Having pulled all the stops to avert an Israeli attack against Iran last spring that never happened, has the Obama administration given all that it has to Israel’s hawkish leaders, only to learn that it has been played? If so, how might this affect the US response to Israeli warnings that [...]]]>
Having pulled all the stops to avert an Israeli attack against Iran last spring that never happened, has the Obama administration given all that it has to Israel’s hawkish leaders, only to learn that it has been played? If so, how might this affect the US response to Israeli warnings that it will attack Iran before the 2012 presidential election?
Martin Indyk, a former US Ambassador to Israel during the Clinton years who is now head of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, is reported by the Sheldon Adelson-owned Israel Hayom to have told Israel Army Radio on August 23 that:
The administration was convinced that Israel was going to attack in the spring. That was the official assessment, everyone ran to battle stations, mobilized, engaged with the Israelis, did whatever they could to calm them down and make it clear that the President [Barack Obama] was absolutely committed to Israel’s security and to ensuring that Iran would not get nuclear weapons. That seemed to work fine. But after that, the administration concluded that Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu and Defense Minister [Ehud] Barak were engaged in a complete bluff, and having succeeded in bluffing them, I think they were wary of being bluffed again.
When Obama met with Netanyahu in March, according to Indyk, the president came away convinced that an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities was about to occur. He did everything possible to reassure Israel’s leader that the US would do whatever was necessary to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. “Apparently, Israel complied, as no attack has yet taken place,” according to the religious nationalist news site Arutz Sheva.
A diplomatic success story? Hardly, according to The Jerusalem Post:
After no Israeli strike took place, Indyk said that the US officials felt as though they had been duped by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s ruse. The former ambassador added that there is a sense within the US government that Washington is once again being misled by Israeli declarations and leaks.
It’s not clear whether Indyk is working for or against the President in suggesting that the Obama administration feels it was played by Netanyahu and Ehud Barak. Or, by stating that after having been misled about Israel’s intentions, the administration remains committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons but views Israel as “the boy who cried wolf” and is therefore taking less seriously the hyperbolic hints that Israel will attack Iran prior to the US election. It’s possible that Indyk’s current message intentionally contrasts with the recent recommendation of fellow Clinton adviser Dennis Ross that Obama try to avert an Israeli military strike on Iran by promising Netanyahu even more armaments and military support.
The author of the Clinton administration’s “dual containment” policy that simultaneously targeted Iran and Iraq (instead of playing the two Persian Gulf powers off against one another as traditional “balance of power ” strategic logic would have suggested), Indyk has served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East affairs, Special Assistant to the President, and the US National Security Council’s senior director for Near East and South Asia. Bill Clinton appointed Indyk as Ambassador to Israel in 1993. A former Research Director at the American Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Indyk was the founding director of the Washington Institution for Near East Policy (WINEP), an AIPAC-created think tank dedicated to influencing the executive branch on Middle East foreign policy while AIPAC focused on lobbying members of Congress. Indyk is also the founding director of Brookings’ Saban Center for Middle East Policy. During the 2008 presidential primaries, Indyk backed Hillary Clinton, but supported Barack Obama when he won the Democratic nomination.
In the past several months, however, Indyk has grown critical of Obama’s foreign policy. As co-author of Bending History: Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy (with Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Lieberthal) he classified Obama as a pragmatist who opted for reasonable policies — often the least-worst available options — “with an approach typified by thoroughness, reasonably good teamwork, and flexibility when needed”. Indyk told Nahum Barnea of the Hebrew-language Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot in an interview coinciding with the book’s publication that despite the greatness of the vision he presented, “Obama’s cold, analytical and aloof attitude didn’t suit the Middle Eastern climate.”
In a February 29 op-ed in the New York Times, Indyk criticized the “fundamental design flaw” in the Obama administration’s Iran sanctions policy. Indyk warned that “crippling” sanctions designed to “persuade the Israelis that there is a viable alternative to a preventive strike” could backfire as “the Iranians conclude that they have no choice but to press ahead in acquiring the ultimate means of assuring the regime’s survival.” Furthermore, Indyk opined, the constant warnings of Obama’s military advisers about the grave consequences of a military strike by Israel might signal that the US cannot be counted upon to restrain the Israelis from launching a war against Iran. Indyk also suggested that election year rhetoric might impact Iran’s strategic calculus. The louder Obama insists that that he will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that that Iran will respond defiantly:
The only way out of the vicious circle is for Khamenei to understand that Obama is not seeking his overthrow — that behind the negotiating door lies a path to Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear power and not a corridor to the gallows. But how, while pursuing sanctions designed to cut Iran’s economic jugular, can Obama credibly signal this to Khamenei without opening himself up to the charge of weakness? Any hint of reassurance to the Iranian regime will surely be seized upon by his Republican rivals as a sign of appeasement.
Yet during an Yediot Aharonot interview at the end of May, Indyk recommended that Israelis be wary of US efforts to negotiate with Iran. “The Israeli response must be skeptical, regardless of what exactly is agreed upon there,” Indyk said. “When others are negotiating in your stead, you have every reason to suspect you are being sold out.”
In his latest interview, Indyk’s message seems to be that Obama has nothing left to promise Netanyahu:
Essentially, the U.S. had done everything it could to reassure Israel, the president doesn’t have anything more in his quiver, no other arrow to shoot to reassure it. I think this time around they thought, ‘Here we go again, there’s nothing more we can do we’ll just learn to live with it.
What exactly is Indyk’s game?
]]>Weiss mainly focuses on Israel-Palestine and human [...]]]>
Weiss mainly focuses on Israel-Palestine and human rights in the Middle East. He also headed “Just Journalism”, a media monitoring organization focused on “how Israel and Middle East issues are reported in the UK” prior to its September 2011 closure (lack of funding was cited). His own work has been widely published and last month Foreign Affairs printed his “What it Will Take to Intervene in Syria“, where he argued that intervention “at this moment would be premature” and then proceeded to describe how it could be executed anyway. Less than a month later the crux of Weiss’s position is that Bashar al-Assad is no longer a legitimate leader and Iran and Russia are already “intervening” in Syria, so the West should too:
…Russia, Iran and Hezbollah have all been “intervening” in Syria’s internal affairs for ten months now. Meanwhile, the Arab League, the United States and the European Union have all determined that any claim to sovereignty Assad might have had in 2011 is null and void in 2012. What is needed, therefore, is not condemnations, demarches and shuttered embassies but a Western equivalent of intervention in Syria, namely in the form of:
- • Humanitarian “safe areas” to provide food, aid and medical supplies to the civilian population and give the various opposition groups a headquarters inside their own country
• Advanced weapons and communication devices for the Syrian rebels
• A no-fly zone to stop the regime from using its aircraft to conduct reconnaissance, offload security personnel and – yes – strafe rebel strongholds from the sky.
Weiss also strongly criticizes the US, UK and France for not working to push the Assad government out more forcibly:
Hillary Clinton, William Hague and Alain Juppe can grumble all they like about travesties at Turtle Bay and the inevitability of Assad’s fall. Even if they got their toothless Security Council resolution calling for Assad’s departure, then what? Would he pack up and go quietly? If so, where to? How’s the tabouleh in the Black Sea?
Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution, who supported intervention in Libya in the very early stages of the uprising, wrote in CNN today that Russia and China’s vetoing of last week’s United Nations draft Security Council resolution on Syria has made the reality on the ground more dangerous for Syrians. He accordingly urges more consideration of the “various military options available” (while conceding that taking such action is currently premature) and makes the case that Western powers have in fact been reluctant to intervene despite growing necessity:
The “anti-imperialists” will, as they often do, cry foul. This time, though, they will find themselves on the wrong side. None of the Western powers has come out in even tepid support of military intervention. Consumed by their own internal problems, this is not at all something they want. But it may be something the Syrian people need.
Yesterday US intelligence veteran and foreign policy analyst Paul Pillar wrote that one reason why Russia and China vetoed the UN draft resolution was because of their experience with Libya:
The Russians in particular made it clear they were determined not to fall again for what they regarded as a bait and switch on Libya, in which a NATO military intervention that received multilateral support on humanitarian grounds quickly morphed into support for toppling the Libyan regime.
Pillar appears to be adamantly on the anti-intervention side. He argues that foreign intervention in Libya has given Iran and North Korea “the worst possible message” with respect to their own security interests and alleged nuclear ambitions and that “Sectarian divisions in Syria would make the aftermath of even a low-cost regime-toppling intervention messier than Libya.”
The American Security Projects’ Joshua Foust also weighed in on the Libya/Syria comparison in the context of the intervention debate in the Atlantic today:
In a vacuum, intervening to prevent mass killings in Libya made sense. Libya, however, did not (and does not) exist in a vacuum. It has both internal and regional politics. So does Syria. The failure to gain international buy-in to do something — not necessarily militarily but some response — to the atrocities there is a direct consequence of interventionists ignoring politics in their rush to do good. Unfortunately, the people of Syria are now paying the price, and will continue to do so.
As reported by Josh Rogin in Foreign Policy, this weekend several members of congress touched on the Syria intervention debate at the 2012 Munich Security Conference as well. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry echoed Pillar and Foust’s argument that “Syria is not Libya” but added that:
…nobody should interpret that statement to suggest that it means that Syrian leaders can rely on the notion that they can act with impunity and not expect the international community to assist the Syrian people in some way.
Interestingly, while senate hawks John McCain and Joe Lieberman had harsher words for Russia and China, they, like Kerry, avoided advocating intervention directly. According to Lieberman:
What’s happening in Syria today is exactly what we got involve in Libya to stop from happening…. I understand Syria is more complicated, but one choice we don’t have is just to stand back and let the government kill people who are fighting for their own freedom.
Pro-interventionists like Weiss aside, many of whom have been arguing for the West to go into Syria for months (consider the output of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Foreign Policy Initiative on the issue), the trend in Washington seems to be that more could and should be done about Syria, but other considerations are getting in the way. Meanwhile, according to a poll conducted by Shibley Telhami in October, an overwhelming majority from the Arab countries he surveyed support the Syrian rebels over the government, but are divided about foreign intervention. During the question-answer period of the poll’s launch event at the Brookings Institution, Telhami added that Syrians themselves are also “divided” on the issue: “My suspicion is many Syrians want international intervention, many don’t.”
It will be interesting to see how ongoing brutality by Assad’s forces will affect this debate not only among the most important actors, the Syrian people, but foreign governments too.
]]>- The Wall Street Journal: Kenneth M. Pollack, director of the Saban center at the Brookings Institution, opines, “Could al Qaeda Hijack Egypt’s Revolution?” and observes, “the Iranian regime is also gleeful about the collapse of Mr. Mubarak, one of America’s most important Arab allies and one of Tehran’s most passionate enemies.” He continues, “Iran’s mullahs often see opportunity in chaos and violence, believing that anything that disrupts the region’s American-backed status quo works to their advantage,” and concludes, “All of this gives Iran and al Qaeda common interests that may drive them toward tacit cooperation—with the goal of fomenting a modern Bolshevik Revolution.”
- Tablet Magazine: Hudson Institute visiting fellow Lee Smith argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is still a radicalizing force in Egypt and calls Yussuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based Muslim Brotherhood preacher who exiled himself from Egypt in 1961, a “prospective Khomeini.” Qaradawi, who hosts the show “Shariah and Life” on Al Jazeera, “has cultivated among some American analysts a reputation for moderation with his fatwas, permitting masturbation and condemning Sept. 11 (while supporting suicide bombers in Israel),” says Smith. Smith goes on to argue, “While the parallels between Iran in 1979 and Egypt in 2011 can be overdrawn, it is foolish to pretend that they are not there,” and warns, “To the Iranians, Qaradawi is perhaps not the ideal voice of Sunni Islamism, but insofar as he rises and the Americans suffer, Tehran will make its accommodations.”
- Los Angeles Times: Jonah Goldberg writes a column on “The real realism in Israel” in which he argues against linkage and supports the view that the current unrest in Egypt has nothing to do with Israel. Goldberg, who is at the Herzliya Conference, on a trip underwritten by the Emergency Committee for Israel, says that proponents who see an Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a key U.S. foreign policy goal, such as Gen. James Jones, are detached from reality. “Such thinking falls somewhere between wild exaggeration and dangerous nonsense,” says Goldberg. He goes on to argue, “As we’ve recently been reminded, Israel is the only truly democratic regime in the region, and therefore the most stable. But, we are told, if we were only more conciliatory to corrupt dictatorial regimes and more sympathetic to the ‘Arab street,’ the region would be more stable. (Ironically, this is very close to Israel’s own position, no doubt because it will take any peace it can get.)”
Innocent writes (my emphasis):
According to the Brookings Institution’s 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll, 77 percent regard Israel as the biggest threat, 80 percent regard the United States as the biggest threat, and only 10 percent regard Iran as the biggest threat. Fifty-seven percent think the region will be better off if Iran had nuclear weapons. Despite those remarkably high numbers, it is the opinion of brutal Arab dictators who want America to bomb Iran that has dominated news stories. Meanwhile, the opinions of other Arab leaders in Oman, Qatar, Syria, Kuwait, and Jordan,who have expressed concern about the repercussions of an attack on Iran, have all but been ignored. Of course, it’s not a coincidence that the same news organizations overselling U.S.-Arab solidarity against Iran were the same ones that overhyped Iranian involvement during the Iraq War.
Innocent makes a valuable point that WikiLeaks cables offer far from conclusive evidence that the Arab world would support a U.S. or Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Inter Press Service‘s Gareth Porter addressed this very issue and took a critical look at the New York Times‘s reporting on the WikiLeaks cables.
In fact, the cables show that most Gulf Arab regimes – including Saudi Arabia itself – have been seriously concerned about the consequences of a strike against Iran for their own security, in sharp contrast to Israel’s open advocacy of such a strike. They also show the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait expressing that concern with greater urgency in the past two years than previously.
Those facts were completely ignored, however, in the Times’ account.
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The media coverage of hostile remarks about Iran from some Gulf Arab leaders, among others, largely glazed over the autocratic [...]]]>
The media coverage of hostile remarks about Iran from some Gulf Arab leaders, among others, largely glazed over the autocratic character of the figures making the comments. But the gaps in attitudes between the dictatorial leadership of many of these Arab countries and their populations — citizens or subjects, however you want to call them — is vast and well-known.
Telhami and Zobgy’s Arab Public Opinion survey is a highly regarded poll, known for reflecting the views of the people in these countries who go unmentioned in diplomatic cables such as those released by WikiLeaks.
As of last August, here’s how those surveyed felt about Iranian nuclear weapons (hint: it’s nothing like their leaders):
Gulf Between Arab Leaders and Public
The U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks about Arab regimes’ hostility toward Iran — and the innumerable commentators on the subject – all overlook the gulf between autocratic Arab leaders and their citizens or subjects, who tend to have a different view of Iran and its nuclear programme.
However, a Brookings Institution and Zogby International 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll, released in August, found that more than three- quarters of respondents in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Lebanon and Egypt thought Iran had the right to pursue its nuclear programme despite most feeling that it is aimed at developing weapons.
While a majority of respondents (55 percent) said they believe Tehran’s nuclear programme is aimed at developing weapons – a charge denied by Iran – nearly four out of five respondents (77 percent) said the country has the right to pursue the programme – a whopping increase of 24 percent since last year.
Support for the programme was strongest by far in Egypt and Morocco and weakest in the UAE, where a strong majority said Iran should be pressured to halt it.
Conversely, only 20 percent of respondents said they favoured applying international pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear programme. That was down from the 40 percent who took that position one year ago.
“Overall, there is very little support here for the notion that Arabs are secretly yearning for the U.S. to attack Iran,” wrote Marc Lynch, a Mideast expert at George Washington University, whose blog on foreignpolicy.com has a wide readership among elite sectors here. “Really little.”
Moreover, a solid majority (57 percent) of respondents agreed that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would lead to a “more positive” outcome in the Middle East region. That was nearly twice the percentage of one year ago (29 percent). By contrast, only 21 percent said that it would lead to a “more negative outcome”, compared to a plurality of 46 percent who took that position in 2009.
(Much of this sidebar is drawn from Lobe’s August article on the poll. The link for Marc Lynch’s FP piece was added to this post.)
]]>Most striking (no pun intended) was that only 18 percent of respondents think the U.S. should launch a military strike on Iranian nuclear targets now. Even if diplomacy and sanctions fail to stop Iranian advancement toward a bomb, a slim plurality still think the U.S. should not bomb Iran (49 percent oppose it, 47 would support it). More than half of respondents say if Israel starts a war with Iran, the U.S. should not leap to Israel’s defense.
The Chicago Council, Obama’s hometown think tank, released the report yesterday at the Brookings Institution in D.C., an indication of the Council’s well-connected policy circles. Worth mentioning is that the chairman of the Council’s board of directors is top Obama fundraiser and early supporter Lester Crown, patriarch of the Crown family empire. The Obama administration even announced, at a symposium convened by the Council, food programs based on Council recommendations.
One should note that this survey was conducted in June. That means that the more than 2,700 responses came before the latest round of chatter about attacking Iran, sparked by Jeffrey Goldberg‘s August article about a potential Israeli strike on Iran in the Atlantic.
Before this chatter kicked off, that when respondents were asked should Israel bomb Iran and Iran retaliate, sparking a war between the two, whether the U.S. should stay on the sidelines, “a majority (56%) says the United States should not bring its military forces into such a conflict, with 38 percent saying it should.” (See chart labeled “Figure 14.”)
Should the U.S. jump in to Israel's defense?
The Chicago Council explains this aversion to jumping in, known as “selective engagement,” by pointing to factors like the economic crisis at home. With military forces over-extended already, Americans are not keen on fighting the wars of others. Their focus, according to what the Council calls the First “Principle of Selective Engagement,” is “Support for actions against top threats.” The focus here is on “clear and direct threats to the homeland.”
However, according to survey respondents, Iran does pose a “‘critical’ threat to U.S. vital interests in the next ten years.” The second priority listed in that category — behind “international terrorism,” with 73 percent — was “the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers.” Sixty-nine percent of respondents called it a “‘critical’ threat.” Iran’s nuclear program, as a distinct choice, was a close third on the list with 68 percent giving it the “critical” designation.
The Top choices for "'critical' threats" to the U.S.
But the report notes that “while Americans favor actions to try to stop the country from enriching uranium and developing a weapons program, there is clear hesitation to resort to military action because of the perceived dangers and limits of such a response.” This, says the Chicago Council, is because Americans reported back with some certainty that a litany of negative consequences would follow a U.S. strike on Iran. (See chart, labeled “Figure 48.”) About four in five respondents think nearly every negative consequence of a strike listed is “likely” or “very likely,” and about the same amount think a strike would not cause Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Furthermore, three quarters of respondents thought that a U.S. strike would cause Iranians to rally around their government.
How likely are possible outcomes of a U.S. attack on Iran?
So how would people in the U.S. like to deal with nuclear Iran? The Chicago Council report says (with my emphasis):
At this point in time, Americans favor trying to resolve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means. More significantly, even though 54 percent now oppose diplomatic relations (up 16 points from 38% in 2002 when 58% were in favor), 62 percent favor U.S. leaders meeting and talking with Iran’s leaders. When asked their views of what the United States should do if Iran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of the UN Security Council, which has asked it to stop enriching uranium, Americans are not immediately ready to resort to a military strike. Only 18 percent say the United States should carry out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear energy facilities, with 41 percent preferring to impose economic sanctions and 33 percent wanting to continue diplomatic efforts to get Iran to stop enriching uranium (only 4% do not want the United States to pressure Iran to stop enriching uranium).
Even if those preferred mechanisms — sanctions and diplomacy — fail, respondents of the survey were nearly split on whether the U.S. should then attack in order to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon: 49 percent oppose a U.S. attack and 47 percent would support it. Interestingly, only 45 percent of respondents think the U.S. can run a program of Soviet-style containment on a nuclear Iran. And, a majority of 55 percent of those who would oppose bombing Iran even as a last resort to prevent it from going nuclear think that Iran can be contained.
On a note of the specific direction of policy, a slim majority of respondents believe that if a robust system of international inspections were in places as an insurance policy, Iranians should be able to manufacture their own nuclear fuel for peaceful electricity-generating purposes.
These splits in opinion are surprising, considering the priority put on Iran’s program as a “‘critical threat.” Furthermore, Iran was tied with North Korea “at the bottom on the scale of ‘feelings’ toward other countries.” While Americans don’t ‘like’ Iran, they view it as less important a country than they have in previous Chicago Council surveys. Although a majority thought Iran is either “somewhat” or “very” important, those numbers are down. Nearly two in five Americans think Iran is unimportant.
Finally, it is important to consider the partisan divide when interpreting the survey’s findings. On the question of jumping into an Israeli-Iranian war started by Israel, “Majorities of Republicans support … bringing U.S. forces into a war with Iran on the side of Israel prompted by Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities (52%).” Only a third of Democrats support that same proposition.
]]>Jim Lobe wrote the poll up yesterday. He said:
Much of the disillusionment with Obama appears related to his failure to make progress in achieving a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, according to Telhami, who has conducted eight previous surveys of Arab opinion since 2000.
Asked what policies pursued by the Obama administration they were most disappointed with, 61 percent of respondents in the new poll identified the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That was more than twice the percentage of the next-most-cited example, Washington’s Iraq policy (27 percent).
“This is the prism through which Arabs view the Untied States,” Telhami said, referring to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
Iran appears to have benefited, at least indirectly, from Arab disillusionment with Obama, the poll results suggested.
While a majority of respondents (55 percent) said they believe Tehran’s nuclear programme is aimed at developing weapons – a charge denied by Iran – nearly four out of five respondents (77 percent) said the country has the right to pursue the programme – a whopping increase of 24 percent since last year.
Of course none of this should come as any great surprise, and linkage has become an increasingly accepted way to view U.S.-policy in the Middle East after Gen. David Petraeus’s Senate testimony in March in which he stated that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, “…foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel,” and, “[t]he conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.”
Numerous pundits, academics and politicians have tried to deny that this linkage exists but, try as they might, facts on the ground make it very difficult to close the box which Petraeus, very publicly, opened this spring.
Eighty-six-percent of the poll’s respondents were “prepared for peace if Israel is willing to return all 1967 territories including East Jerusalem,” 39 percent held the belief that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be resolved through negotiations, and only 16 percent believed it will end through war.
One has to wonder how U.S. interests are served by continuing to ratchet up tensions with Iran via “Sanctions Plus,” “Economic Warfare,” or chest-pounding threats of military strikes. As U.S.-Iran relations deteriorate and Iran, via its allies, exacerbates tensions between Israel and its neighbors, Arab public opinion will, if the trends in the poll have any predictive power, swing in Iran’s favor and make the Obama administration even less popular in the region. That isn’t good for Israel which, if Israeli ambassador to the U.S. Michael Oren’s dire warnings are to be believed, might find itself in another war before the end of the summer, and it isn’t good for a U.S. administration which is trying to figure out a way to extract the country from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Of course all of this requires that you believe that there is a linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. If you suspend your belief in that linkage, then anything goes.
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