Hyping the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) threat risks generating flawed policies. The White House probably is a source of frustration, as its critics claim, but others seem too eager to commit US combat troops. Meanwhile, the administration, under constant pressure regarding the US effort, has not done enough to energize the anti-IS coalition that President Obama worked so hard to assemble. This inclines allies to believe Washington will do the heavy lifting for them. Although addressing IS full-bore (and unilaterally) might seem appealing to some, this urge undermines the patience needed for more sensible courses of action.
The Hagel Affair
The resignation of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel last month resulted in criticism that the White House is unreceptive to outside views, such as expanding the US military effort against IS. Excessive micromanagement of military related issues by the White House (including the phone line to commanders in Afghanistan that bypassed Hagel) has also been cited.
Past Presidents have done likewise. In overseas crises, many presidents created their own channels, giving White House officials more power than cabinet secretaries. Franklin Roosevelt often relied on Harry Hopkins over Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Richard Nixon used Henry Kissinger in lieu of William Rogers, and Colin Powell found himself outside the Bush administration’s inner circle. Perhaps the most extreme example of presidential micromanagement was Lyndon Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War.
The Obama White House has long had dicey relations with the Pentagon. This has been, according to the Pentagon’s side of the argument, the source of delays and confusing policy directions on several issues, with the White House accused of falling into “group think.” For his part, Hagel had complained in the early fall to National Security Advisor Susan Rice in a memo about a lack of cohesion in US policy toward IS.
Nonetheless, White House micromanagement or Pentagon-White House difficulties aside, Obama’s reluctance to ramp up the US military effort against IS excessively seems well founded. Of course, Hagel’s position is not entirely clear, but escalation had been advocated by Hagel’s two predecessors: Robert Gates and Leon Panetta.
Costs of US Escalation
IS appears ready to endure lopsided casualties to inflict some on American combat troops. And IS could follow through on this hope. Not only are its combatants fanatics, the radical Sunni militia also employs deadly suicide bombings against foes in close-up urban combat (as we’ve seen in Kobani). Additionally, IS likely hopes to get a hold of at least a few US military prisoners for filmed beheadings. So why hand IS exactly what it wants?
With large urban areas to be cleared just in Iraq—from Fallujah to Mosul—US combat troops would also likely incur casualties in excess of those suffered in 2003-08 against somewhat less fanatical Sunni Arab insurgents and Shi’a militias during the war.
American military difficulties could be further magnified by reduced interest on the part of Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government in making the political concessions needed to split Sunni Arab tribes and other secular elements away from IS and marshal its own forces more swiftly. After all, why should Baghdad go the extra mile if the US seems willing to take care of Baghdad’s IS problem militarily?
Recently, despite lost ground in and around Ramadi west of Baghdad, Iraqi and Kurdish forces have made gains between Baghdad and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) territory to the north. Moving up Iraq’s central line of communications, Iraqi forces have driven IS from some important territory. The siege of the vital Baiji refinery complex has been lifted, and gains have been made in the demographically mixed Diyala Governate northeast of Baghdad.
Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurds continue to push IS slowly westward. Baghdad and the KRG reached a temporary oil agreement yesterday that should clear the way for greater cooperation elsewhere, like battling IS. Bitter quarrelling under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki left Iraqi-KRG relations in shambles.
Struggling to rebound from severe reverses last summer, however, the Iraqi Army is in no position to mount a major offensive deep into IS holdings. However, successful Iraqi and Kurdish attacks demonstrate the vulnerability of IS’s vast perimeter. Strong IS forces cannot be everywhere at once to repel various challenges and adequately support ongoing attacks (such as its effort against Kobani).
In terms of a military threat, IS has been largely contained. It cannot advance northward against Turkey; isolated pro-IS sympathies exist in Jordan, but the highly professional Jordanian Army would be a tough nut to crack; and in Iraq, most all Shi’a and Kurdish areas lie outside IS control and are fighting hard to maintain this status. In Syria, IS could advance against weaker rebel forces like the Free Syrian Army, but it seems obsessed with seizing Kobani despite heavy losses.
Coalition and US Escalation
The anti-IS coalition the White House assembled is contributing relatively little to the overall military effort, despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s glowing rhetoric at today’s coalition conclave in Brussels. The air campaign is mainly an American show. Committing more US assets would make it easier for others already foot-dragging over contributions to continue dithering. Now is not the time to ramp up US military efforts, but rather to pressure allies to increase their own contributions.
The bulk of IS’s reinforcements in the form of foreign fighters flow through NATO ally Turkey. The CIA in September and the UN more recently sharply increased their estimate of the number of foreign fighters reaching the Islamic State. To date, Turkey has been more helpful to IS than the coalition because of its passivity. If it cannot be pressured to vigorously interdict incoming fighters, IS would be able to replace many lost fighters—although with less experienced cadres.
The White House (and other allies) must press Turkey harder. President Obama delayed air support for beleaguered Syrian Kurds for two weeks in deference to Turkish concerns (allowing IS to gain a foothold inside Kobani). Even today’s 60-nation gathering seems short on clear goals, let alone a robust military agenda on contributions.
Admittedly, although the Administration has done too little diplomatic spadework, its leverage overseas probably has been undermined by American politicians, pundits, and many in the media demanding an expanded US effort.
Bottom Line
IS remains a daunting foe, so it will not be defeated easily, soon, or completely. To Americans pressing urgently for quick solutions, this is difficult to accept. But comments like one yesterday by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair of the House Foreign Relations Middle East and North Africa Sub-Committee, suggesting IS could damage everyone’s way of life are typical of exaggerations impeding objective policymaking.
Yet those claiming the air campaign has been ineffective are also naïve. IS has mostly ground to a halt. In some places, like Kobani, IS is hemorrhaging combat casualties. Meanwhile IS’s infrastructure, leadership, training camps, heavy weapons, oil refineries, and lines of communication have been hammered by the ongoing aerial bombardment. This week, assets in IS’s “capital” of Raqqa, Syria were also subjected to a wave of airstrikes.
Many want IS crushed quickly out of fear of IS attacks against the American homeland. Yet, as we saw in Afghanistan in 2001-02 with al-Qaeda, the combatants would not be completely rounded up should substantial US forces be sent in. Many hundreds at the very least would escape to find refuge elsewhere. In that scenario, IS would likely shift toward an international terrorist mode, posing an even greater threat to the United States. Therefore, a more collective effort—forcing IS to truly understand that it faces dozens of foes and not just a few—would be a wiser way forward. It is meanwhile imperative to strip IS of as many of its non-extremist Sunni Arab allies as possible, so they do not have to be dealt with militarily.
Photo: President Obama addresses reporters during a meeting with th anti-IS coalition on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on Sept. 24, 2014
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
Today, I’m asking my readers to please support the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The group has been working hard on some new legislation and it’s really important to help get this bill to the floor of the Senate and the House.
According to a report in Buzzfeed, [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
Today, I’m asking my readers to please support the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The group has been working hard on some new legislation and it’s really important to help get this bill to the floor of the Senate and the House.
According to a report in Buzzfeed, AIPAC has been working with congressional staff members for months on the bill, trying to find the formula for success. The bill would “…aim to prevent U.S. companies from participating in the (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel) campaign without infringing on Americans’ First Amendment rights to political speech. It would also try to make the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership being negotiated between the U.S. and E.U. conditional on whether the E.U. takes action to stop BDS.”
And how would they prevent US companies from participating in BDS? By “…authorizing states and local governments to divest from companies deemed to be participating in BDS,” and by denying “…federal contracts to such companies.” This bill should be at the top of the agenda for American activists in the United States who wish to see our country change its policies towards Israel and Palestine.
AIPAC hasn’t been doing very well of late. Their attempt to weasel a provision into another bill that would have allowed Israelis to enter the United States without a visa while Israel refused to make the same arrangement for US citizens raised a lot of hackles on Capitol Hill, even in some offices that are very AIPAC-friendly. The proposed provision was killed. AIPAC was unable to sway the Senate against the nomination of former Senator Chuck Hagel for Secretary of Defense. Nor has it been able to significantly impact the Obama administration’s efforts to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program.
There have been a lot of failures lately, including the failure to get Congress to push hard for an attack on Syria last year. But this bill, if it ever reaches the floor, could be the biggest bust of all, with some serious ramifications for the powerful lobbying group.
Let’s just start with the First Amendment issues this raises. If this bill ever sees the light of day, AIPAC is going to try to convince people that it is similar to the laws passed forty years ago in response to the Arab League’s boycott of Israel. Put simply, it isn’t.
Those laws–the 1977 amendments to the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Ribicoff Amendment to the 1976 Tax Reform Act (TRA)–were drawn up narrowly, to apply only in the case of abetting or cooperating with a boycott directed at Israel by other countries. The mentions of boycott “by a foreign nation” or similar words are so frequent that the meaning cannot be missed. This is no surprise, of course; Congress is loath to dictate to US businesses, and it is especially tricky where a national interest is not clearly and immediately at stake. So these laws were contrived so that they only barred supporting boycotts by foreign countries against Israel.
In the case of BDS, no government is running this program, not even the pseudo-governments of the Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has not endorsed boycotts of Israel and is, itself, completely incapable of boycotting Israeli goods and services. It is in most ways a captive market to Israel. Hamas has, frankly, paid little attention to such measures, though they have encouraged them rhetorically from time to time.
There is a call for BDS from Palestinian civil society, but that is not covered by the 1970s laws. Moreover, any law that would target BDS would need to be constructed in such a way so that it would not have made boycotts of Apartheid South Africa illegal. Those boycotts also came in response to a call from the African National Congress. If businesses could not engage in such activities, there would be great outrage.
So the Arab League boycott is moot as a basis for anti-BDS legislation. The right to boycott is also not limited by what the government decides is an acceptable boycott and what is not. People, and businesses, are free to choose with whom they will do business. Congress making such decisions violates the very essence of the First Amendment, and it is highly unlikely that such a law could pass as a result and, if it could, even less likely that it could withstand legal challenges.
The bit about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is even more toxic. The point of TTIP is to make international trade between the United States and European Union easier, to reduce tariffs and lessen bureaucracy. The idea is to significantly improve the speed, and thus the volume and value, of trade between the two economic giants. Adding stipulations like ensuring that EU states are working against BDS is precisely what TTIP is designed to avoid. Whatever my own objections to TTIP (and they are many), it clearly holds great appeal for businesses on both sides of the Atlantic.
It is one thing for US citizens with influence in Washington to go along with the powerful lobbying forces defending Israel’s ability to act with impunity in the region; for the most part, that has not had a negative effect on trade. But this would be a very different matter. Now we are talking about AIPAC going up against powerful, domestic business interests. That is a whole new ballgame.
Even bringing the bill to the floor would demonstrate in a clearer way than ever before that AIPAC is willing to compromise US commercial interests and even one of the most cherished and basic freedoms the US prides itself on for the sake of Israeli interests.
Consider also that the overwhelming majority of boycott actions, divestment decisions and even popular proposals for sanctions against Israel have focused squarely on Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. They have not targeted Israel as a whole, with the exception of some of the attempts at cultural and academic boycott. But these are not major concerns for Israel nor do they have the same impact potential as economic boycotts and divestment. So, the threat to free speech and to international trade that this bill represents would be demonstrably in the service of the settlement enterprise, the siege of Gaza and the occupation regime more generally. The mask would be off.
In reality, I very much doubt any such legislation is ever going to move forward, at least not from AIPAC. They know the problems as well as anyone and, while I don’t doubt that they are working constantly with their closest friends in Congress to see if something could work, I don’t think they’ll be successful. But if you want to see AIPAC suffer major damage, such a bill would do it. I can’t think of a better strategy to oppose AIPAC than to do everything we can to make sure this sort of doomed anti-BDS legislation hits the floor in Congress with a resounding thud.
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
This month the Wall Street Journal reported that the Obama administration had slowed the shipment of hellfire missiles to Israel after it bombed a UN school in Gaza on Aug. 3 with the US-made weapon. The White House has insisted that weapons transfers to Israel have not been [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
This month the Wall Street Journal reported that the Obama administration had slowed the shipment of hellfire missiles to Israel after it bombed a UN school in Gaza on Aug. 3 with the US-made weapon. The White House has insisted that weapons transfers to Israel have not been suspended or halted, and that the administration is only “taking extra care to look at these shipments.” Yet some analysts understood the unusual decision as a warning message to Tel Aviv about the use of disproportionate force. Whether or not that’s true, it’s no secret that the United States is Israel’s biggest source of military assistance, even if the White House has not been completely aware of the extent of that support.
Two years ago, Congress passed the United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act (P.L. 112-150), which reiterated, as a matter of policy, the US commitment “to help the Government of Israel preserve its qualitative military edge amid rapid and uncertain regional political transformation.” It expressed the non-binding “sense of Congress” favoring various possible avenues of cooperation: providing Excess Defense Articles to Israel; enhanced operational, intelligence, and political-military coordination; expediting the sale of specific weaponry including F-35 joint strike fighter aircraft, refueling tankers, and “bunker buster” bombs; as well as an US-Israel cooperative missile defense program and additional aid for Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system.
Iron Dome: Approaching $1 billion—and Beyond
Iron Dome, a dual mission system built by Israeli defense contractor Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which doubles as a very short range air defense system and an interceptor of incoming rockets, mortars and artillery, has received $720 million in American funding since the program’s inception in 2011. Israel currently has nine batteries, each costing about $100 million. The price tag for every Tamir missile fired by the Iron Dome system costs an estimated minimum of $50,000, with two missiles responding to every incoming rocket that is considered a threat to Israeli lives and property.
US support for Iron Dome will soon surpass $1 billion. In March, the Pentagon asked for $176 million for the program for Fiscal Year 2015, which begins Oct. 1, but the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee raised the Iron Dome appropriation to $351 million on July 15—more than half the $621.6 million it had appropriated for Israeli missile defense for the upcoming year. A week later, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel sent a letter to Senate leaders and key committee chairpersons relaying the Israeli government’s request for an immediate $285 million of emergency allocation for Iron Dome. On Aug. 1—a Friday afternoon—the House (398-8) and Senate both approved adding an additional $285 million to Iron Dome’s funding, which was followed by President Obama’s signature the following Monday morning.
As of last week, according to Y-Net, Iron Dome reportedly had a 90% success rate during the first month of “Operation Protective Edge,” intercepting more than 600 rockets headed toward Israeli population centers from Gaza.
Autopilot Foreign Policy
After Israel’s bombing of the UN school in Gaza, and the huge loss of Palestinian civilian lives due to the war, the Obama administration apparently became aware that it was unformed about, and had very little control over US military assistance to Israel. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reported Aug. 14 that President Obama had just discovered that the US military was authorizing and providing weapons shipments to Israel without his knowledge.
Unknown to many policy makers, Israel was moving on a separate track to replenish supplies of lethal munitions being used in Gaza and to expedite the approval of the Iron Dome funds on Capitol Hill.
On July 20, Israel’s defense ministry asked the US military for a range of munitions, including 120-mm mortar shells and 40-mm illuminating rounds, which were already stored at a pre-positioned weapons stockpile in Israel.
The request was approved through military channels three days later but not made public. Under the terms of the deal, the Israelis used US financing to pay for $3 million in tank rounds. No presidential approval or signoff by the secretary of state was required or sought, according to officials.
The White House then instituted a review process over armaments being shipped to Israel, instructing the Pentagon and the US military to hold a transfer of Hellfire missiles. According to Haaretz:
Against the backdrop of American displeasure over IDF tactics used in the Gaza fighting and the high number of civilian casualties caused by Israel’s massive use of artillery fire rather than more precise weapons, officials in the White House and the State Department are now demanding to review every Israeli request for American arms individually, rather than let them move relatively unchecked through a direct military-to-military channel, a fact that slows down the process.
One senior US official said the decision to tighten oversight and require the pre-approval of higher-ranking officials for shipments was intended to make clear to Israel that there is no “blank check” from Washington in regards to the US-made weapons that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uses in Gaza.
For its part, the State Department has denied reports that it has been kept in the dark about US to Israel weapons transfers. Last week spokeswoman Marie Harf disagreed with the WSJ‘s assessment that the executive branch had been blindsided, and attributed any apparent delay to “inter-agency process.”
The Times of Israel has since reported that the holdup of the Hellfire missiles has been resolved; the weapons will soon be on their way. Although the anonymous Israeli official who operated as a source for the story didn’t specify when the weapons would be arriving, according to Israel’s Channel 10 news, “the incident is behind us.”
]]>by Jim Lobe
Outgoing Anti-Defamation League president Abraham Foxman had a gift for sniffing out anti-Semitism, particularly if it took the form of criticism of Israel, and it will be difficult to fill his shoes in that regard. And while a number of well-known and prominent members of the Jewish community [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Outgoing Anti-Defamation League president Abraham Foxman had a gift for sniffing out anti-Semitism, particularly if it took the form of criticism of Israel, and it will be difficult to fill his shoes in that regard. And while a number of well-known and prominent members of the Jewish community are reported to be in the running to succeed him, I wonder if Elliott Abrams may be gunning for the job.
Of course, it was Abrams, George W. Bush’s top Middle East aide and habitual defender of murderous (even genocidal in the case of Guatemala) right-wing forces and armies in Central America under Ronald Reagan (not to mention his felonious role in the Iran-Contra affair), who publicly exposed Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel as an anti-Semite, not once but twice, as part of an unsuccessful bid by hard-line neoconservatives to sabotage his confirmation as defense secretary. The libel was so disgusting that Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, where Abrams has been Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies (much to the discomfort of many CFR members) since 2009, felt compelled to explicitly denounce it as “over the line,” “preposterous,” and “beyond the pale.”
Now Abrams has found a new target: the British royal family. Here’s what he posted on his “Pressure Points” blog Wednesday beneath a photograph of Prince Charles decked out in Saudi dress while visiting King Abdullah earlier this week:
The heir to the British throne is shown in this photo during a “private visit” to Saudi Arabia. Such a visit is entirely appropriate, but it is a reminder that the British royals appear to have an allergy to visiting Israel. The Queen has never set foot there. Prince Charles did attend the Rabin funeral, but has never gone back and never made an official visit. Such a visit is occasionally hinted at or predicted, but then never gets scheduled. The continuing failure or refusal of any royal to make an official or state visit to Israel is an anomaly that suggests bias, and undermines potential British influence in the region.
It may very well be that the royals, like some (perhaps many) other snooty upper-class Brits, may harbor some prejudices against Jews and/or Israel, although Charles’s attendance at Rabin’s funeral in 1995 seems to undermine Abrams’ case somewhat. But, as the royals have no known policy-making role, does this really make a big difference in the grand scheme of things? Would the UK really wield greater influence in the Middle East if it sent the royal family to Israel? And what should we conclude if no royal has ever visited the West Bank or Gaza? That they’re biased against Palestinians?
I do hope the British Foreign Office asks Haass to explain this bizarre post that appears on his august organization’s website.
]]>via IPS News
Eight years ago, Stephen Rosen, then a top official at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and well-known around Washington for his aggressiveness, hawkish views, and political smarts, was asked by Jeffrey Goldberg of the New Yorker magazine whether some recent negative publicity had harmed the [...]]]>
via IPS News
Eight years ago, Stephen Rosen, then a top official at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and well-known around Washington for his aggressiveness, hawkish views, and political smarts, was asked by Jeffrey Goldberg of the New Yorker magazine whether some recent negative publicity had harmed the lobby group’s legendary clout in Washington.
“A half smile appeared on his face, and he pushed a napkin across the table,” wrote Goldberg about the interview. “’You see this napkin?’ [the official] said. In twenty-four hours, we could have the signatures of seventy senators on this napkin.”
Eight years later, the same official, Stephen Rosen, who was forced to resign from AIPAC after his indictment — later dismissed — for allegedly spying for Israel, told a Ron Kampeas of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) that AIPAC needed to retreat from its confrontation with President Barack Obama after getting only 59 senators — all but 16 of them Republicans — to co-sponsor a new sanctions bill aimed at derailing nuclear negotiations between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany).
“They don’t want to be seen as backing down… I don’t believe this is sustainable, the confrontational posture,” he said.
If AIPAC had succeeded in getting 70 signatures on the bill, which the administration argued would have violated a Nov. 24 interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 that essentially freezes Tehran’s nuclear programme in exchange for easing some existing sanctions for a renewable six-month period, that would have been three more than needed to overcome a promised Obama veto.
But, after quickly gathering the 59 co-sponsors over the Christmas recess, AIPAC and the bill’s major sponsors, Republican Sen. Mark Kirk and Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez, appeared to hit a solid wall of resistance led by 10 Democratic Committee chairs and backed by an uncharacteristically determined White House with an uncharacteristically stern message.
“If certain members of Congress want the United States to take military action, they should be up front with the American public and say so,” said Bernadette Meehan, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council. “Otherwise, it’s not clear why any member of Congress would support a bill that possibly closes the door on diplomacy and makes it more likely that the United States will have to choose between military options or allowing Iran’s nuclear program to proceed.”
Combined with a grassroots lobbying campaign carried out by nearly 70 grassroots religious, anti-war, and civic-action groups that flooded the offices of nervous Democratic senators with thousands of emails, petitions, and phone calls, as well as endorsements of the administration’s position by major national and regional newspapers and virtually all but the neo-conservative faction of the U.S. foreign policy elite, the White House won a clear victory over AIPAC and thus raised anew the question of just how powerful the group really is.
AIPAC’s inability to muster more support among Democrats, in particular, came on top of two other setbacks to its fearsome reputation over the past year.
Although they never took a public position on his nomination a year ago, the group’s leaders were known to have quietly lobbied against former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel for Defence Secretary due his generally critical attitude toward Israel’s influence on U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Several groups and individuals closely aligned with AIPAC, notably the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League’s (ADL) – both of which have joined AIPAC in lobbying for the new Iran sanctions bill – questioned or opposed Hagel. Ultimately, however, he won confirmation by a 58-41 margin in which the great majority of Democrats voted for him.
Eight months later, AIPAC and other right-wing Jewish groups lobbied Congress in favour of a resolution to authorise the use of force against Syria — this time, however, at Obama’s request, although clearly also with the approval of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
But the popular groundswell against Washington’s military intervention in yet another Middle Eastern conflict — as well as the reflexive aversion by far-right Republicans to virtually any Obama initiative — doomed the effort.
Neither Hagel nor Syria, however, has approached the importance AIPAC has accorded to Iran and its nuclear programme which have dominated the group’s foreign-policy agenda for more than a decade. During that time, it has become used to marshalling overwhelming majorities of lawmakers from both parties behind sanctions and other legislation designed to increase tensions — and preclude any rapprochement — between Tehran and Washington.
Last July, for example, the House of Representatives voted by a 400-20 margin in favour of sanctions legislation designed to halt all Iranian oil exports from Iran. The measure was approved just four days before Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s inauguration.
Throughout the fall, AIPAC worked hard — but ultimately unsuccessfully — to get the same bill through the Senate.
Now, two months later and unable to muster even a filibuster-proof 60 votes in the Senate, AIPAC appears to have shelved the Kirk-Menendez bill, which, among other provisions, would have imposed sanctions if Tehran violated the Nov. 24 agreement or failed to reach a comprehensive accord with the P5+1 on its nuclear programme within a year.
“Clearly, the ground has shifted, dealing a huge defeat to AIPAC and other groups who have been aggressively lobbying for [the new sanctions bill],” wrote Lara Friedman, a lobbyist for Americans for Peace Now in her widely-read weekly Legislative Round-up, while other commentators, including Rosen, warned that overwhelming Republican support for the bill put AIPAC’s carefully cultivated bipartisan image at risk with Democratic lawmakers and key Democratic donors.
“They definitely lost this round and that has cost them a huge amount of political capital with the administration and with a lot of Democrats,” said one veteran Capitol Hill observer who also noted AIPAC faced “an almost perfect storm” of an administration willing to fight for a policy that also enjoyed strong support from the foreign-policy elite and an engaged activist community that could exert grassroots pressure on their elected representatives. “Senate offices were getting a couple of calls in favour [of the bill] and hundreds against. That certainly has to make a difference.”
“AIPAC and other hard-line groups remain a potent force in guaranteeing generous U.S. aid to Israel and hamstringing U.S. efforts to achieve a two-state solution, but their clout declines when they advocate a course of action that could lead to another Middle East war,” Stephen Walt, co-author of “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” told IPS in an email exchange.
“The neoconservatives were able to push Bush & Co. to invade Iraq in 2003, but their success required an unusual set of circumstances and the American public learned a lot from that disastrous experience,” according to the influential Harvard international relations scholar.
No one, however, believes that AIPAC and its allies have given up. If the P5+1 negotiations should falter, the Kirk-Menendez bill is likely to be quickly re-introduced; indeed, one influential Republican senator said it should be put on the calendar for July, six months from Jan. 20 the date that Nov. 24 interim accord formally went into effect.
“It seems likely that advocates [of the bill] are getting ready to shift to some form of ‘Plan B’ [which], …one can guess, will look a lot like Plan A, but, instead of focusing on derailing negotiations with new sanctions, [it] will likely focus on imposing conditions on any final agreement — conditions that are impossible to meet and will thus kill any possibility of a deal,” according to Friedman.
That could include conditioning the lifting of sanctions on an agreement that includes a ban on any uranium enrichment on Iranian soil — a condition favoured by Netanyahu that Tehran has repeatedly rejected and that most experts believe would be a deal-breaker.
]]>Since the conclusion of the Interim Agreement between Iran and 6 world powers in Geneva, Washington has taken pains to reassure friends and allies in the Persian Gulf that it will not be fooled by the Islamic Republic. Further, the US will continue to bolster both its own military deployments and [...]]]>
Since the conclusion of the Interim Agreement between Iran and 6 world powers in Geneva, Washington has taken pains to reassure friends and allies in the Persian Gulf that it will not be fooled by the Islamic Republic. Further, the US will continue to bolster both its own military deployments and regional defense capabilities. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel outlined this commitment during a Dec. 7 speech in Bahrain.
Hagel emphasized that:
“The Department of Defense will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies;
“…we routinely maintain a naval presence of over 40 ships in the broader region, including a carrier strike group;
“During my last trip to the region, we finalized agreements with nearly $11 billion that will provide access to high-end capabilities; and
“The United States…is committed to supporting the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] as an anchor for regional stability.”
As a psychological exercise, coming in the wake of an earthquake — America’s new willingness to negotiate seriously with Iran and, let us hope, its reciprocation — this US military muscle-flexing is appropriate. But beyond the elusive quality of “reassurance,” to what end?
If Iran does pose a direct threat to the Persian Gulf Arab states, it is hardly likely to be with major military force. That has long been a Chimera, as the most elementary military analysis demonstrates. Iran is not the Soviet Union, with massive strike armies, frontal aviation, and nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. At best, Iran’s military capabilities are fourth- or fifth-rate; even if it obtained a nuclear weapon, all the deployed conventional military power confronting it would not be relevant to whatever demands of deterrence emerged. Deterrence or attack would be the choices, and both would depend on actions by the United States (or Israel). Neither course would depend either on regionally-deployed military power or the defense capabilities of local countries.
The challenge posed by Iran now and in the future, as well as the challenges and opportunities that could flow from the recent opening to Iran, take very different forms:
1) Iran is a vibrant, creative society, which none of the Gulf Arab statelets (or even Saudi Arabia) can begin to match, including because, in the case of most of them, they depend on large proportions of expatriates (South and East Asia; Palestine) for what they do achieve;
2) following a lifting of sanctions, Iran’s resulting sale of consumer goods to other regional states, backed by its history of marketing success, and thereby a rising economic dependence of local states on Iran;
3) potential cultural penetration, of which appeal to Shiite minorities (or majorities, as in Bahrain) is only one element;
4) rivalry, however small to begin with, for US geopolitical attention — including that already demonstrated by the (2001-2002) complementarity of interests in Afghanistan and potential cooperation in fostering a “stable” Iraq, as well as in ratifying everyone’s common interest in the security of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz;
5) opposition to al-Qaeda and its ilk, whereas individuals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states support these terrorists; and
6) if Western-Iranian diplomacy succeeds, a potential role in reducing pressures on both the US and Israel regarding Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The US needs to attend to all these challenges and, in the cases of items 4-6, potential opportunities, in terms of America’s interests rather than those of the Persian Gulf Arab states. US strategy needs to emphasize not its military presence or even loading down the locals with more weapons. Instead, the US should focus on and strengthen its regional diplomatic and economic engagement, including its role as peacemaker across the region. This will be all the more important as a means of demonstrating commitment as US direct dependence on the region’s hydrocarbons diminishes. (At the same time, devotees of the “pivot” to the Far East should take note: due to its own interests, the US can’t leave the Middle East, nor can the Europeans.)
Further, if negotiations with Iran do pay off and sanctions are significantly removed, a non-military US offensive to temper Iranian ambitions would automatically be buttressed by a massive influx of US and other Western firms’ investments into Iran. Already, firms are lining up to get back into Iran when and if the starter’s pistol is fired. This could provide incentives for Iranian “good behavior” that sanctions conspicuously do not.
A further tell-tale is found in what US military planners themselves have said: that the US can strike any target, anywhere, from just about anywhere. A US carrier task force doesn’t need to be close to Iran in order to be there in a few days’ or weeks’ time; air power can be deployed in hours. If the locals believe they need to see large masses of US military power immediately on call, that is in part because we have allowed them to believe that “US presence” and “strategic commitment” must be denominated primarily in military terms. But the world is rapidly moving beyond the value of that proposition; “US engagement” needs to be denominated increasingly in other terms. Indeed, what is “capability,” in whatever terms denominated, unless there is also “intention” to use it?
A lot of what is happening now with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, plus Israel, is due to their worry that they will lose their absolute predominance in American geostrategic attention and might have to share some of it with Iran if the nuclear negotiations bear fruit — perhaps along with other developments. This is a major reason why Saudi Arabia, other Gulf Arab states, and Israel oppose what was achieved in Geneva.
In summary, US strategy regarding partners and allies in the Persian Gulf needs to move beyond the fixation with military instruments and focus more on redeveloping US engagement and commitment in non-military terms. The US should also stop feeding the locals with the myth that arms sales and a US military presence are what it takes for them to be secure and be able to rely on the US.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
In a surprise move, the British parliament has rejected the Government’s motion to provide support for military action against Syria. This was a clear rebuke to Prime Minister David Cameron and, equally, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, William Hague, who as much as any leader anywhere pressed [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
In a surprise move, the British parliament has rejected the Government’s motion to provide support for military action against Syria. This was a clear rebuke to Prime Minister David Cameron and, equally, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, William Hague, who as much as any leader anywhere pressed from early-on for a vigorous response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the government of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad.The decision by parliament did not spring from nowhere. A good deal of public and elite opinion in Britain remains badly bruised by former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s rampant enthusiasm for the US neo-cons’ drive to invade Iraq ten years ago. In a series of enquiries, Blair was badly tarnished – enquires that were not even contemplated in the United States for members of the administration of President George W. Bush who got so much so wrong. In one of the most telling phrases, the Blair government was accused (with reason) of having concocted a “dodgy dossier” to support claims that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. While there was nothing quite as telling as US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council, which was, in the old British phrase, “economical with the truth,” there were the revelations that intelligence was to be “fixed” around conclusions that the Iraqi WMD did exist. “Fixed,” in this context, meant that the US was determined to go to war, come what may, and the British would go along or, more correctly, would be in the van.
Thus it should not have been that surprising that the lack of clarity in the intelligence picture about the source of the August 21st chemical weapons attacks in Syria led a lot of people in Britain, including in all three major political parties, to express doubts, so much so that the British now have to be ruled out of any military action that the US government might choose to initiate.
Where does this leave President Obama? One senior British leader predicted that the US and perhaps others will go ahead with some form of military action, and they are very likely right. Already, the “commentariat” in Washington has shifted its discussion from the question “whether?” to “when?” and “how?” and has suspended further disbelief about whether this is a good thing.
But not so fast. Questioning does continue on Capitol Hill, on both sides of the aisle, and on several grounds. One could be called the legal niceties – though not so much whether the United Nations would approve of the use of force; its remit has long since gone by the boards for a large fraction of American elected officials, and the Obama administration apparently has already given up on trying to get a UN mandate. The Russians and Chinese would veto any serious resolution in the Security Council – and the British draft tabled this week now can no longer count on the backing of the government that introduced it, a development without precedent in UN history. The idea of going to the General Assembly for an expression of concern about the use of chemical weapons, sufficient for a legal fig-leaf for the Obama administration, is itself a non-starter.
The Capitol Hill legal niceties relate to the role that Congress, or at least a large faction of it, wants to play in any US decision to become engaged actively in hostilities in or over Syria, however limited. This is not so much about the perennial debate over the meaning of the Constitution, which assigns to Congress the sole authority to declare war: that hasn’t been done since December 1941; or even the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It is rather that the average member of Congress, just returning from the so-called “district work period” (AKA holiday), will have had reinforced at least to some degree the rising consensus in the US against yet another war in the Middle East. Iraq is now more or less over; Afghanistan still has a bit of a way to go; and we need to recall that the US, while highly instrumental in forcibly deposing Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi two years ago, was content – indeed a bit anxious – to have that characterized as “leading from behind.”
Even more important, perhaps, is not the question of “who struck John?” The administration says that this was the Assad government, even though it has not fallen into the trap of calling it a “slam dunk,” as the hapless Director of the CIA did in 2003 over Iraq’s supposed WMD. Nor is there questioning on Capitol Hill that there could be a “false flag” involved here – that is, someone acting as agent provocateur in order to bring the US to the point of military action against Assad, even at the cost of more lives lost on the rebel side. Important instead is the difficulty that many observers have in understanding what kind of military attack profile can be designed that will do just enough to chasten the Syrian government against a further use of chemical weapons, but not so much that it will risk tipping the balance in the Syrian civil war, dragging the United States deeply into the conflict, and perhaps leading to the overthrow of the Assad regime – to be replaced by what? The answer to that question is not even “blowing in the wind,” but could very well be those whom the US fears most in the Middle East, the Islamist fundamentalists of the worst stripe, who draw their inspiration and support not from the Saudi Arabian and Qatari governments, though, as Sunnis, they very much want Assad to go, but from wealthy individuals in these countries who bankroll the terrorists. The result is the same, and the US and others, notably Israel, fear the potential consequences.
President Obama has already delayed his impending decision to use force, even though it was telegraphed in highly-colored terms by Secretary of State John Kerry (while Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been working to slow down the rush to judgment). Now Obama has to face that the ally that was most egging him on, at least within the NATO family, is no longer there; and instead of bolstering the US position has considerably weakened it. The domestic US politics may not have changed – the risk that a Democratic president will be accused of being soft or, heaven forfend, is reluctant to use military force other than to good ends – but the most strident of the public defenders abroad that the evidence and the need for action was incontrovertible has not been able to rally his own commitment to act.
The President is also caught by his own hasty remarks of a couple of years ago, both that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a “red line,” and that Assad must go. In neither case did he do anything to back up his remarks – and opponents of deep US military engagement in Syria will not complain about that. In the latter case, however – “Assad must go” – nothing has been worked out politically or diplomatically for Syria’s future that would not, with Assad’s departure, potentially leave the minority Alawites at the brutal mercy of the rebels and especially the “moveable feast” of Sunni terrorists who have now migrated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen to the richer pickings of Syria. In the haste of some in Washington to get the president to redeem his “redline” pledge as soon as possible, the US even cancelled a meeting with the Russians in the Hague on a possible Geneva II set of peace talks; and it even tried to get the UN secretary general to remove the UN inspectors from Syria – as President George W. Bush did regarding Iraq a decade ago, with consequences that still plague the region and the US reputation there.
Perhaps, therefore, what the British parliament has done is a blessing in disguise. Perhaps it will led the US administration to slow down a bit. This is not so much to let the UN determine formally that chemical weapons were used (that does seem certain) or even whether the perpetrator was the Syrian government (that still is most likely), but finally to begin trying seriously to create some sort of diplomatic framework for Syria’s future (even if, as regrettable as that seems, Assad would have to be part of the picture); and as well to start putting together an overarching strategy for the region as a whole, including analysis, planning, and policy for helping to stem the Sunni-Shia civil war in the heart of the region that was relaunched a decade ago when the US – with Britain that time, and a few others – invaded Iraq.
If “think again” is the result of what the parliament in London did on Thursday, maybe it will be possible finally to set US policy toward the Middle East on a solid, strategically-sound footing. And if that means the President has to change his mind regarding the likelihood of military attack, so be it; it would be consonant with his totally-correct statement last week that he is paid by the American people to promote US interests. And if he gets to policies that can do that, by however circuitous a route, that is a good thing.
by Farideh Farhi
Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian disaster as cover. We should also know that given the “red line” he drew last year, America’s credibility is on the line. And of course we are reminded of the need for the US to be the protector of the global and civilized norm against the use of chemical weapons.
None of these arguments will convince the critics of military action.
President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel are hardly Dr. Strangeloves sitting on a bomb directed at Damascus, but the lack of clarity on what happens the day after seems reckless. If the Assad regime used chemicals weapons, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that half-hearted military action — designed to punish but not remove Assad from power — will encourage further use of the weapons and more devastation?
Yes, US credibility is on the line, but attaching credibility to martial muscle could entail the further loss of it in more important areas. The revelation that in the midst of a humanitarian crisis the political class in Washington seems focused on launching cruise missiles can itself reflect a serious lack of credibility and failure in global leadership; this one built upon moral and ideological bankruptcy.
There may be some people in Syria and elsewhere in the region who will cheer military action, but if the Obama administration is unable to use it to exhibit some sort of leadership and bring an end to Syria’s tragedy through a serious political process like in Egypt, the move will be despised by all sides.
It’s been suggested that Obama’s military action in Syria will pose a dilemma for Iran’s new moderate government as it contemplates what to do in a domestic environment in which Iran’s hardliners will be pushing for a response. It won’t. Jasmin has already pointed to the mild reaction from Tehran. The reality is that Obama’s military action will make the Syria tragedy his and not Iran’s. And in Iran’s post-election environment, in which the country has moved towards national reconciliation — both among the elite and between the government and population — nothing suits the Islamic Republic better than divesting itself from this issue quietly.
The hardline argument for strongly supporting the Assad regime won in Tehran when his downfall was stated as Washington’s — as well as Riyadh’s and Tel Aviv’s — desired outcome in the name of weakening the Islamic Republic. But events in Syria are now well beyond the proxy war stage. They are out of control and have spilled into adjacent countries. Of course, Iran does not share borders with Syria. Rather and more importantly, the ideology that the Syrian tragedy has spawned with ample support from Saudi and Qatari funds — one that is anti-Shia, anti-Iran, anti-US and anti-Semite (even if it may not necessarily be virulently anti-Israel for now) — is more of a problem for whichever country ends up owning this issue. And owning it is exactly what the Obama administration is about to do, even if it acts in the name of credibility and/or punishment and reportedly only through a barrage of Tomahawks for a few days.
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), urging President Barak Obama to turn a cold shoulder to newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani while pursuing a more confrontational and aggressive Iran policy. The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann has already penned an important discussion of why this measure complicates efforts to reach a peaceful solution with Iran, which I highly recommend.
It is worth recalling that another Iranian president-elect, Mohammad Khatami — a reformist whose surprise election shocked the Iranian political establishment — was also greeted by sanctions pushed through Congress. On August 19, 1997, weeks after Khatami took office, President Bill Clinton confirmed that virtually all trade and investment activities by US persons with Iran were prohibited. Those sanctions not only boosted Iranian hardliners who oppose a detente with the US, they also helped ensure that Khatami and his supporters would be unsuccessful in making many of the economic improvements and political changes needed to improve the lives of the Iranian people. His crippled victory was followed by the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Since then, dozens of letters, resolutions and sanctions bills have emanated from Congress, which of late seems incapable of accomplishing anything else.
According to the “76 senators” who signed the letter:
We believe there are four strategic elements necessary to achieve resolution of this issue: an explicit and continuing message that we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a sincere demonstration of openness to negotiations, the maintenance and toughening of sanctions, and a convincing threat of the use of force that Iran will believe. We must be prepared to act, and Iran must see that we are prepared.
So the US must somehow demonstrate an “openness to negotiations” while maintaining and toughening sanctions and convincingly threatening to “use force”, even as it remains mired in Iraq and Afghanistan and utterly bewildered about Syria and Egypt?
Saxby Chamblis did it, Richard Shelby didn’t. Sheldon Whitehouse did it, Ron Wyden didn’t. Chuck Schumer did it, Barbara Boxer didn’t.
Signing and not signing such letters may be of limited practical consequence — though AIPAC and other lobbying groups are certainly keeping tabs — but the political fallout of abstaining can be deafening. When Chuck Hagel was nominated for Secretary of Defense, his detractors screamed about the anti-Iran “letters” he hadn’t signed, according them equal status with his actual votes.
Tammy Baldwin, who was mercilessly hammered by her 2012 opponent Tommy Thompson for wavering on Iran sanctions, didn’t sign onto this letter.
Al Franken (D-MN), who did, won his seat in 2008 after a recount that lasted for months, unseating incumbent Norm Coleman by a mere 312 votes. Coleman, a stalwart of the Republican Jewish Coalition, is salivating at the prospect of Franken making a single false move on the pro-Israel/anti-Iran front that would enable Republicans to pounce. While Franken seems to be in a strong position for reelection in 2014, he can take nothing for granted in the current political environment.
The last listed co-signer, newbie Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), is currently focused on the economy and particularly on who will be running the Fed. But she has been quick to climb aboard the bandwagon that’s torpedoing the prospect of improved relations with Iran, as has Angus King, the Maine Independent who replaced Republican Olympia Snowe.
Of course, the 24 who, for one reason or another, chose not to sign the letter are hardly “profiles in courage”. Some aren’t seeking reelection when their current Senate term is up and can run free of the AIPAC leash, among them Max Baucus, Tom Coburn, Jay Rockefeller and Carl Levin. Perhaps the most curious non-signers are the AIPAC-endorsed, staunchly pro-Israel senators who have consistently voted in favor of increasingly crippling Iran sanctions but also recently abstained from signing a similar letter last December, urging the President to stiffen them. This group includes Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK).
Inferring that any senator not signing an AIPAC-crafted letter has opposed crippling sanctions or will oppose the next round of them would be a major mistake. Most of the two dozen non-signers of the latest letter, including Rand Paul (R-KY), who opposes a military attack on Iran, have voted in favor of sanctions in the past and will probably do so in the future unless some political incentive convinces them otherwise. The absent Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) were among the original cosponsors of S. 65 – the AIPAC-promoted “Back Door to Iran War” resolution that expressed support of an Israeli attack on Iran. It garnered 91 cosponsors and passed the Senate 99-0 on May 22. Kirk’s website is meanwhile applauding the House’s passage of the latest Iran sanctions in the House (as is AIPAC; the accompanying photo to this post is the lead image on its website’s front page) and urges the Senate to act as well, which will likely happen in September.
Just about every resolution and vote ratcheting up sanctions against Iran has passed the Senate with a hefty majority. Murkowski, Wyden, and Jon Tester (D-MT) were among the 44 senators who signed an AIPAC letter in June 2012 opposing negotiations with Iran although they didn’t sign this one.
President Obama has defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting a different result”. How ironic it would be if he were to heed this latest letter and, yielding to Congress, sign off on more and stricter sanctions, just as a new Iranian president offers at least an opening for a better era in US-Iran relations.
That said, Rouhani, who stated the other day that “we need to have negotiations without threats” needs to move quickly — while Congress is on its five week summer break — in making some headlines of his own, by, for example, establishing direct contact with the United States.
]]>by Dina Esfandiary
In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot [...]]]>
by Dina Esfandiary
In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot go unpunished. But is there enough information to justify action? More importantly, can the US and the rest of the international community actually do much?
The quick answer to both questions is no.
The UK and France have obtained samples from inside Syria that have tested positive for traces of a Sarin by-product. Videos and pictures show victims suffering symptoms similar to those caused by certain chemical weapons (although foaming of the mouth is not usually a symptom of Sarin exposure). The information has been corroborated with witness testimonies. This is credible but not definitive.
There is no information about the exact location or timing of the alleged attack. The physiological samples show individuals were exposed but they do not clarify where, when or how. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether it was an actual attack or just an accidental release of agents from a broken or lost canister.
The samples and interviews do not point the finger at Assad in any definitive manner. It would be reasonable to assume the agents came from the regime — after all, Assad has spent the last four decades developing his chemical weapons arsenal into the biggest in the Middle East. But the evidence is not unequivocal. If intentional, it is possible the agents were released by a rogue general or rebels that have somehow come across Sarin canisters. Unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible.
The limited scale of the alleged attack also raises a number of questions. Why risk large-scale international retribution for such a small result? Chemical weapons are effective weapons of terror, but Assad is not short of means of terrorizing his enemies. Why run the risk of intervention for so little gain? Especially at a time when US policy priority has shifted from deposing Assad to ensuring Islamists do not come to power in Syria.
The uncertainty surrounding these allegations and the small scale of the alleged attack make it difficult to say for certain that Assad has crossed the US’ red line. “Suspicions are one thing; evidence is another”, said Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel last week.
But the problems do not stop there. If the allegations are proven correct, the options for responding are not attractive.
Some Israeli officials have called for military action to “curb” Syria’s chemical weapons. But this is different (and much more difficult) than military action in response to the use of chemical weapons. A military response to the alleged crossing of the red line could include air strikes on Syrian military installations (rather than just chemical weapons facilities) for example. But using air strikes to secure Syria’s chemical weapons is risky, especially when the location and size of the facilities are unconfirmed. More importantly, what if as a result of the airstrikes, some of the agents were released into the atmosphere? The consequences would be devastating. Add to that Syria’s robust air defences and the possibility that some munitions will survive and be open to looting, and doing nothing suddenly looks like a good idea.
The other option is to send troops in. But the lack of accurate intelligence on the location and size of Syria’s stockpiles makes this difficult. In a sea of uncertainty, the one thing the international community is sure of is that Assad’s stockpiles are large (the largest in the Middle East) and dispersed. In fact, so much so that in November, the Pentagon told the White House that upward of 75,000 troops would be needed to secure Syria’s chemical weapons. Is the US ready for another invasion of a Middle Eastern country and a treasure hunt to find all facilities and stockpiles in the context of civil war, where foreign troops would be a prime target?
It is difficult to idly sit by while the crisis in Syria escalates. But the US and the international community cannot jump into another war in the region based on assumptions. And given the existing circumstances and options, securing Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles will require more persuasion and negotiation than brute force.
– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
Photo: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel briefs the press in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on April 25, 2013. Hagel announced that the White House released a statement that it has evidence that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has used chemical weapons against the Syrian rebels. DoD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo.
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