by Jim Lobe

I suppose this is something to be welcomed, but David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee Casey — who spent a good part of the George W. Bush administration offering legalistic defenses in the National Review and on the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal of the “global war [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

I suppose this is something to be welcomed, but David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee Casey — who spent a good part of the George W. Bush administration offering legalistic defenses in the National Review and on the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal of the “global war on terrorism” in every single aspect, including, of course, the “anticipatory self-defense” by the US in invading Iraq, and who have long accused “the Left,” Palestinians, and other presumed enemies of the United States of waging “lawfare” against Washington’s freedom of action to do anything it likes around the world — yesterday published their latest politico-legal analysis in the Journal in strong support of waging lawfare against Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It’s entitled, “The Outlaw Vladimir Putin,” and among other things, it calls for Washington and its allies to challenge the legality of Russia’s actions “in every conceivable legal venue, whether domestic or international,” including the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the same body that ruled in favor of Nicaragua in the case of the CIA’s mining of its harbors back during the Contra War, and against Israel in the case brought by the Palestine Authority against the “Separation Wall.” The defendants in each case ignored the rulings, although President George H.W. Bush eventually quietly agreed to settle the Nicaragua case for $12 million. Rivkin and Casey worked in the Justice Department for both Ronald Reagan, who was responsible for the mining, and Bush I.

What’s remarkable about the op-ed, aside from their advocacy of lawfare (although they don’t use the term), is their seeming lack of self-consciousness about Washington’s own record over the last 30 years or so. For example,

Now Russia has demonstrated that military force in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, may well remain the only reliable means of protection against hostile actions by larger, more powerful states. … This development is certain to have profoundly destabilizing consequences worldwide.

Or:

Russia’s behavior, and its legal and institutional justifications are dangerously destabilizing the existing international system. What is the likely result? The use of force around the world will be encouraged, and the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons magnified.

Well, all of that is true. But what if we replaced “Russia” in that sentence with “the United States” in reference to its invasion of Iraq? Of course, Rivkin and Casey would argue, as they have in the past, that the Iraq war was entirely justifiable as a case of “anticipatory self-defense,” but frankly even if you accept their argument (which is awfully far-fetched given the lack of any serious, let alone imminent, threat posed by Baghdad in 2003), there’s no doubt that the invasion has had “profoundly destabilizing consequences,” particularly given the fact that Putin himself cited it as an important precedent and an example of Washington’s hypocrisy.

Similarly, the authors take offense at Moscow’s demands that, among other things, Ukraine make Russian the country’s second “official” language, ban certain nationalist political parties, and become neutral and non-allied. They insist that these demands “clearly violate the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs enshrined in the U.N. Charter and customary international law.” Now think of the innumerable times that Washington has demanded certain changes in the domestic and foreign relations of weaker countries as conditions for friendly relations and/or aid. Do Mssrs Rivkin and Casey consider, for example, US demands for the extradition of drug traffickers from Mexico or changes in Uganda’s draconian law against LGBT individuals or other countries to cut oil purchases from Iran to be violations of the principle of nonintervention? I’d be very surprised if they did.

They argue that Moscow should also be held accountable for its alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions and the laws of war which, of course, are precisely the international legal standards that Washington stands accused of abusing by national and international human rights groups in its conduct of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention its use of drones to eliminate targets in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. Of course, their interpretations of these laws, when applied to US actions, tend to be quite liberal and forgiving despite the not inconsiderable number of innocent men, women, and children who have been killed by US forces in these conflicts. Moscow’s use of troops who have removed their Russian insignia, as well as the failure to promptly repatriate captured Ukrainian troops and equipment from Crimea, however, should be considered “major violations” of the laws of war and treated accordingly despite the fact that Moscow’s takeover of Crimea was conducted relatively peacefully and virtually with no bloodshed.

Now, I don’t mean to be justifying anything Russia has done and agree completely with the authors that the Russian action sets a terrible precedent. But, during their service in government, the United States, among other things, carried out covert wars against Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola, invaded Grenada (on the totally phony pretext of protecting US medical students there), and Panama. During the last 12 years, they defended wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and virtually all of the abuses, including “enhanced interrogation techniques,” associated with those. As I said, there’s a certain lack of self-consciousness here, which is rather typical of neoconservatives.

But, by all means, we should take the Russians to the ICJ. That could be a very useful precedent.

Photo: President George W. Bush and former President George H. W. Bush greet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Bush family house in Kennebunkport, Maine, in July 2007. Credit: AFP/Getty Images/Jim Watson

by Derek Davison

Crimeans voted “overwhelmingly” to secede from Ukraine and join Russia in a March 16 referendum. The Obama administration declared shortly after that “the international community will not recognize the results of a poll administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Derek Davison

Crimeans voted “overwhelmingly” to secede from Ukraine and join Russia in a March 16 referendum. The Obama administration declared shortly after that “the international community will not recognize the results of a poll administered under threats of violence and intimidation from a Russian military intervention that violates international law.”

Crimean secession proceeds

Exit polls taken during Sunday’s referendum suggested that around 93% of voters supported the option to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia over the option to assert Crimean sovereignty under the terms of the 1992 Crimean constitution. There was no option in the referendum to maintain the peninsula’s status quo with respect to Ukraine. Crimea’s Tatar community planned to boycott the vote, though recent Russian efforts to reach out to the Crimean Tatars, through representatives of Russia’s related Volga Tatar community, may be easing the concerns that Crimea’s Tatars have around union with Russia. Large pro-Russian crowds reportedly gathered in the Crimean cities of Sevastopol and Simferopol to celebrate the results of the vote.

Diplomatic condemnation of the referendum from the United States and Europe was swift. On Saturday, before the referendum, the United Nations Security Council considered a resolution declaring Crimea’s referendum illegal, which was vetoed by Russia after China abstained and every other Security Council member voted in favor. On Sunday, President Barack Obama spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone, and according to the White House read-out of the call, “[h]e emphasized that Russia’s actions were in violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and that, in coordination with our European partners, [the United States is] prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions.” Top Obama advisor Dan Pfeffer told reporters that the US is preparing to impose sanctions against Russian officials, including asset freezes and visa bans. The European Union seems prepared to consider similar actions, and EU foreign ministers are scheduled to meet in Brussels later this month to discuss next steps. Putin countered that the legal framework for Crimea’s secession was established by Kosovo’s secession from Serbia in 2008, and reportedly insisted to Merkel that the referendum was “in full compliance with international law.”

What happens now?

Amid concerns that the referendum’s outcome would quickly lead to a military confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian forces, it seems a temporary pause may have been achieved. According to Reuters, Ukraine’s acting defense minister told reporters on Sunday that “[a]n agreement has been reached with (Russia’s) Black Sea Fleet and the Russian Defence Ministry on a truce in Crimea until March 21.” It’s unclear what a “truce” means in this situation, when there have yet been no sustained acts of violence between Russian and Ukrainian forces, and when the Russian government officially continues to deny the presence of any Russian troops in Crimea beyond those stationed at its Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol.

Russia has yet to formally agree to annex Crimea, and leading Russian politicians have given verbal support to Crimean independence, but Putin has previously said that Russia has “no plans” to annex the peninsula. A decision to annex Crimea would bring with it an immediate crisis, given that the peninsula is almost entirely dependent upon the Ukrainian mainland for its electricity, fuel, and fresh water. If Russia does elect to annex the region, it may have no choice but to engage in negotiations with the new Ukrainian government, whose legitimacy it has thus far refused to recognize, over maintaining those services in Crimea until Russia can build the infrastructure to provide them instead.

Russia may also attempt to seize other parts of Ukraine outside of Crimea, which could render Crimea’s utility vulnerabilities moot. On Saturday, for example, Russian forces seized a Ukrainian natural gas terminal just north of Crimea, and Ukrainian forces reportedly surrounded the terminal in response. Russian media declared that Crimean “self-defense forces” had seized the terminal in response to the Ukrainian government cutting off the supply of gas to parts of Crimea. Pro-Russian demonstrators clashed with Ukrainian security forces in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk, and two eastern Ukrainian cities carried out informal referendums similar to the one in Crimea; these events raised the possibility that Russian intervention could spread from Crimea to the eastern part of mainland Ukraine. Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city and another eastern region with a large number of Russians, has also seen demonstrations in favor of closer ties to Moscow. Russian troops are reported to be massing along its Ukrainian border, and the Ukrainian government has taken steps to form a National Guard and to mobilize military reserves, veterans, and volunteers.

On Monday, the Obama administration announced sanctions (travel bans and asset freezes) against 11 individuals, “to impose costs on named individuals who wield influence in the Russian government and those responsible for the deteriorating situation in Ukraine.” Included in this first round of sanctions are Dimitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister for defense issues; Valentina Matviyenko, head of the upper house of Russia’s parliament; Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov; and former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The EU announced sanctions targeting 21 individuals, including Aksyonov, Rogozin, and Matviyenko, but the full list was not immediately available.

Western governments continue to threaten Russia with further sanctions against its interests, but European fears that Russia will cut off its supply of natural gas to Europe in response to draconian actions have complicated the situation. Natural gas exports from the United States are seen as one possible way for Europe to wean itself from Russian gas, but it is very unlikely that US exports could do much to alleviate the pain of a Russian shut-off, at least in the immediate future. On the other hand, analysts are pointing to the fact that Russia depends to a large degree on its oil and gas sales to Europe, and to the fact that Russian businesses have considerable ties to Western banks, to suggest that Russia’s vulnerability to sanctions may be higher, and its ability to punish those sanctions more limited, than has previously been assumed.

Western governments have also promised that financial and possibly military assistance will be provided to Ukraine. The US has pledged at least $1 billion in aid to Ukraine to help stabilize the government, but the measure authorizing those funds has been caught up in Congressional wrangling for several days and will be reconsidered when Congress returns to session on March 24.

Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry addresses reporters before meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in London on March 14, 2014