by Jasmin Ramsey

Almost 1,000 Egyptians have died, according to the official count, since Aug. 14 when Egypt’s armed forces began clamping down on Muslim Brotherhood-led protests against the military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi. That number well exceeds the 846 people who officials say died during the 18 days of protest [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

Almost 1,000 Egyptians have died, according to the official count, since Aug. 14 when Egypt’s armed forces began clamping down on Muslim Brotherhood-led protests against the military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi. That number well exceeds the 846 people who officials say died during the 18 days of protest that ended Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule in Jan. 2011.

The democratically elected Morsi, a leading member of the MB, has not been seen in public since Jul. 3. But Mubarak has been released from prison into house arrest while he faces retrial. Egyptian media has for the most part adopted the language of the army in framing the unrest — Muslim brotherhood members are alleged “terrorists” who are trying to destroy the country.

While the US, who the Egyptian media claims conspired with the Brotherhood, has cancelled military exercises with Egypt and urged both sides to halt violence, it has so far resisted calls for halting military aid to its strategically positioned ally.

The rapid turn of events in Egypt, from a revolution to perhaps a “counterrevolution”, has left US President Barack Obama in quandary. Having eventually supported the fall of Mubarak, the US looks hypocritical in continuing its relationship with the military as authoritarian rule is restored.

In an interview with IPS, Emile Nakhleh, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Islamic Strategic Analysis Program, explained why repression will not prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from continuing its existence as a rooted, cultural and political force. Continued repression could also push the Brotherhood’s younger members to embrace violence as a political tool.

The US should pursue its own interests in Egypt, which “do not necessarily equate with dictatorial repressive regimes,” the Middle East expert told IPS. “In the long run, democratically elected governments will be more stable than these autocratic regimes.”

Q: There are different accounts circulating, especially in the Egyptian media, about what the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) actually is. Can you provide some background?

A: The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 as a social, religious, educational, political and partly military movement. It was founded against British colonialism and with it came the fight for Palestine, starting in the early 30s. Its main ideology is as follows: Islam is the solution. And the 3 D’s in Arabic, which translate to Islam is faith, state and society. There is to be no separation between the mosque and state in any of these.

The Muslim Brotherhood spread more than any other party in the Middle East in the last 85 years. It focused heavily on Islam, but took all those other things into consideration. And then of course they got involved in politics. That put them in conflict with the monarchy at the time. In 1948 this conflict became violent. Muslim Brotherhood members assassinated the Egyptian Prime Minister and in turn, the regime assassinated the founder of the MB in 1949.

By the mid-90′s, the Brotherhood decided to forgo violence and move toward their original mission, Da’wa, to proselytize their doctrine by Islamizing society from below. They wouldn’t allow themselves to be removed by force; they saw what happened in Algeria in 1991 and redirected their ideology to society itself, modeled after that American baseball-feed ideology, you know, you build it and they will come. So you Islamicize society from below and once society becomes Islamicized, you can establish a position in government and become a Shari’a-friendly government.

This process started in the late 80s, when the MB entered 4 or 5 parliamentary elections as independents or in alliance with other parties, such as the Wafd Party and the Labor Socialist party. Why? Because the government passed Law 100, which prohibited religious parties from participating in politics.

In the 2005 election, the MB won 88 seats in parliament, the largest ever for the MB. But they ran as independents. They emerged as the largest opposition party in parliament after Mubarak’s ruling party. In their 85-year history, the MB has been banned and repressed by regimes — from King Faruk to Mubarak; that’s why they’re not going away. They’re part and parcel of the religious foundation of Egyptian society.

With every regime Egypt has had since 1948, the relationship with the MB has always initially been good and then soured toward the end. Gamal Abdel Nasser was the same. He reached out to the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954 and by 1955-6, when a plot to assassinate him was uncovered, the Muslim Brotherhood was repressed and exiled. Then in 1966 Nasser’s government hanged one of the MB’s conservative thinkers, Sayyid Qutb.

Q: Is that what’s happening now, with the army’s arrest of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie?

A: Qutb was actually more of a radical thinker than the mainstream MB. It’s also very interesting to note that a number of MB activists were exiled to Saudi Arabia where they established a more radical view of Islam. That view led Saudi Arabia to oppose Nasser’s actions in Yemen and other Arab nationalist projects.

Q: The Saudis welcomed the MB because they were Salafis?

A: The Saudis welcomed the MB with open arms because they were Salafis and because they were opposed to the secular Arab nation ideology that was preached by Nasser. The MB’s relationship with Nasser soured until 1970 when Nasser died and Anwar Sadat came to power. Sadat also began to court the MB as a countervailing force against leftist and Nasserist nationalist ideology.

The MB’s influence really began in the 1970s when they reconstituted themselves as a religious party that underpinned society. The constitution reflected Islam and allowed them freedom to preach and participate in associations, so much so that by the 1980s, the MB, through elections, controlled almost every professional association and university student council.

That scared the hell out of Hosni Mubarak, who also tried to court the MB in the beginning. It was, by the way, Mubarak who approved a change in the constitution to say Sharia is the source of legislation.

General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s game is thus very dangerous. It will fail because the MB is the most organized and the most disciplined in Egypt and because they have been used to repression from Farouk to Nasser to Sadat and to Mubarak. Sadat allowed the MB to reconstitute itself and invited MB exiles to return home, but by the late 1970s, the MB broke with Sadat because of his trip to Jerusalem and the peace treaty with Israel. At that time, the entire Arab world broke with Sadat.

Although Sadat warmed up to the MB, he never recognized them as a political party, only as a social religious element, which was great for the MB. This gave them freedom to penetrate the soft ministries, education and welfare, and establish all kinds of religious schools, alongside al-Azhar University. Because of that, religious education under their guidance began to expand tremendously.

Q: Should military aid to Egypt be stopped?

Aid should be cut off. We supported the removal of Mubarak so we can’t support the resurrection of a military dictatorship. The cut-off by itself is not enough. It should be accompanied by a high-level conversation about Egypt’s future in accordance with the ideas of Egypt’s January 2011 revolution. In Bahrain, we should make it very clear to the al-Khalifas that repression and exclusion of the Shia majority cannot continue.

Q: How much does Egypt need the US and how much does Egypt — especially the Egyptian army — need the US?

A: Don’t forget that most of Egypt’s military aid is spent in this country for weapons systems. But that’s not the main reason for the aid. U.S. military aid to Egypt has been a tool of American national interests, which are to maintain the peace treaty with Israel, give us priority over the Suez Canal and flights over Egypt, etc, and to help us with the war on terror, especially since 9/11.

There’s a side interest, too: Egypt’s role with the Palestinians and Hamas and the push for negotiations. The main interlocutor with Hamas over the years has been Egyptian intelligence folks like Omar Suleiman.

Q: Does the Egyptian military truly fear the US stopping aid?

A: The military would be devastated if the US stopped aid because of the training the US provides and also because of the prestige. All the statements by Egyptian officials contradicting this notion is just talk.

Q: What if Saudi Arabia steps in to support the military more than it is already supporting them, as it has offered to do?

A: The Egyptian military doesn’t want to be beholden to Saudi Arabia. One of Sadat’s primary goals in reaching out to the US was to reestablish relations with the US after the October 1973 War, specifically so Egypt could acquire that training and prestige. Threatening to halt aid will be met with tremendous consternation by the Egyptian army.

Q: So the US stops the aid. Then what?

A: It’s a 2-way street. Consider our national interests, but it’s also in Egypt’s interest to maintain the peace treaty, by the way. Even Morsi wasn’t going to touch it. And when there was terrorism in the Sinai, he worked with the Israelis in fighting it.

The president’s speech in Cairo in 2009 was important because, at least rhetorically, it reflected the belief that the Islamic world is diverse and there is a distinction between the majority and the minority who are the radicals. We need to engage mainstream Muslims. He believed in that and has been interested in engaging mainstream parties that have been elected through peaceful and fair processes. That’s why he accepted to work with the MB and the Freedom and Justice Party.

Q: There was an article article in the New York Times on July 10 suggesting that the ouster of Morsi was actually planned from early on. What’s your take?

A: Morsi appointed el-Sisi himself and el-Sisi turned against him. Elements of the old regime and the so-called Egyptian liberals, who never accepted the election results, plotted from day one to undo Morsi. That’s not to say that Morsi did not make mistakes. He reneged on most of his promises. He promised to include women and Egyptian minorities in the country’s decision-making processes and he did not. But the old guard and the military never forgave Morsi for finally removing Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. So even after Morsi’s hard work, he brought in el-Sisi. Well, el-Sisi pretended that he supported Morsi but in fact he didn’t. There’s an unholy alliance between the military, the old regime and Egypt’s so-called liberals against Morsi. It’s also a fact that the revolution removed Mubarak but it did not remove the regime. So after Morsi came to power, the ministries and their bureaucrats began to torpedo his program. There were lines in Cairo after the flow of oil was restricted and somehow they disappeared shortly after Morsi was toppled.

And then el-Sisi called on people to go to the streets and give him a “mandate” to act in the national interest and remove Morsi. In January 2011, people went into the streets to remove Mubarak, and in 2013, by el-Sisi’s request, they removed Morsi. Very soon they are going to discover that this is a military dictatorship and they’re going to go into the streets again.

Q: Why is the military so revered in Egypt?

A: In addition to everything else, they have a first-rate propaganda machine. They have a tremendous public relations operation. They are masters at what we call strategic communication with the public. They probably control more than 30% of the Egyptian economy, much like China, Pakistan and Iran

The military claimed during the Nasser regime and then under Sadat that it did a great job in its wars with Israel and it was the politicians who actually undermined their missions. They are always blaming someone else. So it has emerged as symbol of national sovereignty. Nasser gave that impression when he took over the Suez Canal in 1956.

Every president since the end of the monarchy in Egypt has come from the ranks of the military. So they remove their military uniform, don a suit and become president. Morsi was the first president since 1954 who didn’t come from the military and the military didn’t trust him. I’m not a defender of Morsi, he made many mistakes, but this was the first freely, fairly, democratically elected leader since Egyptian independence. All the others were selected through sham elections with a lack of viable political opposition.

Q: What do Saudi Arabia’s explicit calls to back up the Egyptian military financially in battling the Muslim Brotherhood say about US-Saudi relations?

A: The Saudis are terrified of the MB as a reform movement. Now Saudi Arabia is also playing a dangerous game. A coalition of Arab autocrats is trying to stifle democracy because they do not like these revolutionary movements and are terrified of seeing them in their own countries. That’s why the Saudis sent troops to Bahrain to control the Shia, they said. When no one bought this argument, they said they were battling terrorism. And they say they are trying to kill it in Egypt, which is the main Arab country. If it’s killed there, they will feel more comfortable in their rule.

But this is not about the MB in Egypt or the Shia in Bahrain. Its about reform movements and opposition to repressive regimes in those countries.

Q: What options does President Obama have at this point?

A: The president had to face a new reality with the Arab Spring. He decided on going with the pro-democracy movements and that’s why he supported the removal of dictators in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Now, he has been a bit silent on Bahrain, even though the American ambassador has spoken out. I think the United States has got to create a clear balance between national security and our democratic values and it has to communicate such a balance to the American people and to peoples in the region clearly.

We should still pursue our own interests, but they do not necessarily equate with dictatorial repressive regimes. In the long run, democratically elected governments will be more stable than these autocratic regimes.

Q: Which means the US should be willing to make some sacrifices in the short-term?

A: I think so, yes. You can’t have a cookie-cutter approach to the whole region. For Bahrain, you should emphasize that if the ruling family wants to maintain its rule, they should seriously engage in dialogue with the opposition, should stop human rights abuses, release political prisoners from jail and provide the Shia majority equal access to employment in government sectors, including the military and security services.

Q: Won’t these autocratic regimes worry that implementing reforms will present more challenges to their rule?

A: They believe that they can maintain power through repression, but they should know by now that staying in power can’t be guaranteed without popular support. Look at what we’re seeing in Egypt, in Syria, in Libya…

What concerns me is that in Bahrain and Egypt, our personnel are being threatened; our ambassadors are being vilified in the media, which in Egypt and in Bahrain are the mouthpieces of the regime. The autocratic regimes in both countries run sophisticated PR campaigns. The al-Khalifa in Bahrain believe the US supports Bahrain’s Shia! The Egyptian military and some liberals believe the US supports the MB and Morsi.

So this lack of clarity in our positions is generating personal threats to our diplomatic personnel, journalists and private citizens in those countries.

Q: Is Egypt becoming a military state?

The military regime is making it clearly so. Arresting the General Guide of the MB, at el-Sisi’s instructions, which no previous regime has done, signals that the military regime is here to stay.

I worry about Egypt. I really think by moving to reinstate military rule, the el-Sisi regime is inviting more violence.

Something worries me more. In the last 20 years, the MB and other mainstream Islamic political parties have supported man-made democracy and rejected al-Qaeda’s calls, including its calls against participating in this election. And now, with democracy being torpedoed by the military, this is something that the younger generation is going to tell the older leadership within the MB — that we tried democracy and it failed and the only alternative is violence.

We might see the rise of a youthful generation in the MB that no longer believes in democracy as a viable political system.

Q: Where is the Egyptian revolution heading?

A: El-Sisi has presented himself as a guardian of national sovereignty, not a new Mubarak. It’s going to be a while before the so-called liberal and mainstream Egyptians begin to see the reality of the new military regime in Egypt. And in the meantime, the youthful members of the Muslim Brotherhood are going to turn to violence if their peaceful protests continue to be violently repressed.

Q: So far the only country where the so-called Arab Spring has had seemingly stable results is Tunisia, where a moderate Islamic government remains in place. What do you see in Egypt’s future?

The toppling of Morsi in Egypt doesn’t mean the failure of Islam or Islamic politics. It represents the failure of a particular leader in a particular country at a particular time. In Tunisia, Moncef Marzouki and Rachid Ghannouchi avoided the mistakes that Morsi made. The ruling party, Ennahda, has tried to be more inclusive and consult with other groups and parties and be more open. That’s why by comparison, Tunisia has succeeded despite the killing of two senior opposition members.

To be fair, the MB and Morsi inherited a very dysfunctional economy. The economy in Tunisia was much better by comparison. And frankly, there’s no way in hell that any party in Egypt would have been able to address Egypt’s economic issues in 1 year. If the military stays in government in the next year and they also don’t address Egypt’s severe economic problems, including unemployment and tourism, people are going to ask again, what have you done for us? That’s why I argued earlier this year that if they had just waited for Morsi to finish his term, he would have never been re-elected. We should never worry about the first election; we always should look at the 2nd and 3rd elections.

Photo Credit: Charles Roffey

by Henry Precht

The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.

On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Henry Precht

The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.

On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day before, but Iranians opposed to the Shah weren’t aware and filed into the square to be confronted by gunfire from soldiers. The government said that fewer than a hundred were killed; the opposition claimed over 1,000. The latter figure was believed by most Iranians.

The same calculus is true of the August 14 shootings in Cairo: the government reports some hundreds killed; its opponents claim thousands have been gunned down.

Few outsiders understood after Black Friday that a turning point had been reached in Ayatollah Khomeini’s struggle against the Shah. It was downhill for the ruler from then on. The Shah was at war with his people, it can be seen in retrospect; there was no way that he could prevail. The Carter Administration, like most outsiders, failed to grasp that. Focused on talks between Israelis and Egyptians at Camp David, the president, together with his Middle Eastern guests, issued a statement of support for the Shah and hope for his “liberalizing” promises.

Something of the same — support [for a return to democracy] and hope [for nonviolence] was President Barack Obama’s message after August 14. He recognizes that Egypt is sharply divided, the Muslim Brotherhood has close to a popular majority, the military have the guns and the US is distrusted and often despised by both sides. Treading carefully, he cancelled next month’s joint military exercise — perhaps aware that visiting American troops might be in danger of deadly attacks by extremists. But he left on the table for now the next tranche of military aid (over $1 billion) — perhaps aware that cancellation would be deeply offensive to nationalists and the blocked contract for F-16 aircraft a burden on the US budget.

Unwisely, he didn’t go far enough.

If Obama is to be true to American values, he should avoid hurting the Egyptian people, but support their aspirations for democracy and dignity. That means no sanctions against the country as a whole or the military as an institution. It does not mean that individual Egyptians responsible for the killings should be immune from US sanctions.

The president should ban any official US contact with General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, his appointed president, prime minister, minister of the interior and any other officials who can be deemed guilty of authorizing violence after the coup and in the subsequent crackdown. The president should call on them to withdraw in favor of a small and politically balanced committee formed by resigned vice president Mohamed ElBaradei (no friend of the US). This committee, in turn, Obama would suggest, would select three individuals — one from the Muslim Brotherhood, one from the military ranks and one distinguished, independent Egyptian — to form a governing triumvirate. Each of the three would be acceptable to the other political elements.

The US would try to enlist other outside powers — EU members, Turkey, Russia and the Arab League — in backing some such scheme. Together they would demand an end to violence by all parties and the release of political prisoners. President Mohamed Morsi, after a very brief return to office, would resign for the good of Egypt — encouraged by the US and other outsiders and, with luck, by some of his MB colleagues. The constitution and parliament would be restored pre-coup. In effect, August 14 would represent a reversal of the coup rather than the beginning of a civil war.

If a plan of reasonable compromise is not worked out very soon, the threat of prolonged sectarian and civil strife is very real. A point of no return is approaching. Every death on the streets creates new martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves. Think Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Think Iran in 1978.

Photo Credit: Mohamed Azazy

by Jasmin Ramsey

It’s hard to imagine anyone outside of Egypt watching this footage of Cairo burning last night (Mosa’ab El Shamy’s photographs are also stunning) without saying WTF in one way or another. For those who have been following the events that led to the killing of at least [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

It’s hard to imagine anyone outside of Egypt watching this footage of Cairo burning last night (Mosa’ab El Shamy’s photographs are also stunning) without saying WTF in one way or another. For those who have been following the events that led to the killing of at least 525 Egyptians yesterday – according to the government, who put the count of the 18-day Egyptian revolution at 843 — this post by the erudite Issandr El Amrani is a must-read:

You could ask a thousand questions about the violence that has shaken Egypt, from why police decided to move now against Islamist sit-ins and with such brutality after making so much of its careful planning in the last week, to whether the attacks on churches and Christians more generally that erupted in reaction are part of a pre-planned reaction or the uncontrollable sectarian direction political tensions take in moments of crisis. But the question that really bothers me is whether this escalation is planned to create a situation that will inevitably trigger more violence – that this is the desired goal.

The fundamental flaw of the July 3 coup, and the reason those demonstrators that came out on June 30 against the Morsi administration were wrong to welcome it, is that it was based on an illusion. That illusion, at least among the liberal camp which is getting so much flak these days, was that even a partial return of the old army-led order could offer a chance to reboot the transition that took such a wrong turn after the fall of Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011. This camp believed that gradual reform, even of a much less ambitious nature than they desired in 2011, would be more likely to come by accommodating the old order than by allowing what they perceived as an arrangement between the military and the Islamists to continue. Better to focus on fixing the country, notably its economy, and preventing Morsi from sinking it altogether, and take the risk that part of the old order could come back.

Update: I only saw Paul Pillar’s “Cultivating Extremists in Egypt” now, in which he writes:

Wouldn’t the breeding of more Egyptian terrorists be a bad thing from the viewpoint of Egyptian military leaders? Not if they wish to present themselves as a bastion against terrorism and to lay claim as such to American support. The brass may be more comfortable with this sort of claim than with one based on shepherding the introduction of true democracy—given all the uncertainties democracy is apt to pose for the highly privileged position of the Egyptian military and its officer corps.

Photo Credit: Mohammad Omer/IPS

When I was living in Cairo, the transition to winter was sometimes smooth. The beastly oven of summer changed slowly into a bearable fall of cool-warm. The fall moved from the cool-warm to a few weeks of cold, or at least what was cold to Egypt. These were smooth changes. It [...]]]> via Lobe Log

When I was living in Cairo, the transition to winter was sometimes smooth. The beastly oven of summer changed slowly into a bearable fall of cool-warm. The fall moved from the cool-warm to a few weeks of cold, or at least what was cold to Egypt. These were smooth changes. It seemed so normal. We even delighted in the cold evenings when we could wear sweaters while sailing on the Nile. It felt like a novelty the first time; then it was comfortable to change with the changes and dig out our sweaters in late November.

The recent cold winds to hit Cairo and Egypt came as a shock to some. These cold winds came from the decrees of President Mohamed Morsi. He was supposed to be the protector and developer of democracy according to many. He has turned out — for many — to be quite different. He essentially grabbed the powers of the judicial, executive and the legislative branches of the baby democracy that is developing in Egypt. He stole the candy from the baby, according to many in Egypt.

Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood supporters cheered in delight. Just about everyone else felt the cold winds. They also felt that their revolution was falling prey to a manipulative, dangerous and very clever man. The person who the Brotherhood really wanted at first had the last name of Al-Shater, “the clever one”. The real clever one turns out to be the person that many called “the spare tire” — the American-educated “former” leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi Isa El-Ayat. The last part of his name might give some in the west pause, if they are thinking.

Egypt for now is looking more like Iran in 1979 than ever before.

The liberals and intellectuals were the original igniters and leaders of the Egyptian revolution; the Muslim Brotherhood took it from them. There were discussions about inclusivity, but as the Copts, liberals, Wafd and others left, the Constitutional and other committees made no effort to reincorporate them. There was a collective crocodile sigh and the leadership went on with the committees.

The press, other media, academics, government officials and more are being packed by members of, or loyalists to, the Muslim Brotherhood. Discussions about applying a somewhat strict version of Sharia in Egypt get more heated by the day, while the opposition apparently continues to be sidelined from the game. The extremist Salafis seem to have more voice in the new Egypt than the academics or even the experienced umdas (village leaders) in some areas.

Sectarian tensions are mounting. The recently elevate Pope of the Copts has stated publicly that he rejects the mounting power of the extremists and wants his flock to be considered full members of Egyptian society. Given that the Copts make up around 8-10 percent of the country, that makes sense.

A working democracy requires inclusivity. It needs a sort of equality supported not just voting, but other civil and social rights too. It took the United States over a century to move toward greater voting and other rights for minorities. These were hard fought battles that started with the bloodiest war in American history, the Civil War, and went on into the 1960s with the various civil rights and voting acts. This process is ongoing.

Democracy is a fragile thing; extremism is its worst enemy. Al Ahram provides a translation of President Morsi’s recent decrees here:

“We have decided the following:

Article I

Reopen the investigations and prosecutions in the cases of the murder, the attempted murder and the wounding of protesters as well as the crimes of terror committed against the revolutionaries by anyone who held a political or executive position under the former regime, according to the Law of the Protection of the Revolution and other laws.

Article II:

Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled. 

Article III:

The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This provision applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate effect.

Article IV:

The text of the article on the formation of the Constituent Assembly in the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that reads, “it shall prepare a draft of a new constitution in a period of six months from the date it was formed” is to be amended to “it shall prepare the draft of a new constitution for the country no later than eight months from the date of its formation.”

 Article V:

No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly.

 Article VI:

The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.

Article VII:

This Constitutional Declaration is valid from the date of its publication in the official gazette.” (Emphasis supplied)

The paragraphs in bold and italics are the ones that are really worrying and angering so many in Egypt. They are also the ones that have sparked violence on the streets of Cairo and in many other places in Egypt. They have spurred a call for the impeachment of the President. They have instigated a strike by the judges in the country that will further paralyze a legal system that has been in various forms of paralysis for decades. That strike is also due to the firing of the chief prosecutor, who was apparently replaced by a judge with Muslim Brotherhood sympathies.

The Egyptian stock market tumbled yesterday and had to be shut down. It had a relatively feeble increase today. The cold winds seem to be keeping investors away. The sense of risk is still there. If more negative events take place, the market could fall again.

Demonstrations and counter demonstrations are being called. There will likely be more violence, more worry and anxiety amongst Egyptians and more hardening of opinions across the ever-widening political divide in this great country gone astray.

The fact that top judges have said they are planning to meet with President Morsi is a hopeful sign. Of course, after all the hard feelings, I am not sure what could come from that. The journalists union may call a strike; there were fist fights and loud yelling matches in the journalists’ union building yesterday. The organization that represents a lot of the fellahin or peasant farmers in Egypt stated its anger at Morsi’s decrees by saying the servitude of the peasants was over. The younger people are still fired up. The ULTRAs, the soccer fans for Ahly, Zamalek and others who were a major part of the disturbances and demonstrations since the early days of the revolution are also out in the streets again and looking for a fight.

The Muslim Brotherhood has called for a pro-Morsi demonstration. The anti-Morsi groups have called for other demonstrations. The offices of the Muslim Brotherhood have been attacked in many areas, including in Damanhour in Behaira Province, where one really would not expect such violence. A 15-year-old boy died in that attack.

Those thinking about investing in Egypt will likely shy away even more. Tourism will be shattered if this does not settle down soon. The winter season is the most important for tourism in Egypt. The IMF loan and some of the foreign aid packages for Egypt could also be in jeopardy. Capital flight is likely to increase. Unemployment and inflation are likely to get worse. The sense of hope in the county will likely be worsened. This is most important for the youth in the country. They have mostly very hard, impoverished and frustrating lives. They are also the demographic that could drive the country into another revolution for the poor, the unemployed and the hungry.

A cold wind indeed has come to Egypt.

One can hope that the cold winds will subside and warm a bit before the politics of Egypt freezes over into immovable camps. One can hope that there will be true dialogue and a moving forward for the country in many ways.

The revolution was the greatest event to take place in a very long time for most Egyptians. Many died and even more were injured. A post-revolution Egypt needs to be for all Egyptians, as many in the opposition have stated.

The Muslim Brotherhood should be listening and listening hard to what is going on. Winning a hair-thin election is not a mandate. There are many people in Egypt — all over Egypt — who do not like and do not trust the Muslim Brotherhood. Their time in power could be very short if they do not respond to the calls for equity, inclusiveness and great open-mindedness. Many also see the Morshid, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badei, as the man behind many of the decisions made by President Morsi. This is proving to be very dangerous for the stability of Egypt.

Egypt is a complex country facing a very challenging future. If it cannot move towards democracy and prosperity in a more stable and efficient way, great trouble lies ahead. The cold winds of November 2012 could be warm in comparison to what’s waiting.

Sawt means voice and vote in Arabic. If positions in Egypt harden and more and more people are left behind or shoved aside, the voices of even the so-far-silent could get much louder.

- Paul Sullivan is an internationally recognized expert on security issues including energy security, water security and food security in the Middle East and North Africa. He is an economist by training and a multidisciplinary public intellectual by choice. He is an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University.

Thousands of Egyptians poured into the streets on Saturday, a day after a court sentenced former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to a life prison sentence, enraging protesters who hoped to see the fallen strongman receive the death penalty for his failure to stop the killing of protesters during Egypt’s [...]]]> via Think Progress

Thousands of Egyptians poured into the streets on Saturday, a day after a court sentenced former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to a life prison sentence, enraging protesters who hoped to see the fallen strongman receive the death penalty for his failure to stop the killing of protesters during Egypt’s uprising. He and his sons were acquitted of corruption charges. By Sunday morning, several hundred protesters were still demonstrating in Cairo’s Tahrir square, committing to stay until the deaths of those killed by security forces last year are avenged. See the chaos in the courtroom after the verdict was delivered:

The role of labor was crucial in Egyptians’ popular efforts to oust Hosni Mubarak, perhaps the bale of straw that broke the U.S.-supported dictator’s back. Naturally, organizers and activists are glowing. But will [...]]]> Our colleague Emad Mekay has a piece on Egyptian labor in today’s International Herald Tribune, the global edition of the New York Times.

The role of labor was crucial in Egyptians’ popular efforts to oust Hosni Mubarak, perhaps the bale of straw that broke the U.S.-supported dictator’s back. Naturally, organizers and activists are glowing. But will it last?

With continued military rule in Egypt, at least until elections in the fall, the recent kingbreakers find themselves at odds with the newly-elevated junta, who have asked them to calm things down.

Here’s an excerpt of Mekay’s report from Egypt’s textile hub El Mahalla, home to a long-oppressed labor movement:

[Organizer Hamdi] Hussein was all smiles as he announced that he was heading to Cairo to attend a meeting to chart out future labor demands after the stunning success of the Egyptian revolution.

“Yesterday, this meeting would have been secret and I would have been forced to sneak in and out of El Mahalla,” Mr. Hussein said during an interview.

“Now, the labor movement that helped topple Mubarak will take its rightful place in protecting the revolution.”

But will it? This newfound labor empowerment has startled the interim government, which was originally appointed by Mr. Mubarak, and challenges the efforts by the military, which is effectively in charge, to protect Egypt’s existing institutions and return the country to a more normal life.

“All ministers here are displeased with the strikes,” Magdy Radi, the cabinet’s spokesman, said by telephone. “It is hampering our work as a caretaker government. But it is an issue for the supreme council to take care of, not us.”

The military council, despite initial reports that it would move to ban strikes altogether, has so far taken a more measured approach. On Tuesday, it issued a communiqué urging Egyptians to tone down their labor protests, citing the consequences for the economy and the supply of everyday needs.

The new government and the military may have a more profound reason to be worried about a new wave of strikes, which played a critical role in bringing down the Mubarak regime.

Earlier this month, as the world was riveted by the young “Internet generation” demonstrating in huge numbers in Tahrir Square, Mr. Hussein and 20 other labor leaders were busy using their mobile phones to plan a nationwide series of strikes and sit-ins.

The death throes of the Mubarak regime in Egypt signal a new level of crisis for a U.S. Middle East strategy that has shown itself over and over again in recent years to be based on nothing more than the illusion of power.   The incipient loss of the U.S. client regime in [...]]]> By Gareth Porter

The death throes of the Mubarak regime in Egypt signal a new level of crisis for a U.S. Middle East strategy that has shown itself over and over again in recent years to be based on nothing more than the illusion of power.   The incipient loss of the U.S. client regime in Egypt is an obvious moment for a fundamental adjustment in that strategy.

But those moments have been coming with increasing regularity in recent years, and the U.S. national security bureaucracy has shown itself to be remarkably resistant to giving it up.  The troubled history of that strategy suggests that it is an expression of some powerful political forces at work in this society, as former NSC official Gary Sick hinted in a commentary on the crisis.

Ever since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979, every U.S. administration has operated on the assumption that the United States, with Israel and Egypt as key client states, occupies a power position in the Middle East that allows it to pursue an aggressive strategy of unrelenting pressure on all those “rogue” regimes and parties in the region which have resisted dominance by the U.S.-Israeli tandem:  Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

The Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq was only the most extreme expression of that broader strategic concept.  It assumed that the United States and Israel could establish pro-Western regime in Iraq as the base from which it would press for the elimination of resistance from any of their remaining adversaries in the region.

But since that more aggressive version of the strategy was launched, the illusory nature of the regional dominance strategy has been laid bare in one country after another.

• The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq merely empowered Shi’a forces to form a regime whose geostrategic interests are far closer to Iran than to the United States;
• The U.S.-encouraged Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 only strengthened the position of Hezbollah as the largest, most popular and most disciplined political-military force in the country, leading ultimately the Hezbollah-backed government now being formed.
• Israeli and U.S. threats to attack Iran, Hezbollah and Syria since 2006 brought an even more massive influx of rockets and missiles into Lebanon and Syria which now appears to deter Israeli aggressiveness toward its adversaries for the first time.
• U.S.-Israeli efforts to create a client Palestinian entity and crush Hamas through the siege of Gaza has backfired, strengthening the Hamas claim to be the only viable Palestinian entity.
• The U.S. insistence on demonstrating the effectiveness of its military power in Afghanistan  has only revealed the inability of the U.S. military to master the Afghan insurgency.

And now the Mubarak regime is in its final days.  As one talking head after another has  pointed out in recent days, it has been the lynchpin of the U.S. strategy.  The main function of the U.S. client state relationship with Egypt was to allow Israel to avoid coming to terms with Palestinian demands.

The costs of the illusory quest for dominance in the Middle East have been incalculable. By continuing to support Israeli extremist refusal to seek a peaceful settlement, trying to prop up Arab authoritarian regimes that are friendly with Israel and seeking to project military power in the region through both airbases in the Gulf States and a semi-permanent bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategy has assiduously built up long-term antagonism toward the United States and pushed many throughout the Islamic world to sympathize with Al Qaeda-style jihadism.   It has also fed Sunni-Shi’a tensions in the region and created a crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.

Although this is clearly the time to scrap that Middle East strategy, the nature of U.S. national security policymaking poses formidable obstacles to such an adjustment   Bureaucrats and bureaucracies always want to hold on to policies and programs that have given them power and prestige, even if those policies and programs have been costly failures.  Above all, in fact, they want to avoid having to admit the failure and the costs involved.  So they go on defending and pursuing strategies long after the costs and failure have become clear.

An historical parallel to the present strategy in the Middle East is the Cold War strategy in East Asia, including the policy of surrounding, isolating and pressuring the Communist Chinese regime.  As documented in my own history of the U.S. path to war in Vietnam, Perils of Dominance, the national security bureaucracy was so committed to that strategy that it resisted any alternative to war in South Vietnam in 1964-65, because it believed the loss of South Vietnam would mean the end of Cold War strategy, with its military alliances, client regimes and network of military bases surrounding China.   It was only during the Nixon administration that the White House wrested control of national security policy from the bureaucracy sufficiently to scrap that Cold War strategy in East Asia and reach an historic accommodation with China.

The present strategic crisis can only be resolved by a similar political decision to reach another historical accommodation – this time with the “resistance bloc” in the Middle East.  Despite the demonization of Iran and the rest of the “resistance bloc”, their interests on the primary issue of al Qaeda-like global terrorism have long been more aligned with the objective security interests of the United States than those of some regimes with which the United States has been allied (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan).

Scrapping the failed strategy in favor of an historic accommodation in the region would:

• reduce the Sunni-Shi’a geopolitical tensions in the region by supporting a new Iran-Egypt relationship;
• force Israel to reconsider its refusal to enter into real negotiations on a Palestinian settlement;
• reduce the level of antagonism toward the United States in the Islamic world and
• create a new opportunity for agreement  between the United States and Iran that could resolve the nuclear issue.

It will be far more difficult, however, for the United States to make this strategic adjustment than it was for Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to secretly set in motion their accommodation with China.  Unconditional support for Israel, the search for client states and determination to project  military power into the Middle East, which are central to the failed strategy, have long reflected the interests of the two most powerful domestic U.S. political power blocs  bearing on national security policy:  the pro-Israel bloc and the militarist bloc.  Whereas Nixon and Kissinger were not immobilized by fealty to any such power bloc, both the pro-Israel and militarist power blocs now dominate both parties in the White House as well as in Congress.

One looks in vain for a political force in this country that is free to press for fundamental change in Middle East strategy.  And without a push for such a change from outside, we face the distinct possibility of a national security bureaucracy and White House continuing to deny the strategy’s utter failure and disastrous consequences.

I LOOK OUTSIDE AND IT’S HAPPENING, WITH A [...]]]> The following are lightly edited notes from a conversation over the phone with IPS correspondent and LobeLog contributor Emad Mekay in Egypt. Check out all our news coverage of Egypt and Emad’s other dispatches, and a story for the wire late Friday night.

I LOOK OUTSIDE AND IT’S HAPPENING, WITH A PRICE

It’s really history being made. It’s the kind of thing I knew would happen, but I imagined it happening maybe in the future life of my kids.

But I look outside and it’s happening. But it comes with a price, and the price is insecurity now and uncertainty in the future. — Could you hear that? The gunshot?

With regard to Omar Suleiman’s appointment as vice president, I’ve been on the phone with dozens of people, and everyone says the same thing: Nothing has changed. Suleiman has been there for 20 years. And Mubarak still has power.

INSECURITY AWAY FROM KEY SIGHTS, POLICE ‘THUGS’?

It’s bad today. It’s not political; it’s security now. And it’s getting out of control.

A lot of the looters are former low-level secret police that have been cut loose, looting and attacking homes and robbing people. Many of them originally were in plain clothes, because their job was to gather intelligence.

The police are in rebellion now. They are bandit police, and they’re turning against society in general. The police are not functioning; there are no traffic police. I’ve been out all day, and all the police stations are all surrounded by tanks.

I have a firsthand report about clashes between the police and the army in Tenth of Ramadan City, about 60 km northeast of Cairo. Eventually, the army was able to round up a bunch of the police conscripts and imprison them in the police station.

Things were more normal yesterday than today. Look at me: Instead of going downtown, I was scared that my kids and wife would be attacked, so I had to come back early. And this is happening in almost every city, in every district across Egypt.

It’s getting very chaotic and I don’t know what will happen next. See, I’m talking to you now, and I just heard another shot fired. And it’s a very nice area. We were concerned that they were going after the areas that seemed affluent.

I spent all day in Sixth of October City, and I’ve seen more tanks coming on trucks. And some areas are being barricaded by the army. Residential areas are unprotected except for police stations.

There’s no police force now. They were ordered to pull back.

IS MUBARAK PLAYING THE SECURITY CARD?

I think the regime is playing a game, really trying to scare people off of change because of this insecurity. Many of the things that are being done seem organized, especially the looting. (Many of these groups are fighting with the army, too.) The government may be just punishing the people.

Of course, this insecurity will have political consequences: Now, the people’s regime change demand may take a back seat to security. People are turning inward; they just want protection. The TV stations are airing live phone calls from people saying, ‘We are in such-and-such location, send the army. We need help because we are being attacked by thugs.’

The government was putting out some ridiculous things, such as accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of looting. That never gained much traction; no one believed it.

But everything outside takes more time. I went to see why I can’t make international phone calls, and the phone company was closed. The banks are closed and ATMs don’t work. The telecom company is closed. Schools are closed, universities are closed.

The food situation is getting worse. There are lines for every kind of item. All kinds of stores — even food stores — have been looted. I confirmed that Hyper-One, a mega-grocery in Skeikh Zayed City, was looted.

Because we’re in an area that’s not hooked up to the gas grid, we have to buy gas cylinders, and we couldn’t buy that either. And we are only four or five days into the unrest. I have maybe a week worth of cooking gas.

PEOPLE PUSH BACK WITH NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES

The police are attacking people from one area to the next. Me and my neighbors are keeping sort of a neighborhood watch. Everyone is armed with knives and sticks, lead pipes, whatever they can get.

Shots are being fired everywhere now. Mosques are turning into local radio stations with their megaphones. People in the neighborhoods are stationed in the mosque to warn the area about advancing thugs, the gangs that are looting and attacking people.

It’s a very messy situation, very different than yesterday.

Right now, people are coming together and that’s a good thing. People are trying to patrol the streets with just sticks and kitchenware, because the army and police have a monopoly on weapons in Egypt.

There is sort of a very moderate Muslim independent preacher — a televangelist — named Amr Khaled who volunteered to help people form small groups to help protect and establish security.

People are banding together. Everyone is calling everyone else and giving them tips, telling them how to secure their kids. Many hope the chaos and security problems will not affect the political process.

INTERNATIONALS LOOKING TO GET OUT

The governments of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and others have been giving embassy hotline numbers to local television channels to distribute so that their citizens can get in touch and get help leaving Egypt. America has not posted any number for U.S. citizens that I have seen.

WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?

If Mubarak falls, it is difficult to see how the U.S. will be able to secure any influence in whatever comes next in Egypt unless they organize a clear stance now so Egyptians can see it. It would probably take a strong statement that makes the regime understand that this is the future and that the U.S. wants change.

This is a chance for everyone to not make the same mistakes.

The protesters are not anti-American, so why make them anti-American by backing the wrong side. It’s a pretty clear choice.

Slow-building [...]]]> The following is a set of edited notes from a conversation between myself and IPS’s correspondent in Egypt, Emad Mekay, who was filing dispatches for LobeLog until the Internet went down. He was on the streets of downtown Cairo today until just after the curfew, when he returned home and we chatted by phone.

Slow-building protests started out with diverse crowds, including children

From the morning on, the number of protesters was increasing by the hour. Immediately after Friday morning Prayers at Sixth of October City, a suburb of Cairo, 3,000 people were out in the streets. By afternoon prayers, the number doubled. In the crowd there were many women, some with kids in tow.

The crowd appeared to traverse social lines, from people wearing the garb of door-guards to middle-class and affluent people. Even school girls were out.

I took it as a sign that people really want change when they risk taking their children out. But when things got out of hand, a lot of people pulled their kids out of protests.

Also soon after clashes started, residents began stocking up on food, and in the main area of Cairo, shops were closing their doors. People were unable to get around in cars.

Only the protesters, the police, and the army were left on the streets.

Of course, I got hungry. I stopped at a state-run bread distribution center and I jokingly asked the woman selling bread why she wasn’t protesting. She asked how many people were out, and I said about 4,000 so far. She said she’s waiting for more people. She’s technically a government employee.

In downtown Cairo, people in their homes and apartments looking out from their balconies and windows were throwing food and water to the protesters. Protesters were even allowed to go and make landline calls and go back down to the streets (mobile service is down in many areas and for many different services). This is in downtown Cairo, some of it in affluent areas. People would just open their doors to let people in.

Protesters going after symbols of the government

Before I went to Cairo, I was near the protest from a nearby main mosque. They were marching down and singing songs like ‘down with Mubarak.’ On the way, there was a police station. Some protesters tried to get in, but didn’t initially throw stones.

These are the symbols people are focusing on now: pictures of Mubarak, police stations, and NDP offices.

I don’t think there’s sympathy for the government — though people are worried about what’s next and whether things will get out of control.

The protesters are not looking outward at all and not mentioning Israel or the U.S.

They are concerned about better lives in Egypt. There were no religious slogans except for “alluhah akbar,” which is also a general expression of celebration.

Army presence in streets, perhaps military intelligence

The branch of the Army that came to downtown Cario to protect the (state-run) TV and Radio building were from the Republican guard, which is the presidential guard.

There were reports of tanks around the U.S. and other embassies, protecting those diplomatic installations.

There were cars around the city in strategic areas with tinted windows. It’s illegal for civilians in Egypt to have tinted windows. Usually, these cars are some kind of military intelligence.

There also appeared to be a communications tower being set up downtown (for police to communicate). But this sort of activity is usually conducted by the military.

Government blames the Muslim Brotherhood

Basically, what the government was trying to do was say that it was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) behind the unrest, but most of the leadership of the MB was arrested ahead of the protest.

Instead of having senior officials from Mubarak’s party come out and say its the Muslim Brotherhood, a parade of low-ranking governemnt officials came out and said the MB did this. They were blaming the Brotherhood for the “riots,” and for fires.

Unsubstantiated rumors flew that the government itself had set fires in order to blame the MB. People noted that it took nearly four hours for firetrucks to come and fight the fires; they guessed that the authorities could have easily called in services.

Communication breakdown

At home, people were watching satellite broadcasts like Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and even Al Hurra, the U.S. government-funded station, which all had good coverage.

Most forms of communicating out are down or suppressed. There is still no Internet service, and mobile phone services are still down. [Mekay was unable to dial the U.S. from his landline.]

People are complaining that landlines are often busy, too. People are phoning into Egypt in terror, trying to call their families.

The authorities cracking down and cutting all communications really infuriated everyone. It was a sign that they might be losing control.

Nervous excitement

When I came back here, there were some intellectuals who were blaming Mubarak for what’s happening.

Everybody’s nervous; you might hear it in my voice. I don’t know if it’s just excitement, but things are boiling. It’s scary in a way, too, because I personally don’t know what’s going to happen next.

There are reports on satellite television of two more protesters dead in Mansour, a city in the northeast Nile River Delta. Al Jazeera just reported that in the main city on the Suez, 11 people died today, on top of the three others that have died in recent days.

The government may react more violently.