by Emile Nakhleh
Bahrain’s national election planned for this Saturday portends no change in the al-Khalifa regime’s anti-Shi’a stance and is yet another futile exercise in sham democracy. Even the mainstream al-Wefaq Shi’a opposition party has decided to boycott the election because of perceived bias in the recently gerrymandered electoral districts.
Most observers view the election as another public relations ploy by the minority Sunni regime to convince the outside world, especially Western countries, that all is well in the tiny kingdom. The regime is betting, perhaps correctly, that the West would not criticize its game of superficial electoral politics because of Bahrain’s participation in the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and Saudi Arabia’s influence in the process.
The regime’s sectarian repression of the Shi’a majority is deeply grounded in the same radical Sunni ideology espoused by Islamic State (ISIS or IS). In fact, extremist Sunni rhetoric has been tolerated in Bahrain in the name of fighting the Shi’a opposition and Iran.
IS enjoys significant backing in Bahrain among some pro-regime Sunni factions. Such ideological support, which is widely spread out among certain Sunni groups in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, is a key driver of IS in Iraq and Syria. This also explains why many IS jihadists come from the family-ruled Gulf states.
Promoting extremist Sunni ideology at home while ostensibly fighting IS in the Levant is a cynical ploy by the Khalifas’ to justify their continued suppression of Shi’a rights and policy of turning a blind eye to the poor living conditions in Shi’a villages and towns. Sitra, a tiny Shi’a island just south of the capital city of Manama, is indeed a world apart from the glitzy Khalifa strongholds in other parts of the island country.
Stoking sectarianism might be a winning strategy in the short term; it is certainly a losing proposition in the long run. It’s equally foolish for the Bahraini regime to believe that Western support, which is currently driven by the war against IS, would be sufficient to save them from the wrath of their people should a radical Shi’a uprising erupt.
Wefaq and the Election
The regime, and US policymakers for that matter, should take Wefaq’s boycott of the election very seriously. As a mainstream opposition political party, Wefaq has been willing to cooperate with the Sunni regime under the umbrella of the Khalifas as long as genuine reform is implemented.
For the party, meaningful reform includes free elections; reinstating the 1973 constitution; government accountability (particularly at the level of the prime minister); ending economic, political, and employment discrimination, especially in security and defense; and halting illegal arrests, trials, and convictions.
In fact, Wefaq supported the reform initiative of then-Emir Hamad in 2001-02 and endorsed the so-called National Charter believing that Hamad was committed to genuine reform. Several opposition figures came back from exile to cooperate with the new initiative.
Unfortunately, however, the only “reform” that resulted from Hamad’s initiative was changing the name of the country to the “Kingdom of Bahrain” and replacing his title of “Emir” with “King.” The reform initiative stalled because of opposition from Prime Minister Khalifa and the “Khawalids” in the office of the emir in Gulf countries, and defense, and judicial branches of government.
Overturning the Bahraini regime’s unconstitutional step of stripping Shi’a citizens of their citizenship has become a key reform demand for Wefaq. Despite the constitutional prohibition, a total of 40 Bahrainis have been stripped of their citizenship in the past two years—31 in November 2012 and nine in August 2014.
Article 17 of the Bahraini constitution states that a Bahraini citizen “cannot be stripped of his nationality except in case of treason. It is prohibited to banish a citizen from Bahrain or prevent him from returning to it.” Article 18 states, “People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties.”
Wefaq is the largest, most prominent and pragmatic opposition political party in the country. Its 18 members resigned from parliament three years ago to protest the draconian measures the ruling family has adopted against the opposition, particularly the Shi’a community.
Wefaq believes the regime will use the skewed election results to justify its massive human rights violations and continued campaign of harassment, arrests, and illegal detentions. Wefaq and other opposition groups—including Wa’d, al-Tajjamu,’ and al-Ikha’—decided to boycott the election, refusing to take part in what some of them call a pseudo-democratic political charade.
Jamil Kathim, who heads Wefaq’s Shura Council, said the election “does not represent the popular will and will not provide security for the country.” Matar Ibrahim Matar, a former Wefaq Member of Parliament who is currently living in Washington, DC, called on the government to postpone the election “until a national path forward has been agreed on.”
The opposition groups also urged King Hamad to “seek a national consensus to resolve the serious national issues that have bedeviled the nation since 2011 before holding elections.”
The mainstream opposition includes several leading figures with whom the regime could work with if it’s seriously interested in becoming more inclusive. These include Ali Salman, Secretary General of Al-Wifaq, Jamil Kathim, Abd al-Jalil al-Khalil, Ali al-Marzook, Matar Ibrahim Matar, Jasim Hussain, Mansoor al-Jamri, Nabil Rajab, Lamis Dhaif, Maryam al-Khawaja, Ali al-Ikri, and several others.
The regime, in defiance, has gone all out to publicize the elections based on Crown Prince Salman’s so-called “Common Ground” framework. In addition to “Electoral Districts,” the other four parts of the framework include “Legislative Authority,” “Cabinet Formation,” “Judicial Reform,” and “Security.”
Is There a Way Forward?
The regime is pressing ahead with the election while ignoring the pragmatic demands of the opposition. Human rights Watch and Human Rights First have frequently identified the egregious human rights violations committed by the regime against innocent civilians and political activists.
But Bahrain has waged a fierce public relations campaign to dissuade Western governments from raising the human rights issue in the country. The Khalifa regime has used an army of “access” academics, former diplomats, retired senior military officers, corporate executive think-tankers, and pliant media influential figures to act as informal advisers to “lobby” policymakers in Western capitals on behalf of the Bahraini regime.
What we are seeing now is a minority Sunni regime refusing to share the political process with the country’s Shi’a majority on the basis of fairness, equity, and justice. If the United States believes continued tensions in Bahrain and in the wider Gulf are harmful to its strategic regional interests, it cannot remain oblivious to these violations and to the possibility of radicalization in Bahrain.
Due to the Khalifas’ refusal to seriously act on the concerns of the country’s Shi’a majority, the elections on Saturday will not move the reconciliation process forward. Washington may be hoping to stabilize its relations with Iran through an agreement on the nuclear issue and to understand the regional factors that led to the rise of IS to speed up its defeat, but the growing chance of vicious sectarianism in Bahrain could undermine its search for regional stability.
]]>Economic issues are paramount on the minds of Iranian voters as they ponder the long list of candidates registered for president: who among them is likely to survive the vetting by the Guardian Council, and, of those, who offers the best plan to get Iran’s economy out of the rut it has [...]]]>
Economic issues are paramount on the minds of Iranian voters as they ponder the long list of candidates registered for president: who among them is likely to survive the vetting by the Guardian Council, and, of those, who offers the best plan to get Iran’s economy out of the rut it has been in for the last several years?
Since the last election in 2009, the economy has stopped growing, more people are unemployed, prices have skyrocketed, and the currency has lost more than half of its value. Not all of these are the fault of outgoing President Ahmadinejad — sanctions have tightened considerably since he started his second term in 2009. But for the last several months the economic debate in Iran has been dominated by both his conservative and reformist critics who charge that his populist policies have brought economic ruin.
Three large programs define this populist legacy of redistribution. The first was a large $40 billion lending program for small enterprises, known as the “quick-returns projects”, which started in 2006 and was already widely considered a colossal failure before the 2009 election. The 2011 census revealed zero net jobs added to the economy since the program’s inception. Meanwhile, the public banks that were forced to lend to these projects have been left with huge unpaid loans. This large expansion of credit that failed to bring much additional output spurred the inflationary spiral that would later define the Ahmadinejad presidency.
The low-cost housing scheme, known as Maskan Mehr, also turned out to be highly inflationary because it relied on public lending to low-income people, forcing the banks to increase their borrowing from the Central Bank by about $40 billion and adding even more to liquidity.
The third, and most controversial, is the subsidy reform program, which redistributed some $70 billion worth of energy subsidies — most of which benefited people in middle- and upper-income groups — more equitably by replacing them with cash transfers. It also proved inflationary because the amount of cash distributed exceeded the cost of the energy subsidies that had been removed by an estimated $15 billion per year. The last two programs are still ongoing and have come under sharp attack, from both reformists and conservatives.
There seems to be a widespread perception among Iranian voters that Mr. Ahmadinejad has failed to deliver on his promise, first made in the 2005 elections, to “bring the oil money to the dinner table.” But this does not mean that the public is ready to give up on redistribution. If there is a program that promises them what they are looking for – redistribution without inflation – they will support it. But such a program is not currently to be found among the plans of any of the declared candidates.
Mr. Rafsanjani’s dramatic entrance into the election fray last Saturday is in part motivated by the hope that after eight years of redistributive policies, a majority of voters are now ready to view the type of pro-growth and pro-market policies that he spearheaded as president from 1989 to 1997 with more sympathy. He has certainly already won the support of the left-leaning reformers who, ironically, heavily criticized his structural-adjustment policies then.
Mr. Mashai’s equally dramatic registration on Saturday (with President Ahmadinejad at his side) is to convince voters that with more time populists will deliver on their promises. They should be assured of sizeable support from lower-income people, especially those who have benefited from his cash transfers.
The subsidy reform has been putting 450,000 rials per person per month in individual bank accounts since January 2011. While the value of this transfer has declined due to inflation – when it started it was worth about $45 but is now worth less than half as much — it amounted to about 50% of the per capita expenditures of the poorest 10% of the population in 2011. With unemployment at record levels, they would find themselves in extreme poverty if this transfer is substantially reduced or eliminated. As much as half of the country’s total population are net beneficiaries of the cash transfer program because the energy subsidies they replaced were highly regressive.
Mr. Rafsanjani’s put-down of cash transfers in 2008 as “fostering beggars” is unlikely to endear him to the poor and the jobless. Convincing them that they would do better with real economic growth makes economic sense but will be a hard sell politically to this group. He may not need them, however, because the middle- and upper-income classes for whom the cash transfer matters little — for the top decile, it makes up only 5% of their expenditures — account for some 40% of the electorate.
Candidates from conservative factions, known as “Principlists”, have so far gotten away with simply pointing out what they are against – inflation, unemployment, and bad implementation of good policies by the current administration. They have been careful to stress their commitment to continue the two remaining programs – subsidy reform and low-cost housing – but manage them better.
But the arrival of Mssrs. Rafsanjani and Mashai on the electoral scene will force them to define more precisely how they plan to bring about economic growth while continuing the most important policies of the Ahmadinejad administration. If the Guardian Council, which has the final say on who can run, allows this election to become a three-way race between populist, pro-growth, and Principlist philosophies, the conservative candidates will have to say more clearly what they are for, not just what they are against. Without it, they are likely to find themselves squeezed between the two better-defined alternatives.
]]>Election Day in the United States was — as it has been since 1845 — a Tuesday, which meant that it also coincided with “Terror Tuesday,” the label attached to the meetings held by President Obama and his inner national security circle to discuss and authorize drone strikes based on the Administration’s [...]]]>
Election Day in the United States was — as it has been since 1845 — a Tuesday, which meant that it also coincided with “Terror Tuesday,” the label attached to the meetings held by President Obama and his inner national security circle to discuss and authorize drone strikes based on the Administration’s secretive “targeted kill lists.” Shortly after the election results came in, it was reported that the US almost certainly carried out a targeted killing operation in Yemen against a reported al Qaeda target in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The individual targeted, ’Adnan al-Qadhi, who is said to have been killed along with 2 other AQAP suspects, was reportedly suspected of helping plan the 2008 Embassy Sana’a bombing.
As usual, there has been no independent verification for Yemeni claims that the three men were killed.
Yemen-watcher Gregory Johnson noted on his blog Waq al-Waq that the strike suggested there would be little reevaluation of the drone program — being carried out over Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and in the coming weeks, Mali and Libya — even though it continues to raise costs not wholly justified by reported successes:
So, even if the accusations against al-Qadhi were true and he was involved in the 2008 US Embassy attack and even if the US did have intelligence that he was about to carry out an attack on US personnel in Yemen or planning a strike against the US – did the US also have intelligence that all of the other individuals within the car were also involved?
This is important. The US has carried out, by my best estimate, between 37 – 50 strikes this year in an attempt to kill 10 – 15 people. Many of those 10 – 15 people are still alive (see: Nasir al-Wihayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi, Ibrahim Asiri and so on) but people are dying in Yemen.
And while we in the US may not feel or realize this, it is very real in Yemen. And this is causing problems and – I continue to say – is one of the key reasons behind the rapid growth of al-Qaeda in Yemen.
There are, however, some signs suggesting the program will be reevaluated by the President and his White House advisers as calls mount for greater scrutiny.
It would be difficult for the Administration to scale back a program it has invested so heavily in and touted without actually admitting to too much, Stephen Walt blogged, following Obama’s victory. He went on:
I fear that re-election will convince his team that they’ve basically got the right formula: drones, special forces, covert action, secrecy, etc., combined with a very cautious approach to diplomacy. This is certainly preferable to the follies of the Bush administration, but it also means that the U.S. will be engaged in lots of trouble spots but unable to resolve any of them.
Greg Miller, the author of the Washington Post‘s recent insider account of the intra-Administration debate on expanding the drone program, had also noted that the debate was rather circumscribed: “[t]here were a couple dissenters who had a seat at the table … They lost those seats at the table.”
The program has again received a full-throated endorsement from the Center for a New American Security — a think tank close to the Obama Administration — as the lesser evil in comparison to deploying Pakistani or American forces to to carry out ground offensives.
Spencer Ackerman, writing at Wired, suggests a debate could occur due to diplomatic considerations, but with few officially put-forward alternatives in play:
]]>“There is a recognition within the administration that the current trajectory of drone strikes is unsustainable,” [Michael] Zenko [of the Council on Foreign Relations] says. “They are opposed in countries where strikes occur and globally, and that opposition could lead to losing host-nation support for current or future drone bases or over-flight rights.” In other words, tomorrow’s America diplomats may find that drones overshadow the routine geopolitical agenda they seek to advance. The trouble is, the administration’s early search for less-lethal policies to supplement or supplant the drones isn’t promising.”
Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus continues to provides incisive analysis to the debate over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Following are a few of his suggested questions for the presidential candidates’ foreign policy debate on Monday.
What are the candidates willing to do to ensure their “red lines” on [...]]]>
Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus continues to provides incisive analysis to the debate over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Following are a few of his suggested questions for the presidential candidates’ foreign policy debate on Monday.
What are the candidates willing to do to ensure their “red lines” on Iran’s nuclear program aren’t violated and how much will Israeli concerns affect the ultimate outcome?
The president has said he would prevent Iran from “having a nuclear weapon” and has offered assurances that U.S. intelligence would be able to determine when building one had begun.
In his June “Face the Nation” appearance, Romney said he would be willing to use military force, but he did not define what that meant. Recently, he has said he would prevent Iran from having “a nuclear weapons capability,” but what does that mean?
Though the current policy of the United States and its allies rests on a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for Iran to suspend its activities related to reprocessing uranium, Iran has produced uranium enriched to 20 percent. Enrichment up to 90 percent is considered weapons grade. Most of the enrichment has been up to 6 percent, usable as fuel in electric power reactors.
What solution is required by each candidate for this situation? Do they believe any deal with Tehran requires Israeli approval?
Does Romney or Obama believe they could attack Iran’s nuclear program without congressional authorization — as was the case with Libya — and without agreement from the United Nations or support from NATO or a group of other allies, including some countries in the region?
On March 21, 2011, Obama sent Congress a two-page letter saying that as commander in chief he had constitutional authority to authorize the military operations to prevent a humanitarian disaster. He said it would be limited in duration and noted that the U.N. Security Council had authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, and that the undertaking was done with British, French and Persian Gulf allies. Nineteen days after the strikes began, NATO took over command of the air operations from the U.S. Africa Command.
Does Obama or Romney believe that any military action against Iran would be as limited as the one in Libya? Does either believe that U.S. ground forces could be drawn into battle should Iran or its allies respond with attacks against Israel or other countries?
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Appearing on ABC’s This Week yesterday, GOP presidential hopeful Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-MN) claimed that Iran had threatened the U.S. with a nuclear attack, a proposition so discordant with the facts that ABC host Christiane Amanpour told the candidate that the claim wasn’t possible because Iranian officialdom has [...]]]>
Appearing on ABC’s This Week yesterday, GOP presidential hopeful Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-MN) claimed that Iran had threatened the U.S. with a nuclear attack, a proposition so discordant with the facts that ABC host Christiane Amanpour told the candidate that the claim wasn’t possible because Iranian officialdom has never acknowledged a nuclear weapons program. Here’s the exchange:
BACHMANN: Iran has also stated they would be willing to use a nuclear weapon against the United States of America. I think if there’s anything that we have learned over the course of history, it is that when a madman speaks, we should listen. And I think in the case of Iran, that is certainly true.
AMANPOUR: Congresswoman, of course the United States is concerned about the nuclear program. Iran denies that it has one, so it hasn’t threatened to use them.
Watch the video:
]]>The officials, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and a Tehran prosecutor, were sanctioned because of their role in the 2009 crackdown against peaceful protesters in the wake [...]]]>
The officials, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and a Tehran prosecutor, were sanctioned because of their role in the 2009 crackdown against peaceful protesters in the wake of the disputed presidential election.
Reuters has the story:
]]>The U.S. Treasury Department said in a statement that the Tehran prosecutor general, Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi, and the commander of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Basij Forces, Mohammed Reza Naqdi, were added to its Office of Foreign Assets Control blacklist.
The action bans any U.S. persons from transactions with them and seeks to freeze any assets they may have under U.S. jurisdiction. It also subjects them to State Department visa sanctions.
The sanctions were imposed under an executive order signed by President Barack Obama in September 2010 that targeted human rights abuses the United States said were committed by Iranian government officials.