by Jim Lobe
Following the publication last month of my post, “ProPublica and the Fear Campaign Against Iran”, I sent an email message to Stephen Engelberg, ProPublica’s editor-in-chief, drawing his attention to my critique of Sebastian’s Rotella’s article, “The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads in Latin America”, published by ProPublica on July [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Following the publication last month of my post, “ProPublica and the Fear Campaign Against Iran”, I sent an email message to Stephen Engelberg, ProPublica’s editor-in-chief, drawing his attention to my critique of Sebastian’s Rotella’s article, “The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads in Latin America”, published by ProPublica on July 11 and corrected on July 18. The correction was apparently the result of my inquiry to the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (which likely led the DNI to alert ProPublica in one way or another) regarding a key misattribution to DNI James Clapper of a quote by Florida Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. I also asked Mr. Engelberg to consider issuing two other corrections of what I viewed as errors of fact contained in Mr. Rotella’s article.
The following is the exchange of messages between Mr. Engelberg and me (which has also been published in the Comments sections of both the original ProPublica article and my critique of it). Depending on time constraints and unforeseen events, such as today’s bloodshed and violence in Egypt, which require me to write articles for IPS, I also intend to respond to Mr. Engelberg’s reply both with respect to the specific points he makes and to the broader issues regarding Mr. Rotella’s coverage of alleged Iran/Hezbollah-related terrorism. Let me add that I am gratified that, given all of his responsibilities, Mr. Engelberg took the time and effort to respond to my comments, and I hope the dialogue will continue.
From: Jim Lobe, IPS
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2013 1:20 PM
To: Stephen Engelberg
Subject: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Hi Mr. Engelberg:
Please forgive my presumptuousness in addressing this directly to you, but I couldn’t find anyone else, such as an ombudsman, to whom to address this complaint. My name is Jim Lobe, and I’ve served as the Washington DC bureau chief for Inter Press Service (ipsnews.net) for almost three decades.
I refer to Mr. Rotella’s article published July 11, “The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads in Latin America,” for which ProPublica has already issued one important correction regarding the misattribution of a quotation by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen to DNI James Clapper.
I published a lengthy critique (including the misattribution) of Mr. Rotella’s article on my blog (lobelog.com) on July 18, just a few hours after the correction was issued and 24 hours after I had alerted the DNI’s press office to its existence. (The critique can be found at http://www.lobelog.com/propublica-and-the-fear-campaign-against-iran/.) In addition to the misattribution, I also noted at least two major factual errors in the story – including the characterization of an individual convicted in a terrorist plot 2010 as a “longtime intelligence operative for Iran” and the assertion that Iran was the top source of illegal migrants to Canada – neither of which has been corrected by ProPublica.
If you have the patience to read the critique, you will see that these factual errors and misattributions, at least in my view, have been symptomatic of larger problems regarding Mr. Rotella’s reporting on Iran/Hezbollah/terrorism-related issues, problems which some of my colleagues and I have noticed for some time and about which they may be writing more for the blog. You will also see that, at least in the case of this specific article, a very highly regarded former top intelligence official with expertise on Iran and the Middle East, Paul Pillar, shared some of our views. In case you don’t have the patience to read the critique, this is what he sent me by email after reading Mr. Rotella’s article:
“The article certainly seems to be an effort to go out of the way to raise suspicions about Iranian activities in the hemisphere, by dumping together material that is either old news or not really nefarious, and stringing it together with innuendo. Almost all of the specifics that get into anything like possible terrorist activities are old. The Iranian efforts to make diplomatic friends in Latin America by cozying up with the regimes in Venezuela and elsewhere that have an anti-U.S. streak is all well known, but none of that adds up to an increase in clandestine networks or a terrorist threat. The closest the article gets in that regard is with very vague references to Venezuela being used by “suspected Middle Eastern operatives” and the like, which of course demonstrates nothing as far as Iran specifically is concerned. Sourcing to an unnamed “intelligence officer” is pretty meaningless.”
Assuming that Mr. Pillar used his best professional judgment in making this assessment, I would think that ProPublica should be quite concerned about his view – especially the reference to the use of “innuendo” in the story – if not so impressed with mine. Innuendo, I’m sure you will agree, is not something ProPublica would ever want to be associated with, especially on such an issue of such importance to U.S. foreign policy.
In any event, I hope that ProPublica would consider issuing the additional corrections of fact noted above.
Given ProPublica’s very important mission and work, as well as your own many contributions to excellent journalism, I would be very gratified to hear back from you on this.
Thanks for your time and consideration.
Best regards,
Jim
—–Original Message—–
From: Stephen Engelberg
Sent: Aug 4, 2013 11:11 AM
To: “Jim Lobe, IPS”
Cc: Tom Detzel
Subject: RE: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Dear Jim,
Thanks for the note. The editor handling this coverage has been away and unreachable for the past week. He reviewed your lengthy critique before he left. We will be in touch with you next week with some further thoughts. We have reviewed the two factual issues you raised in addition to the misattribution and we respectfully do not think either merits a correction. I am copying our editor, Tom Detzel, on this note
Best,
Steve Engelberg
From: Jim Lobe
Sent: Sunday, August 04, 2013 2:10 PM
To: Stephen Engelberg
Cc: Jim Lobe
Subject: RE: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Thanks for your note.
Of course, I respectfully disagree with your decision regarding the correction (if, for no other reason, than readers will now believe that Iran is the biggest source of illegal migrants toCanada unless they dig deeper), but that obviously is not my decision. In any event, the larger issue about the use of anonymous or clearly interested sources, particularly amid a clear campaign to persuade Americans that Iran poses such a compelling national security threat that we should prepare for war against it, is far more important.
Unfortunately, I am currently in Seattle and will be spending much of the coming week in the mountains , but I will be back in DC the following week if that would work. As I noted in my little but lengthy essay, we may shortly be publishing a bit more about Mr. Rotella’s work and sources, but I look forward to any further communication.
I hope you’re in as beautiful a climate and topography as I am at the moment.
Best regards,
Jim
—–Original Message—–
From: Stephen Engelberg
Sent: Aug 5, 2013 12:02 PM
To: Jim Lobe
Subject: RE: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Jim,
Strangely enough, I’m in Portland right now so I’ve been able to at least match the climate.
Best,
Steve
From: Jim Lobe
Sent: Friday, August 09, 2013 10:34 AM
To: Stephen Engelberg
Subject: RE: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Hi Steve:
I just came down from two fantastic days in the mountains.
Re: Rotella and any follow-up we might have next week on the latin america terror infrastructure when i get back, Gareth Porter wrote the following piece for IPS and Lobelog while I was enjoying the scenery and the hiking. Of course, the story bears on the credibility of the investigations carried out by the argentine prosecutor, alberto nisman, in which Mr. Rotella appears to hold great stock. I understand the daily beast may be following up on Gareth’s piece shortly, arriving at pretty much the same conclusions.
I hope to hear from you and/or the editor then.
best, jim
From: Stephen Engelberg
Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 10:09 AM
To: Jim Lobe
Subject: RE: Rotella on Iran terrorist infrastructure in Latin America
Jim,
We’ve reviewed your critique of our story, “The Terror Threat and Iran’s Inroads to Latin America,” and the two issues you raised in an email to Steve Engelberg requesting corrections. We’re certainly not averse to correcting when warranted. In this instance we’ve decided that’s not required.
First, you say we misreported Joseph Humire’s testimony about Iranian migrants going toCanada. In fact, Humire’s testimony states that Iran is the number one source of improperly documented migrants (i.e., illegally entering on false, altered, stolen or improperly obtained travel documents), most of whom seek refugee status when they arrive. Citing the Canadian border services agency, his testimony stated that most of those Iranian migrants arrived via Latin America from 2009 to 2011, and that the majority passed through Caracas. This is what we reported in our brief mention of his testimony. Nowhere did we say there is a “flood” of Iranian operatives into Canada, as you wrote. We spoke to Mr. Humire. He said our story was an accurate account of his testimony, which was not solely based on the report by the Canadian border services agency, but on his conversations with Canadian border officials who are concerned about the Iranian migrant issue. He said this accounts for differences in wording between his testimony and the report, which states that Latin America was the primary last embarkation point for Iranian migrants in 2009 and 2010. As you noted, the report also states that the flow subsequently shifted to Western Europe, although Caracas and Mexico City remain significant embarkation points.
Second, you dispute the section stating that the trial of Abdul Kadir, convicted in the 2007 JFK terror plot, revealed that he was a longtime intelligence operative for Iran. According to a Justice Department news release about his sentencing to life in prison, however, “Kadir, a former member of the Guyanese parliament, admitted that he regularly passed information to Iranian authorities about sensitive topics, including the Guyanese military, and believed himself bound to follow fatwas from Iranian religious leaders.” Furthermore, the full 502-page report by Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman into Iran’s activities inLatin America further explores the evidence that Kadir was an Iranian operative. The Nisman report cites the U.S. court file and testimony to Argentine prosecutors by witnesses including New York Joint Terrorism Task Force investigator Robert Addonizio, who testified that Kadir “worked for the Iranian government and provided it with intelligence information about Guyana” and that Kadir’s activities “were those of a spy.” You have a different view of the nature of Kadir’s relationship with Iran, but our account of the assessments of the U.S. and Argentine authorities is accurate.
Your blog raises other complaints, but in fact the story is far more balanced and restrained than your portrayal. Among other things, it prominently states that there is “considerable debate inside and outside the U.S. government” about the extent and nature of Iranian influence in Latin America. The story also quotes a senior U.S. government official in support of the State Department’s conclusion that Iranian influence is actually waning. And it reports Rep. Bennie Thompson’s opinion that the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez had weakened Iranian ties. You failed to mention any of those points in your post.
Regarding the correction of Director Clapper’s remarks, you are already aware that the mistake stemmed from an error in testimony by Ilan Berman. Upon learning from a government official of a potential misattribution, we contacted Mr. Berman. He graciously acknowledged responsibility for the error, so we immediately corrected and updated the story.
We agree that anonymous sources should be used sparingly, with discretion and with full awareness of the potential for officials to use the cloak of anonymity for political purposes. That said, it seems wholly unrealistic to presume that people in the U.S. government or elsewhere would discuss classified information on the record. We note that your own stories cite anonymous sources, several of whom do not appear to be risking their security clearances. Your recent posts quote unnamed “U.S. officials”, a “lobbyist”, an “insider”, a “well-connected Congressional staffer” and “one Washington veteran.” As you are no doubt aware, an unprecedented number of criminal leak investigations has cast a significant chill on government sources. Front-line officials and others involved in national security cases often will not speak on the record about sensitive information if it jeopardizes their safety, their career or an important investigation.
At the same time, when our story cites, by name, the testimony of former Colombian intelligence chief Fernando Tabares about alleged Iranian terrorist activity, you describe the information as “purported” and “of unknown origin.” This is perplexing, as the story clearly names “the Argentine investigation” as the source of Tabares’ testimony, which can be found on pages 474 and 475 of the Nisman report along with information from a second Colombian intelligence official. We have reviewed the full version of Nisman’s report in the original Spanish. We also note that Sebastian Rotella has considerable independent expertise about the AMIA attack, which he began covering in the mid-1990s when he was based in Argentina.
Finally, your insinuations about an ideological agenda are simply without merit and are debunked by any number of stories by Rotella, who has a proven and esteemed record of unbiased, revealing and incisive reporting. We have full confidence in his competence and professionalism.
/s/ The Editors,
ProPublica
Photo Credit: Prensa Miraflore
by Peter Jenkins
Last week, while visiting Israel and Jordan, President Barak Obama publicly emphasised that there is still time to resolve the nuclear dispute without resorting to force and that this is his preference. For peaceniks everywhere, those were encouraging words.
But, advertently or not, the President’s words also revealed [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Last week, while visiting Israel and Jordan, President Barak Obama publicly emphasised that there is still time to resolve the nuclear dispute without resorting to force and that this is his preference. For peaceniks everywhere, those were encouraging words.
But, advertently or not, the President’s words also revealed two of the most perplexing aspects of his administration’s Iran policy: their insistence on making unique demands of Iran, and their reluctance to give weight to US intelligence findings.
Let me try first to explain what I mean by “unique demands”.
In Jordan the President said: “Now if in fact what the Supreme Leader has said is the case, which is that developing a nuclear weapon would be un-Islamic and that Iran has no interest in developing nuclear weapons, then there should be a practical, verifiable way to assure the international community that it’s not doing so”.
Since 1970 there has been an almost universally accepted “practical, verifiable way” of providing such an assurance. It is to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), submit all nuclear material to international monitoring, and convince international inspectors that nuclear material is not being diverted to non-peaceful purposes.
Since the late ‘90s, a supplementary measure, known as the Additional Protocol, has also gained acceptance. It enables international inspectors to satisfy themselves that a given state has placed all the material in its possession, and not just a part of it, under safeguards.
As it happens, Iran has been a party to the NPT since 1970, and for all but the years between 1991 and 2003 it has satisfied the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the nuclear material in its possession has been in peaceful use.
For two years (late 2003 to the end of 2005) Iran also applied the Additional Protocol; and since 2005 it has reiterated a readiness to re-apply this instrument if sanctions introduced to coerce Iran into giving up the dual-use technology of uranium enrichment are lifted.
So there is no reason to think that Iran is unready to do what other states do to provide practical, verifiable grounds that they are not developing nuclear weapons. When, therefore, President Obama implies that this would not be enough, he also implies that a unique standard of confidence-provision is being set for Iran.
Some would say that this is reasonable. Iran’s failure to declare to the IAEA small quantities of nuclear material over a 12-year period, and their use in research apparently related to nuclear weapons acquisition, rightly provoked suspicions about Iranian intentions.
But neither the NPT nor IAEA rules provide for the imposition of unique standards on states that have been in non-compliance with their IAEA obligations; they simply require correction of the failures that gave rise to a non-compliance finding. For other states returning to conformity, by making the necessary corrections, has been enough.
Furthermore — to come to the second perplexity — since late 2007 the justification for suspecting that Iran has weaponization intentions has dwindled, thanks to the effectiveness of US intelligence operations. On several occasions, the Director of National Intelligence has reported a high probability that Iran has not decided to acquire nuclear weapons although it seeks the option to produce them (which it can be dissuaded from doing through intelligent diplomacy).
In other words, Iran is no longer suspected, by those whose job it is to know best, of being engaged in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Additionally, Iran is ready to provide ongoing assurances to that effect in the same way that other states do. Yet the President of the United States is asking for more.
What form might “more” take? The President gave a hint when he alluded, in Israel, to Iran needing to meet its “international obligations”. In the past that phrase encompassed not just NPT and IAEA obligations, which Iran assumed voluntarily, but also the obligations imposed on Iran by the UN Security Council since 2006.
This is controversial because those obligations were imposed to force Iran into abandoning uranium enrichment at a time when suspicions about Iran’s nuclear intentions were still acute. Once the US intelligence community reported “with high confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program, to what extent has it been just or reasonable to demand that Iran meet these “obligations”?
A past head of US Strategic Command once remarked that when a threat assessment changes, the strategic posture should also change. This wise observation seems to have passed over the heads of those who are responsible for formulating US (and EU) policy towards Iran. The risk remains that one day most of us will come to regret that.
]]>The administration of Barack Obama has taken its sweet time preparing the report, perhaps because a consensus opinion [...]]]>
The administration of Barack Obama has taken its sweet time preparing the report, perhaps because a consensus opinion from all the U.S. intelligence agencies has become a political football in recent years.
A controversial 2007 NIE that said Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program. The assessment took the wind out of the sails of many Iran hawks, and they have been warning ever since that the new report better be accurate. (Likewise, doves alleged that the 2002 NIE on Iraq was politicized to build a case for war.)
Here’s Thielmann, extrapolating hints of the reportedly completed NIE from the Congressional testimony of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper:
]]>Notwithstanding recent developments, key judgments on Iran in the DNI’s 2011 statement are nearly identical to those delivered by the DNI in 2010 and virtually unchanged from those in the controversial 2007 NIE:
- “Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.” (NIE 2007)
- “We continue to assess Iran keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” (DNI 2011)
***
- “We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.” (NIE 2007)
- “Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.” (DNI 2011)
***
- “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.” (NIE 2007)
- “We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.” (DNI 2011)