by Dina Esfandiary

Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Dina Esfandiary

Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” But there remain significant obstacles to a final nuclear agreement. It is unlikely that anything ground-breaking will be achieved in this round of talks. Instead, parties will explore areas of possible convergence and make steady progress towards a potential final deal.

All negotiations are about what parties want and how much they can compromise. What has changed here is not what the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran want, but how badly they want a solution. Both sides are painfully aware of the downsides of no agreement. In the words of a participant at a recent workshop hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is in this case “very bad” — likely, more sanctions and an Iran closer to a rapid breakout capability. This is why there is a strong incentive to explore areas of potential agreement.

What does each side want? The P5+1 want substantial reductions and the dismantlement of some of Iran’s nuclear program. The main issues of concern are Iran’s enrichment capacity, its Arak heavy water (HWR) reactor and the past possible military dimensions of its program. Iran however, aims to preserve as much of its program as possible, and perhaps even expand its capacity. It wants (preferably total) sanctions relief and a clear guideline on the duration of the final agreement. So far, this doesn’t bode well.

Former US official Bob Einhorn encourages negotiators to focus on Iran’s “practical needs”. The November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA) called for a “mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs”. The P5+1 believe that Iran’s enrichment needs for a civilian nuclear program can largely be met through foreign supply and that Tehran does not need to enrich on its soil. But after years of political and economic investment into enrichment, Iran can’t just forgo it. The P5+1 demonstrated their understanding of this conundrum when they stopped asking for enrichment to be fully suspended and accepted it on Iranian soil. The trick now will be to find enough common ground over lengthening Iran’s breakout time by addressing the number and efficiency of centrifuges, while meeting Iran’s current and future needs. Iran repeatedly insists that dismantlement is not on the agenda. Whether that is accurate or part of pre-negotiation posturing, exploring P5+1 condoned research and development into advanced centrifuges as an additional sweetener could make Tehran more amenable to such roll-backs.

The Arak HWR also poses a proliferation concern because of its ability to open up the plutonium route to a bomb for Iran. Despite requiring a reprocessing plant, which Iran does not have and so far does not intend to build, the P5+1 have made it clear that maintaining it in its current form is unacceptable. Iran’s nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi spoke of the country’s willingness to modify the reactor to produce less plutonium to allay Western fears. But the true test is whether the P5+1 can coax Iran to allow the modification of Arak into a light-water reactor. Once again, the P5+1 seem to be exploring positive incentives to address this.

One area of greater agreement is over transparency and verification. Iran insists it is prepared to accept intrusive verification measures to prove the “peacefulness” of its program. In fact, it already did so under the JPA. But the Additional Protocol (AP) is a difficult sell back home. Iranian negotiators are prepared to implement some of its safeguards as long as it’s not branded as such. Iran is also adamant that the scope and duration of these measures must be clearly defined.

This brings us to another important part of these talks: rhetoric. Today more than ever, there seems to be an understanding on both sides about what the other faces back home. Iran knows that US President Barack Obama walks a fine line on these negotiations when it comes to Congress, while the West is clearly more perceptive of the difficulties posed by the hardliners in Tehran and Iran’s need to save face. The P5+1’s willingness to accept suggestions such as implementing intrusive verification measures without naming the AP or framing talks in terms of modernising the Iranian program rather than dismantling it demonstrates this. Some officials recognise the need to ignore Iranian rhetoric, knowing full well that like in the West, the most uncompromising statements are often intended for a domestic audience.

The road to a final agreement is long and complicated. Anything from a small statement by an Iranian or American hardliner to Russian disengagement from the negotiations because of the crisis in Ukraine could derail the talks and take us back to square one. But we keep forgetting how far we’ve come in so little time. A year ago, no one would have thought that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would embrace a more moderate president or that he would agree to an interim deal constraining Iran’s nuclear program. Today, both sides are negotiating wholeheartedly. What they want has not changed. What has changed is how much they want a final solution.

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Photo:EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (L) opens with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during E3/EU+3 – Iran Talks meeting in Vienna on March 18,2014.

by Dina Esfandiary

Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani has been sworn in. His cabinet has been approved. The rest of us are on the edge of our seats waiting to see if Iran and the US will hold meaningful negotiations to address the Iranian nuclear file. But scheduling talks is only the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Dina Esfandiary

Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani has been sworn in. His cabinet has been approved. The rest of us are on the edge of our seats waiting to see if Iran and the US will hold meaningful negotiations to address the Iranian nuclear file. But scheduling talks is only the first step, what needs to come next — the willingness to compromise on both sides — will indicate whether a solution to this interminable crisis is possible.

The last round of nuclear negotiations in the spring/summer of 2012 created high expectations as both sides seemed willing to have another go at solving the impasse. At the same time, neither appeared ready to compromise on issues that were of concern to the other. The P5+1 (US, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) sought to address Iran’s ability to sprint towards a nuclear weapon with their “stop, ship and shut” proposal. Tehran was asked to stop producing 20% enriched uranium, export its accumulated stockpile and shut down its underground Fordow uranium enrichment facility all in exchange for minimal sanctions relief: the suspension of measures on gold and precious metals. Needless to say, the Iranians didn’t accept.

While getting all parties to meet and spell out their proposals after a long break in negotiations was a feat in itself, substantively, not much was achieved. Vali Nasr at Johns Hopkins University hit the nail on the head when he said: “The problem is that Iran is stuck in its position: it has to give up substantial things — trump cards — for talks to proceed substantively, and it needs serious concessions in return.” But the P5+1 is not prepared to give them.

Now the context has changed. A new Iranian president has entered the scene and he seems more amenable to meaningful negotiations than his predecessor. This doesn’t mean Rouhani is a reformer. He’s very much a regime insider who had to pass the Guardian Council’s screening process like all presidential candidates do. He’s also a cleric with a long tradition of loyalty to the Islamic Republic who’s served on numerous state bodies and, prior to his election, was Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Of course, these are positive attributes for a president inside the Islamic Republic. Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made enemies in almost every government department, whilst Mohammad Khatami’s reformist ways seriously threatened Iran’s hardliners. Both had their hands tied when it came to implementing significant changes.

Rouhani’s track record suggests he knows how to sell policies at home. In October 2003, when he was Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, he agreed to a limited suspension of its enrichment program while telling the Iranians this would buy time to advance it in other ways. This allowed him to silence his hardline critics who were accusing him of selling Iran out.

In addition to willingness and ability, Rouhani will need assurance that he has an international partner who’s interested in cooperation, and a reason to compromise on an issue that has been elevated to national importance in Iran. If faced with inertia or increasing sanctions, Iran’s hardliners will discredit him and force the country back into a policy of resistance. Both sides must be willing to give-and-take and show decisive leadership to reach a deal.

If the P5+1 wants to limit Iran’s enrichment ability, and possibly its future plutonium production, it will have to offer more in return. Iran will want reciprocity in the weight and substance of a deal. This means some form of significant sanctions relief, or, given the difficulties involved in removing sanctions, a timeline to that effect should Iran agree to curb its program. This would go some way in convincing a (perhaps rightfully) paranoid regime that sanctions were not designed for regime change. Given the difficulties the US faces with Congress, this is an area where the EU could play an important role.

The Iranians will also want some form of acceptance of their “right to enrich”. There is of course, no such right. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) explicitly refers to the right to peaceful nuclear technologies, not enrichment. Nevertheless, once again, Iran has elevated its interpretation of the NPT to such importance that it will have to be addressed. It remains to be seen whether Iran will accept enough limits on its enrichment to prove the peacefulness of its program and allow for the recognition of this “right”.

Rouhani’s presidency offers the P5+1 the best chance it has had in a while to reach some form of technical deal addressing the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Will Iran’s negotiating partner be able to respond this opportunity?

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). An archive of her writings can be accessed here.

- Photo Credit: Mehdi Ghasemi 

After a long night, the results came in on Saturday: Hassan Rowhani, former foreign minister, former nuclear negotiator and reformist by default will be the Islamic Republic of Iran’s next president. The outcome of this seemingly unfraudulent election has led to surprise and hope both inside and outside Iran. But how much [...]]]> by Dina Esfandiary

After a long night, the results came in on Saturday: Hassan Rowhani, former foreign minister, former nuclear negotiator and reformist by default will be the Islamic Republic of Iran’s next president. The outcome of this seemingly unfraudulent election has led to surprise and hope both inside and outside Iran. But how much is Iran’s next president willing to do, and perhaps more importantly, how much can he do?

Predicting the outcome of Iranian elections is a thankless exercise — after all, the last four presidential elections in Iran were surprises. But after months of crackdowns and statements that no dissent would be tolerated”, it seemed this election would come and go with no notable change other than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being shooed out in favour of an appointed hardline conservative. Although the crackdown that followed Iran’s fraudulent 2009 election and Ahmadinejad’s turbulent presidency had damaged the system, it seemed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would not risk another four years of uncertainty for a little bit of legitimacy gained from freer elections. But, again, we were surprised.

Iranian authorities even kept polls open late to accomodate a surge of voters who had initially refrained form voting, feeling that their vote would be ignored. But it became apparent that the government was intent on repairing some of the damage done to its system by demonstrating it was capable of holding elections with a high turnout (80% according to the government) and “only minor issues that were fixed quickly”, as stated by the Guardian Council.

Iranians have made clear their desire for change. Some will paint this as a victory for the sanctions regime, while others will see it as Khamenei’s willingness to act leniently in the face of public pressure. But a problem remains: constitutionally, the Iranian president has little power — Khamenei is still the ultimate decision-maker, which suggests the big picture won’t change much.

The president is responsible for the state of the Iranian economy (which Ahmadinejad did little to improve) and the general mood and direction the country is taking. Depending on their relationship, Iran’s new president might be able to sway the Supreme Leader’s views on some subjects.

Rowhani has not revealed his plans for tackling Iran’s major economic problems like rampant inflation, unemployment and the drop in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial. But he has stated that he will begin to address economic problems first. During his campaign, he often criticised government policy on a range of issues, from the nuclear negotiations to the treatment of prisoners, indicating that he would try to tackle them. And during his first press conference as President-elect, to the great relief of many international watchers, Rowhani highlighted that he would make Iran’s nuclear program more transparent and help build mutual trust to end Iran’s international isolation.

But the pessimist in me remembers that Rowhani passed the Guardian Council’s screening. He is a cleric with a long tradition of loyalty to the Islamic Republic; he did not support the opposition in 2009 and supported the clampdown on student protests in the nineties. Some (even more pessimistic than I) believe his recent liberal tendencies were intended to woo the reformists and reinvigorate those who had lost confidence in the system.

And that’s just the first layer of suspicion. Willingness and ability are two separate things. Think Mohammad Khatami’s presidency — his hands were tied.

It is likely, that as many Western analysts are predicting, not much will change, especially in Iran’s foreign policy. The Islamic Republic has already invested far too heavily in Syria for example, and at no point did Rowhani indicate he would revisit this policy during his campaign. On the nuclear front, he focused on critiscizing the government’s handling of the negotiations, not the existence of the nuclear program.

Having said that, it would be foolish to dismiss the events of the past twenty-fours hours because substantial change, especially vis-a-vis the outside world, seems unlikely. Past presidents have been successful in influencing politics as well as the general mood and image of the country. Khatami was also able to loosen some of the restrictions on the daily lives of Iranians. Moreover, the Iranian population is tired of the current state of affairs; they want breathing space from international pressure to address domestic concerns. This recent victory, no matter how uncertain, has made space for some hope and cautious optimism.

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

by Dina Esfandiary

In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Dina Esfandiary

In a letter to Congress last week, the White House confirmed “with varying degrees of confidence” that chemical weapons had been used in Syria. This has led to a flurry of assertions that something must now be done – Bashar al-Assad’s crimes cannot go unpunished. But is there enough information to justify action? More importantly, can the US and the rest of the international community actually do much?

The quick answer to both questions is no.

The UK and France have obtained samples from inside Syria that have tested positive for traces of a Sarin by-product. Videos and pictures show victims suffering symptoms similar to those caused by certain chemical weapons (although foaming of the mouth is not usually a symptom of Sarin exposure). The information has been corroborated with witness testimonies. This is credible but not definitive.

There is no information about the exact location or timing of the alleged attack. The physiological samples show individuals were exposed but they do not clarify where, when or how. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether it was an actual attack or just an accidental release of agents from a broken or lost canister.

The samples and interviews do not point the finger at Assad in any definitive manner. It would be reasonable to assume the agents came from the regime — after all, Assad has spent the last four decades developing his chemical weapons arsenal into the biggest in the Middle East. But the evidence is not unequivocal. If intentional, it is possible the agents were released by a rogue general or rebels that have somehow come across Sarin canisters. Unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible.

The limited scale of the alleged attack also raises a number of questions. Why risk large-scale international retribution for such a small result? Chemical weapons are effective weapons of terror, but Assad is not short of means of terrorizing his enemies. Why run the risk of intervention for so little gain? Especially at a time when US policy priority has shifted from deposing Assad to ensuring Islamists do not come to power in Syria.

The uncertainty surrounding these allegations and the small scale of the alleged attack make it difficult to say for certain that Assad has crossed the US’ red line. “Suspicions are one thing; evidence is another”, said Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel last week.

But the problems do not stop there. If the allegations are proven correct, the options for responding are not attractive.

Some Israeli officials have called for military action to “curb” Syria’s chemical weapons. But this is different (and much more difficult) than military action in response to the use of chemical weapons. A military response to the alleged crossing of the red line could include air strikes on Syrian military installations (rather than just chemical weapons facilities) for example. But using air strikes to secure Syria’s chemical weapons is risky, especially when the location and size of the facilities are unconfirmed. More importantly, what if as a result of the airstrikes, some of the agents were released into the atmosphere? The consequences would be devastating. Add to that Syria’s robust air defences and the possibility that some munitions will survive and be open to looting, and doing nothing suddenly looks like a good idea.

The other option is to send troops in. But the lack of accurate intelligence on the location and size of Syria’s stockpiles makes this difficult. In a sea of uncertainty, the one thing the international community is sure of is that Assad’s stockpiles are large (the largest in the Middle East) and dispersed. In fact, so much so that in November, the Pentagon told the White House that upward of 75,000 troops would be needed to secure Syria’s chemical weapons. Is the US ready for another invasion of a Middle Eastern country and a treasure hunt to find all facilities and stockpiles in the context of civil war, where foreign troops would be a prime target?

It is difficult to idly sit by while the crisis in Syria escalates. But the US and the international community cannot jump into another war in the region based on assumptions. And given the existing circumstances and options, securing Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles will require more persuasion and negotiation than brute force.

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 

Photo: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel briefs the press in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on April 25, 2013. Hagel announced that the White House released a statement that it has evidence that Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has used chemical weapons against the Syrian rebels.   DoD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo.