by Derek Davison

As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”

A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Derek Davison

As talks aimed at a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran continue, with principals from Iran and world powers meeting in Vienna this week, two recent analyses of the negotiations have compared the talks to a “Rubik’s Cube.”

A May 9 report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled, “Iran and the P5+1: Solving the Nuclear Rubik’s Cube,” offers 40 recommended action items that Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany) could agree to implement in a comprehensive deal. Today the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) also held a panel discussion called, coincidentally, “The Rubik’s Cube of a Final Iran Deal,” moderated by Colin Kahl, the top Middle East policy official at the Defense Department for most of Obama’s first term, and featuring Robert Einhorn, who served as the State Department’s special advisor on non-proliferation and arms control until less than a year ago, Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshares Fund, and Alireza Nader, an Iran expert at the RAND Corporation.

There’s a clear sense in both analyses that a deal is reachable. Cirincione rightly pointed out at the USIP event that the current talks are “the closest we’ve come to an agreement, ever,” and predicted that “absent some unforeseen event, we are going to get a deal.” Indeed, the very existence of something like the ICG report, a specific and detailed look at what a deal might actually contain, would have appeared presumptuous even six months ago but now seems very reasonable given the progress that has already been made.

However, optimism aside, a great deal of work still needs to be done before a deal can be finalized. The level of detail contained in the ICG report speaks to the complexity involved in the negotiations. The ICG recommends, for example, an immediate cap on Iranian uranium enrichment of 6400 Separative Work Units (SWU, a measurement of enrichment capacity that incorporates both the number and technological advancement of operational centrifuges) per year, which is a steep cut from Iran’s current 9000 SWU/year capacity (that Iran sees as already too low), and one that the Iranians may be unwilling to make. That cap would then be lifted, over 8-10 years, to around 19,000 SWU/year, an increase that could theoretically reduce the time it would take Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon if it chose to pursue that goal. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Iran and the P5+1 would agree to those terms.

The ICG framed its recommendations around four points:

• constraining any Iranian capacity to build a nuclear weapon;
• implementing a stringent monitoring and verification system on Iran’s nuclear program,
• establishing concrete negative consequences for a breach of the deal by either side;
• and establishing positive consequences for compliance.

But the ICG’s recommendations, and the discussion on the USIP panel, make it very clear that these objectives will be difficult to meet in a way that satisfies both parties. The two sides disagree on even basic elements of the talks; as Kahl explained, the Iranian government rejects the P5+1’s continued focus on Iranian “breakout capacity” because it has officially sworn off of any military application of its nuclear program. The P5+1 does not accept those assurances, but Iran also has legitimate questions as to why other countries with civilian nuclear programs have not been subject to the same requirements that Iran has faced.

The USIP panel seemed to reach a general consensus that the biggest remaining hurdles to a comprehensive deal revolve around Iran’s uranium enrichment program. This includes both Iran’s capacity for enrichment and the amount of enriched uranium it will be allowed to stockpile; the level of access that Iran will permit to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspectors; and the timing of and conditions for sanctions relief.

The P5+1 are seeking to maximize the limits on Iran’s nuclear program and the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear sites while maintaining sanctions at a high level for a considerable period of time, perhaps decades. Iran, obviously, is seeking the opposite – minimal limits on its nuclear program in return for considerable sanctions relief and only a short period in which its program is subject to international monitoring. As the ICG report put it, “it would appear that the P5+1’s maximum — in terms of both what it considers a tolerable residual Iranian nuclear capability and the sanctions relief it is willing to provide — falls short of Iran’s minimum.”

The single biggest complication to these talks is the utter lack of trust on both sides. As Nader argued, mutual trust is not a requirement for success and the lack of trust can be worked around with stringent inspections requirements and firm commitments to agreed-upon sanctions relief. But that lack of trust adds considerable complexity and difficulty to the negotiations. Iran is ultimately being asked to prove a negative, that it has no nuclear weapons program, and because the P5+1 do not trust Iran to uphold its promises, demands for monitoring requirements and caps on nuclear capacity may simply be too much for Iran to accept.

This is particularly true given a domestic political environment that Nader termed “poisonous,” with Iranian hardliners increasingly concerned about President Hassan Rouhani’s commitment to protecting Iran’s interests in these negotiations, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for the talks vulnerable to shifting political winds.

Iran will also have difficulty trusting the P5+1 to uphold its end of a deal to reduce sanctions assuming that Iran meets, and continues to meet, its obligations. Indeed, Cirincione pointed out today out that western banks, fearful of running afoul of sanctions laws, have still not released the Iranian assets that were unfrozen under the terms of last November’s “Joint Plan of Action.” The challenge of getting a final deal through a potentially hostile US Congress, particularly in an election year, could also give Iran reason for concern.

Yet failed talks could be disastrous for both sides, according to the ICG. Failure now would make another attempt at negotiations very unlikely, would result in new punitive measures against Iran (including new sanctions on an already sputtering economy, and potential military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites), and could ultimately push Tehran to rush for a nuclear weapon, something which everyone, including Iran, says they don’t want.

Election Day in the United States was — as it has been since 1845 — a Tuesday, which meant that it also coincided with “Terror Tuesday,” the label attached to the meetings held by President Obama and his inner national security circle to discuss and authorize drone strikes based on the Administration’s [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Election Day in the United States was — as it has been since 1845 — a Tuesday, which meant that it also coincided with “Terror Tuesday,” the label attached to the meetings held by President Obama and his inner national security circle to discuss and authorize drone strikes based on the Administration’s secretive “targeted kill lists.” Shortly after the election results came in, it was reported that the US almost certainly carried out a targeted killing operation in Yemen against a reported al Qaeda target in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The individual targeted, ’Adnan al-Qadhi, who is said to have been killed along with 2 other AQAP suspects, was reportedly suspected of helping plan the 2008 Embassy Sana’a bombing.

As usual, there has been no independent verification for Yemeni claims that the three men were killed.

Yemen-watcher Gregory Johnson noted on his blog Waq al-Waq that the strike suggested there would be little reevaluation of the drone program — being carried out over Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and in the coming weeks, Mali and Libya — even though it continues to raise costs not wholly justified by reported successes:

So, even if the accusations against al-Qadhi were true and he was involved in the 2008 US Embassy attack and even if the US did have intelligence that he was about to carry out an attack on US personnel in Yemen or planning a strike against the US – did the US also have intelligence that all of the other individuals within the car were also involved?

This is important.  The US has carried out, by my best estimate, between 37 – 50 strikes this year in an attempt to kill 10 – 15 people.  Many of those 10 – 15 people are still alive (see: Nasir al-Wihayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi, Ibrahim Asiri and so on) but people are dying in Yemen.

And while we in the US may not feel or realize this, it is very real in Yemen.  And this is causing problems and – I continue to say – is one of the key reasons behind the rapid growth of al-Qaeda in Yemen. 

There are, however, some signs suggesting the program will be reevaluated by the President and his White House advisers as calls mount for greater scrutiny.

It would be difficult for the Administration to scale back a program it has invested so heavily in and touted without actually admitting to too much, Stephen Walt blogged, following Obama’s victory. He went on:

I fear that re-election will convince his team that they’ve basically got the right formula: drones, special forces, covert action, secrecy, etc., combined with a very cautious approach to diplomacy. This is certainly preferable to the follies of the Bush administration, but it also means that the U.S. will be engaged in lots of trouble spots but unable to resolve any of them.

Greg Miller, the author of the Washington Post‘s recent insider account of the intra-Administration debate on expanding the drone program, had also noted that the debate was rather circumscribed: “[t]here were a couple dissenters who had a seat at the table … They lost those seats at the table.”

The program has again received a full-throated endorsement from the Center for a New American Security — a think tank close to the Obama Administration — as the lesser evil in comparison to deploying Pakistani or American forces to to carry out ground offensives.

Spencer Ackerman, writing at Wired, suggests a debate could occur due to diplomatic considerations, but with few officially put-forward alternatives in play:

“There is a recognition within the administration that the current trajectory of drone strikes is unsustainable,” [Michael] Zenko [of the Council on Foreign Relations] says. “They are opposed in countries where strikes occur and globally, and that opposition could lead to losing host-nation support for current or future drone bases or over-flight rights.” In other words, tomorrow’s America diplomats may find that drones overshadow the routine geopolitical agenda they seek to advance. The trouble is, the administration’s early search for less-lethal policies to supplement or supplant the drones isn’t promising.”

Michele Flournoy, who served from 2009 to 2012 as the first female Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was described as one of “the new realists” by the New York Observer, distinguishing her from Clinton Administration “liberal interventionists”, though like them she argued for “forward engagement” by the US abroad, especially in [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Michele Flournoy, who served from 2009 to 2012 as the first female Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was described as one of “the new realists” by the New York Observer, distinguishing her from Clinton Administration “liberal interventionists”, though like them she argued for “forward engagement” by the US abroad, especially in the Middle East, and warned against the rapid drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan. In this interview with The Chronicle, she offers some comments on the Administration’s Syrian strategy (or lack thereof):

The Syria situation is much more complex and difficult in the sense that you have a divided opposition, you have a division of opinion on the part of the surrounding countries as to whether they want any outside intervention, you have Russia and China clearly opposing any U.N. sanctioning of any intervention and you have a much more capable military on the ground.

It is less clear in the case of Syria whether an intervention would actually help the situation or whether it would make it worse. Instead, the Obama administration has focused on providing humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people on the ground, pressuring the Assad regime to step down through sanctions and other pressure and working with the opposition so they can build their cohesion. [This way], they can provide a viable alternative to the regime and present a transition plan that actually allows people to change sides and jump on board a new government.

….Whenever you’re thinking about intervention you really have to have a sense of clarity about the mission and how the intervention will actually get you to a better position over time.

Again, in Syria, the opposition has not wanted outside military intervention, they wanted support. I think the administration along with several of our international partners are providing that. But it’s always a combination of factors, and each case is unique. I think the administration has had a consistent, principled approach to the Arab Spring, but the truth is each of these countries is in a unique situation and our policy has to be tailored to a case-by-case basis.

Some opposition forums, such as the Syrian National Council and the “Syrian Support Group,” a North American lobby for several anti-Assad militias, have called for direct US military intervention, but the “Free Syrian Army” — increasingly seen as the main fighting force against Assad in Western and Arab capitals — is an umbrella organization and its headquarters in Turkey have not issued an official call for direct foreign intervention.

Turkey allows the FSA to operate on its soil and recently passed a parliamentary measure for “cross-border raids” into Syria after Syrian artillery fire killed Turkish civilians, resulting in a round of shelling against Syrian positions over the border by Turkish forces.

News and views relevant to US Foreign policy for Sept. 14

“Moments of Truth in Libya and Egypt”: Marc Lynch, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, discusses the significance of the protests in Egypt and Libya for US relations. Although the events in Libya – [...]]]> via Lobe Log

News and views relevant to US Foreign policy for Sept. 14

“Moments of Truth in Libya and Egypt”: Marc Lynch, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, discusses the significance of the protests in Egypt and Libya for US relations. Although the events in Libya – where terrorists apparently used the fortuitously-timed public demonstrations as cover for a preplanned operation targeting US diplomats – have seen the Pentagon dispatch drones and warships to the country, Lynch notes that the difference in official and public responses in Egypt and Libya says much about how leaders in these places view US influence over them:

In short, the response from Libya suggests a broad national rejection at both the governmental and societal level of the anti-American agitation. The leaders have said the right things and have done their part to quickly pre-empt a spiral of conflict and recrimination between Americans and Libyans.

…. In Egypt, on the other hand, President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood has been notably invisible. To this point, we have heard no statements from Egyptian government officials condemning the assault on the embassy, no expressions of concern or sympathy, no suggestion of any fault on their own side. The Muslim Brotherhood had previously been planning rallies against the notorious film, and at the time of this writing has not canceled them. Even when they finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Libya, they were not forthcoming on Cairo.

An exchange between the Muslim Brotherhood’s public relations people and the US embassy in Cairo highlighted the differences with respect to Egypt. Though the Brotherhood condemned the attack on the Cairo compound in English, the US Embassy noted that on its Arabic-language social media feeds, the Brothers were praising the men who stormed the Cairo compound and had called for further protests outside of the embassy on Friday.

As Foreign Affairs commented:

The Muslim Brotherhood’s sponsorship of the film protests might be an ill-advised attempt at the diversionary politics Mubarak was a master of, but the costs are high. . If Egypt’s ultra-Salafists take a harder line on the film or manage to co-opt the protests, Morsi could easily lose ground to them.

More protests have since taken place outside US embassies in Tunisia, Sudan and Yemen and have resulted in the breach of the facilities by the protestors. The Obama Administration is now facing further criticism that it had advance warning of threats made against US facilities abroad on 9/11 this year but did not raise alert levels, and over remarks Obama made in a television interview following the Cairo protests stating that while the US did not consider Egypt an ally, it also did not consider Egypt an enemy.

Officially, Egypt is classified as a “major non-NATO ally” and receives US$1.5 billion in military assistance annually. The State Department has since walked back the president’s remark.

“Egypt trying to persuade Iran to drop Assad”: The Associated Press reports that the Egyptian government is seeking to work out an exit for the Assads from Syria with Iran’s support, in exchange for normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic:

Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made the offer when he met last month with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, officials close to the Egyptian presidency said. Morsi’s visit to Iran, to attend a summit of the 120-nation Nonaligned Movement, was the first by an Egyptian president since the 1979 Islamic Revolution there, when diplomatic ties between the countries were cut.
….
Cairo would agree to restore full diplomatic ties, a significant diplomatic prize for Iran given that Egypt is the most populous Arab nation and a regional powerhouse. Morsi would also mediate to improve relations between Iran and conservative Gulf Arab nations that have long viewed Shiite Iran with suspicion and whose fears of the Persian nation have deepened because of Iran’s disputed nuclear program.
….
Morsi’s argument is that neither Assad nor the rebels fighting his regime appear to be capable of winning the civil war, creating a stalemate that could eventually break up the Arab nation with serious repercussions for the entire region, the officials said.

“Israel’s window for action against Iran ‘is getting much smaller,’ says Ambassador Oren”: The Times of Israel carries an interview with Israel’s US ambassador, Michael Oren. Questioned by his interviewers as to what isn’t “well between the US and Israel,” Oren downplays the significance of public disputes between the two countries and accusations of partisanship, responding that “in the strategic issues, the spectrum of our common interests and communications is vast”:

When we talk about Iran, we proceed on the assumption that we have a structural difference. The structural difference is that Israel is a small country, living in Iran’s backyard, with certain capabilities. And Israel is threatened almost daily with national annihilation. And of course the United States is a big country, far away from Iran, with much greater capabilities, and not threatened with national annihilation.

…. Clearly, things have been said which might not have been helpful for the situation. But at the same time in the last few weeks the prime minister had telephone conversations with American officials — he had an hour-long conversation with the president the other night — and things are also said not for public consumption. And they are part of this very intimate, candid and continuous dialogue that we have with the United States.
When asked, Oren denied that Netanyahu has been using the elections to push the US further towards Israel’s “red lines.” His boss, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, recently gave a rare interview to The Jerusalem Post – stating much the same – in an apparent effort to deflect criticism that he is rooting for a Republican victory in November.

“Boxer Expresses Disappointment Over Israeli Prime Minister’s Remarks”: Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a widely-reported letter this Wednesday criticizing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for politicizing debate over the Iranian nuclear program. Boxer emphasizes the increased sanctions on Iran and military aid the US has provided to Israel since Obama took office, and asks that he clarify his views of the US-Israel relationship:

In light of this, I am stunned by the remarks that you made this week regarding U.S. support for Israel. Are you suggesting that the United States is not Israel’s closest ally and does not stand by Israel? Are you saying that Israel, under President Obama, has not received more in annual security assistance from the United States than at any time in its history, including for the Iron Dome Missile Defense System?

As other Israelis have said, it appears that you have injected politics into one of the most profound security challenges of our time – Iran’s illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons.

I urge you to step back and clarify your remarks so that the world sees that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel. As you personally stated during an appearance with President Obama in March, “We are you, and you are us. We’re together. So if there’s one thing that stands out clearly in the Middle East today, it’s that Israel and America stand together.”

“Romney’s foreign policy: An ideology that dare not speak its name”: The Washington Post carries an interview with Alex Wong, the foreign policy director for Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign, in which Wong parries questions over whether or not Romney is a neoconservative himself:

Q: Does he embrace neoconservatism?

A: “You know,” said Wong, “throughout this campaign Governor Romney has indicated that his view on the world is peace through strength, American leadership, in guaranteeing an American century, that this new century continues to be an American century. And that’s the governing philosophy of Governor Romney on peace through strength.”

Q: So does he consider himself a neoconservative?

A: “What I’m saying is,” said Wong, “Governor Romney’s embrace of American values and interests and his call for American leadership is a philosophy of peace through strength.”

The interviewer, Jason Horowitz, later commented on the exchange in a separate article:

His [Romney’s] reaction this week [to the violence in Libya and Egypt] made it clear that when it comes to Republican foreign policy, the neocons are still the only game in town.

…. Romney and his advisers — Wong declined to say whether they were consulted before the candidate weighed in on the the embassy chaos — are tripling down on the clear contrasts offered by neoconservatism’s trumpeting of values, which lends itself nicely to campaign seasons but is more complicated in actual governance (see the war in Iraq).

In an interview with Al-Monitor‘s Laura Rozen, the Obama Administration’s former top Pentagon mideast advisor, Colin Kahl, explains why he isn’t writing off Israel’s latest threats about Iran from key Israeli decision-makers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak as mere saber-rattling:

Al-Monitor: Why are the arguments that it is [...]]]> via Lobe Log

In an interview with Al-Monitor‘s Laura Rozen, the Obama Administration’s former top Pentagon mideast advisor, Colin Kahl, explains why he isn’t writing off Israel’s latest threats about Iran from key Israeli decision-makers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak as mere saber-rattling:

Al-Monitor: Why are the arguments that it is not just saber-rattling more compelling?

Kahl: First, US and European sanctions have nearly maxed out. So what additional benefit does the saber-rattling produce here? Second, the P5+1 process is on hold for the moment and a major breakthrough on the accelerated timeline envisioned by the Israelis is unlikely. Not to mention the fact that some Israeli decision- makers seem skeptical of the benefits of diplomacy, period. Third, despite the saber-rattling, the Iranians don’t fear an Israeli strike (although they might fear a US strike). So Tehran isn’t likely to make a concession in the near-term just because of an Israeli threat.

Finally, the Israelis would seem to know that the prospect of a US strike before the [November 6 US presidential] election is very low, regardless of their posture. This is not primarily for political reasons, as some suggest, but because Iran is not likely to cross US red lines this year. So the prospect of an Israeli attack is unlikely to drive Obama to war before November.

So, I think it is more likely Israeli leaders are preparing the Israeli public for a strike, and creating a narrative for the international community that diplomacy and sanctions have failed and thus Israel has no choice.

Kahl, a Georgetown Professor who is advising the Obama campaign’s foreign policy team, summarized his position about using the “military option” on Iran this June in a report he co-authored for the Washington-based think tank, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS):

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a significant challenge to U.S. and Israeli interests and would increase the prospects for regional conflict. Nevertheless, a preventive military strike against Iran’s nuclear program by either the United States or Israel at this time is not the best option, and rushing to war would risk making the threat worse.

“Although Israel’s leaders frequently lament all the Iran ‘chitchat,’ make no mistake: It’s they who are fueling the discussion,” the Associated Press notes in a report on “Israel plunged into unprecedented debate on Iran war.”

The United States’ “red line” on Iran (an Iranian nuclear weapon), which differs from Israel’s “red line” (Iranian nuclear weapon capability), is one reason why the U.S. remains reluctant to give in to the Israeli pressure campaign. From the CNAS report:

Until Iran appears poised to weaponize its nuclear capability, however, the preferable option is to continue the current combination of pressure and diplomacy. All options, including preventive military action, should remain on the table, but policymakers should recognize that the potential risks and costs associated with using force are high. Military action should remain a last resort, which should be contemplated only by the United States and only under stringent conditions.

Kahl tells Rozen that the two Israeli leaders are convinced that they have to rely on themselves when it comes to dealing with Iran — another Israeli-pushed narrative that’s being reinforced by U.S.-based Israel advocates like Jennifer Rubin — and while that may be the juiciest part of the interview, the following stood out for me (emphasis mine):

Al-Monitor: It’s worth noting these arguments are being made primarily in the Israeli media, as opposed to the international media — The New York Times, CNN, etc. as in the past. This is an argument being made to the Israeli public.

Kahl: It’s very interesting… One explanation may be that it is an intentional effort to condition the Israeli public. Israel appears to be going through the Iraq dynamic we in the United States went through in 2002-2003 [ahead of the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq]. And as Time’s Tony Karon noted the other day, there are only so many times you can tell the Israeli public that they face a “grave and gathering threat of annihilation” before Israeli politicians, for the sake of their credibility at home and abroad, have no choice but to act.

While a nuclear-armed Iran would [...]]]> The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has released a report called “Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb” and it’s a breath of fresh air compared to the output of Iran-focused think tanks that we’ve been covering here. Writes Jim Lobe for IPS News:

While a nuclear-armed Iran would pose significant new challenges to the United States and Israel, a military attack by either country to prevent Tehran from developing a weapon could well prove counter-productive, according to a major new report released here Wednesday by a think tank close to the administration of President Barack Obama.

And while preventive military action should remain on the table, it should only be considered if Iran “has made a clear move toward weaponization”, and there is a “reasonable expectation” that such a strike would set back Iran’s programme “significantly”, among other conditions, according to the 55-page report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

The report, “Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb,” also argues that both the U.S. and Israel should avoid taking any steps that limit prospects for a negotiated agreement designed to dissuade Tehran from “weaponising” its nuclear programme.

In particular, they should not insist – as Israel and its backers in the U.S. Congress are doing – that Tehran end all uranium enrichment on its own territory as a condition of any negotiated settlement since such a stance “would most likely result in no deal at all”, according to the report, whose lead author, Colin Kahl, served as the Pentagon’s top Middle East policy-maker under Obama until January.

Read more.

WASHINGTON, Feb 25, 2011 (IPS) – In a distinct echo of the tactics they pursued to encourage U.S. intervention in the Balkans and Iraq, a familiar clutch of neo-conservatives appealed Friday for the United States and NATO to “immediately” prepare military action to help bring down the regime of Libyan leader [...]]]> From the wire:

WASHINGTON, Feb 25, 2011 (IPS) – In a distinct echo of the tactics they pursued to encourage U.S. intervention in the Balkans and Iraq, a familiar clutch of neo-conservatives appealed Friday for the United States and NATO to “immediately” prepare military action to help bring down the regime of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and end the violence that is believed to have killed well over a thousand people in the past week.

The appeal, which came in the form of a letter signed by 40 policy analysts, including more than a dozen former senior officials who served under President George W. Bush, was organised and released by the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), a two-year-old neo-conservative group that is widely seen as the successor to the more-famous – or infamous – Project for the New American Century (PNAC).

Warning that Libya stood “on the threshold of a moral and humanitarian catastrophe”, the letter, which was addressed to President Barack Obama, called for specific immediate steps involving military action, in addition to the imposition of a number of diplomatic and economic sanctions to bring “an end to the murderous Libyan regime”.

In particular, it called for Washington to press NATO to “develop operational plans to urgently deploy warplanes to prevent the regime from using fighter jets and helicopter gunships against civilians and carry out other missions as required; (and) move naval assets into Libyan waters” to “aid evacuation efforts and prepare for possible contingencies;” as well as “(e)stablish the capability to disable Libyan naval vessels used to attack civilians.”

Among the letter’s signers were former Bush deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Bush’s top global democracy and Middle East adviser; Elliott Abrams; former Bush speechwriters Marc Thiessen and Peter Wehner; Vice President Dick Cheney‘s former deputy national security adviser, John Hannah, as well as FPI’s four directors: Weekly Standard editor William Kristol; Brookings Institution fellow Robert Kagan; former Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman Dan Senor; and former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman.

It was Kagan and Kristol who co-founded and directed PNAC in its heyday from 1997 to the end of Bush’s term in 2005.

The letter comes amid growing pressure on Obama, including from liberal hawks, to take stronger action against Gaddafi.

Two prominent senators whose foreign policy views often reflect neo-conservative thinking, Republican John McCain and Independent Democrat Joseph Lieberman, called Friday in Tel Aviv for Washington to supply Libyan rebels with arms, among other steps, including establishing a no-fly zone over the country.

On Wednesday, Obama said his staff was preparing a “full range of options” for action. He also announced that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will meet fly to Geneva Monday for a foreign ministers’ meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Council to discuss possible multilateral actions.

“They want to keep open the idea that there’s a mix of capabilities they can deploy – whether it’s a no-fly zone, freezing foreign assets of Gaddafi’s family, doing something to prevent the transport of mercenaries (hired by Gaddafi) to Libya, targeting sanctions against some of his supporters to persuade them to abandon him,” said Steve Clemons of the New America Foundation, who took part in a meeting of independent foreign policy analysts, including Abrams, with senior National Security Council staff at the White House Thursday.

During the 1990s, neo-conservatives consistently lobbied for military pressure to be deployed against so-called “rogue states”, especially in the Middle East.

After the 1991 Gulf War, for example, many “neo-cons” expressed bitter disappointment that U.S. troops stopped at the Kuwaiti border instead of marching to Baghdad and overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein.

When the Iraqi president then unleashed his forces against Kurdish rebels in the north and Shia insurgents in the south, they – along with many liberal interventionist allies – pressed President George H.W. Bush to impose “no-fly zones” over both regions and take additional actions – much as they are now proposing for Libya – designed to weaken the regime’s military repressive capacity.

Those actions set the pattern for the 1990s. To the end of the decade, neo-conservatives, often operating under the auspices of a so-called “letterhead organisation”, such as PNAC, worked – often with the help of some liberal internationalists eager to establish a right of humanitarian intervention – to press President Bill Clinton to take military action against adversaries in the Balkans (in Bosnia and then Kosovo) as well as Iraq.

Within days of 9/11, for example, PNAC issued a letter signed by 41 prominent individuals – almost all neo-conservatives, including 10 of the Libya letter’s signers – that called for military action to “remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq”, as well as retaliation against Iran and Syria if they did not immediately end their support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

PNAC and its associates subsequently worked closely with neo-conservatives inside the Bush administration, including Abrams, Wolfowitz, and Edelman, to achieve those aims.

While neo-conservatives were among the first to call for military action against Gaddafi in the past week, some prominent liberals and rights activists have rallied to the call, including three of the letter’s signatories: Neil Hicks of Human Rights First; Bill Clinton’s human rights chief, John Shattuck; and Leon Wieseltier of The New Republic, who also signed the PNAC Iraq letter 10 years ago.

In addition, Anne-Marie Slaughter, until last month the influential director of the State Department’s Policy Planning office, cited the U.S.-NATO Kosovo campaign as a possible precedent. “The international community cannot stand by and watch the massacre of Libyan protesters,” she wrote on Twitter. “In Rwanda we watched. In Kosovo we acted.”

Such comments evoked strong reactions from some military experts, however.

“I’m horrified to read liberal interventionists continue to suggest the ease with which humanitarian crises and regional conflicts can be solved by the application of military power,” wrote Andrew Exum, a counter-insurgency specialist at the Center for a New American Security, about Wieseltier. “To speak so glibly of such things reflects a very immature understanding of the limits of force and the difficulties and complexities of contemporary military operations.”

Other commentators noted that a renewed coalition of neo- conservatives and liberal interventionists would be much harder to put together now than during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.

“We now have Iraq and Afghanistan as warning signs, as well as our fiscal crisis, so I don’t think there’s an enormous appetite on Capitol Hill or among the public for yet another military engagement,” said Charles Kupchan, a foreign policy specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

“I support diplomatic and economic sanctions, but I would stop well short of advocating military action, including the imposition of a no-fly zone,” he added, noting, in any event, that most of the killing in Libya this week has been carried out by mercenaries and paramilitaries on foot or from vehicles.

“There may be some things we can do – such as airlifting humanitarian supplies to border regions where there are growing number of refugees, but I would do so only with the full support of the Arab League and African Union, if not the U.N.,” said Clemons.

“(The neo-conservatives) are essentially pro-intervention, pro-war, without regard to the costs to the country,” he told IPS. “They don’t recognise that we’re incredibly over- extended and that the kinds of things they want us to do actually further weaken our already-eroded stock of American power.”

Tom Ricks, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) senior fellow, adds his take to the list of disastrous scenarios which could follow an Israeli attack on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.