by Mitchell Plitnick

In the past, people have speculated about what Israel and the Occupied Territories would look like if the United States stopped trying to broker the mythical kind of solution that the Oslo process envisioned. Well, now we have an example.

The most radically right-wing government in Israel’s brief history was simply [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

In the past, people have speculated about what Israel and the Occupied Territories would look like if the United States stopped trying to broker the mythical kind of solution that the Oslo process envisioned. Well, now we have an example.

The most radically right-wing government in Israel’s brief history was simply waiting for an opportunity to deliver the most intense and widespread blow to the West Bank. The kidnapping of three young Israelis provided that opportunity and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seized it with a vengeance. Under the cover of searching for the kidnapped youths, Netanyahu launched a massive operation to cripple Hamas in the West Bank, further humiliate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and punish the entire Palestinian population for calling for a halt to the charade of the “peace process” and, worse, moving toward a unified leadership.

On the Palestinian side, the fundamental lack of strategy has become ever more apparent. Ditching the US-brokered process has been, for a very long time, the right move, but sloughing it off in a half-hearted way and without a substitute was unconscionably foolish. That’s especially true when you consider how much time there was to devise an alternative strategy to the US-brokered process over so many years. The result is that the Palestinian unity agreement was imperiled before it was signed by the essential incompatibility of the strategies and ideologies of Fatah and Hamas.

This is being played out on a daily basis now: Abbas appears not only weak, but like a traitor as he cooperates with Netanyahu in this massive operation that has yielded nothing with regard to the three kidnapped Israelis but has resulted in hundreds of arrested Palestinians without cause, disruption of work, school and health services throughout the West Bank, hundreds of injuries and, to date, five deaths. Hamas is fanning the flames of anger while denouncing Abbas for his quisling behavior, but it also offers no alternative, unless one foolhardily believes that yet another intifada is going to soften Israeli stances. The last intifada may have shaken up Israelis, and certainly resulted in numerous deaths and injuries in Israel, but it did no harm to Israel’s stability while killing and harming a great many Palestinians. In fact, it only hardened Israel’s positions and worsened conditions for the Palestinians. This suggests that violence, on top of being deplorable, is a foolish course for the Palestinians.

For his part, Netanyahu is playing this to the hilt. It is far from certain that Hamas, as an organization, is responsible for the kidnapping. Right now, it seems much more likely that this was a small group whose members might also have been members of Hamas, but were not acting in concert with the organization. Netanyahu, however, insists he has “unequivocal” proof that Hamas was responsible. The credibility of that claim erodes with each passing day that Bibi refuses to offer evidence for his claim.

Netanyahu’s brand of politics, like most right-wingers, functions best when the country he runs is either angry, scared, or better yet, both. The current situation creates such an atmosphere. The problem will come when and if the tension in the West Bank boils over. And that problem is going to be one that neither the United States nor much of the rest of the world will be able to ignore. They will have to choose a side.

In looking at where we’re headed right now, we must start by understanding that the US is not removed from these events. While the Obama administration has decided to take a “pause” from this conflict and certainly has other matters like Iraq and the advances of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to occupy its time, it is still Israel’s benefactor, providing arms and, quite likely, the omnipresent protective veto in the UN Security Council. So, the US is still there, whether it wants to be or not.

It will also be drawn further in if the Palestinian Authority collapses and violence in the West Bank is renewed. This seems very much to be the direction Israel is pressing matters towards. If that is the case, then it also stands to reason that the Israeli government intends to annex some part of the West Bank, using the violence as a pretext. Israel, especially given its budgetary constraints these days, is certainly not prepared to supplant the Palestinian Authority in administering the West Bank. The remainder of the West Bank would be surrounded by “Israel” and would be easily contained. From there, local councils or some such arrangements are probably what is envisioned for the lands Israel decides to leave to the Palestinians.

Netanyahu and his cohorts like Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman and Moshe Ya’alon are gambling that the violence of a third intifada will be enough to convince key governments — particularly, the US, UK and Germany — to tolerate the annexation. By “tolerate” I mean that they would object and “refuse to recognize” the action, much as they have with East Jerusalem, but would take no other action.

That is a huge gamble. It is far from certain that even the United States would acquiesce to such actions, and less so that Britain and Germany would. Even if they did, there would surely be a great uproar from other countries, in Europe and throughout the Muslim world, as well as from Russia, France and China. Even governments like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are largely indifferent to the Palestinians’ plight would be unable to stay silent.

But the gambit has a few things working in Bibi’s favor as well. First, as much as the Israeli de facto annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980 outraged many, the reality of the whole city functioning as an “undivided” capital, however restlessly, has survived for over three decades since then. And that’s Jerusalem, the hottest of hotspots in this conflict. Netanyahu surely reasons that if Jerusalem didn’t start a war, there’s a good chance that annexing the Jordan Valley in a similar manner won’t either.

Moreover, the timing is very good for the annexationists. Not only are all eyes on Iraq with a few still lingering over Ukraine, but the specter of ISIS has renewed the sense of fright that the West feels toward Arabs. These will combine, Bibi surely hopes, to encourage a similar clucking of tongues while doing nothing that has greeted the excesses, both pre- and post-election, of the al-Sisi government in Egypt. Netanyahu’s assessment that he can take an outrageous step and get away with it is thus not without recent precedent. The annexation vision, if that is what Bibi is pursuing, would require years of violence to set the stage for it, or at least many months of intense fighting and bloodshed on both sides (though, as always, the Palestinians will bleed a lot more than Israel).

Abbas, however unwittingly, is helping that process along by working with Israel. Netanyahu is not allowing the Palestinian forces to do much of anything in the current operation, but Abbas is also doing nothing to support his own people. Hamas’ strategy isn’t entirely clear yet, but its obviously trying to capitalize on the Palestinian rage that fuels its support. In Hamas’ view, escalating violence plays into its basic strategy of confrontation rather than collaboration. But the question of whether or not Hamas actually has some endgame vision of how it can make any headway against the might of Israel’s forces, let alone triumph, remains yet to be answered.

So, this is what Israel-Palestine looks like without a sham peace process. Does that mean the sham is preferable? Is it better to have a normalized occupation, with all the banality of its entrenched administration and gradual assimilation of more and more Palestinian land into Israel; or is a possibly long period of bloodshed preferable? Only Israelis and Palestinians can answer that question. That said, the shameful behavior of the US, the international community, the Quartet, the Israeli government, and the Palestinian leadership has left few other options.

Israelis can alter this situation, of course, any time they want by electing a government that wants to make a peace deal. Palestinians can also affect change by developing, organizing and executing a strategy that wins them both attention and increased support in the international arena. At this point, however, both sides seem unwilling and unable to take these paths, which increases the odds of Israel-Palestine spiraling back into extreme violence.

This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

Photo: Gaza, June 16 — Women rally for Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons on the 54th day of a mass hunger strike by the detainees and supporters. Credit: Joe Catron

by Mitchell Plitnick

There is a sure, although contemptible, way to get the attention of virtually the entire state of Israel. That is to kidnap some of its younger citizens. It worked with Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and it seems to be playing well again, this time with civilians (living in the settlements [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

There is a sure, although contemptible, way to get the attention of virtually the entire state of Israel. That is to kidnap some of its younger citizens. It worked with Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and it seems to be playing well again, this time with civilians (living in the settlements does not strip one of their civilian status under international law).

Israel, as a whole, is riveted on the fates of these three young men. There is a national outcry in Israel when kidnappings occur that is even louder than when Israelis, even young Israelis, are killed. There is a sense of urgency; that something must be done to free the captives before a worse fate befalls them. The attention is widespread and constant, in cases like Shalit’s, where the captive is kept alive, and in cases where the captives are believed or known to already be dead. Israelis press hard for a resolution to the situation, and political leaders respond, but sometimes, sadly, in self-serving ways.

Was it Hamas?

The outcry from the people of Israel over the fates of Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Sha’ar, and Naftali Frankel is very real. The bluster and finger-pointing from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is an insult. Netanyahu immediately laid the blame at Hamas’ feet, absurdly held the Palestinian Authority responsible, demeaned a very strong statement by Mahmoud Abbas denouncing the act and managed to defy all logic by suggesting that this event was the result of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas.

Beyond the visceral response, however, some perspective is needed. The media seems to have firmly latched on to the idea that Hamas is responsible for this crime. That is certainly possible, but the evidence thus far points away from that direction. Netanyahu has offered no concrete evidence for his statement whatsoever, expecting the world to simply take him at his word despite the obvious benefit for him. The media seems to have done just that, but others are more dubious.

The United States has thus far only conceded that some evidence may point to “Hamas’ involvement.” Hamas has sent out mixed signals, as they always do, but the official line has been that they had nothing to do with the kidnapping. Meanwhile the coordinator of government activities in the territories, Major General Yoav Mordechai has only said they have “a great deal of information” about the kidnappings, pointedly avoiding naming any group that might be responsible.

But whether it was Hamas or not is not really an issue for Netanyahu. The kidnapping has provided the pretext he needed to attack Hamas in the West Bank, and also hit the Palestinian Authority for their temerity in striking a unity agreement with the Islamist party against Israel’s wishes. Netanyahu quite reasonably believes he can drive a wedge between Hamas and Fatah and hasten the collapse of their unity pact, but if that fails, he very well knows that he can weaken Hamas’ presence in the West Bank through mass arrests and possibly deportations to Gaza. At the same time, he puts Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in a very difficult position; Abbas cannot be seen by the international community as supporting or being indifferent to the kidnapping, but he also can’t afford to be seen by his own public to be collaborating with Israel.

Palestinian prisoners

The problem for Abbas is deeply connected with the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, an issue that has resurfaced recently as many of them have gone on hunger strike. Israel often holds Palestinians in so-called “administrative detention,” which means they are being held without charge or trial. It is supposed to last no longer than six months, but because the order can be renewed, some Palestinians are imprisoned in this fashion for years.

The other end of that spectrum, of course, is the controversial issue of Palestinian prisoners who have been convicted of violence against Israelis, especially civilians. These prisoners are often seen as heroes by the Palestinians, a source of intense friction for even the most liberal Israelis. The Israeli public, for its part, doesn’t often distinguish much between Palestinian prisoners; they are generally seen as terrorists by most Israelis, although this is not by any means universal. Many of the more liberal Israelis are not entirely comfortable with the practice of extended administrative detention, although most would acknowledge its utility if used sparingly. Most countries, it should be noted, have some system like this one when attempting to prevent violent crimes, and most have been known, on occasion, to abuse the practice; it’s just that democracies, on the whole, do not abuse it to nearly the extent that Israel does.

Currently, about 300 Palestinian prisoners, including both those that have been charged, indicted or convicted, and those who are held in administrative detention, are on a hunger strike. Israel, seeking to avoid the international embarrassment and the potential powder keg in the Occupied Territories that would result from the deaths of the strikers, is attempting to pass legislation to permit forced feeding, widely considered a grave breach of personal privacy and medical ethics.

For many Palestinians, the issues of Palestinian prisoners and Israelis being held illegally by Palestinians are intimately connected. Israel, of course, has reinforced this on several occasions by agreeing to prisoner exchanges, as they did with Gilad Shalit in 2011. So, as Israel cracks down hard on Palestinian prisoners, Palestinians, even if they object to the kidnapping of the three Israelis, are going to be frustrated if they see Abbas putting more energy and resources into finding the Israelis than dealing with the conditions of his own people in Israeli jails, many of whose lives are also currently in jeopardy.

Netanyahu’s agenda

I want to be clear, at this point, that nothing I say here should be construed as suggesting that Netanyahu does not want to find Yifrach, Sha’ar and Frankel; I’m sure he does. But Bibi is nothing if not an opportunist, and he knows from the Shalit experience that it is entirely possible that this could drag on for some time. He is not about to let the mere fact of human suffering get in the way of his political agenda.

And Netanyahu certainly has an agenda here; what he lacks, as always, is an endgame. His aim is to use the crackdown, legitimized at least for the Israeli public by the kidnapping, to punish Abbas for dropping out of the sham talks that John Kerry was piloting, and for finally coming together with Hamas to agree on a technocratic government charged with paving the way for Palestine’s first national election since 2006. Anticipating that Hamas will gain support in the West Bank, Netanyahu is also using this opportunity to weaken its infrastructure and leadership through mass arrests.

But where does he go from there? His actions will further weaken Abbas, who is already teetering on the edge of oblivion in the West Bank. And, while Hamas may be somewhat less powerful in the short-term, these actions are not going to do long-term damage.

Part of Netanyahu’s strategy here is also to try to make the case that this is the result of the Palestinian unity agreement and that the world needs to stand by Israel and, in essence, against the entire Palestinian body politic. The hope, for Bibi, is that international pressure can be brought down on Abbas to get him to agree to a deal that would appeal to Bibi’s coalition. Such a deal would include a non-contiguous Palestinian pseudo-state with virtually no Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, a continued Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley, Israeli control of Palestinian airspace… in short, the deal Bibi and Kerry were trying to force on Abbas before the talks broke down.

But it doesn’t seem to be working. The United States has dutifully expressed its outrage, but in tepid terms. The European Union took five days before condemning the kidnapping. The message to Netanyahu is that the world is indeed outraged by this act, but they don’t see it as fundamentally changing anything.

The media campaign the Israeli government orchestrated worked well within Israel, but less so outside. The attempt by the Israel Defense Forces to get a Twitter campaign going by grossly playing off the crimes of Boko Haram in Nigeria in abducting hundreds of girls to be sold into sexual or other kinds of slavery was rightly greeted outside of Israel as cheap and insulting. It was turned around by pro-Palestinian social media activists to reflect the large numbers of Palestinians held by Israel. And the timing of the whole campaign is poor, as attention is focused now on Iraq, among other, ongoing areas of tension.

That is not to say the world is unsympathetic. These are, according to all reports, three innocent young men, whose only crime was living and studying in a school in occupied territory. But that does not justify violence against them. They are certainly victims, and they are rightly seen that way in most of the world.

Sadly, the Netanyahu government cannot let such a plight speak for itself. Instead they must polish it and present it in a propaganda package that is more about demonizing all Palestinians than it is about finding the victims. The repeated references to “our boys” and calling the abductees “children” might later resonate in a way Israel doesn’t like. The young men are 19, 16, and 16 years of age, and you’ll be hard-pressed to find instances where Israel treats Palestinian youths of those ages like “children.”

The occupation does not justify an attack on civilians, not even on settlers, if they are not threatening anyone. But like every other occupation in history, it does inevitably lead to it, especially if the occupying power is putting civilians illegally into occupied territory. Such acts are criminal, but inevitable. This did not happen because Palestinians hate Jews, nor because Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement. It happened because of the occupation. When millions of people are treated unjustly, some number of them will act unjustly in response.

If people are truly concerned about young Jews like Eyal, Gilad and Naftali, they must stop playing petty politics, trumpeting extreme nationalism and valuing force over law. The only way to effectively prevent crimes like this in the future is to end the situation where millions of people are living their entire lives without rights…or hope.

This article was published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.