by Peter Jenkins
What a pity that Mr. Netanyahu’s interviewer on CBS’s “Face the Nation”, Bob Schieffer, chose to throw Israel’s Prime Minister a succession of softballs (the cricketing equivalents are called “dollies”).
It would have been refreshing if Mr. Schieffer had asked the PM how he squared his [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
What a pity that Mr. Netanyahu’s interviewer on CBS’s “Face the Nation”, Bob Schieffer, chose to throw Israel’s Prime Minister a succession of softballs (the cricketing equivalents are called “dollies”).
It would have been refreshing if Mr. Schieffer had asked the PM how he squared his certainty about Iran’s nuclear intentions with the assessments that the US intelligence community has produced; queried the PM’s assertion that producing fissile material is nine tenths of the challenge of making a nuclear weapon capable of threatening Israel; reminded the PM of the numerous occasions he has claimed time to be running out for Iran diplomacy; and confronted the PM with what Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, a prominent spokesman for an Arab state that has coexisted peacefully with Israel, said to an interviewer from Spiegel last month:
SPIEGEL: What do you think would happen if Israel were to carry out a pre-emptive attack to prevent Tehran from building the bomb?
Prince Turki: Iran would retaliate against everybody — with its missiles, with suicide bombers, with agents. And we would be the first victims. Imagine if a nuclear installation is destroyed in Iran and there is fallout on our side of the border. The Iranian people would coalesce around their government. In short, it would be total mayhem.
An even more interesting question would have been this: “Prime Minister, have developments over the last two years ever prompted you to re-visit the decision taken by one of your predecessors, in 1992, to demonise Iran, in order to preserve the strategic value of Israel to the US?”
I doubt Mr. Schieffer would have got much of an answer. Yet it would be fascinating to know whether Israel is starting to reconsider the premise of the anti-Iranian course on which it embarked 21 years ago, with ever-greater consequences for US attitudes to Iran, especially in Congress.
According to Trita Parsi, the author of Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US, that course was premised on a change in the way Israeli leaders viewed their neighbourhood.
Since the time of Ben-Gurion, Israel had sought friendly ties with “the periphery” (Iran and Turkey) in order to counter-balance the threat posed by “the vicinity” (the Arab states surrounding Israel plus Iraq).
In 1992 it dawned on a new Israeli government that the defeat of Iraq in the first Gulf War, the dismantlement of Iraqi WMD programs, Egyptian passivity and the launching of the Madrid peace process had defused the Arab threat and opened up possibilities for Israeli economic penetration of Arab neighbours.
But “Israel would have no future in the new order unless it could find a rationale for Washington to continue the strategic relationship” writes Parsi, who goes on to quote an expert on Israeli foreign policy: “There’s no doubt that when the prospects for peace with the inner circle emerged [the depiction of Iran as a threat] started”.
Iran was the obvious choice because of the torrent of revolutionary, anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli rhetoric that had flowed out of Tehran since 1979, and because Iran might one day seek to rival Israeli influence in the Arab states.
Writes Parsi: “Swiftly a campaign was organised to convince the US and Europe that Iran was a global threat.”
“The charges were based not on an existing Iranian threat but on the anticipation of a future Iranian threat,” he states.
What followed is becoming history.
Now the question is whether Israel still feels as sanguine about its Arab “vicinity”, and whether it continues to want Iran to provide the rationale for its strategic relationship with the US.
One might suppose that Israel could dispense with Iran as a rationale now that the US and Europe have such need of Israel as a still point of democratic stability in a maelstrom of Arab unrest.
Can one also suppose that Israel might see value in encouraging the US and Europe to cooperate with Iran to restore stability to the Arab “vicinity”?
The point is not that Syria, Iraq and Egypt are in any condition to threaten Israel militarily. Of course they are not. The point is that instability is intrinsically unpredictable.
Some future twist in the unfolding drama of the Arab Spring could transform Israel’s strategic prospects. And meanwhile the risk of chemical weapons falling into the hands of anti-Israeli terrorists is greater than it has ever been.
The fiction that Iran is a global threat no longer serves Israel well. How long will it take the Israelis, intelligent as they are, to realise that?
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
The Jun. 14 election of Hassan Rouhani, nicknamed the “diplomatic sheik” during his service as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005, to Iran’s presidency was met with hopeful celebrations within the country. But reactions from key world leaders have been much cooler.
While a Jul. 13 Wall [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
The Jun. 14 election of Hassan Rouhani, nicknamed the “diplomatic sheik” during his service as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005, to Iran’s presidency was met with hopeful celebrations within the country. But reactions from key world leaders have been much cooler.
While a Jul. 13 Wall Street Journal report claimed that the Obama administration would seek direct talks with its long-time adversary, it remains to be seen how far the United States will go to bring about a mutually acceptable agreement and whether or not Iran would accept it.
Israel’s prime minister, who has been warning that Iran is getting dangerously close to building a nuclear bomb for more than two decades, wants the United States to increase pressure on Iran while ramping up the military threat.
“What is important is to convey to them, especially after the election, that that policy will not change. And that it’ll it be backed up by increasingly forceful sanctions and military action,” Netanyahu said Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation”.
But Washington has reportedly already assured the Netanyahu government that it will not decrease pressure on Iran following Rouhani’s win.
“We have told the Israelis we intend to judge the Iranians according to their actions and not according to their words,” an American official told the Israeli daily, Haaretz, on Jul. 14.
According to Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiators and who worked closely with Mr. Rouhani, absent substantial modifications in Washington’s negotiating posture, little will change on the Iranian side.
IPS spoke with Mousavian, currently a research scholar at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, about prospects for change in the Iranian nuclear issue.
* IPS News published a version of this article on July 15.
Q: Your article for the Cairo Review, which was written more than a month before Mr. Rouhani’s election, has generated a lot of discussion over the suggestion that one of Iran’s options is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Is Iran seriously considering this?
A: As I reiterated in the article published by the Cairo Review, the first and most favorable option for Iran is to continue seeking a peaceful resolution to the standoff. I explained the five major demands the P5+1 [U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany] made in recent nuclear talks to prevent Iran’s breakout capability and to ensure a maximum level of transparency. Iran, in return, had two major demands: lifting sanctions and recognizing Iran’s rights under the NPT. I have also proposed that the world powers and Iran place their demands within a package, to be implemented in a step-by-step manner with proportionate reciprocation.
Withdrawing from the NPT has never been Iran’s intention. The US and Israel have initiated “all options on the table”, leaving open the possibility of a military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. This policy goes against the UN charter, the NPT, and non-proliferation, where nuclear-armed states — the U.S. and Israel — are threatening to attack Iran, a non-nuclear weapon state. Therefore, as long as the U.S. policy of “all options on the table” remains valid, Iran as a sovereign state is forced to also have “all options on the table”.
Q: The Obama administration claims that Iran has not responded formally to the confidence-building offer made in Almaty, Kazakhstan in February. In your opinion, why haven’t they, and do you expect a formal reply after Mr. Rouhani’s inauguration?
A: The P5+1 proposal in Almaty sought maximum demands and provided the minimum in return. Rouhani’s administration would be ready for a fair and balanced deal, comprising all the major demands of both parties based on the NPT, placed within a package and implemented in a step-by-step plan with proportionate reciprocation.
Q: Is recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium a precondition to a negotiated solution?
A: It would be part of the package deal explained above.
Q: There are forces in Congress that would like to implement more sanctions on Iran before Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated. What effect can this have on prospects for the negotiations?
A: Iran would never take calls for direct talks and engagement serious as long as the U.S. continues its sanction and pressure policy. If Washington is genuinely seeking rapprochement, it needs to demonstrate that through an act of goodwill instead of through increased hostilities and animosity. Iranians place importance in U.S. actions, not just words.
Q: What’s the balance of forces as you see them in Iran with respect to those who want to take a hardline on the nuclear issue and those who are in favor of a greater flexibility, and what is the effect of sanctions on this internal debate?
A: There are two schools of thought in Iran with respect to the nuclear approach, but there is no dispute on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, which includes enrichment. The P5+1 and Western approach toward Iran’s nuclear dossier does however play an important role in the balance of these two schools of thought.
During the nuclear talks from 2003 to 2005 with the three European powers [UK, France and Germany], when I was a member of the negotiating team, Iran demonstrated far-reaching overtures to resolve the nuclear dispute. Iran implemented the maximum level of transparency a member-state of the NPT can commit to by accepting the Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement. We also demonstrated Iran’s readiness to commit to all confidence building measures, assuring the peaceful nature of the nuclear program—forever. Regrettably, Iran and its European counterparts failed to reach a final agreement because the US continued to deny the legitimate rights of Iran under the NPT. The US inflexibility and position altered the balance of forces in Iran toward those in favor of radicalism. Therefore, if the West seeks cooperation and flexibility from Iran, it has to respond proportionally and appropriately.
The sanctions policy is only good for a lose-lose game. The Iranian nation has suffered from the sanctions, while the West has suffered from the dramatic increase of Iran’s enrichment-capacity and level. Once sanctions were implemented, Iran increased the number of centrifuges from 3,000 to 12,000, the level of enrichment from 3.5% to 20%, the stockpile of enriched uranium increased approximately 800% and so on.
Q: Mr. Rouhani referred to Israel as Israel rather than by any other name in his first press conference as president-elect. In your opinion, do you think this portends a new approach by Mr. Rouhani? What could it look like?
A: Dr. Rouhani is not a man of radical rhetoric. He is courteous and logical and respects international norms and regulations. The key to resolving the dispute with Iran depends on whether the traditional Western policies of pressure, sanctions, threats and humiliating Iran will change to those based on respect, mutual interests and cooperation with Rouhani’s administration.
Q: In your view, what caused the Iranian government to reject the TRR fuel swap proposal in 2009 and subsequently accept it when Turkey and Brazil came forward as intermediaries in 2010?
A: Iran never rejected the TRR fuel swap proposal of October 2009. Iran was asking for the simultaneous exchange of fuel for enriched uranium. The West was instead demanding the immediate delivery of Iranian enriched uranium with the fuel only provided to Iran after 2 years. However, in December 2009, through Mohammad ElBaradei, Iran offered a direct deal between Tehran and Washington, where Iran would deliver the enriched stockpile immediately and receive the fuel rods after two years. This concession from Iran was to open a door for direct talks and make a deal with the U.S. The U.S declined the offer. After that Iran signed the deal with Turkey and Brazil because the U.S. president encouraged the Turkish Prime Minister and Brazilian president to reach an agreement. Yet again, the U.S. declined to support the deal and instead pressed ahead with sanctions on Iran.
Q: Why should the world have confidence in Iran now when it is believed that for many years Iran pursued “a policy of concealment” as Mr. ElBaradei once put it?
A: In 1975, Germany signed a contract to build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran, and was paid approximately 7.8 billion DM. The project was 90% completed at the time of the 1979 Revolution. Soon after the revolution, the West’s policy toward Iran was aimed at denying Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear power plant — a clear violation of NPT.
In 1976, France signed a contract with Iran worth $1.2 billion to produce the fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on French soil. Once again, following the revolution, the West transgressed Iran’s right to access the international fuel market, in clear violation of the NPT. Such Western policies pushed Iran toward self-sufficiency. Moreover, during Iraq’s invasion of Iran (1980-88), the US and European powers provided the materials and technology for Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, killing and injuring about 100,000 Iranians. With such a history, can Iran have confidence in the West?
]]>Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus continues to provides incisive analysis to the debate over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Following are a few of his suggested questions for the presidential candidates’ foreign policy debate on Monday.
What are the candidates willing to do to ensure their “red lines” on [...]]]>
Washington Post columnist Walter Pincus continues to provides incisive analysis to the debate over Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Following are a few of his suggested questions for the presidential candidates’ foreign policy debate on Monday.
What are the candidates willing to do to ensure their “red lines” on Iran’s nuclear program aren’t violated and how much will Israeli concerns affect the ultimate outcome?
The president has said he would prevent Iran from “having a nuclear weapon” and has offered assurances that U.S. intelligence would be able to determine when building one had begun.
In his June “Face the Nation” appearance, Romney said he would be willing to use military force, but he did not define what that meant. Recently, he has said he would prevent Iran from having “a nuclear weapons capability,” but what does that mean?
Though the current policy of the United States and its allies rests on a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for Iran to suspend its activities related to reprocessing uranium, Iran has produced uranium enriched to 20 percent. Enrichment up to 90 percent is considered weapons grade. Most of the enrichment has been up to 6 percent, usable as fuel in electric power reactors.
What solution is required by each candidate for this situation? Do they believe any deal with Tehran requires Israeli approval?
Does Romney or Obama believe they could attack Iran’s nuclear program without congressional authorization — as was the case with Libya — and without agreement from the United Nations or support from NATO or a group of other allies, including some countries in the region?
On March 21, 2011, Obama sent Congress a two-page letter saying that as commander in chief he had constitutional authority to authorize the military operations to prevent a humanitarian disaster. He said it would be limited in duration and noted that the U.N. Security Council had authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, and that the undertaking was done with British, French and Persian Gulf allies. Nineteen days after the strikes began, NATO took over command of the air operations from the U.S. Africa Command.
Does Obama or Romney believe that any military action against Iran would be as limited as the one in Libya? Does either believe that U.S. ground forces could be drawn into battle should Iran or its allies respond with attacks against Israel or other countries?
]]>
“President Obama and the bipartisan, bicameral congressional leadership, have deepened America’s support for Israel in difficult times”: In what multiple outlets have deemed a “rare” statement, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) issued a press release on Sunday praising the Obama Administration – as well as both Congressional Republicans [...]]]>
“President Obama and the bipartisan, bicameral congressional leadership, have deepened America’s support for Israel in difficult times”: In what multiple outlets have deemed a “rare” statement, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) issued a press release on Sunday praising the Obama Administration – as well as both Congressional Republicans and Democrats — for their collective handling of Iran’s nuclear program and for their overall commitment to Israel’s security.
“Martin Indyk: ‘I’m afraid that 2013 is going to be a year in which we`re going to have a military confrontation with Iran’”: On CBS’s Face the Nation Sunday morning talk show, former Ambassador to Israel and “architect” of the dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq during the 1990s Martin Indyk told host Bob Schieffer that no president would issue a public ultimatum, such as a “red line”, not even Romney:
The idea of putting out a public red line, in effect, issuing an ultimatum, is something that no president would do. You notice Governor Romney is not putting out a red line. Senator McCain didn`t, either, and neither is Bibi Netanyahu, for that matter, in terms of Israel`s own actions, because it locks you in.
And I think what`s clear is that the United States has a vital interest in preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. There is still time, perhaps six months, even, by Prime Minister Netanyahu`s own time table, to try to see if a negotiated solution can be worked out. I`m pessimistic about that.
If that doesn`t work out, and we need to make every effort, exhaust every chance that it does work, then I`m afraid that 2013 is going to be a year in which we`re going to have a military confrontation with Iran.
Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, also suggested military action was possible in the near future and that the declaration of “red lines” would be unhelpeful, concurring that “instead of red lines, let me suggest deadlines,” arguing that “what we ought to do is go to the Iranians with a diplomatic offer and make clear what it is they have to stop doing, all the enrichment material they have to get rid of, the international inspections they have to accept, in return sanctions would be reduced, and they would be out from under the risk of attack.”
“McCain: U.S. “is weakened” under Obama”: Also on Meet the Press this Sunday was Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who decried the Obama Administration’s Syria policy and complained that the US is ceding ground to radical Islamists:
McCain: In Syria, 20,000 people have been massacred. These people cry out for our help. They`ve been massacred, raped, tortured, beaten. And the president of the United States will not even speak up for them, much less provide them with the arms and equipment for a fair fight when Russian arms are flowing in, Iranian help and Hezbollah on the ground.
Schieffer: So, what is it that we`re doing wrong here?
McCain: Well, it`s disengagement. Prior to 9/11, we had a policy of containment. Then after 9/11, it was confrontation with the terrorists and al Qaeda. Now it`s disengagement.
Every time– you just saw the spokesperson– we`re leaving Iraq. We`re leaving Afghanistan. We`re leaving the area. The people in the area are having to adjust and they believe the United States is weak, and they are taking appropriate action.
McCain also criticized the President for having a public dispute over “red lines” with Netanyahu and said that the US should tell then Israelis “we will not let them cross and we will act with you militarily.”
“Don’t Expect a Romney Intifadeh, the Palestinians Are Used to Disappointment”: Tony Karon of TIME responds to leaked remarks Mitt Romney made at a fundraiser in Florida in which he asserted that the Palestinians do not want a peace deal with Israel and suggested that his administration would “kick the ball down the field” with little hope for future progress on the peace process. Karon argues that while it is rare to hear such words from politicians in Israel, the West Bank or the US, in practice, kicking the ball down the field has been the “default policy” for the Obama Administration and its predecessors:
…. The prospect of achieving a two-state peace via a bilateral consensus at the negotiating table remains remote for the foreseeable future. Admitting as much, however, has been deemed unwise for the U.S., for Israel and for a Palestinian leadership that has invested the entirety of its political being in the Oslo accords. After all, admitting that there’s no prospect of ending the occupation through a “peace process” that survives only as a misleading label for the status quo would force all sides into an uncomfortable choice of accepting things as they are or finding new ways of changing it.
Netanyahu is being pressed by his own base in the direction of formalizing the de facto creeping annexation of the West Bank, while Abbas has become a kind of twilight figure, facing a rebellion on the ground that could sweep away the Palestinian Authority. He is once again threatening to walk away from Oslo and annul the agreement, to dissolve the Authority or to press forward with his bid for statehood at the U.N., but neither the U.S. nor Israel, nor many of the Palestinians on whose behalf he threatens these actions, appear to take such threats very seriously. Abbas may be waiting — in vain — for Washington to change course, but not many Palestinians believe that’s likely to happen.
Romney’s comments, and the extent to which they jibe with Obama’s default policies even as the catechisms of the peace process are duly recited, are simply a reminder that the game is up. No matter who wins the White House in November, the Palestinians aren’t going to get any change out of Washington.
“Talk to Iran’s Leaders, but Look Beyond Them”: The New York Times runs an op-ed by CFR Fellow Ray Takeyh urging the US to cut “an interim deal” over Iran’s nuclear program so that it can move past the matter and focus on exerting more support to the political opposition there to compel the leadership to pursue a different course:
]]>Once an interim deal is in place, the United States must take the lead in devising a coercive strategy to change the parameters of Iran’s domestic politics. A strategy of concerted pressure would seek to exploit all of Iran’s liabilities. The existing efforts to stress Iran’s economy would be complemented by an attempt to make common cause with the struggling opposition.
…. Under such intensified pressures, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, could acquiesce and negotiate with the opposition. There are members of the Iranian elite who appreciate the devastating cost of Iran’s intransigence and want a different approach to the international community. The problem is that these people have been pushed to the margins. If Khamenei senses that his grip on power is slipping, he might broaden his government to include opposition figures who would inject a measure of pragmatism and moderation into the system.
The history of proliferation suggests that regimes under stress do negotiate arms control treaties: Both the Soviet Union and North Korea signed many such agreements. …. Once there is a new outlook — as there was in the Soviet Union when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power — then it is possible to craft durable arms limitation agreements.
Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
William Kristol & Jamie Fly, Weekly Standard: Neoconservative pundit William Kristol who cofounded such jewels as the [...]]]>
Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
William Kristol & Jamie Fly, Weekly Standard: Neoconservative pundit William Kristol who cofounded such jewels as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) and who serves on the board of the hyperbolic Israel advocacy group, the Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI) tries to pressure the President into bringing the U.S. closer to war with Iran with ideologue in arms, Jamie Fly: (Jim Lobe has the story.)
President Obama says a nuclear Iran is unacceptable. The real and credible threat of force is probably the last hope of persuading the Iranian regime to back down. So: Isn’t it time for the president to ask Congress for an Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iran’s nuclear program?
Instead of running away from it, administration officials could be putting the military option front and center and ensuring it is seen as viable. And if the administration flinches, Congress could consider passing such an authorization anyway.
And here is Mitt Romney’s response to the article from CBS’s “Face the Nation“:
…I can assure you if I’m President, the Iranians will have no question but that I would be willing to take military action, if necessary, to prevent them from becoming a nuclear threat to the world. I don’t believe at this stage, therefore, if I’m President, that we need to have war powers approval or a special authorization for military force. The President has that capacity now.
Former Senator Charles Robb (D-Va): Testifying at this week’s Armed Services Committee hearing titled “Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge: Understanding the Military Options” was former Senator Charles Robb who now co-chairs the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) Task Force on Iran. Robb mainly reiterated recommendations from a BPC report released in February. According to BPC staffers, “only the credible threat of force, combined with sanctions” affords “any realistic hope of an acceptable diplomatic resolution.” Unsuprisingly, “force” is the key to successful diplomacy:
There are three primary components of a credible military threat: an effective information and messaging strategy, economic preparations and credible military readiness activities. Undertaking these steps would boost the credibility of the military option, thereby strengthening the chance for sanctions and diplomacy to succeed in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program.
What exactly is the BPC? Jim Lobe has the scoop:
We’ve been covering BPC’s work on Iran pretty intensively both on IPS and Lobelog since the fall of 2008 when it issued its first Iran report whose primary author, as I understand it, was Michael Rubin (and Dennis Ross was on the task force that produced it).
The staff director for their Iran reports is Michael Makovsky whose RightWeb profile was updated just two months ago.
Makovsky, brother of David at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), not only served at one time in the IDF, but also was a West Bank settler, according to reports. When I asked him directly about a month ago whether those reports were accurate, he abruptly terminated an otherwise relatively cordial conversation about his service in the Feith’s Office of Special Plans in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. If those reports are indeed true, and, to my knowledge, he’s never denied them, one has to ask how someone who presumably supports Israeli settlements in occupied territory could become Foreign Policy Director of something called the “Bipartisan Policy Center”.
When they unveiled their last report in February you can read my synopsis here, Robb and Sen. Coates presided. I wrote about their first report in 2008.
Interestingly, several of the key players on the Iran task force at BPC were invited to a Foundation for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) retreat in the Bahamas back in May 2007, entitled “Confronting the Iranian Threat: The Way Forward”. In addition to Makovsky, Rademaker was invited, as were Michael Rubin and Air Force Lt. Gen. Chuck Wald (ret.), who has been a major contributor to the Iran task force and co-written op-eds about its work with Robb and Coates. Precisely who turned up there, I don’t know, but Wald told me at the time that he wasn’t able to attend. I wrote about the invitation on Lobelog at the time. You can find it here. It was kind of a who’s who among the neo-con hawks: Bret Stephens, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Michael Ledeen, etc. etc.
Congress, Foreign Policy: Josh Rogin reports on a bipartisan letter spearheaded by Sens. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Roy Blunt (R-MO) that was sent out last Friday by 44 senators calling on the President to cease diplomatic efforts if the Iranians don’t submit to 3 U.S. demands, as well as continue the relentless sanctions regime and ramp up the military option:
“On the other hand, if the sessions in Moscow produce no substantive agreement, we urge you to reevaluate the utility of further talks at this time and instead focus on significantly increasing the pressure on the Iranian government through sanctions and making clear that a credible military option exists,” they wrote. ”As you have rightly noted, ‘the window for diplomacy is closing.’ Iran’s leaders must realize that you mean precisely that.”
Salon’s Glenn Greenwald responds:
This implication is clear: a military attack by the U.S. on Iran is at least justified, if not compelled, if a satisfactory agreement is not quickly reached regarding Iran’s nuclear program. At the same time, the letter itself virtually ensures no such agreement is possible because the conditions it imposes as the “absolute minimum” are ones everyone knows Iran will never agree to (closing the Fordow facility and giving up its right to enrich uranium above 5 percent). It also declares that it is not only Iran’s possession of a nuclear weapon that is “unacceptable” — diplomatic code for “we’ll go to war to stop it” — but its mere “capability” to build one.
As does the Washington Post’s hawk-in-chief Jennifer Rubin who applauds the increasingly militaristic trend in Congress and the fact that it’s “unlikely the Iranians will agree to any of those conditions” in the letter while yet again agitating for the U.S. to wage war on Iran (emphasis mine):
But those crippling sanctions have come very late as Iran compiles a sufficient stockpile of enriched uranium to make multiple bombs. We are drawing close to the point when Obama will face the choice he has tried to avoid: Act militarily, support the Israelis’ military action or accept the “unacceptable,” a nuclear-armed revolutionary state sponsor of terror? And as we arrive at that point it becomes clear that the only reason for Israel (with fewer military capabilities than the United States) to act militarily rather than the United States would be that the president, even on the most critical national security threat of our time, won’t lead.
Yet despite all the huffing and puffing that Rubin does on a weekly basis about the “threat” the U.S. faces from Iran, just this February Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that “Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict.” Add to that the top U.S. intelligence official James Clapper’s reiteration that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear bomb and that diplomacy and sanctions–as opposed to the militaristic measures that Rubin advocates–remain the most effective means of dissuading the Iranians from going nuclear.
Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: What sanctions good for according to Rubin (forget that diplomacy mumbo jumbo):
We should, of course, move forward on sanctions insofar as they may undermine the current regime and push segments of the population in the country to align themselves with the Green Movement.
And here is her lament for what has so far been U.S. refusal to militarily strike Iran:
Given Obama’s refusal to act forcefully against Iran’s weaker, non-nuclear armed ally Syria, I strongly suspect it will be up to Israel. That would be a pitiful result of a lackadaisical American approach to our primary security threat and the ignominious end to “leading from behind.” Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that, but at this point that certainly seems like the most likely outcome.
Washington Post: The Post’s hawkish editorial board calls for U.S. rejection of Iran’s right to peacefully enrich uranium (putting them in line with the Israeli position) and increasing pressure on Iran:
The Obama administration must nevertheless be prepared to take an Iranian “no” for an answer. It should resist any effort by Russia or other members of the international coalition to weaken the steps that Iran must take, or to grant Tehran major sanctions relief for partial concessions. It should continue to reject recognition of an Iranian “right” to enrich uranium.
The United States and its allies also should have a strategy for quickly and significantly increasing the pressure on the Khamenei regime if the negotiations break down. Israel may press for military action; if that option is to be resisted, there must be a credible and robust alternative.
Mark Kirk (R-Ill.): Following the Moscow talks Senate hawk Mark Kirk calls for a “final” (what happens after?) round of more sanctions on Iran:
After three rounds of meetings, Iran remains in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions ordering it to halt all its uranium enrichment activities. The House and Senate should immediately negotiate a final Iran sanctions bill that can be sent to the President’s desk in July. This legislation should include new and tougher sanctions proposals put forward by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, including sanctions targeting Iran’s energy and financial sectors, shipping and insurance.
Jed Babbin, American Spectator: The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense under George H.W. Bush who stated in 2006 that he was “willing to kill as many people as it requires to take out Hezbollah” declares that “[d]iplomacy won’t work” with Iran so for now covert operations, particularly in the cyber realm, should be vigorously deployed through all available means including the U.S.’s vast arsenal:
]]>Expanding our cyberwar operations against Iran is one of the best options. Offensive cyberwar is far cheaper, and easier, than the defensive. We can, and should, disrupt Iranian government and military functions as often as we can. Iran is reportedly developing a new computer language to make such attacks more difficult. Our cyber warriors should be tasked to infiltrate that project and plant malicious software — “malware” in cyber jargon — to gather information from and at our command disrupt or destroy the computer networks the new system runs on.
A future president — let’s hope one will take office next year — should consider the “bad luck” option. Covert operations need not be conducted only by special operations forces, CIA agents, or computer warriors. We have a significant variety of stealthy weapons and weapon platforms. That president would have the option of making an equally large variety of Presidential Determinations authorizing the use of those weapons against Iran’s nuclear facilities and its intelligence and military centers.