by Jim Lobe
It’s not clear whether Bill Kristol went to the dentist Thursday and had a prolonged reaction to the Sodium Pentothal he was administered or whether he’s become desperate over the prospect that neoconservatives are losing their hold over the GOP (even his Keep America Safe co-founder,
by Jim Lobe
It’s not clear whether Bill Kristol went to the dentist Thursday and had a prolonged reaction to the Sodium Pentothal he was administered or whether he’s become desperate over the prospect that neoconservatives are losing their hold over the GOP (even his Keep America Safe co-founder, Liz Cheney opposes attacking Syria), but his lead editorial in this week’s Weekly Standard makes public the kind of argument one suspects he usually reserves for the back rooms and private dinner parties with impressionable “princes” of the Republican Party for whom he can serve as their private Machiavelli. The cynicism shown here is truly remarkable. After summarily dispensing with the “statesmanship” argument as to why Republicans should vote yes on President Obama’s AUMF — and statesmanship has nothing to do with the plight of the Syrian people or the use of chemical weapons; it’s all about U.S. power and credibility — he moves on to the “crass political reasons” why they should do so. Those reasons deserve to be quoted at length:
A Yes vote is in fact the easy vote. It’s actually close to risk-free. After all, it’s President Obama who is seeking the authorization to use force and who will order and preside over the use of force. It’s fundamentally his policy. Lots of Democrats voted in 2002 to authorize the Iraq war. When that war ran into trouble, it was President Bush and Republicans who paid the price. [Editor's note: don't tell that to Hillary Clinton.] If the Syria effort goes badly, the public will blame President Obama, who dithered for two years, and who seems inclined to a halfhearted execution of any military campaign. If it goes well, Republicans can take credit for pushing him to act decisively, and for casting a tough vote supporting him when he asked for authorization to act.
A No vote is the risky vote. In fact, the risk is all on the side of voting No. The only thing that can get Obama off the hook now is for Republicans to deny him authorization for the use of force against the Assad regime. Then the GOP can be blamed for whatever goes wrong in Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East, over the next months and years. And plenty will go wrong. It’s a Yes vote that gets Republicans in Congress off the hook.
A Yes vote seems to be statesmanlike. …In fact, many voters do like to think they’re voting for someone who has at least a touch of statesmanship, and so casting what appears superficially to be a politically perilous vote could well help the stature of Republicans with many of their constituents back home.
It’s true that a Yes vote will be temporarily unpopular with the base. To support Obama now may seem to invite primary opposition from challengers who would be more in tune with popular sentiment to stay out of the Syrian civil war. For a few weeks after the vote, Republicans will hear such rumblings. But at the end of the day, Republican primary voters are a pretty hawkish bunch. It’s hard to believe they’re going to end up removing otherwise conservative representatives or senators in favor of challengers who run on a platform whose key plank is that Republicans should have voted to let an Iran-supported, terror-backing dictator with American blood on his hands off the hook after he’s used chemical weapons. What’s more, primary elections are more than half a year away. Republican senators and congressmen will have plenty of time to reestablish their anti-Obama credentials by fighting Obama on Obama-care, immigration, the debt ceiling, and a host of other issues.
A Yes vote can also be explained as a vote to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Syria is an Iranian proxy. Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons is a proxy for Iran’s ability to move ahead unimpeded in its acquisition of nuclear weapons. To bring this point home, soon after voting to authorize the use of force against the Assad regime, Republicans might consider moving an authorization for the use of force against the Iranian nuclear weapons program. They can explain that Obama’s dithering in the case of Syria shows the utility of unequivocally giving him the authority to act early with respect to Iran. An Iran debate would pretty much unite Republicans and conservatives and would help mitigate political problems arising from a Yes vote on Syria. The issue of Iran will most likely come to a head before Election Day 2014, probably even before primary elections earlier next year. An Iran resolution means the Syria vote won’t be the most important vote Republicans cast in this session of Congress—it won’t even be the most important foreign policy vote.
Of course, these arguments are also being made with Republicans by AIPAC and other institutions of the Israel lobby, but not nearly so publicly. Which, in my view, makes this such a remarkable document.
This week’s Weekly Standard appears devoted almost entirely to the Syria vote, with featured contributions by Fred Barnes, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Gary Schmitt, Fred Kagan, and Stephen “Case Closed” (a reference to his book purportedly proving Saddam’s ties to al-Qaeda) Hayes (who just came out with a paywalled op-ed actually opposing Obama’s AUMF unless it’s amended to authorize a much bigger commitment). Schmitt directs his comments at the 2016 Republican presidential aspirants — the three senators currently considered most likely to run (Marco Rubio, Rand Paul, and Ted Cruz) have voted against or indicated opposition to the AUMF — in ways similar to Kristol’s:
No doubt, there are conservatives who, like the president, want simply to pivot away from the Middle East altogether and believe that’s what the public wants as well. But what the public wants today and what it sees as important down the road will almost certainly not be the same. In 1999, John McCain went against the majority of his congressional GOP colleagues, supported a military intervention in Kosovo, and stole a march on his nomination opponents in appearing more presidential. He was joined by then-governor George W. Bush in support of the intervention, and soon enough the polls showed a majority of Americans in agreement.
On the other side of the coin, another senator with presidential aspirations, the relatively hawkish Democrat Sam Nunn, voted in 1991 against the congressional authorization for the first Gulf war and now admits it was the greatest mistake of his career.
In short, conservatives, especially those thinking that they could be sitting in the Oval Office one day, ought to think long and hard before they reject a sensible, if not perfect, authorization for the use of force.
So, it’s clear that Kristol and the Weekly Standard see the upcoming vote as a critical test of their enduring influence over the Republican Party.
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Thus, just when it seemed as if he were making some real progress on isolating Iran, Obama sends Ahmadinejad a signal that he is in no real trouble after all. Dating back to the Bush administration’s own feckless diplomacy on Iran’s nukes, Tehran has happily exploited the West’s efforts to appease it.
And
…[S]o long as Obama is still wedded to the absurd idea that he can talk them out of their nuclear plans, the Iranians have to be thinking that it will soon be too late for anyone to stop them from gaining a nuclear weapon.
Tobin wasn’t the only voice this week to riff upon the tune that diplomatic outreach to Tehran is appeasement and, in some cases, comparable to Neville Chamberlain’s attempts to negotiate with Adolf Hitler.
Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ fellow Benjamin Weinthal wrote:
Soggy Western appeasement toward Iran’s regime is a natural precondition for Israeli military action, a country whose existence is immediately threatened by Iranian acquisition of atomic weaponry. The West has a chance to avoid a repeat performance of its wretched appeasement politics of the 1930s. If robust economic sanctions do not force Iran to walk away from its nuclear-weapons program, the West has to lay the foundation for military strikes. Time is the West’s enemy.
Whether or not the current outreach to Tehran is a form of appeasement—and it’s worth noting that the P5+1 did not endorse the Brazil-Turkey nuclear fuel swap agreement which appeared to have a greater chance of succeeding at the time —the strategy of calling those who pursue options other than military conflict “appeasers” is a time-honored tradition among neoconservatives who’d rather push the U.S. into wars of choice. Even “neocon dashboard saint” Winston Churchill, as pointed out by The Wonk Room’s Matt Duss, may have had a slightly more nuanced understanding of the concept.
The history of labeling the opponents of preemptive war “appeasers” or “Neville Chamberlains” is a rich one. Countless opeds from 2002 and 2003 offer a reminder of the similar arguments which were employed to push the U.S. into invading Iraq.
The Weekly Standard’s cofounder, Fred Barnes, wrote in the May 29, 2002 issue:
Now, consider the world’s response if he lets Saddam survive and prosper. Would anyone, anywhere in the world, feel safer? Would Europeans who balk at tough measures like an invasion of Iraq feel more protected? Would American businesses awaiting a signal to open the capital investment spigot feel the time had come? The answer is no, no, and no. Bush would become a well-liked statesman, just as Neville Chamberlain was for months after Munich.
Calling out an “Axis of Appeasement” during the first Bush presidency, The Weekly Standard‘s Bill Kristol wrote in the August 26, 2002 issue:
Let’s be clear. President Bush’s policy is regime change in Iraq. President Bush believes that regime change is most unlikely without military action. He considers the risks of inaction greater than the risks of preemption. No doubt he and his administration could have been doing a better job of making that case in a sustained and detailed way. But that is not why an axis of appeasement–stretching from Riyadh to Brussels to Foggy Bottom, from Howell Raines to Chuck Hagel to Brent Scowcroft–has now mobilized in a desperate effort to deflect the president from implementing his policy.
On October 24, 2002, Senator John McCain, then honorary co-chair of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, opened an oped in the Washington Post with a quote from Neville Chamberlain and continued:
A decade of appeasement and assistance to one of the world’s worst regimes [North Korea] provided it the time and the means to develop weapons that now threaten America and our friends.
And
Iraq demonstrates that American resolve elicits a different response. Although no more than a ploy, Baghdad’s professed openness today to renewed weapons inspections after years of defiance is made possible only by the compelling threat of military force. Our determination to confront Saddam Hussein openly and with all necessary means demonstrates a freedom to act against an enemy that does not — yet — possess nuclear weapons.
Unlike the constantly rehashed history of Neville Chamberlain’s signing of the Munich Agreement in September 1938, neoconservative pundits seem to want Americans to forget about the history of the campaign leading up to the invasion of Iraq.
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