by Mitchell Plitnick
There are many false clichés about the Israel-Palestine conflict. There are also some very true ones, though these are heard less frequently. Perhaps the most profound of these was proven once again this week: the United States is incapable of playing a positive role in this arena.
There is [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
There are many false clichés about the Israel-Palestine conflict. There are also some very true ones, though these are heard less frequently. Perhaps the most profound of these was proven once again this week: the United States is incapable of playing a positive role in this arena.
There is nothing about that statement that should be controversial. A decades-long line of US politicians and diplomats have spoken of the need to resolve this conflict. In recent years, these statements have often been accompanied by an acknowledgment of the need for “Palestinian self-determination.” But Israel is the one country, among all of the world’s nations, of whom those very same leaders speak in terms of an “unbreakable bond,” a country between whose policies and ours there “is no daylight.”
Let’s say my brother gets in a dispute with someone else, perhaps even someone I am acquainted with. Would anyone think that I would be the appropriate person to mediate that conflict? If my brother also had a lot more money and influence in the conflict, and therefore a fair mediation required a broker who was willing to pressure my brother into compromise because, right or wrong, he does not have incentive to do so, am I the right person for that job?
Of course that would be absurd, yet that is exactly what has been expected of the United States. The comparison goes even deeper because the political forces in the United States, as my father would do in this scenario, exert personal pressure (familial and financial) favoring my brother. While being quite natural, this isn’t justice, and it’s a recipe for disaster, not resolution.
US Secretary of State John Kerry now says that the United States is going to “re-evaluate” its efforts for Israel-Palestine peace. But will that be an honest evaluation, one that asks the hard questions? Because after twenty years of failure, there is but one fundamental question: is the United States, given its self-imposed diplomatic parameters and its AIPAC-directed domestic political obstacles, capable of mediating this conflict?
We need to understand, when evaluating the Obama administration’s performance here, that, reality aside, it is perceived as the toughest on Israel since George H.W. Bush. And, to be sure, it worked harder to get small concessions from Israel than its predecessor in the George W. Bush administration. But for those who still don’t understand the extent to which US policy prioritizes Israeli preferences over basic Palestinian needs, this past week’s events should have made it clear. Indeed, it is because of that potential clarity that Israel has moved immediately to replace the facts with its own, demonstrably false, narrative.
A Clear US Failure
Let’s review the collapse of the Kerry Talks. Eight months after scoring his victory in getting Israel and the Palestinians back to talks, Kerry had nothing but increased acrimony between the two parties to show for it. For many weeks, both Israel and the Palestinians had tacitly recognized the futility and had directed their efforts toward jockeying for a position to emerge from the inevitable collapse of talks as the more reasonable side. As the date that had been designated for the fourth and final release of 26 long-time Palestinian prisoners approached, Israel began to signal it would not follow through on its agreement to let them go. And Kerry’s frank incompetence started to become even more apparent.
Israel had been saying for weeks that the last batch of prisoners included Palestinian citizens of Israel whom they had not agreed to release. It is unclear exactly what happened here, but Kerry gave no indication that Israel was not being honest about that claim. The picture that emerged was that Israel agreed to the 104 prisoners being released but not necessarily to these specific ones, who, as citizens of Israel, do fall into a different category. Rather than clarify, it looks like Kerry simply assured Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he’d convince the Israelis to get it done. If that is what happened, it indicates a serious lack of understanding on Kerry’s part of the difference the Israeli status of those prisoners made in Israel. It would mean that the US secretary of state was woefully ill-suited to this task.
Had Kerry bridged this gap, it might have been enough to move the prisoner release forward. This was the objection Israel started with. But by March 29, the date designated for the last prisoner release, Israel, certainly with US agreement, shifted gears and made the release contingent on the Palestinians committing to continuing the talks for another twenty months. This sat well with Kerry, since at this point, all he was really after was continuing the talks. Any goals of substance had long since evaporated.
Seeing that the Palestinians were not going to agree to this arrangement, Kerry tried to get Israel to sweeten the deal with a phony limitation on settlement construction that committed Israel to nothing at all and guaranteed accelerated settlement expansion in the Jerusalem area, and the freeing of 400 additional prisoners of Israel’s choosing which would have almost certainly meant freeing thieves and other common criminals whom the Palestinians would not necessarily even want to give back. In exchange for this Israeli “largesse” not only would the talks be extended, but the US would give Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu a massive political plum to please his right-wing: the freeing of convicted US spy Jonathan Pollard.
Kerry secured Netanyahu’s agreement then started to show the Palestinians this deal he had worked out with Israel and wanted them to accept. He never got that far, because that was when the Palestinians finally said “enough” and began applying for membership in numerous international bodies, as is their right.
When Kerry left the region in a huff, he blamed both sides for taking “unhelpful” and “unilateral” steps. That, in itself, is an inaccurate description of a collapse that was largely engineered by Israel. But it was clear that the Obama administration was planning to go further. The US Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, expressed the administration view clearly in her testimony before a House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on UN funding.
“On the Palestinian question, it just would underscore that we will oppose attempts at upgrades in status anywhere,” Power testified. “The [International Criminal Court] is, of course, something that we have been absolutely adamant about. Secretary Kerry has made it very, very clear to the Palestinians, as has the president, I mean, this [the Palestinians joining the ICC and bringing cases against Israel] is something that really poses a profound threat to Israel. It is not a unilateral action that will be anything other than devastating to the peace process…”
So it is either the Palestinians’ fault for threatening to hold Israel accountable for its actions in the international legal system or it’s both sides’ fault. No administration official has singled out Israel for its actions as they have the Palestinians, despite the fact that the Palestinians were acting on their rights which they had only agreed to hold off on as long as Israel lived up to its commitments and kept the talks going. It was Israel, not the Palestinians who reneged, and while the United States is well aware of this, they won’t say it.
Instead, US officials are helping clean Netanyahu’s image by shifting the blame for the announcement of new settlement units to Housing Minister Uri Ariel. Ariel, of the Jewish Home party, which is a right-wing rival of Likud, certainly seized an opportunity to torpedo any peace talks, in line with his views and his party’s policies. But the idea that this was done behind Netanyahu’s back is absurd. Netanyahu has offered no rebuke of Ariel, nor has he distanced himself at all from the announcement of the new settlement units or the timing of the announcement. Given that Kerry had made an emergency trip to the region just at that time, even most of the right-wing would not have had a problem with Netanyahu putting the new buildings on hold for a while. No, this was not Ariel’s initiative. It was Netanyahu’s.
Where to now: Israel
The Palestinians applied to fifteen international bodies. But the ones they chose to apply to pose no threat to Israel. Indeed, if anything, the choices they made, which largely consist of various human rights conventions, serve to make the Palestinian Authority (PA), not Israel, more accountable. The PA made a point of not applying to the International Criminal Court, which is Israel’s chief concern. The applications they made only moderately upgrade the Palestinians’ status, acquired over a year ago when they won admission to the UN General Assembly as a non-member observer state. The applications are, certainly, a threat that they will do more if things keep going as they have been.
Israel has declared that it will punish the Palestinians, though so far, aside from officially cancelling the last prisoner release, the only specific measure they have announced is the withdrawal of a permit for a West Bank telecommunications company to start building its wireless infrastructure in Gaza. There will likely be more measures soon. But the telling point is the absolute absence in Israel of any criticism of Netanyahu for the collapse of the talks.
The parties in the governing coalition that were supposed to hold Netanyahu to the peace track, Yesh Atid and HaTnuah, have been unwavering in their support of Netanyahu since the talks collapsed. The major opposition parties, particularly Labor and Shas, have either been silent or offered measured support to Netanyahu. It is clear that Netanyahu faces no pressure to modify his position.
This tells us that Israel is going to continue on its present course. It leaves little doubt that Netanyahu is perfectly comfortable with Kerry simply giving up and turning his attention to other matters. And why shouldn’t he feel that way? Congress remains locked into mindless obedience to any and all Israeli actions, and the Obama administration has made it clear it is not going to expend the political capital necessary to bring about any changes.
Where to now: Palestine
Now that Abbas has finally reached the point where he could not accept another one-sided US proposal, he needs to consider his options. He has thrown down a gauntlet with his applications to the international bodies. The message: Palestine will take full advantage of its rights if Israel remains unwilling to negotiate in a spirit of compromise that acknowledges the legitimacy of Palestinian claims. Remember that the Palestinians have surrendered 78% of Palestine, accepted the principle that Jerusalem will be shared and acknowledged that the implementation of refugee rights would be negotiable and considerate of Israel’s demographic needs.
Abbas absolutely cannot be seen to be bluffing. If Israel does not change its stance, he must apply to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for recognition of Palestine and begin bringing war crimes cases there. There is a reason Ambassador Power considers this a real threat to Israel. The United States will indeed shield Israeli leaders from imprisonment if they are found guilty by the ICC, but Israeli leaders will find themselves unable to travel to Europe, which, despite US largesse, is by far Israel’s biggest trading partner. That matters, a lot.
Abbas must be willing to follow through, even if he is unlikely to be around for the endgame. Israel would certainly respond harshly to such actions, and the PA is not going to survive that kind of Israeli action. That’s why Abbas will be sorely tempted to find another way. But, as we’ve already seen, popular pressure is beginning to boil in the West Bank.
Where to now?
The breakdown of these talks is a turning point. Yes, there will be desperate cries for another “last chance” for the Oslo-based two-state solution, but there is a growing realization that this is now a pipe dream. The United States will likely continue for some time to play the same role it has for twenty years, but if this round generated miniscule hope, future attempts will be met with virtually absolute cynicism.
The politics of all of this is going to move farther away from Washington, although the pull from Congress will slow the process. But even the bought and paid for Congress won’t be able to stop it. Europe will be forced to take more actions, and Israel is going to be increasingly isolated. The parameters are becoming more fluid and, in a departure from the Oslo years, the new ones are going to be dictated by events in Israel and the Palestinian Territories more than in Washington.
The smart thing for Washington to do is to reset the process, bring together real experts — rather than AIPAC-endorsed lawyers for Israel like Martin Indyk, Dennis Ross and David Makovsky — with leaders from Israel, Palestine, Europe and the Arab world and start over. There may be a way to find a formulation, whether one state or two, that justly addresses Palestinian rights as well as Israeli ones, but it must start with admitting that the Oslo process is dead. Continuing self-deception, whether from right-wingers like Netanyahu who gamed the system, or well-meaning centrists like J Street who staked their existence on the vain hope that this process, ill-formed at birth, could ever succeed, must be treated now like the threat to any progress that it is.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry leaves US Ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro behind as he ends his failed trip to Israel. Credit: State Department
]]>Many who offer opinions on policy toward Iran, and particularly on how to handle negotiations over its nuclear program, implicitly claim an unusual ability to read the minds of Iranian decision-makers. Assertions are made with apparent confidence about what the Iranians want, fear [...]]]>
Many who offer opinions on policy toward Iran, and particularly on how to handle negotiations over its nuclear program, implicitly claim an unusual ability to read the minds of Iranian decision-makers. Assertions are made with apparent confidence about what the Iranians want, fear or believe, even without any particular evidence in support. Several possible explanations can account for the misplaced confidence.
One is that we are seeing common psychological mechanisms in action. A well-established human tendency is, for example, to interpret cooperative behavior on another person’s part as a response to one’s own behavior, while ascribing uncooperative conduct to innate orneriness on the part of the other person. Thus there is a failure to understand how firmness in Iran’s negotiating position is a response to firmness on the Western side, and there is an accompanying tendency to interpret a lack of Iranian concessions as indicating an Iranian desire to stall and drag out negotiations.
Another explanation is that a particular frame of mind is imputed to the Iranians because it implies a U.S. policy that is politically popular for other reasons. Loading ever more onerous sanctions on Iran is a popular political sport, especially on Capitol Hill, to show toughness or love for Israel. The politicians who play that sport therefore favor a view of the Iranian mindset according to which the Iranians are simply not hurting enough and need to hurt some more, after which they will cry uncle.
A third explanation is that the supposed interpretation of Iranian thinking is a cover for another policy agenda held by the person offering the interpretation. This is especially the case with some of those arguing for more vehement threats of military attack against Iran. Some of those proponents have made no secret of the fact that they believe (for whatever strange reason) that war with Iran would be a good thing. Saber-rattling gives them a better chance of reaching that goal, because if an agreement is not reached with Iran then the advocates of saber-rattling would be among the first to cry that U.S. credibility would be damaged if the military threats were not carried out.
These possibilities come to mind in reading an op ed by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In particular, they are brought to mind by Ross and Makovsky’s statement, in explaining lack of progress in the negotiations, that “Iranian leaders seem not to believe that we will use force if diplomatic efforts fail.” What is their basis for that observation? Have the Iranian leaders themselves said anything like that? No, they haven’t. Ross and Makovsky seem to be basing such an observation solely on the Iranian negotiating position itself, and in so doing they are implying only a single cause for that position. Whatever Iran does in the way of making or not making concessions is all supposedly a matter of whether the Iranians see the possibility of U.S. military force being employed. Every other carrot, stick, belief or perception evidently does not matter at all.
Actually, those other things matter a lot. There is the little business of sanctions, for example. Ross and Makovsky are to be complimented for stating that if Iran is prepared to make the kind of concessions we are looking for, then “we should be prepared to lift the harsh economic sanctions.” But they do not mention that the United States and its negotiating partners have given the Iranians little or no reason to believe that we are so prepared. Instead, the only sanctions relief that has been incorporated in the Western proposals is stingy in comparison with the panoply of sanctions that Congress keeps piling on. We do not need any magical insight into secret Iranian thoughts to realize how important this dimension is in shaping Iran’s negotiating behavior. We only have to look at the demands and proposals that Iran has advanced at the negotiating table, as well as the actual economic damage that the sanctions have inflicted.
Ross and Makovsky get something else right, but for the wrong reason. Their piece is partly an argument in favor of making a comprehensive proposal rather than taking a step-by-step approach; they pooh-pooh the idea of confidence-building that is associated with step-by-step. A comprehensive proposal is a good idea, but precisely because a lack of confidence—which is glaring on both sides—is a major part of the problem. The Iranians lack confidence that the United States and its P5+1 partners ever want to get to an end state in which they fully and formally accept a peaceful nuclear program, with uranium enrichment, in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, rather than indefinitely stringing out negotiations while the sanctions continue to inflict their damage. Again, we do not need to be mind-readers to realize this; the Iranians have been quite explicit in stating that they require a clearer idea of where the negotiations are heading.
So a “going big” comprehensive proposal is a good idea—but not as Ross and Makovsky pitch it, as some kind of ultimatum with a threat of military force functioning as an “or else” clause of the proposal. That kind of clause only stokes Iranian doubts about the West’s ultimate intentions and feeds Iranian interest in a possible nuclear weapon as a deterrent.
What is the explanation for Ross and Makovsky’s assertions about Iranian thinking? Are they exhibiting one of those psychological heuristics, or covering a hidden agenda, or something else? I don’t know; I don’t pretend to be able to read their minds.
]]>Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post: The neoconservative pundit attacks the Obama administration for not aligning its “red line” [...]]]>
Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post: The neoconservative pundit attacks the Obama administration for not aligning its “red line” on Iran (a nuclear weapon), with Israel’s red line (nuclear weapon-making capability) and not adhering to Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand for a deadline:
The Obama policy is in shambles. Which is why Cordesman argues that the only way to prevent a nuclear Iran without war is to establish a credible military threat to make Iran recalculate and reconsider. That means U.S. red lines: deadlines beyond which Washington will not allow itself to be strung, as well as benchmark actions that would trigger a response, such as the further hardening of Iran’s nuclear facilities to the point of invulnerability and, therefore, irreversibility.
Which made all the more shocking Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s dismissal last Sunday of the very notion of any U.S. red lines. No deadlines. No bright-line action beyond which Iran must not go. The sleeping giant continues to slumber. And to wait — as the administration likes to put it, “for Iran to live up to its international obligations.”
Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal: The board shares Krauthammer’s analysis:
Most of all, Iran continues its march toward a nuclear weapon despite the President’s vow that it is “unacceptable.” The U.S. says it has isolated Iran, but only last month the U.N. Secretary-General defied a U.S. plea and attended a non-aligned summit in Tehran. The Administration has issued wholesale exemptions to Congressional sanctions, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared on the weekend that the U.S. is “not setting deadlines” for Iran as it sprints to a bomb.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has engaged in repeated public arguments with Israel, supposedly its best ally in the region. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, recently declared that he doesn’t want to be “complicit” in any Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites. The White House failed to contradict him. A nation that appears so reluctant to stand by its friends won’t be respected or feared by its enemies.
Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: The neoconservative pundit laments the fact that Israel’s Prime Minister must resort to “heckling” the US president to get what he wants and quotes a staffer from the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies to further her position on the Israel vs. Iran debate:
Such is the state of the U.S.-Israel relationship. The tussle over who requested what begs the question as to why the leaders aren’t meeting in New York. If the relationship is as close as Obama insists, there would be every reason to meet, make a show of solidarity and make a joint statement regarding Iran. So Netanyahu resorts to heckling Obama in public over “red lines.”
Schanzer said, “ The real problem here is the lack of transparency on the part of President Obama. When was the last time he delivered an official presidential statements on the Iranian nuclear crisis? He has not given the American people or the Israelis a glimpse of how he plans to tackle what has become the most pressing foreign policy issue of our time. This is what is driving Bibi to his wits end. “
So how is that leading from behind, timidity in the face of jihadists, meekness toward Iran and heavy defense cut policy working out? Are we more safe or are events spinning out of control? Are we most respected or less? The answer: Romney is being unfair pointing all this out.
Danielle Pletka, the New York Times: Explictly hawkish views and recommendation stated here by the vice president for foreign and defense policy at the neoconservative-dominated American Enterprise Institute:
America cannot prevent every tragedy, nor can we assure ourselves of the affection of every Middle Eastern citizen. But we can have a policy in Iraq that fights Iranian influence, a policy in Egypt that incentivizes liberalism among elected leaders, a policy in Syria that hastens the fall of Assad and promotes the rise of moderates, a policy that punishes attacks on our embassies that take place unimpeded by the local government (see Egypt), and a policy that rewards the values we cherish and punishes extremism. And yes, those policies can go hand in hand with a military strategy that attacks our enemies where they live. We may not always win the fight of western liberalism against Islamist extremism, but we could try much harder.
David Makovsky, the New Yorker: Ali Gharib points out why an argument made by David Makovsky of the AIPAC-created Washington Institute — that Israel’s bombing of Syria’s nuclear program should be factored into calculations about attacking Iran’s program — doesn’t stand up to an important test.
]]>Examining a New Yorker article by the Israel-focused Washington Institute’s David Makovsky, Ali Gharib observes in the Daily Beast that in contrast to Makovsky’s analysis, “The lessons of the Israeli raid on Syria in 2007 can’t be applied to Iran’s nuclear program”:
Unlike the Syrian nuclear [...]]]>
Examining a New Yorker article by the Israel-focused Washington Institute’s David Makovsky, Ali Gharib observes in the Daily Beast that in contrast to Makovsky’s analysis, “The lessons of the Israeli raid on Syria in 2007 can’t be applied to Iran’s nuclear program”:
Unlike the Syrian nuclear program (or the Israeli one, for that matter), the Iranian nuclear program is not shrouded in complete secrecy. Far from a single reactor at a remote desert site, Iran has multiple nuclear facilities, all declared to U.N. authorities (the U.S. is “very confident that there is no secret site now,” after past deceptions). How, then, if there were to be an explosion at a well known and declared nuclear facility, could the Iranians save face as Assad did? By pretending that they scared off the Israeli jets, who just happened to jettison their munitions on top of the Fordow enrichment facilities?
It’s ironic, then, that the Israeli focus on Iran—constant pronouncements, threats, and public pressure on the U.S.—has driven the Iranian program into the spotlight, rendering moot the lesson of bombing Syria’s secret program. Nonetheless, because the Israeli Syrian strike was a success, it will be held up as an example, just as proponents of war with Iran hold up Israel’s 1981 attack on an Iraqi reactor as a success even though that claim doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Statements made by Israeli Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz during his talk this morning at a Brookings event here in Washington can be interpreted as supportive of Gharib’s argument. Halutz (whose father was Iranian) seriously criticized the fact that “too much was said publicly” about how to handle Iran’s nuclear program and refused to answer any related questions from the outset. Halutz also reiterated his criticism of the red line debate, noting that publicly defining red lines, which can easily change at any given time, enables “the other side…to know where are the borders”. He said that discussions about red lines, as well as when and how to take action on them, should be conducted behind closed doors. Quoting a line from The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Halutz said: “When you have to shoot, shoot!” Halutz also repeatedly stressed that the use of force “absolutely should be the last, last, last resort”.
]]>Aid to the PA is under bi-partisan attack in Congress due to the Palestinians’ campaign to somehow upgrade their standing in the United Nations. The campaign against the Palestinians, and [...]]]>
Aid to the PA is under bi-partisan attack in Congress due to the Palestinians’ campaign to somehow upgrade their standing in the United Nations. The campaign against the Palestinians, and also against the United Nations, has already gained enough momentum that yesterday’s hearing, initially to have been held in session of the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, was upgraded to a hearing of the full Foreign Affairs committee.
Leading the charge, unsurprisingly, is Committee Chair Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), who has introduced a bill threatening UN funding mainly, though not exclusively, over the issue of Israel and the Palestinians. But her predecessor as Chair, Howard Berman (D-CA) was absolutely blunt in saying: “I believe it is appropriate to point out that should the Palestinians pursue their unilateralist course, the hundreds of millions of dollars in annual assistance that we have given them in recent years, will likely be terminated.”
Four leading Democrats, Steve Israel (D-NY), Robert Brady (D-PA), Eliot Engel (D-NY) and Steven Rothman (D-NJ) have sent a bill to the Foreign Affairs Committee which would
With all this, you’d think aid to the PA was doomed, would you not?
But hold on. At the hearing, there were four witnesses, with David Makovsky of the AIPAC-created Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) being the most moderate. The other speakers were James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation, Dr. Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (which, along with Heritage, are neo-conservative think-tanks, with more info available here) and neocon all-star Elliott Abrams.
Makovsky was predictably dubious about cutting off aid to the Palestinians, and the entire panel was more or less united around the idea that Congress must at least keep funding PA security forces that are working with Israel to prevent attacks on Israelis.
Abrams, somewhat surprisingly, joined not only Makovsky but also the dovish “pro-Israel, pro-peace” lobbying group J Street in cautioning against cutting other aid to the PA. He said,
There’s a lot here that bears close scrutiny, as the picture Makovsky paints is pretty far removed from reality. But the important point is this wide agreement, spanning the center-left to the far right, that cutting off aid to the PA is against the interests not only of the PA but of Israel and the US as well.
This leads to an obvious question: is continuing aid to the PA in the interests of the Palestinians?
While there has been little visible Palestinian opposition to the UN campaign, or, in recent months, to the PA in general, there has also been remarkably little enthusiasm about it from any sector of the Palestinian public or civil society.
So while it’s virtually certain that, even among those opposed to the UN bid, Palestinians will collectively be furious, again, at the US for its opposition to any initiative they ever take, it’s not clear that a sizeable portion of the Palestinian public is impressed with Mahmoud Abbas campaign here.
And yet, this may produce a renewed opportunity for the PA leadership.
With unity between the PA and Hamas still nothing more than idealistic words, the future of the Palestinian national movement, and the identities of any potential interlocutors with Israel and the US, is completely in doubt. One reason is, indeed the continuing insistence of Fatah that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have a prominent role in a unity government. But really, that is just the public face of the real concern, which is loss of US funding.
But if arguments such as those put forward by Makovsky and Abrams win the day on Capitol Hill, the PA leadership will have new options. The US will have demonstrated a reluctance to cut Palestinian aid and, while this is not likely to extend to maintaining aid to a PA that includes Hamas, it may well allow for more boldness in Palestinian diplomacy, and further actions to try to internationalize the issue and take it out of exclusively US hands.
But taking advantage of such an opportunity will require bold and clever leadership, which the PA/PLO/Fatah have not demonstrated any hint of.
One last curiosity in all of this talk of suspending aid to the PA. That came from the inimitable Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League. He said: “I certainly understand the anger in Congress. You ignore us and then you want us to continue giving you aid?”
Foxman says this as a man who staunchly defends an Israeli government that has repeatedly thumbed its nose at the United States and embarrassed the President, despite the fact that aid to Israel, in both dollars and on the ground military coordination is greater and deeper than at any time in history.
One can only imagine the color of Abe’s face if the obvious irony was pointed out to him.
]]>Others have [...]]]>
Others have also described Ross as more skeptical [than Mitchell] about the chances of peace, based on his decades-long experience with trying to bring together the parties.
I don’t want to get all new-agey, but if you think something is difficult or impossible to do, the chances of being able to do it are greatly diminished from the get-go.
So why does this Ross guy keep getting jobs that he doesn’t think are possible? I picked up Ross’ book off of my shelf here in D.C., and it amazed me how many times he says you cannot make any kind of deal with the Iranians. Then, Obama put him in charge of making a deal with the Iranians. Ross, we now learn, doubts that a peace deal can be reached in Israel-Palestine, and Obama gives him a job making peace in Israel-Palestine.
On the Middle Eastern conflict, Ross’s credentials for the job are impeccable. After all, he’s been involved in decades — decades! — of failed peace processes. Ross has worked at the Washington Institute (WINEP), an AIPAC-formed think tank, and also chaired the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI), an Israeli organization dedicated to “ensur(ing) the thriving of the Jewish People and the Jewish civilization.” (The organization seems to oppose intermarriage with racist-sounding statements like “cultural collectivity cannot survive in the long term without primary biological foundations of family and children.”)
Ross was thought responsible for crafting Obama’s presidential campaign AIPAC speech — yes, the one with the line about an “undivided” Jerusalem that would spike a peace deal if implemented. Ross later reiterated the notion of an undivided Jerusalem as a “fact” in an interview with the Jerusalem Post.
Ross was recently in the news following a secret but not-so-secret visit to the Middle East, which was fleshed out on Politico by Laura Rozen. Rozen was the reporter who carried a rather shocking anonymous allegation about Ross:
“[Ross] seems to be far more sensitive to [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu’s coalition politics than to U.S. interests,” one U.S. official told POLITICO Saturday. “And he doesn’t seem to understand that this has become bigger than Jerusalem but is rather about the credibility of this administration.”
In an update, Rozen carried NSC CoS Denis McDonough’s defense of Ross:
“The assertion is as false as it is offensive,” McDonough said Sunday by e-mail. ”Whoever said it has no idea what they are talking about. Dennis Ross’s many decades of service speak volumes about his commitment to this country and to our vital interests, and he is a critical part of the president’s team.”
But the new Forward article, as MJ Rosenberg points out, backs up the notion that Ross was extremely concerned with “advocat[ing]” for Israel. The source is none other than Israel-advocate extraordinaire Abe Foxman (who doesn’t negotiate on behalf of the U.S. government):
“Dennis is the closest thing you’ll find to a melitz yosher, as far as Israel is concerned,” said the Anti-Defamation League’s national director, Abraham Foxman, who used the ancient Hebrew term for ‘advocate.’”
Do you get the feeling that Ross advocated for Iran? Or, as the Forward article put it (with my strikethrough), has “strong ties to Israel” Iran? Guttman writes that Ross is considered to have a “reputation of being pro-Israeli.” As for Iran? Not quite: Ross’s Iran experience seems to boil down to heading United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), a group that pushes for harsher, broad-based sanctions against Iran (despite a stated goal to not hurt ordinary Iranians) and that has criticized Obama’s policy of engagement. Ross left the gig, as with JPPI, when he took the job with the administration.
The group also launched an error-filled fear-mongering video (while Ross was still there; he appears in the video) and a campaign to get New York hotels to refuse to host Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he comes to town each year for the U.N. General Assembly, which hardly lays the groundwork for good diplomacy.
Oh, and about the Iran engagement designed by Ross: The administration’s approach has been questioned by several leading Iran experts. “It is unlikely that the resources and dedication needed for success was given to a policy that the administration expected to fail,” National Iranian American Council (NIAC) president Trita Parsi observed. In December, Ross publicly defended the administration against charges that engagement was less than sincere from the U.S. side. But it is Ross himself who has apparently long held a pessimistic outlook on engagement.
Ross’s 2007 book, “Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World“, is fascinating in light of where Ross has come from, and where he’s taken Iran policy. I was struck at a five-page section of the first chapter called “Neoconservatism vs. Neoliberalism,” in which Ross writes, “[Neoconservatism's] current standard-bearers — such as Richard Perle, David Frum, William Kristol, and Robert Kagan — are serious thinkers with a clear worldview,” (with my links).
Later, in several long sections about the run-up to George W. Bush’s Iraq war, Ross notes that Paul Wolfowitz was highly focused on Iraq before and after 9/11. He also mentions “political difficulties” in the push for war: “Once [Bush] realized there might be a domestic problem in acting against Iraq, his administration focused a great deal of energy and effort on mobilizing domestic support for military action.”
But Ross never acknowledges that some of his neoconservative “serious thinkers” — such as Kristol and his Weekly Standard magazine — were involved in the concerted campaign to mislead Americans in an effort to push the war… just as the same figures are pushing for an attack on Iran. Frum, who does seem capable of serious thinking, was the author of the “axis of evil” phrasing of Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address. The moniker included both Iraq and Iran, despite the fact that the latter was, until the speech, considered a potential ally in the fight against Al Qaeda. (Marsha Cohen chronicled an Israeli effort to squash the alliance, culminating in Frum’s contribution to the Bush speech.)
Ross never mentions that neocon Douglas Feith, a political appointee in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP), was responsible for cherry-picking intelligence about Iraq within the administration, and whose office was feeding cooked information to the public via Scooter Libby in Vice President Dick Cheney‘s office. Through Libby, the distorted information made its way into the hands of the Standard and sympathetic journalists like ideologue Judith Miller at the New York Times. In August of 2003, Jim Lobe wrote (with my links):
[K]ey personnel who worked in both NESA [the Pentagon's Near East and South Asia bureau] and OSP were part of a broader network of neo-conservative ideologues and activists who worked with other Bush political appointees scattered around the national-security bureaucracy to move the country to war, according to retired Lt Col Karen Kwiatkowski, who was assigned to NESA from May 2002 through February 2003. …
Other appointees who worked with… both offices included Michael Rubin, a Middle East specialist previously with the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI); David Schenker, previously with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Michael Makovsky; an expert on neo-con icon Winston Churchill and the younger brother of David Makovsky, a senior WINEP fellow and former executive editor of pro-Likud ‘Jerusalem Post’; and Chris Lehman, the brother of the John Lehman, a prominent neo-conservative who served as secretary of the navy under Ronald Reagan, according to Kwiatkowski.
Ross has personal experience with many OSP veterans, working with them at WINEP and signing hawkish reports on Iran authored by them.
During the 2008 presidential campaign, Ross was a member of a task force that delivered a hawkish report apparently co-authored by two veterans of OSP, Rubin and Michael Makovsky. (Ross reportedly recused himself as the presidential campaign came into full swing.) Lobe, noting Ross’s curious involvement, called the report a “roadmap to war with Iran,” and added, a year later, that the group that put out the report was accelerating the plan, calling for a military build-up and a naval blockade against Iran.
After taking his position within the Obama administration, Ross released a book, co-authored with David Makovsky, that was skeptical of the notion that engagement could work. Nathan Guttman, in a review of the book for the Forward, wrote:
The success of diplomatic engagement, according to Ross, is not guaranteed and could be unlikely. Still, he and Makovsky believe that negotiations will serve a purpose even if results are not satisfying. “By not trying, the U.S. and its refusal to talk become the issue,” said Makovsky in a June 1 interview with the Forward. “What we are saying is that if the U.S. chooses engagement, even if it fails, every other option will be more legitimate.”
The attitude of Ross and Makovsky seems closer to that of the Israeli government then to that of the Obama administration.
OSP, Feith, the Makovsky brothers, and Rubin are not listed in the index of “Statecraft,” nor have they appeared in the many sections that I’ve read in full.
In his book, Ross does have many revealing passages about concepts that have been worked into the Obama administration’s Iran policy. One such ploy, which has not been acknowledged or revealed publicly, is using Israel as the crazy ‘bad cop’ — a potentially dangerous game. Ross also writes that international pressure (through sanctions) must be made in order to cause Iran “pain.” Only then, thinks Ross, can concessions such as “economic, technological and security benefits” from the U.S. be offered:
Orchestrating this combination of sticks and carrots requires at this point some obviously adverse consequences for the Iranians first.
This view does not comport with the Obama plan for a simultaneous dual-track policy toward Iran — which holds that engagement and pressure should occur simultaneously — and serves to bolster critics who say that engagement has not been serious because meaningful concessions have not been offered. But it does hint at another tactic that Ross references at least twice in the book: the difference between “style” and “substance.” With regard to Iran, he presents this dichotomy in relation to public professions about the “military option” — a euphemism for launching a war. But publicly suppressing rhetoric is only used as a way to build international support for pressure — not also, as one might expect, a way to assuage the security fears of Iran.
But those aren’t the only ideas from the 2007 book that seem to have made their way into U.S. policy toward Iran. In “Statecraft,” Ross endorses the use of “more overt and inherently deniable alternatives to the use of force” for slowing Iran’s nuclear progress. In particular, he mentions the “fragility of centrifuges,” which is exactly what is being targeted by the Stuxnet virus, a powerful computer worm thought to be created by a state, likely Israel, and perhaps with help from the U.S., according to the latest revelations.
Some critics of this website complain that the level of attention given to neoconservatives is too great, but they should consider this: Look at Dennis Ross. He works extensively with this clique, and no doubt has the occasional drink or meeting with them. And, most importantly, he writes approvingly about neoconservatives, noting that their viewpoint affects political considerations of “any political leader.” Because of these neocon “considerations,” he writes, this is how we should view the Islamic Republic: “With Iran, there is a profound mistrust of the mullahs, and of their perceived deceit, their support for terror, and their enduring hostility to America and its friends in the Middle East. … No one will be keen to be portrayed as soft on the Iranian mullahs.”
This from the man that formulated a policy that has offered “adverse consequences” but so far no “carrots.” Ross’s predictions are a self-fulfilling prophecy — and since he gets the big appointments, he gets to fulfill them. Taking reviews of his book with Makovsky, the Bipartisan Policy Committee report, and “Statecraft” as a whole, I’m not at all surprised that little progress has been made with Iran.
But, at least, that was his first try. He’s a three-time-loser on Israeli-Palestinian peace-making. With Iran, I had to put the pieces together, whereas with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, his record is right there for all to see. Putting Ross in charge of peace-making between the two seems to perfectly fit Einstein’s definition of insanity.
]]>In an article posted on the website of the Israeli newspaper Haaretz early this morning, Dennis Ross reportedly revealed that he had been abruptly “reassigned”.
Since late February, Ross’ position in the Obama administration has been that of “Special Adviser for the Gulf and Southwest Asia” to US [...]]]>
In an article posted on the website of the Israeli newspaper Haaretz early this morning, Dennis Ross reportedly revealed that he had been abruptly “reassigned”.
Since late February, Ross’ position in the Obama administration has been that of “Special Adviser for the Gulf and Southwest Asia” to US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton [see Jim Lobe's LobeLog post on Feb. 23]. Despite a title that makes no mention of Iran, it has been widely accepted in diplomatic circles and by the media that Ross was in charge of the State Dept.’s Iran portfolio. Ravid claimed that Ross would now be dealing primarily with “regional issues related to the peace process.”
According to Ravid:
Washington sources speculate that a number of reasons moved the administration to reassign Ross. One possibility is Iran’s persistent refusal to accept Ross as a US emissary given the diplomat’s Jewish background as well as his purported pro-Israel leanings. Ross is known to maintain contacts with numerous senior officials in Israel’s defense establishment and the Israeli government.
Ross began his career as a high level policymaker during the Carter administration, working in the Pentagon under Paul Wolfowitz. His track record as a foreign policy hawk continued during the Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43 presidencies. A Fellow of the hardline pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), Ross was an advocate of the policies of the neoconservative Project for a New American Century (PNAC).
At the time of Ross’ appointment, objections were raised as to his appropriateness for the highly sensitive post, not only in light of his neoconservative contacts but because of his bluntly expressed “liberal hawk” views.
Iran’s leaders have long insisted that they are not anti-Semitic and have nothing against Jews who are not Zionists. Iran’s 25,000 Jews elect their own member of the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. They continue to resist inducements offered by the Israeli government to emigrate to Israel. A delegation of rabbis from Neturei Karta, a small ultraorthodox anti-Zionist Jewish subsect that participates in anti-Israel demonstrations, has been warmly welcomed in Tehran. The marginal group has defended Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and welcomed his 2007 visit to New York, in constrast to mainstream Jewish organizations who protested the visit.
But Ross is hardly an anti-Zionist, nor can he claim any pretense of neutrality on issues concerning Israel. Ross served as the chairman of the Board of Directors and the “Professional Guiding Council” of the Jewish People’s Policy Planning Institute (JPPPI) between its founding in 2002 and February 2009, when he assumed his State Dept. post. Although JPPPI describes itself as an “independent think tank,” its website notes that it was established by the Jewish Agency, an Israeli quasi-governmental organization. Links provided on the JPPPI website include AIPAC and Jewish organizations such as the American Jewish Committee, which have been increasingly involved in advocating a hardline position toward the Islamic Republic.
Ravid noted that “Diplomatic sources in Jerusalem surmised that another possibility for Ross’ ouster is his just-released book, Myths, Illusions, and Peace – Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East.” Ross’ co-author, David Makovsky, is a former journalist who is now a WINEP fellow.
According to Ross and Makovsky, the primary rationale for the US to attempt diplomatic engagement with Iran is not because the effort will succeed, but because failure, which they view as inevitable, will eventually elicit support among allies of the US and Israel for harsher measures against Iran: “Tougher policies–either militarily or meaningful containment — will be easier to sell internationally and domestically if we have diplomatically tried to resolve our differences with Iran in a serious and credible fashion.” These tougher policies include the possibility of military action. The book, released last Thursday, opposes any linkage between progress on Israeli-Palestinian issues and unwavering US opposition to an Iranian nuclear program.
Questions about the differences between the hardline positions advocated in the book and the Obama administration’s approach have been raised twice during the past three weeks during State Dept. press briefings. On June 10, State Dept. spokesman Ian Kelly was asked:
QUESTION: If -– a question you were asked a couple of weeks ago about what Dennis Ross wrote in his book –- you didn’t have an answer for us at that time. But there’s a school of thought in the Middle East and that the President, President Obama, seems to subscribe to it, is that if you solve Israel-Palestine, that will help solve other problems in the region. Dennis Ross, in his book, says that’s not necessarily the case. I was wondering if you have any comment on that.
MR. KELLY: Dennis Ross co-wrote this book before he became a member of the Administration, and I’m just – I’m not going to comment on anything that he said in the book.
Kelly had given a similar reply to a reporter on May 29, except in his earlier answer, he had stated he was unfamiliar with the book’s contents and therefore was unable to comment.
Ross’ appointment to the Iran portfolio at the State Dept. has been regarded by advocates of rapprochement and engagement as curious as well as counterproductive. “It’s paradoxical that Obama, who made opening a dialogue with Iran into a crucial plank in his campaign, would hand the Iran file to Ross,” Robert Dreyfuss wrote in The Nation on April 8:
Widely viewed as a cog in the machine of Israel’s Washington lobby, Ross was not likely to be welcomed in Tehran–and he wasn’t. Iran’s state radio described his appointment as “an apparent contradiction” with Obama’s “announced policy to bring change in United States foreign policy.” Kazem Jalali, a hardline member of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee, joked that it “would have been so much better to pick Ariel Sharon or Ehud Olmert as special envoy to Iran.” More seriously, a former White House official says that Ross has told colleagues that he believes the United States will ultimately have no choice but to attack Iran in response to its nuclear program.
About a month ago, Jim Lobe raised the “intriguing question” here on LobeLog as to whether there were signs that Ross might be headed for trouble. Two recent articles, one in the Wall Street Journal by Jay Solomon (US, Allies Set October Target for Iran Progress) and the other in Haaretz headlined US Puts October Deadline on Iran Talks, also by Ravid, reported that Ross had set an autumn target date for concluding the first round of talks between the US and Iran during a meeting with an unnamed senior European diplomatic official. Nevertheless, Jim noted, Kelly explicitly denied there was any “deadline” or even a “notional timeline” for progress in talks with Iran.
Today’s intriguing question would seem to be not “Why was Dennis Ross ousted as Obama’s envoy to Iran?”, but rather, was he? If he was, why does the State Dept. appear to be denying it? Why has the story disappeared from the Haaretz website?
If Ross wasn’t ousted, why would Barak Ravid, a respected journalist for what is arguably Israel’s most credible newspaper, claim that Ross had said he was? Would Ravid have invented the story of Ross’ revelation to Haaretz with no basis in fact? Did Ross “leak” the news (as he often appears to, particularly to Israeli journalists), believing it to be true, or perhaps to vent his displeasure with the Obama administration’s expressed determination to engage Iran? Or had a decision in fact been made in the State Dept. to shift Ross to another position, which has since been reversed on account of developments in Iran?
Update: At today’s State Dept. daily press briefing, Ian Kelly was asked about Ross’ current employment status. His answer was unequivocally ambiguous:
QUESTION…are a lot of reports about Dennis Ross, based on one specific report in an Israeli newspaper. What’s his status? Has he been fired?
MR. KELLY: He has not been fired.
QUESTION: Is he being ousted?
MR. KELLY: He is not being ousted.
QUESTION: Is there an abrupt change to responsibilities?
MR. KELLY: I — there is — there is — look, he is in — he is in the building today. I was in his office today. He’s working very hard on the same issues that we’ve been discussing the last, whatever it is, 15 minutes. And you know, if and when there is some kind of personnel announcement, I’d be happy to let you know. [...]
QUESTION: … assigned to another position at the White House?
MR. KELLY: Anything’s possible. I could be fired today, too. I mean…
… if you guys keep probing me on this.
QUESTION: Isn’t it true that he’s been reassigned to another position at the White House?
MR. KELLY: Like I said, I have — there — I have no personnel announcements.
QUESTION: So the secretary has full confidence in Dennis Ross to continue in his present role?
MR. KELLY: Absolutely.
QUESTION: So Dennis Ross — Dennis Ross is going to continue in his role as adviser to the secretary on — what was it? –….Southwest Gulf affairs?
MR. KELLY: He is — as I say — he is working very hard. He worked hard throughout the weekend and he’s continuing to do his job today.
QUESTION: Has the book that he and David Makovsky have published recently caused any problems for him internally in this administration?
MR. KELLY: No. No. It’s a very good book, by the way. I started reading it over the weekend. …
QUESTION: Oh, so you’re doing reviews from the podium (inaudible). [...]
QUESTION: Was there any concern about this authorship of this book, of some of the opinions that he and his co-author expressed in the book…
MR. KELLY: No.
QUESTION: … during the time leading up to his appointment?
KELLY: No, not at all.
QUESTION: Why not?
MR. KELLY: Well, I mean — Mr. Ross is — he is in the administration now. He is a very close adviser of the secretary on a number of issues related to Iran and the region. But he also came out of — came out of the academic community and he — he’s entitled to — he was entitled to his opinion. He wrote the book before he came on board here.
QUESTION: But, I mean, his opinion and his book and everything notwithstanding, are you saying that Dennis Ross is not being reassigned to another position at the White House?
MR. KELLY: I’m saying he’s working very hard here at the State Department.
QUESTION: But you’re not saying no?
MR. KELLY: I’m saying he’s working very hard here at the State Department.
QUESTION: Well, I’m not saying he’s…
MR. KELLY: I’m not going to predict the future…
Another Update: Time Magazine is now reporting that Ross is not going out but up, and that he will have more control over Iran policy:
]]>Dennis Ross, the Obama Administration’s special adviser on Iran, will be leaving his post at the State Department to become a senior adviser at the National Security Council (NSC) with an expanded portfolio, Administration officials told TIME.
…