by Adnan Tabatabai
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani arrived in New York yesterday with the clear understanding that he’s being carefully watched back home. The official purpose of his trip is to address the United Nations General Assembly, but much more is at stake. Rouhani made solving the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program the centerpiece of his presidential campaign, but while the Nov. 24 deadline to reach a final accord is steadily approaching, no deal is in sight. Meanwhile the president of the United States—essentially Iran’s main negotiating partner in the talks—is facing growing pressure to develop a coherent strategy against the radical militia that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL). The course of the next few months could define both leaders’ presidential legacies.
No matter how you look at it, resolving both these issues requires a modus operandi between Iran and the United States. Bilateral talks between the two long-time adversaries have almost become routine over the last year; the latest meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry lasted for more than an hour Sunday in New York. But the debate over the definition of a “functional relationship” with Washington is among the most sensitive issues in Iran with competing political factions exercising extreme skepticism against each other.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is (and has always been) trying to cover all his bases: those backing the Rouhani government’s path towards constructive engagement, and those for whom rapprochement with the US is a red line.
Last week, an infographic published on the ayatollah’s website illustrated why talks with the US in the past 12 months have been harmful to Iran. Two days later, a compilation of quotes by the Supreme Leader supporting the negotiations was published on the same site.
Critics Seek Center Stage
Some of the Rouhani government’s most outspoken opponents convened on Monday for yet another press conference in Tehran to voice their concerns about Iran’s foreign policy. Since May this year, these hard-line conservative MPs, clerics and think tankers—also known as “the concerned” (delvaapasaan)—have routinely set up meetings whenever a new round of nuclear talks is taking place between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1).
Through lectures and a Q&A session with journalists, the panelists of the “Path and Pit” meeting outlined the “dos and don’ts” for Rouhani’s trip and warned against yet another “inappropriate action”—their reference to Rouhani’s last-minute telephone conversation with US President Barack Obama during last year’s UNGA.
The concerns identified by the delvaapasaan are based on a variety of issues that extend far beyond the nuclear negotiations. The group mainly criticizes the Rouhani government for:
- Abandoning resistance as the main theme defining foreign affairs
- Leaning towards appeasement vis-à-vis Washington
- Selling out Iran’s right to scientific progress in the nuclear talks
- Falling short of informing the parliament about the nuclear talks
- Not allowing a critical debate about their foreign policy in the media
- Not following the path outlined by the supreme leader
Panelist Mohammad Hassan Asafari, a member of the parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs, credited Iran’s “strong” position in the region to its policies of resistance and expressed worries about Rouhani’s approach to ending the sanctions regime. “We should not show the enemy that we are eager for the sanctions to be lifted,” he said. “It would pave the way for the enemy’s benefit if Iran looks too keen.”
Hamid Rasai, a MP and leading member of the hard-line Endurance Front who got one of Rouhani’s ministers impeached, argued that direct talks with the United States have not only resulted in no benefit but also been followed by harsher rhetoric from Washington and additional unilateral sanctions.
Rasai also stressed that “Rouhani should know he is the president of the Islamic Republic, not just the president of the people of Iran.” He must therefore seize the opportunity provided by the UNGA “to spread our message to the world”—which former President Ahmadinejad managed to do, according to Rasai.
Mohammad Ali Ramin, a former deputy minister under Ahmadinejad, argued that the group is not only concerned about the nuclear issue but also about the broader picture in which the supreme leader is the Imam of the global umma (community) and not just the Iranian nation. Rouhani should therefore recognize that he is “administering just a corner of that umma” and consider the leader’s viewpoints, said Ramin.
The last speaker in the group, University of Tehran Professor Saeed Zibakalam, said he expects the Rouhani government to whitewash Washington’s position towards Iran, and criticized the negotiating team for substantially exaggerating the benefits of the Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva last year. The plan does not acknowledge Iran’s right to enrich uranium and no sanctions were lifted, argued Zibakalam.
Asked by journalists to identify the difference between the current and previous administration on Iran’s nuclear file, Rasai said that under Ahmadinejad, the nuclear issue was taken care of by the Supreme National Security Council, whereas now it is processed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it is under the scrutiny of “no one but Rouhani”.
Rasai further complained about state media being controlled by a government that he said prevents critical debate and criticized other media for promoting rapprochement with the United States. Rasai even asked a journalist from the reformist daily Etemad why his paper is “waiting for Rouhani to have a meeting with the Satan.”
Rasai and Zibakalam both agreed that the Iranian people would not accept bowing down to the US and would oust any president who attempted to do so.
Political Realities
The meeting was yet another indicator that criticism of Iran’s foreign policy goals has reached a new peak on the home front.
In recent days, far-right conservative outlets like Fars News, Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrouz and Raja News ran features and op-eds warning against the acceptance of a nuclear deal limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment and any rapprochement with the United States.
Indeed, almost immediately after it was reported by the New York Times, public opposition was voiced in Iran to a “face-saving” proposal that would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges in place but suspend operations. “This proposal is ridiculous…If such a proposal is formally presented by American officials, it indicates their childish outlook on the negotiations or the stupid assumptions of the Iranian side,” said Hossein Sheikholeslam, a deputy to the speaker of parliament, according to Fars News.
As I wrote two months ago, the Rouhani administration is not desperate for a deal—especially not one that would be difficult to sell at home.
A recent poll suggests that more than 70% of the Iranian public would not accept a deal that forces Iran to dismantle up to half of its operating centrifuges and limit its nuclear research capacities. A large majority of Iranians also believe that their nuclear program is just an excuse for foreign powers to exert pressure on Iran, according to the poll.
Regardless of whether or not the survey’s methodology is reliable (accurate polling is hard to come by when it comes to Iran), the overall results reflect what one would hear and read in Iran.
While hope persists, we should not expect another big step with regards to US-Iran relations during Rouhani’s trip to New York this year—no phonecall, no handshake, and no joint press conference.
Even if there were a political breakthrough—which seems unlikely at this point—the timing isn’t right. Such political staging would result in harsh political blowback in Washington and Tehran for both presidents.
We should therefore expect the nuclear talks as well as any debate on fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq to be conducted in a private and prudent fashion.
Meanwhile, Iran has been making history with other world powers. The meeting today between Rouhani and French President Francois Hollande was widely publicized by both countries. The expected meeting between Rouhani and British Prime Minister David Cameron would be the first of its kind in 35 years.
Iran’s international outreach should not be interpreted as solely bent on rapprochement with the United States. In this light, Rouhani has a lot to gain from his second visit to New York deal or no deal.
Right now, meeting w/ the President of #France @fhollande re expansion of bilateral ties. #ConstructiveEngagement pic.twitter.com/1QxwADd26e
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) September 23, 2014
by Robert E. Hunter
Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets. This would not be an open-ended intervention. We would not put boots on the ground. Instead, our action would be designed to be limited in duration and scope.
I’ve [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets. This would not be an open-ended intervention. We would not put boots on the ground. Instead, our action would be designed to be limited in duration and scope.
I’ve made a second decision: I will seek authorization for the use of force from the American people’s representatives in Congress….this morning, I spoke with all four congressional leaders, and they’ve agreed to schedule a debate and then a vote as soon as Congress comes back into session.
–President Barack Obama, August 31, 2013
President Barack Obama’s announcement this weekend that he has “decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets” is remarkable for many reasons, in particular because he coupled it with a commitment to “seek authorization for the use of force from…Congress.”
The first remarkable element is that he has already taken the decision to strike before fully engaging Congress, instead of the usual practice of reserving judgment on possible military action until that process is complete. This immediately begs the question “What if Congress balks?” Does the president go ahead anyway? And if Congress turns him down — after all, he is not “consulting” but “seek[ing] authorization” — does that affect his (and America’s) credibility, as the author of the “red line” against the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government? Proponents of a military strike are already making that point, although, in this writer’ judgment, it is grossly overdrawn, and no one who wishes us ill should put much weight on this proposition.
The best counterargument is that, at a time when the UN and others are still assembling evidence on the use of chemical weapons (undeniable) and “who did it” (probably the Syrian government), waiting awhile is not a bad thing. Obama covered the point about risk of delay by citing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “…that our capacity to execute this mission is not time-sensitive; it will be effective tomorrow, or next week, or one month from now.” Taking the time “to be sure” is thus useful; as is the value in trying to build support in Congress, especially given the clarity of memory about the process leading up to the US-led invasion of Iraq a decade ago, when the intelligence “books” were “cooked” by Bush administration officials, as well as by the British government.
The second remarkable element is that the president did not ask Congress to reconvene in Washington in the next day or two, but is content to wait until members return on September 9th. This provides time for the administration to build its case on Capitol Hill, supporting a decision the president says he has already taken; but it also risks diminishing the perceived sense of importance that his team, notably Secretary of State John Kerry, here and here, has been building about the enormity of what has been done.
A related factor is that the United States will not be responding to a direct assault on the United States or its people abroad, civilian or military, and the case for America’s taking the lead is less about our interests than what, at other times, has been called America’s role as the “indispensable nation.” As has been made clear by all and sundry, if the US does not act, no one else will shoulder the responsibility. But this lack of a direct threat to the nation heightens the president’s need to make his case that the US must take the lead.
The need to make the case to Congress was hammered home by the British parliament’s rejection of a UK role in any attack on Syria, despite the lead taken by Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary William Hague in pressing for military action — and thus helping to “box in” the US president. No doubt, what Parliament did influenced Obama’s decision to get the US Congress firmly on record in supporting his decision to act.
A third remarkable element, though not surprising, is that the administration has apparently given up on the United Nations. To be sure, Russia and China would veto in the Security Council any resolution calling for force; but it would have been common practice — and may yet be done — for the US to apply to the recognized court of world opinion by at least trying, loud and long, to establish an international legal basis for military action, even it fails to achieve UN agreement. There is precedent for this approach, notably over Kosovo in 1998, where the UN failed to act (threat of vetoes), but the US at least made a “college try” and demonstrated the point it sought to make. This made it easier for individual NATO allies to adopt the fudge that each member state could decide for itself the legal basis on which it was prepared to act.
But the most remarkable element of the President’s statement is the likely precedent he is setting in terms of engaging Congress in decisions about the use of force, not just through “consultations,” but in formal authorization. This gets into complex constitutional and legal territory, and will lead many in Congress (and elsewhere) to expect Obama — and his successors — to show such deference to Congress in the future, as, indeed, many members of Congress regularly demand.
But seeking authorization for the use of force from Congress as opposed to conducting consultations has long since become the exception rather than the rule. The last formal congressional declarations of war, called for by Article One of the Constitution, were against Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary on June 4, 1942. Since then, even when Congress has been engaged, it has either been through non-binding resolutions or under the provisions of the War Powers Resolution of November 1973. That congressional effort to regain some lost ground in decisions to send US forces into harm’s way was largely a response to administration actions in the Vietnam War, especially the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 1964, which was actually prepared in draft before the triggering incident. The War Powers Resolution does not prevent a president from using force on his own authority, but only imposes post facto requirements for gaining congressional approval or ending US military action. In the current circumstances, military strikes of a few days’ duration, those provisions would almost certainly not come into play.
There were two basic reasons for abandoning the constitutional provision of a formal declaration of war. One was that such a declaration, once turned on, would be hard to turn off, and could lead to a demand for unconditional surrender (as with Germany and Japan in World War II), even when that would not be in the nation’s interests — notably in the Korean War. The more compelling reason for ignoring this requirement was the felt need, during the Cold War, for the president to be able to respond almost instantly to a nuclear attack on the United States or on very short order to a conventional military attack on US and allied forces in Europe.
With the Cold War now on “the ash heap of history,” this second argument should long since have fallen by the wayside, but it has not. Presidents are generally considered to have the power to commit US military forces, subject to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, which have never been properly tested. But why? Even with the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland, the US did not respond immediately, but took time to build the necessary force and plans to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (and, anyway, if President George W. Bush had asked on 9/12 for a declaration of war, he no doubt would have received it from Congress, very likely unanimously).
As times goes by, therefore, what President Obama said on August 29, 2013 could well be remembered less for what it will mean regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria and more for what it implies for the reestablishment of a process of full deliberation and fully-shared responsibilities with the Congress for decisions of war-peace, as was the historic practice until 1950. This proposition will be much debated, as it should be; but if the president’s declaration does become precedent (as, in this author’s judgment, it should be, except in exceptional circumstances where a prompt military response is indeed in the national interest), he will have done an important and lasting service to the nation, including a potentially significant step in reducing the excessive militarization of US foreign policy.
There would be one added benefit: members of Congress, most of whom know little about the outside world and have not for decades had to take seriously their constitutional responsibilities for declaring war, would be required to become better-informed participants in some of the most consequential decisions the nation has to take, which, not incidentally, also involve risks to the lives of America’s fighting men and women.
Photo Credit: Truthout.org
]]>by Peter Jenkins
Once we came across a man-of-war anchored off the coast.…in the empty immensity of earth, sky and water there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent….There was a touch of insanity in the proceedings. – Joseph Conrad
In preparation for debates in the House of Lords and the House of [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Once we came across a man-of-war anchored off the coast.…in the empty immensity of earth, sky and water there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent….There was a touch of insanity in the proceedings. – Joseph Conrad
In preparation for debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons on 29 August (which turned out to be heart-warming advertisements for parliamentary democracy), the British government released the advice it had received from the Attorney General on the legality of military action to deter and disrupt the further use of chemical weapons by the government of Syria.
The essential passage reads as follows:
If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophes in Syria by deterring and disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is available under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention provided three conditions are met [convincing evidence; no alternative; proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate]
Anticipating this argument on the website of the European Journal of International Law on 28 August, Dapo Akande comes to the conclusion that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is an inadequate legal basis for the use of force in response to the outrages which took place in the suburbs of Damascus on 21 August.
In describing humanitarian intervention as a doctrine, the British Attorney General is trying to suggest that customary international law provides a legal basis for the use of force for humanitarian purposes. This is, however, far from being the case. The UK is in a small minority in advancing this claim.
Most states consider humanitarian use of force to be contrary to the prohibition on the use of force other than in self-defence that is a feature of customary international law (as well as of the UN Charter, absent specific authorization by the Security Council or in self-defence). For a doctrine to become customary international law, the support of a large majority of states is necessary.Furthermore on 28 April 2006 the Security Council adopted a resolution (1674) of which the ante-penultimate paragraph reads:
Notes that the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons and the commission of…violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirms in this regard its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.
The meaning could hardly be clearer. In April 2006, the Security Council, of which the UK is a permanent member, took the view that situations akin to that which arose in Syria on 21 August should be referred to the Council, to allow the Council to decide whether the use of force to redress the situation is necessary and would be appropriate.
The outcome of the 29 August debates is seen in Britain as ruling out UK participation in military action against the Syrian government, absent UN authorization or the emergence of a different set of circumstance requiring parliamentary consideration. The shakiness of the government’s legal case played a part in creating parliamentary resistance to UK involvement in current circumstances.
Is there any chance that legal considerations will deter the use of force by the US, given the existence of at least one diplomatic alternative?
by Robert E. Hunter
In a surprise move, the British parliament has rejected the Government’s motion to provide support for military action against Syria. This was a clear rebuke to Prime Minister David Cameron and, equally, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, William Hague, who as much as any leader anywhere pressed [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
In a surprise move, the British parliament has rejected the Government’s motion to provide support for military action against Syria. This was a clear rebuke to Prime Minister David Cameron and, equally, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, William Hague, who as much as any leader anywhere pressed from early-on for a vigorous response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the government of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad.The decision by parliament did not spring from nowhere. A good deal of public and elite opinion in Britain remains badly bruised by former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s rampant enthusiasm for the US neo-cons’ drive to invade Iraq ten years ago. In a series of enquiries, Blair was badly tarnished – enquires that were not even contemplated in the United States for members of the administration of President George W. Bush who got so much so wrong. In one of the most telling phrases, the Blair government was accused (with reason) of having concocted a “dodgy dossier” to support claims that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. While there was nothing quite as telling as US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN Security Council, which was, in the old British phrase, “economical with the truth,” there were the revelations that intelligence was to be “fixed” around conclusions that the Iraqi WMD did exist. “Fixed,” in this context, meant that the US was determined to go to war, come what may, and the British would go along or, more correctly, would be in the van.
Thus it should not have been that surprising that the lack of clarity in the intelligence picture about the source of the August 21st chemical weapons attacks in Syria led a lot of people in Britain, including in all three major political parties, to express doubts, so much so that the British now have to be ruled out of any military action that the US government might choose to initiate.
Where does this leave President Obama? One senior British leader predicted that the US and perhaps others will go ahead with some form of military action, and they are very likely right. Already, the “commentariat” in Washington has shifted its discussion from the question “whether?” to “when?” and “how?” and has suspended further disbelief about whether this is a good thing.
But not so fast. Questioning does continue on Capitol Hill, on both sides of the aisle, and on several grounds. One could be called the legal niceties – though not so much whether the United Nations would approve of the use of force; its remit has long since gone by the boards for a large fraction of American elected officials, and the Obama administration apparently has already given up on trying to get a UN mandate. The Russians and Chinese would veto any serious resolution in the Security Council – and the British draft tabled this week now can no longer count on the backing of the government that introduced it, a development without precedent in UN history. The idea of going to the General Assembly for an expression of concern about the use of chemical weapons, sufficient for a legal fig-leaf for the Obama administration, is itself a non-starter.
The Capitol Hill legal niceties relate to the role that Congress, or at least a large faction of it, wants to play in any US decision to become engaged actively in hostilities in or over Syria, however limited. This is not so much about the perennial debate over the meaning of the Constitution, which assigns to Congress the sole authority to declare war: that hasn’t been done since December 1941; or even the War Powers Resolution of 1973. It is rather that the average member of Congress, just returning from the so-called “district work period” (AKA holiday), will have had reinforced at least to some degree the rising consensus in the US against yet another war in the Middle East. Iraq is now more or less over; Afghanistan still has a bit of a way to go; and we need to recall that the US, while highly instrumental in forcibly deposing Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi two years ago, was content – indeed a bit anxious – to have that characterized as “leading from behind.”
Even more important, perhaps, is not the question of “who struck John?” The administration says that this was the Assad government, even though it has not fallen into the trap of calling it a “slam dunk,” as the hapless Director of the CIA did in 2003 over Iraq’s supposed WMD. Nor is there questioning on Capitol Hill that there could be a “false flag” involved here – that is, someone acting as agent provocateur in order to bring the US to the point of military action against Assad, even at the cost of more lives lost on the rebel side. Important instead is the difficulty that many observers have in understanding what kind of military attack profile can be designed that will do just enough to chasten the Syrian government against a further use of chemical weapons, but not so much that it will risk tipping the balance in the Syrian civil war, dragging the United States deeply into the conflict, and perhaps leading to the overthrow of the Assad regime – to be replaced by what? The answer to that question is not even “blowing in the wind,” but could very well be those whom the US fears most in the Middle East, the Islamist fundamentalists of the worst stripe, who draw their inspiration and support not from the Saudi Arabian and Qatari governments, though, as Sunnis, they very much want Assad to go, but from wealthy individuals in these countries who bankroll the terrorists. The result is the same, and the US and others, notably Israel, fear the potential consequences.
President Obama has already delayed his impending decision to use force, even though it was telegraphed in highly-colored terms by Secretary of State John Kerry (while Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been working to slow down the rush to judgment). Now Obama has to face that the ally that was most egging him on, at least within the NATO family, is no longer there; and instead of bolstering the US position has considerably weakened it. The domestic US politics may not have changed – the risk that a Democratic president will be accused of being soft or, heaven forfend, is reluctant to use military force other than to good ends – but the most strident of the public defenders abroad that the evidence and the need for action was incontrovertible has not been able to rally his own commitment to act.
The President is also caught by his own hasty remarks of a couple of years ago, both that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a “red line,” and that Assad must go. In neither case did he do anything to back up his remarks – and opponents of deep US military engagement in Syria will not complain about that. In the latter case, however – “Assad must go” – nothing has been worked out politically or diplomatically for Syria’s future that would not, with Assad’s departure, potentially leave the minority Alawites at the brutal mercy of the rebels and especially the “moveable feast” of Sunni terrorists who have now migrated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen to the richer pickings of Syria. In the haste of some in Washington to get the president to redeem his “redline” pledge as soon as possible, the US even cancelled a meeting with the Russians in the Hague on a possible Geneva II set of peace talks; and it even tried to get the UN secretary general to remove the UN inspectors from Syria – as President George W. Bush did regarding Iraq a decade ago, with consequences that still plague the region and the US reputation there.
Perhaps, therefore, what the British parliament has done is a blessing in disguise. Perhaps it will led the US administration to slow down a bit. This is not so much to let the UN determine formally that chemical weapons were used (that does seem certain) or even whether the perpetrator was the Syrian government (that still is most likely), but finally to begin trying seriously to create some sort of diplomatic framework for Syria’s future (even if, as regrettable as that seems, Assad would have to be part of the picture); and as well to start putting together an overarching strategy for the region as a whole, including analysis, planning, and policy for helping to stem the Sunni-Shia civil war in the heart of the region that was relaunched a decade ago when the US – with Britain that time, and a few others – invaded Iraq.
If “think again” is the result of what the parliament in London did on Thursday, maybe it will be possible finally to set US policy toward the Middle East on a solid, strategically-sound footing. And if that means the President has to change his mind regarding the likelihood of military attack, so be it; it would be consonant with his totally-correct statement last week that he is paid by the American people to promote US interests. And if he gets to policies that can do that, by however circuitous a route, that is a good thing.