunately continues to tolerate Manama’s undemocratic actions.

The June 18 report by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights depicts a deteriorating situation in Bahrain accentuated by mass arrests, excessive force against civilians and protesters–including children–torture of prisoners, and trials in military courts. Bahrain is heading down a dark path of instability, sectarianism, violence, and potential terrorism under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa, uncle of King Hamad and great uncle of Crown Prince Salman.

Despite these policies, the demands of Bahraini reformists, Sunnis and Shia alike, are reasonable and doable. In fact, they offer al-Khalifa an opportunity to turn the country around. Most analysts judge the demands for a return to the 1973 constitution, a freely elected national legislature, an independent civilian judiciary, and a transparent government the backbone of good governance and the basic ingredients for democracy. Yet in order to stay in power, Prime Minister Khalifa is not interested in dialogue with opposition activists despite their reasonable demands.

Public opinion polls indicated over the years that majorities of Bahrainis and other Arabs supported these principles and hoped the United States would urge Arab governments to implement them. During my government service I briefed senior Bush administration officials on these points and their long-term implications.

The glimmer of hope for democratic reform that existed in Bahrain in those years has all but faded. The US’s relations with that country remain very friendly. The Fifth Fleet continues to operate out of Mina Salman, falsely giving Khalifa and his hard-line faction within the ruling family the impression that America stands by Bahrain despite its systematic mistreatment of the majority of its people.

Demands for good governance and social justice have been advocated as far back as the early 1970s, when the first fair and free election for the Constituent Assembly was held. Then and now Sunni and Shia opposition called for democracy under the umbrella of the ruling family. Then and now, the Prime Minister has strenuously objected to meaningful reform and accused the opposition of treason and sedition.

Bahrain enjoyed a short-lived democratic experience right after independence in the 1972-75 period because of the leadership of the Amir of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, father of the King and brother of the Prime Minister. He overruled his brother’s opposition to political reform and insisted that family rule and democracy are not incompatible. Bahrain’s brush with democracy forty years ago, which included a constituent assembly to draft a constitution in 1972 and a constitution and a national assembly in 1973, ended in 1975 with the dissolution of the national assembly and the suspension of the constitution.

Following the demise of the democratic experiment, al-Khalifa ruled by decree, and the country was gripped by fear and systematic violations of human rights. The Prime Minister, with the support of a coterie of Sunni hardliners, emerged as the key decision maker in the economic, political, and national security life of the country.  The Shia were (and are) excluded from serving in the armed forces and the security services, including in leadership positions and in key ministries.

Three factors led to the end of the democratic period in the early 1970s:  a) the questioning of the domestic security law, including the agreement with the US to station elements of the US Navy at the Jufair facility in Manama; b) calls for a transparent national budget, including the personal budget of the Amir; and c) pressure from Saudi Arabia to scuttle the democratic experiment. Then and now, Saudi Arabia has used its economic hold on Bahrain and military hegemony within the GCC to oppose all democratic tendencies in the Gulf Arab states.

The stillborn democratic experiment of the early 1970s was repeated in the 2001-2002 when King Hamad raised false hopes for reform. The only consequence of those “reforms” was a change in the ruler’s title from Amir to King! The Prime Minster and his Saudi supporters, however, remain the real power behind the throne.

To counter the ruling family’s fears of a Shia avalanche, it’s good to remember that the first free elections in the early 1970s—arguably the only free and fair elections in Bahrain—showed that neither the Sunni minority nor the Shia majority were monolithic groups. They voted for different candidates and different lists, ranging from religious, to nationalist, to leftist, and to Ba’thist.

Pro-reform activists since the early 1970s have included Sunni and Shia. They did not call for removing the al-Khalifa from power or establishing a Shia majority rule.

Where Do We Go from Here and Why Should We Care?

If the al-Khalifa persist in opposing genuine reform, the window of compromise will rapidly close and hope for dialogue will vanish. Violence will escalate, calls for regime change will become more vocal and the US will be blamed for the impasse.  This is a recipe for lawlessness and terrorism.

The pro-democracy demands that most Bahrainis agree on have been identified in three key documents since the Arab Spring touched Bahrain a year and a half ago.  They are the Manama document, the Crown Prince’s statement, and the National Encounter statement. They called for a representative parliament with full legislative powers, fair and free elections through equitable electoral districts and a review of the naturalization law; merit, not religious affiliation as basis for employment in the government and the military and security agencies; and addressing administrative and financial corruption as well as the sectarian impasse.

More recently, demands have included calls for the removal of the Prime Minister who has been in power since the country’s independence 41 years ago. Opposition figures believe no credible dialogue could be conducted with the opposition under auspices of the Prime Minister who, in their eyes, is no longer a legitimate leader of their country.

As a backdrop to potential dialogue, the al-Khalifa ruling family in reality have been fortunate in that most observers judge the demands for reform fair and reasonable.  They’ve called for democracy and so far not regime change.

Since the democratic experiment was aborted in 1975, real power in the country has been concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. His corruption, patronage, control of internal security, dictatorial running of the cabinet, visceral hatred of the Shia and Iran, and dependence on Saudi military and financial support have helped him cement his position. Khalifa objected to the promulgation of the constitution in 1973 and views genuine reform as a threat to him and to the family. The King and his son Crown Prince Salman, for all intents and purposes, have been marginalized.

The untold story in all of this is the pervasive and sinister influence of Saudi Arabia on Bahrain. Such influence dates back to 1971, one year before independence, when Saudi Arabia even objected to Bahrain declaring its independence because the Saudis wanted Bahrain to become a member of the United Arab Emirates. Of course, Bahrain and Qatar left the three-year unity talks with the other emirates and declared their respective independence.

The Saudis have controlled the purse of the Bahraini Amir over the years by giving him the oil from the Saudi Abu-Sa’fa field. Saudi influence is more pervasive now than ever with the presence of Saudi troops on the island and with the talk of unification between the two countries. A unity with Saudi Arabia appeals to al-Khalifa and his old guard colleagues but is strongly opposed by mainstream liberal Sunnis and the Shia majority.

Washington has several opportunities to help Bahrain institute genuine reforms. It should reach out to the King, his son Salman, and the deputy Prime Minister Shaykh Muhammad bin Mubarak, who for many years was the foreign minister of Bahrain.  They should be strongly encouraged to initiate dialogue with different segments and personalities of Bahraini society, especially some of those who are part of the “National Encounter.” The Sunni and Shia supporters of the National Encounter represent the center of Bahraini society and are highly respected by their countrymen. Prime Minister Khalifa cannot be a legitimate or credible partner in this dialogue.

The administration should make it very clear to the king and his son that Arab autocracy has run its course and that if no genuine reforms are instituted, calls for reform could quickly turn to regime change. They should be told unequivocally that, the Saudi anti-Shia, Sunni-based, counter-revolution policy will fail and that al-Khalifa will be unable to stem the tide of protests despite the bloody crackdown and continued arrests, torture, and kangaroo trials.

Although Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain are different cases, Washington’s support of democracy in the first two countries is not similarly pursued in Bahrain. Consequently, the US is beginning to suffer from a perception of hypocrisy and a double standard. If Manama continues to respond to its citizens’ demands violently and repressively, frustrated citizens will come to view the US naval presence in their country as part of the problem.

The Fifth Fleet would then become a magnet for potential terrorism against our people. While it would be naïve to expect the Fifth Fleet to leave the island anytime soon, a conversation with the ruling family about our presence should give them pause.

–Emile Nakhleh is the former Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at the CIA and author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World and Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society