by François Nicoullaud

Defining the size of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program has become a major sticking point in the negotiations between Iran and world powers expected to resume next month. The scale of this enrichment program, however, greatly relies upon undecided agreements between Tehran and Moscow on the long-term supply of nuclear fuel [...]]]> via LobeLog

by François Nicoullaud

Defining the size of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program has become a major sticking point in the negotiations between Iran and world powers expected to resume next month. The scale of this enrichment program, however, greatly relies upon undecided agreements between Tehran and Moscow on the long-term supply of nuclear fuel for the Russian-built reactors: a 1,000 Megawatt reactor already operating in Bushehr since 2012 and two other reactors that will likely be built on the same site if the talks between Russia and Iran conclude successfully.

The decision to build several reactors on the Bushehr site basically conforms to general practice in the nuclear industry, as it generates important economies of scale. Tehran justifies its controversial enrichment ambitions by noting its intention to use, in the medium-term, domestically enriched uranium in its reactors.

Iran has already stored around nine tons of low-enriched uranium, about a third of the quantity necessary to run a Bushehr-type reactor for a year, consuming in the process about 40,000 Separative Work Units (SWU, a type of energy unit in the field of uranium enrichment). If Iran preserves its present capacity of about 10,000 SWU per year, corresponding to the 10,000 or so first-generation centrifuges currently in operation, it will need about eight more years to produce enough low-enriched uranium to operate a Bushehr-type reactor for one year. This brings us to around 2022, when the present contract for the delivery of Russian fuel for the first reactor in Bushehr comes to an end. It would also be around that time, according to best estimates, that two new reactors would have to be fed with an initial load of fuel to start functioning.

However, using such a stockpile of domestic uranium for Bushehr assumes that it would initially be incorporated in fuel elements complying with Russian standards. This would require Russia’s agreement and its active cooperation as long as Iran does not master the corresponding know-how. At first, this cooperation could take the form of fabricating the fuel in Russia using low-enriched uranium provided by Iran. In the second stage, the Russians could help the Iranians build and operate a fuel fabrication plant on Iranian soil. As for the introduction of Iranian-made fuel elements in the Bushehr reactor, this would once again require the agreement and the cooperation of the Russians, who could otherwise rightly withdraw their guarantee on the safe operation of the reactor.

What will the origin of the nuclear fuel used in the operating Bushehr reactors be in, say, 2022? Moscow would like to supply the reactors with Russian fuel, as this would vastly enhance their economic benefits. But Tehran will want to use Iranian fuel in at least the first reactor, as this would justify the expansion of their enrichment capacities (it should be remembered that the Iranians, under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action, must demonstrate that the enrichment capacity they desire responds to “practical needs”). Ultimately, the Russians will have to respond at least partially to Iran’s expectations if they want to retain their chance to sell Tehran two new reactors.

Within this framework, a possible compromise could be, for example, entrusting the Iranians with the fabrication of fuel for the first Bushehr reactor and leaving the Russians to take care of the other two. A similar formula would let the Iranians produce about a third or fourth of the fuel necessary for the three reactors (after the initial loading of the second and third reactors) while the Russians maintained responsibility of the rest. This would compel the Iranians to reach an enrichment capacity of about 90,000 to 120,000 SWU per year by around 2022. Adding Iran’s needs for its research reactors would bring the total required capacity to approximately 100,000 to 130,000 SWU per year.

This last figure is somewhat below the 190,000 SWU per year put forward by Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Iranian Organization for Atomic Energy, and quoted later by the Supreme Leader, but this discrepancy can probably be explained by different modes of calculation. Indeed, when one remembers that the production of highly enriched uranium for a nuclear explosive engine using the implosion method requires no more than 5,000 SWU, variations of capacities beyond 100,000 SWU per year are no longer relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

Of course, Russia could refuse to allow Iran to manufacture even part of the Bushehr fuel. This would greatly benefit the Americans and the Europeans, who would be happy to deprive Iran of arguments for developing a significant enrichment capacity. But in doing so, Moscow would likely forego the opportunity to sign a contract with Iran for the construction and operation of the two additional Bushehr reactors, which would result in a big loss for its nuclear industry.

On the other hand, if Russia were to announce its readiness to share the fuel fabrication process for Bushehr with Iran, that would be enough to validate Tehran’s view of its “practical needs” and justify an Iranian enrichment capacity of about 10,000 SWU per year for 6 or 7 years, eventually increasing to 100,000 and beyond. In this case, Western powers would find it extremely difficult to convince Tehran to limit its capacity to a few thousand first-generation centrifuges, corresponding to a capacity of 4,000 to 6,000 SWU — a long-sought goal.

All in all, one has to face the fact that Russian and Western interests diverge on the core issue of Iran’s enrichment capacity. If the Americans and Europeans want to keep the P5+1 unified, they should be especially thoughtful when considering Moscow’s dilemma in its bilateral trade negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps most importantly, these powers should prevent other subjects of contention, such as Syria or Ukraine, from interfering with the negotiations as a whole.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif shares a laugh with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov.

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by Charles Naas

Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.

The negotiating teams have been unusually [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Charles Naas

Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.

The negotiating teams have been unusually disciplined in terms of leaks but official briefings have indicated that some major technical issues are on the way to being settled. Encouraging? Yes, but from the beginning of the talks it was realized, or should have been, that the day would come when Iran’s long term plans for a sizable nuclear energy program and the need for large amounts of enriched uranium would be front and center.

The past is prologue. Roughly 5 decades ago, we negotiated for several years with Iran over future nuclear cooperation until there was little hope left and went aground for some time over who would control the possible reprocessing of spent fuel from the US supplied enriched uranium. In the reprocessing of spent fuel, small quantities of plutonium could be separated and used in power plants or nuclear bombs.

The US side offered a variety of solutions, such as a bilateral plant; buy-back of the fuel; shipping the spent fuel for reprocessing to European facilities; and multi-national enrichment and reprocessing firms. Iran, however, refused all such ideas until President Jimmy Carter and the Shah directly reached a compromise agreement. The president was able to satisfy the Persian monarch’s personal and national pride that Iran would not be treated unfairly. The success of the Iranian Revolution in February of 1979 prevented the legal enactment of that treaty.

Now the concerns over reprocessing have been replaced by deep concerns over enrichment. The present Iranian government, like its royal predecessor, has planned a substantial civilian power program that has tentatively selected 16 areas for the construction of 1000 MW reactors. None, it is believed, has had a shovel of earth removed as yet, however in the view of the lengthy construction time and the vast expenditures required for reactors, issues such as security and supply for sufficient enriched uranium are vital.

At present Iran has 9,000 first stage and 10,000 second stage — IR2 — centrifuges. In all the years that some of them have been operating, Iran has been provided a little over 11,000 kilograms — roughly 5 tonnes — of enriched uranium. This supply is sufficient for 5-7 bombs if further enriched but is totally insufficient for civil reactor needs.

For example, Iran’s one completed reactor at Bushehr needs roughly 21 tonnes of enriched uranium as yearly replacement fuel that will be sold by Russia. The new reactors — which are at least a decade away — will require roughly 70-80,000 tonnes of fuel to start power production, and annual replacement fuel of about 21-25,000 tonnes per reactor. Iran’s negotiators have proclaimed that to meet its future requirements, Iran will need at least 100,000 advanced centrifuges. If in fact Iran pursues its civilian objectives, that figure is modest.

So far Iran has insisted that its future needs must rely on domestic production and depending on imports would make Iran highly vulnerable to political differences and crises. This position is given added weight by the fact that the six powers across the table have been imposing sanctions for a decade.

The position of the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) has been that Iran should reduce its current centrifuges to a number that can only provide enriched material for medical research and isotopes, and depend on imports from reliable producers for future reactor fueling.

The parties are an ocean apart. In response to the negotiating crisis, emergency bilateral sessions took place between Iran and each of the P5+1 members to examine whether there is enough “give” to hold out the hope that compromises can emerge. (Unhappily, as with Carter and the Shah, we do not have leaders who understand or trust each other.) The bilateral talks also give Iran opportunities to test whether cracks are possible within the six. If each side holds to its position, the negotiating effort could be extended for at least a six month period or end.

One potential way forward that requires careful study would be to stipulate that a specific number of additional centrifuges may operate and that the enriched uranium should be put aside under especially rigorous security for a particular future reactor. Whether the US Congress, Israel and Iran’s conservative cabal, not to mention the other five powers, could live with this kind of solution is questionable. But each leader, especially Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, have put great effort into this possible opening of modest relations after three decades of mistrust.

Presumably neither views failure with equanimity, although Obama has consistently said that success was no more than 50% likely.

If failure seems likely, there are many questions that have to be addressed now and not await a crisis:

• Will Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif politically survive or will the possibility of a more cooperative Iran disappear?
• Do we take failure as a stage of negotiations and push onwards?
• Will the US Senate quickly enact even more sanctions?
• Will Israel attack Iran’s nuclear facilities as it has often threatened?
• What will be our policy to an Israeli assault and will we foolishly join in and find ourselves ensnared in another Middle East war?
• Will the P5+1 remain united, continue current sanctions and any new congressional requirements or will each go its separate way?
• Will Iran, Russia and China, all having current differences with the West, establish more extensive economic and political ties?
• The present offensive of the jihadist Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) threatens new power configurations in the Middle East. Will we be able to confer with Iran, one of the most significant countries in the region?

These are parlous times. Are we doing every thing possible to strengthen our hand?

This article was first published by LobeLog.

Photo: US President Jimmy Carter and Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi share a drink in 1977, two years before the monarch would be overthrown by a popular revolution.

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by Derek Davison

The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Derek Davison

The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive agreement, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association (ACA) discussed Iran’s “breakout” period, and Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center talked about possible timeframes for sanctions relief.

While there may be flaws in the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) decision to make “breakout” their primary focus, it is that timeline, and specifically its uranium enrichment component, that dominates the negotiations and related policy debates. Uranium enrichment capacity is, according to Kimball, the “key problem” in terms of coming to a final agreement, given that more progress seems to have been made between the two parties on limiting the Arak heavy-water reactor’s plutonium production, and on more intensive inspection and monitoring mechanisms. He also discussed the contours of a deal that would allow Iran to begin operating “next generation” centrifuges, which enrich uranium far more efficiently than the older models currently being operated by the Iranians.

Kimball’s suggestion mirrored a new piece in the ACA’s journal by Princeton scholars Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel. They proposed a two-stage process for modernizing Iran’s enrichment technology and eventually finding a stable consensus on the enrichment issue. In the first stage, to last around five years, Iran could begin to replace its aging “first generation” centrifuges with more advanced “second generation” centrifuges so long as Iran’s overall enrichment capacity remains constant, and it would be able to continue research and development on more modern centrifuge designs so long as it permitted inspectors to verify that those more advanced centrifuges were not being installed. That five year period would also allow Iran and the international community time to work out a more permanent uranium enrichment arrangement, which could take the form of a regional, multi-national uranium enrichment consortium similar to Urenco, the European entity that handles enrichment for Britain and Germany.

As the authors note, Iran is one of only three non-nuclear weapon states (Brazil and Japan are the others) that operate their own enrichment programs, so the global trend seems to be moving in the direction of these multi-national enrichment consortiums. It is unclear if Iran would agree to this kind of framework, but this piece was co-authored by Mousavian, who has ties to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, suggesting that it could become acceptable to the Iranian government.

One major hurdle in the talks remains Iran’s desire, as noted by Kimball, to be able to fully fuel its Bushehr reactors with domestic enriched uranium by 2021, the year when its deal with Russia to supply fuel to Bushehr runs out. Fueling the Bushehr reactors alone would require vastly more enrichment capacity than the P5+1 would be able to accept, and Iran has plans for future reactors that it would presumably want to be able to fuel domestically as well. The P5+1 negotiators, and well-known non-proliferation organizations including ACA, argue that Iran can simply renew its fuel supply deal with Russia and thereby reduce its “need” for enriched uranium substantially. But from Iran’s perspective, domestic enrichment is its only completely reliable source of reactor fuel. Indeed, Russia has historically proven willing to renege on nuclear fuel agreements in the name of its own geopolitical prerogatives. Any final deal that relies on outside suppliers to reduce Iran’s enriched uranium requirements will have to account for Iranian concerns about whether or not those outside suppliers can be trusted. It’s possible that the kind of enrichment consortium described in the ACA piece will satisfy those concerns.

The other timelines in question, the overall duration of a deal and the phasing out of sanctions, spin off of the more fundamental debate over enrichment capacity, and both revolve around issues of trust. Wolfsthal argued that the P5+1 may require a deal that will last at least until Rouhani is out of office, in order to guard against any change in nuclear posture under the next presidential administration. In his discussion of sanctions relief, Litwak pointed to an even more fundamental question of trust: is Iran willing to believe (and, it should be added, can Iran believe) that the United States is prepared to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic and to stop making regime change the paramount goal of its Iran policy? If the answer is “yes,” then Iran may be willing to accept a more gradual, staged removal of sanctions in exchange for specific nuclear goals, which the P5+1 favors. If the answer is “no,” then Iran is likely to demand immediate sanctions relief at levels that may be too much, and too quick for the P5+1 to accept.

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To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to [...]]]> by François Nicoullaud

To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to an excess of statements calibrated for domestic purposes (a special mention to Wendy Sherman, the chief US negotiator, for saying so little, amiably, in many background meetings with the press). The involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the negotiations has also been of inestimable value. The Agency offers unique expertise and notarizes regularly the way in which Iran complies with its commitments. It contributes therefore decisively to the smooth progression of the discussions.

Quite unexpectedly, Iran’s negotiators have been the driving force in this process. They have seized President Hassan Rouhani’s initiative to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program and have kept it ever since, setting the targets as well as the tempo. Iran’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said on April 7 that the drafting of the final agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) should start in May, and that all efforts should be taken to complete the negotiations by the official deadline of July. The Iranians seem set to resolve the conflict over their nuclear program as fast as possible, once and for all.

The Rouhani administration’s determination serves in pleasant contrast to the rather stiff and slow Iranian behavior that was especially exhibited during the Ahmadinejad era, but also, at times, in the most favorable of circumstances, during the 2003-05 period, when Rouhani was himself Iran’s chief negotiator. At that time, the Iranian diplomats on the frontline were subjected to a heavy-handed system of control, which tended to stifle their movements. Having learned from this experience, President Rouhani, elected last June, has obtained a carte blanche from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While the Leader did issue a set of red lines last month (English diagram), and has issued specific warnings every now and then, he has consistently supported Iran’s diplomats while keeping domestic criticism of Iran’s team at a manageable level.

Indeed, Rouhani may not own the horse, but he controls the reigns. One of his first acts as president was transferring Iran’s nuclear negotiating file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign affairs. That enabled him to build a “dream team” of seasoned negotiators, perfectly comfortable with the codes and practices of their Western counterparts. Iran’s new and refined team has stood out in stark contrast to the collective clumsiness of the P5+1 negotiators, as in the early November 2013 episode, when four Western Foreign Ministers rushed prematurely to Geneva, spurring the media to believe, mistakenly, that a deal would be signed (it was signed 10 days later). But, as Marshal Foch used to say: “After leading a coalition, I have much less admiration for Napoleon…”

Getting to the heart of the matter, many points seem close to being settled. Iran is ready to cap at 5% its production of enriched uranium and to limit its current stockpile from further enrichment. The controversial underground facility of Fordow will probably end up as a kind of research and development unit. The Arak reactor’s original configuration allowed the yearly production of about ten kilograms of plutonium, enough for one or two bombs. Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), has hinted that this configuration could be modified in order to accommodate low-enriched uranium fuel rather than natural uranium. This would reduce Arak’s plutonium production capacity by a factor of five to ten. And Iran has already confirmed that it has no intention of acquiring the fuel reprocessing capacity indispensable for isolating weapon-grade plutonium.

Depending on the pace of sanctions relief, Iran also seems ready to return to a kind of de facto implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would provide enhanced monitoring over all of Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran should be ready to initiate the Protocol’s ratification process as soon as the United Nations Security Council shows itself ready to remove the Iranian nuclear file from its agenda, thus erasing the burning humiliation of 2006, when it passed its first resolution on the subject.

The make or break issues

To date, five sticking points remain on the table.

The most difficult issue concerns the format of Iran’s enrichment capacity. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), adopted last November, speaks of “parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities”. But the West has focused on “breakout time”, that is, the time needed to acquire enough highly enriched uranium for a first bomb if Iran decided to renege on its commitments. This delay has been estimated at about two months in the current state of Iran’s enrichment program. To extend it significantly, Iran would have to bring down the number of its centrifuges from the present 20,000 to 2-6,000.

A drastic reduction of the number of centrifuges, however, would be a deal-breaker for Iran. Following the conservative elements of the regime, the Supreme Leader has recently excluded any kind of bargaining on Iran’s nuclear achievements.

Fortunately, other solutions can alleviate the West’s concerns. First, having enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb does not mean having the bomb. Several more months would be necessary to make it ready. Second, one wonders why the international community would need more than one or two months to properly respond to an Iranian rush for a bomb. If it can’t make it in two months, why would it succeed in six? Third, this infamous breakout time could be extended without reducing the present number of centrifuges by using, as fast as possible, the low enriched uranium produced by Iran as fuel for nuclear reactors, rendering it unserviceable for further, weapon-grade, enrichment. Here, feeding the Arak reactor with domestic low-enriched uranium could solve a good part of the problem.

It is unfortunate, though, that the Iranians have made so little effort up to now to identify the “practical needs” mentioned, at their initiative, in the Geneva agreement. The spokesman of the AEOI has announced recently that a “comprehensive document” was being elaborated on the subject, and would be submitted for approval to the Iranian Parliament. But this process will probably extend beyond the time limit set for the negotiations.

In the meantime, we know that the Russians are bound to provide for eight more years the low enriched fuel necessary for the Bushehr nuclear plant. After this period, they will resist the introduction of Iranian fuel into the Bushehr reactor, as the selling of fuel is for the Russians the most profitable part of their contract with Iran. Their attitude will be the same when discussing the construction and operation of more reactors in Iran. By all means, new Russian reactors, or any reactors from other origins, will not be active before a decade. All of this is to say that if the current number of 20,000 centrifuges was accepted by the international community, the Iranians would have no “practical need” in the offing to justify a raise of this number in the years to come.

Another difficult point is the question of nuclear research and development. The West would like Iran to forsake such activities, especially in the field of centrifugation. Again, this is a red line for the Supreme Leader and the conservatives, as Iran’s engineers are working on models up to fifteen times more efficient than the present outdated model forming the bulk of its program. Here, a simple solution has been suggested by Salehi: instead of setting a cap on centrifuges, which could be circumvented by using more efficient models, the parties should define this cap in “separative work units”, the equivalent of horsepower in the field of enrichment. The introduction of more efficient centrifuges would thus reduce in due proportion the total number allowed.

A third difficult point is the ongoing exploration by the IAEA of the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. This demand, reiterated by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, has been fiercely resisted by Iran. In fact, it was the head of the US national intelligence community who said, in 2007, that the Iranian weaponization program was stopped before completion by the end of 2003. Ten years have since passed, and the people involved in that program must have been granted some kind of protection in exchange for their compliance, hence the inherent difficulty for the Iranians of authorizing outsiders to probe too deep into this subject. In former similar occurrences, such as with Egypt, South Korea and Taiwan, the IAEA has accepted not to divulge details on the wrongdoings discovered by its inspectors, once assured of the cancelation of these programs. A similar way out should be explored with Iran.

The fourth sticking point evolves around Iran’s ballistic missiles. The West wants to include them in the negotiations, as a source of worry identified by the UN Security Council, but this has been outright rejected by Iran. Recall that Iran has accepted to negotiate over its nuclear program as a civilian program placed under the aegis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Negotiations over missiles pertain to a different world, the world of defense and disarmament, in which negotiations are by definition collective, save for unilateral measures imposed upon a defeated country. If there is a solution here, it would require a separate, multilateral discussion on the level and distribution of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with the aim of convincing concerned states to join the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, adopted in 2002 in the Hague.

The last point, little talked about, but hardly the least difficult, concerns the duration of the future comprehensive agreement to be signed by Iran and the P5+1. Under the Geneva JPOA, this agreement, once fully implemented for the duration of all its provisions, will be replaced by the common regime applicable to all NPT members. Iran would then be freed of specific commitments such as the limitation of its enrichment activities, on which extensive IAEA controls, of course, would remain. Such a shift would mean that the International community would be fully reassured about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

However, to reach such an assessment, the general behavior of the Iranian regime and the quality of its relations with the outside world would be as important as the state of its nuclear program. How long should the assessment process last? These considerations cannot be put into writing. The Iranians will probably insist on no more than five years, while the West would be happy to see this regime of special constraints indefinitely extended. This point could be the last outstanding issue in the discussions. Hopefully, if solutions are found on all the previous questions, there will be a strong incentive to find a compromise here to ensure a final deal once and for all.

Photo: EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at a joint press conference following talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Vienna, Austria on April 9, 2014. Credit: AFP/Samuel Kubani

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?

To answer [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9^th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?

To answer this question, one needs to consider what Iran has previously done on this anniversary, the significance of the Islamic Republic’s new sites and its escalatory options.

The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched the National Day of Nuclear Technology in 2006. This was part of the push for a harder stance on the nuclear issue after the breakdown of talks with European powers, during which Iran voluntarily agreed to freeze enrichment-related activities.

As part of the first festivities in 2006, Iran announced that it would — in defiance of a UN Security Council warning — enrich uranium on an industrial scale. A total of 164 centrifuges at Natanz started to spin, churning out uranium enriched below 5%.

During the past seven years, the Islamic Republic has largely used its Nuclear Technology day to unveil new achievements, both for domestic and foreign audiences. As the occasion has repeatedly coincided with nuclear diplomatic developments, it has often been used to signal Iranian attitudes.

In 2007, Iran used the anniversary to announce that it had crossed the Western red line of 3,000 operational centrifuges. Back then, David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, asserted that “Ahmadinejad is trying to demonstrate facts on the ground and negotiate from a stronger position.”

The year after, Iran used the occasion to announce that it would begin installing 6,000 centrifuges and alluded to the testing of a new generation of centrifuges. Then in 2009, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the country’s first Fuel Manufacturing Plant in the central city of Isfahan. The Islamic Republic also said its number of centrifuges had increased to 7,000.

In 2010, as the UN Security Council convened to discuss fresh sanctions, Iran unveiled new “third-generation” centrifuges, said to have separation power six times that of first-generation centrifuges. Iran also declared that “considerable” uranium reserves had been found in Yazd province. That year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had 8,610 centrifuges installed, of which 3,772 were operating.

In 2011, after dialogue over Iran’s production of 19.75%-enriched uranium had broken down, it opted to simply praise past achievements. Apart from this, it announced the resumption of fuel reloading at the Bushehr power plant. And last year, after the escalation of Western sanctions, Iran announced that local scientists had produced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor containing uranium enriched to 19.75%.

This year, Iran announced on the anniversary that it had opened two uranium mines and a yellowcake processing plant named after an assassinated nuclear scientist. What’s the significance of these sites?

In terms of capacity, the yellowcake facility is insignificant. Its stated output of 60 tons a year is less than one third of what’s needed to fuel the Bushehr atomic power plant. Moreover, the discovery of the uranium deposits, which are now being extracted, was first announced years ago. Along the same line, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had announced in February 2012 that the mines would be operational in about a year, that is, right around this time.

The most important fact to keep in mind, however, is that Iran has for a long time been projected to be close to exhausting its limited supply of yellowcake. Without feedstock to inject into its centrifuges at Natanz (in gaseous form), Iran’s uranium enrichment — at least to 3.5% — would grind to a halt.

In short, the new sites unveiled on April 9th are designed to ensure the status quo.

There are other factors which also signify Iran’s pursuit of the status quo rather than escalation. For example, considering the many powerful escalatory options in its possession — wider use of new-generation centrifuges, expansion of operations at Fordow, increases in enrichment levels and construction of long-promised, new enrichment sites — the announcements this year seem geared towards signaling  restraint to a foreign audience without appearing empty-handed in front of a domestic public facing unprecedented sanctions.

Indeed, the Islamic Republic has little interest in escalating the situation at this point, especially as it faces its first presidential election since the disputed vote in 2009. The idea that Iran prefers to quietly kick the can down the road until it gets its house in order was also recently expressed by former top US non-proliferation official, Gary Samore.

Meanwhile, it could also be argued that the United States – or at least its Congress — is pursuing escalation.

Following the deadlock in Kazakhstan, US lawmakers have been pushing for fresh sanctions that would constitute something akin to an Oil-for-Food Program 2.0. The draft Senate bill states that the proposed embargo won’t be lifted until Iran releases political prisoners, respects the rights of women and minorities and moves toward “a free and democratically elected government.”

Moreover, last week, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) — a front for the until recently terror-listed Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (MEK) — opened an official office one block away from the White House. The group was put on the State Department’s terror list by the Clinton Administration. In the past, the MEK was behind a series of killings and bombings in Iran — one of which led to the permanent paralysis of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s right arm. The MEK, which sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, was also reportedly involved in the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Among these men is Darioush Rezaeinejad, whom the new yellowcake facility is named after.

The signal that’s being sent to decision-makers in Tehran, regardless of whether the Obama Administration approves of the MEK’s new office, is that the sanctions have little to do with their nuclear program. Combined with the wording of the proposed embargo, the situation ominously fits into Ayatollah Khamenei’s narrative that even a nuclear deal won’t be enough to roll back American pressure.

All things considered, one should be careful about linking Iran’s latest announcements about its nuclear achievements to the continued deadlock in talks with the 6 world powers, or viewing Iran’s actions as deserving of the escalation pursued by at least one of these powers.

It is becoming ever clearer that both Iran and the United States need to get their houses in order before they can move in the right direction. More than ever, cool heads need to prevail.

It is expected that the six world powers negotiating group (the P5+1) will once again meet this month at various diplomatic levels with Iranian representatives to resolve fears that Iran could decide to divert its civilian nuclear program toward military use. Little has been agreed upon in past sessions and optimism [...]]]> via Lobe Log

It is expected that the six world powers negotiating group (the P5+1) will once again meet this month at various diplomatic levels with Iranian representatives to resolve fears that Iran could decide to divert its civilian nuclear program toward military use. Little has been agreed upon in past sessions and optimism for the next meeting is modest. The allied group’s most recent position has called for the ending of 20 percent uranium enrichment; the shipment abroad of 20 percent enriched uranium; the closure of Fordow, an underground enrichment center near Qom; and a halt to lower-grade enrichment. Iran has insisted that it has the right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for peaceful purposes and, in effect, that its concerns about sanctions must be addressed.

American press and government attention to Iran’s extensive nuclear program is concentrated on its potential diversion of nuclear material toward military purposes. Often ignored in public discussions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions is that its interest in nuclear power and related medicinal use spans over 40 years. In the 1980s, the Shah developed the thesis that petroleum should be used for dozens of potential products and not wasted on power production. At that time, he set a target of 20,000 megawatts (mg) of power by ten nuclear reactors to be designed and erected by engineering firms from the US, France and Germany. The Germans were the only country that got to the actual construction phase of Iran’s first power reactor in the city of Bushehr. The US and Iran had to reach agreement on a new treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy before contracts could be signed and the long negotiations were held up by the Shah’s insistence that the treaty provide for Iran’s right to the entire nuclear process from enrichment to reprocessing. A compromise was reached and the agreement was initialed in the summer of 1978, but the revolution intervened before it could be submitted to the Senate for ratification.

In the 1977-78 period, the Shah also instructed his staff to calculate what resources, human and other, would be needed if at some point Iran decided to have a military nuclear program. The entire program was then set aside early in the revolutionary period by the Iranian government and Western governments withdrew their interests in cooperation, including Germany.

During the late 1980s or early 1990s, Iran’s new Islamic government directly or indirectly drew upon plans laid down by the monarchy and assessed its future power needs. Like the monarchy it had worked to overthrow, Iran’s current government opted for 20,000 mg of nuclear origin to be completed in the third decade of 2000. In this period, the Rafsanjani and Khatami governments, like the Shah before them, also apparently authorized research and experimentation for possible military uses. It is these activities that continue to concern the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western governments even though Iran has steadily denied engaging in nuclear activities that are geared toward military purposes. The American intelligence community has officially concluded that in fact, Iran halted suspicious actions in 2003 and no other state has asserted that it has convincing evidence to the contrary.

Now, more than 40 years after the first expression of interest in nuclear power, Iran has in operation only Bushehr, a 1,000 mg pressurized water reactor, that the Russians took over from the canceled German contract. Power reactors require the enrichment of large amounts of uranium ore to a level of 3.5% to 5%, or Low-enriched Uranium (LEU), and further separative work to a form appropriate for reactor fuel. Reactors like Bushehr require roughly 26 tonnes of LEU as yearly fuel and several times that for total start-up requirements. As part of the construction contract, the Russians have provided a total of 85 tonnes of LEU and have to maintain control of the irradiated fuel. Bushehr has the capacity to supply 2% of the country’s electricity needs.

Iranian authorities expect to complete the Arak heavy water plant in 2013-2014. The reactor will create 40 mg of power and 10-12 kilos of plutonium per year. Officials in Tehran have claimed that the plutonium will be used for research and medicinal isotopes. Outside observers are particularly concerned that at some point in the future the plutonium could be used to build at least two nuclear explosives yearly if the plutonium is separated form the fuel. North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan used plutonium for their nuclear bombs. As yet, however, Iran does not have the capability to separate the plutonium into explosive usable form.

The IAEA presently has inspection rights to over 20 facilities dedicated to various aspects of Iran’s extensive nuclear program including two enrichment facilities (Natanz and Fordow), a plant that separates uranium from ore in Isfahan, the research reactor in Tehran, and a number of research and development centers.

Iran announced last year that it hoped to sign contracts this year for construction of the Bushehr Two reactor and possibly one south of the city of Awaz at Darkhovin. The Bushehr Two reactor was at one time to be constructed by the French and planned to be a second heavy water type to produce 330 mg of power.

Iran has 5,303 kg of enriched uranium in storage — perhaps one fifth of the yearly fuel requirement for Bushehr, let alone its start-up needs. The uranium mines in Iran are not of high quality and at present importation, like the 450 tonnes from South Africa several decades ago, will be subject to UN and international sanctions. The head of Iran’s nuclear matters has expressed the ambition to have 48,000 centrifuges at Natanz, which, at full operational capacity, could provide the yearly fuel requirements for one reactor. Iran’s centrifuge plant as yet can not produce that number but could over time and will move to more efficiently designed centrifuges. The enrichment capabilities at Fordow could supplement Natanz. The Iranians created considerable controversy last year when over 200 kgs of uranium were enriched at Fordow to 20 percent allegedly to fuel the Tehran research reactor. Twenty percent enriched uranium can be increased to over 90 percent bomb level much more quickly than from low enrichment. A sizable portion of the uranium had also been put in a form for Tehran’s reactor.

Looking ahead, Iran has made considerable advances in its nuclear program and will continue its unyielding position that under the NPT it has every right to a civilian program that includes reactor fuel enrichment. The program, at least in the past decade, has had all the attributes of legitimate civilian uses. However, the future course will be even more difficult now than in the past. Iran has persevered successfully in developing a solid base despite the assassination of its nuclear scientists and the Stuxnet cyber attack against the computers that direct several programs. But economic sanctions will make the importing of reactor requirements, including dual-use items, nearly impossible. Continuing threats of cyber warfare and aerial bombings will also continue to hang over Iran’s planners.

The concern of the US, Israel and others is that Iran’s leaders, despite their insistence that all Iran’s actions are permitted under the NPT, could decide to “break out” and achieve weaponization within a brief period. If such a decision was made, it could take the track of highly enriched uranium ore, and, once Arak is working, by plutonium. However, any efforts in this direction would certainly be known soon after they were made and the US and Israel would have sufficient time to decide about military action or adopting a policy of containment. Iran’s nuclear activities in no way pose a current threat to the region or to the United States.

Photo: Roundtable view of nuclear talks held in Moscow, Russia (June 18-19). Courtesy of European External Action Service Flickr.