by Derek Davison
While the world’s attention has largely shifted to events in Iraq following last week’s capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the crisis in Ukraine continues unabated. Ukraine’s relations with Russia are deteriorating, and recent events may have pushed the country closer than [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
While the world’s attention has largely shifted to events in Iraq following last week’s capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the crisis in Ukraine continues unabated. Ukraine’s relations with Russia are deteriorating, and recent events may have pushed the country closer than ever to a civil war.
The latest military salvo in the growing conflict between Kiev and separatist, pro-Russian militias in the eastern part of the country occurred on June 14, when separatists using shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles brought down a Ukrainian military plane that was attempting to land in the eastern city of Luhansk. All 49 people aboard the flight were killed and the ordinance it was carrying exploded. The self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic” claimed responsibility for the attack. New Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko vowed retribution. A day earlier, on June 13, Ukrainian government forces took control of the port city of Mariupol, in Donetsk Province.
On June 16, Poroshenko called for a cease-fire with separatists that could be the first step toward a negotiated peace settlement, but said that it would be conditioned on Ukrainian troops regaining control of the country’s 2000 km (1240 mile) land border with Russia. That could take a while; there has been active fighting in the border region between the Ukrainian army and separatist fighters, but according to Poroshenko, the government has only regained control of around 250 km of the border. Meanwhile, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declared that as many as four million people in the Donetsk region are now at risk of losing their access to fresh water, since a pumping station near the city of Slaviansk had been damaged and repairs are being interrupted by sporadic outbreaks of fighting. On June 17, a reporter and sound engineer for the Russian state TV outlet Rossiya were killed by mortar fire outside of Luhansk, leading the OSCE to call for an investigation into the circumstances of their deaths.
Although the separatists who downed the plane claim that their anti-aircraft arms were taken from Ukrainian arsenals, the Ukrainian government, the United States, and NATO are accusing Russia of supplying advanced weaponry to the separatists, which Russia has denied. These accusations included the charge that three Soviet-era T-64 tanks crossed the Russian border and were later observed being operated by separatist forces, although there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding this claim. Images taken from civilian satellites and released by NATO over the weekend appear to show three tanks being loaded onto a trailer at a Russian military staging area near the Ukrainian border on June 11, and videos posted to YouTube later that day show T-64 tanks on the streets of two pro-Russian cities in eastern Ukraine, accompanied by a truck waving the Russian flag. This is a circumstantial case at best; T-64 tanks are still operated by the Ukrainian military, and the tanks seen in the YouTube videos could have been taken from the Ukrainian army by the separatists, although they do not appear to display the typical Ukrainian military markings and camouflage pattern. It must also be noted that previous supposed visual evidence of Russian military assets in Ukraine has been proven inaccurate.
Kiev’s relationship with Moscow also continues to fray on economic and diplomatic fronts. The most recent demonstration of this occurred on Monday when Russian energy corporation Gazprom announced it has cut all natural gas shipments to Ukraine. Negotiations over Ukraine’s total debt to the Russian firm, estimated at just under $4.5 billion, reached another impasse when the two sides could not agree on the settlement of $1.95 billion in immediately outstanding charges before the June 16 deadline. Gazprom has filed a suit against Ukraine’s gas firm Naftogaz over the debt in a Stockholm court, but Naftogaz has countersued, seeking $6 billion in repayment for what it calls “overpayments” since 2010 and a ruling that will force Gazprom to offer Ukraine substantially reduced gas prices. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk meanwhile accused Russia of manipulating the gas situation to “destroy Ukraine,” while his Russian counterpart, Dimitri Medvedev, suggested that Ukraine’s government is not up to the task of running the country.
While there is no immediate risk to Ukrainian citizens from Gazprom’s decision to shut the gas off, since relatively little gas is used during the warm summer months, the country is well short of the amount of gas it would need to stockpile to get through the winter; so an extended dispute could have a very damaging impact. Also at possible risk are Russian gas shipments to the rest of Europe, half of which flow through Ukraine; Gazprom will continue to supply enough gas through Ukraine’s pipelines to meet European demand, but warned Ukrainians not to tap into that supply. An explosion hit the West Siberian gas pipeline today in the central Ukrainian Poltova Province, but it is not yet clear how much damage the explosion caused, and there is no indication as to its cause.
Tensions in Kiev have also boiled over. On June 14, after the downing of a jet in Luhansk, a crowd of anti-Russia demonstrators attacked the Russian embassy, shattering windows and briefly raising the Ukrainian flag over the building. Russia formally protested the attack, and the United States called on the Ukrainian government to provide adequate security for the Russian embassy. Ukraine’s interim foreign minister, Andrii Deshchytsia, while speaking to the crowd of demonstrators in an effort to halt the attack, reportedly used an anatomical slur in reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin, which drew further condemnation from Russian leaders.
Despite the deserved attention on Iraq’s growing crisis, the situation in Ukraine continues to develop and should not be overlooked. Its ramifications for European stability and world energy markets are too important to ignore.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.
A pro-Russian protestor yells at Ukrainian riot police outside the regional administration building in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk on March 22, 2014. Credit: Zack Baddorf/IPS.
]]>by Derek Davison
Ukrainians took to the polls May 25 to elect a new president, the chocolate magnate and former foreign minister, Petro Poroshenko. But the election was marred by violence involving pro-Russian separatists in the country’s beleaguered eastern Donbas region, even as Russia itself appeared ready to reduce tensions.
With [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Ukrainians took to the polls May 25 to elect a new president, the chocolate magnate and former foreign minister, Petro Poroshenko. But the election was marred by violence involving pro-Russian separatists in the country’s beleaguered eastern Donbas region, even as Russia itself appeared ready to reduce tensions.
With a reported 55% voter turnout, Poroshenko was the overwhelming victor, taking 54% of the vote, compared to the 13% received by former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Turnout was depressed especially in the eastern part of the country where pro-Russia militias and their supporters boycotted the vote and the continued unrest forced the closure of as much as 75% of the region’s polling places. The results were a blow to far-right parties Svoboda and Right Sector, the candidates of which each received only around 1% of the vote a piece. But another far-right candidate, Oleh Lyashko, finished in third place with just over 8% of the vote.
At the same time that Poroshenko was celebrating his victory, violence in the Donbas city of Donetsk moved the country closer to civil war. A group of pro-Russian separatists from the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic reportedly took control of part of the city’s airport, prompting an assault by Ukrainian security forces that reclaimed the airport and may have killed as many as 35 separatists and 40 people overall. This was the most violent clash in the crisis since May 2, when more than 40 people were killed in Odessa after a pro-Ukrainian mob forced a crowd of pro-Russian protesters into a government building and set it on fire. Today separatists also reportedly shot down a Ukrainian military helicopter near the city of Slovyansk, killing 14 people, including a high-ranking general in the Ukrainian National Guard.
Poroshenko’s immediate concern is bringing an end to the violence in Donbas and trying to restore some unity to the country, but it’s unclear how he will accomplish those aims. He insists that his first trip as president will be to the Donbas region and that his government will offer amnesty to separatists who agree to stop fighting, but he has also vowed to give “no quarter” to those who do not. Poroshenko must also find a way to achieve closer ties to the European Union, which is his stated preference, while repairing Kiev’s fractured ties to Moscow — essential if Ukraine is to have any kind of national security. This process may already be happening; on Wednesday Ukraine’s Naftogaz natural gas company reportedly reached an EU-brokered deal with the Russian gas firm Gazprom to settle a substantial portion of Ukraine’s $3.5 billion debt to the Russian company. Poroshenko has promised to begin a dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin as soon as possible.
Recent Russian rhetoric suggests that Poroshenko will find a willing partner in that dialogue. Late last week, Putin said his government would “respect” the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential vote. Prior to a May 11 secession referendum in the eastern cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, Putin had urged separatists to postpone the vote (they ignored his request). Most significantly, Putin has said he is ordering Russian troops on the Ukrainian border to withdraw, and while this is not the first time he has claimed to have ordered such a withdrawal, this time there are apparently some signs of movement. There is substantial reason to believe that, despite Poroshenko’s clear preference for closer Ukrainian ties to Europe, he and Putin will be able to work with one another. Ongoing tensions in eastern Ukraine are going to complicate that process, however, as Russian officials have called on Kiev to cease its military operations against separatists.
Now that the election is over, Ukraine has the opportunity to quell the unrest it has been plagued by since the Euromaidan protests ousted the elected Yanukovych and installed a caretaker government in Kiev with dubious legitimacy and almost non-existent support in eastern Ukrainian. But is Poroshenko the right person for that job? He has been a fixture in Ukrainian politics since he was first elected to parliament in 1998, serving in the cabinets of former presidents (and bitter rivals) Viktor Yushchenko and Yanukovych. He is believed to have helped fund the Euromaidan movement, but was not active in the protests. He has advocated closer ties with the EU but has considerable business interests in Russia via his Roshen Confectionary Corporation. He has no political ties to radical right-wing elements in Ukrainian politics that could alienate him from the pro-Russia east. On paper, then, Poroshenko has the credentials of someone who can appeal to all sides of the current conflict, particularly if he is prepared to offer eastern Ukrainians the kind of regional autonomy and Russian-language rights that he talked about during the campaign.
In reality, however, Poroshenko faces considerable, possibly insurmountable, challenges, and it’s not yet clear how he plans to tackle them. Despite the immediate urgency of the situation, he must be willing to proceed slowly in terms of bringing the breakaway Donbas region back under control. Moving rapidly to end the crisis means more military force, which will not improve Kiev’s image in the east and may cause Russia to re-engage in the crisis. Poroshenko must also work with Putin to start normalizing Ukrainian-Russian relations; Ukraine’s national security depends on repairing those ties, and its already weak economy depends on reaching a favorable deal with Gazprom to retire Ukraine’s massive debt and keep gas prices at a reasonable level. Poroshenko should also take steps to improve that weak economy, to combat corruption, and make the reforms that will distinguish his government from the Yushchenko and Yanukovych administrations. If, as seems likely, Poroshenko pursues a course of neoliberal IMF-driven austerity — the same broadly neoliberal agenda that his failed predecessors followed — then he may quickly find himself on the wrong side of Ukrainian public opinion.
Photo Credit: Mstyslav Chernov
]]>by Sara Vakhshouri
After almost a decade of negotiations, Moscow reached a 400 billion dollar energy deal with Beijing yesterday, allowing the Russian state-controlled Gazprom to export gas to China for 30 years.
The key agreement guarantees long-term market access for Russian gas in the Asian market, where Russia has historically had [...]]]>
by Sara Vakhshouri
After almost a decade of negotiations, Moscow reached a 400 billion dollar energy deal with Beijing yesterday, allowing the Russian state-controlled Gazprom to export gas to China for 30 years.
The key agreement guarantees long-term market access for Russian gas in the Asian market, where Russia has historically had a negligible market share. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will meanwhile receive discounted gas prices for the duration of the contract.
Yet the logistics are daunting. For Russian gas to actually arrive in China, Russia has to invest $55 billion in exploration and pipeline construction. For its part, China has to provide $20 billion for gas development and infrastructure. Ultimately, the gas will be transported to China through a pipeline in the Siberian gas field. The flow of gas to China is scheduled to start in 2018, and will gradually increase to 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year. The exported volume could be increase to 60 bcm a year.
There has been much speculation as to why the two countries finally agreed to the mega-deal after so many years of not being able to find common ground. Analysts have pointed to a Russian desire to counter the growing Western pressure it faces, to a China that’s now desperately seeking long-term access to clean and discounted energy.
The agreed gas prices have not been announced yet, but the pricing method is similar to the European price formula, which is tied to crude oil prices. Russia obviously would not want to sell its gas at prices that are lower than those it offers Europe, between $350-$380 per thousand cubic meters. But China would not agree to higher prices; this is a long-term deal, and with expected growth in North American shale gas production, markets generally expect a downward price trend.
Another reason China expects lower prices is that it is in the early stages of producing gas from its own shale reserves, particularly from the three basins of Sichuan, Yangtze Platform and Tarim.
In 2013, the Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimated that China possessed 1,115 trillion cubic feet (31 trillion cubic meters) of technically recoverable shale gas. That same year China produced 7.1 billion cubic feet (200 million cubic meters) of natural gas from shale formations. This puts China in the third place of shale gas producing countries after the US and Canada.
Russia, however, sees things differently. Although Russian gas prices in Europe are too low to be replicable with other alternatives, this deal still undermines broader Western attempts to isolate Russia’s economy. President Vladimir Putin knows very well that low gas prices to Europe make it a relatively unattractive destination, particularly for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) shipments. But American LNG cannot be shipped to Europe at the same prices Russia offers — here again, logistics is the main issue.
Iranian natural gas is also not an option for Europe at present. Iran’s low natural gas export capacity makes it impossible for Tehran to be able to compete with Moscow in this market.
All this explains Putin’s plan for the Asian market: securing market share and access in Asia for the long-term by offering low gas prices. Russia is preparing to compete with US supplies in Asia, a region that potentially could become a major market for US shale gas and condensate. Indeed, the 30-year gas export deal between Gazprom and CNPC not only ensures the security of demand for Russian gas, it also allows Russia to compete with the US by sending its gas to Asia via pipeline at a time when the prospects of LNG exports from this country do not look very promising.
This landmark deal will also help Russia recover from its budgetary issues and partial revenue loss from the European market in the short- and long-term. In other words, Russia’s geopolitical influence in Asia will increase at a time when, due to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, Europe has lost its trust in Russia as a long-term and reliable energy supplier.
For the Chinese, promoting natural gas is a top priority for their economic and energy policy strategies. Securing long-term access to Russian discounted natural gas therefore occupies an important place in Beijing’s energy security plan. Access to natural gas transferred via pipeline not only offers price advantages in comparison to LNG imports, it also reduces Chinese dependency on international waters. This will significantly reduce the transportation risks of energy flow to this country.
]]>by Derek Davison
As Ukraine’s internal stability continues to deteriorate, the United States and European Union have imposed additional sanctions against Russian leaders, punishing them for what increasingly appears to be Kiev’s failures. In the face of US and, especially, European hostility, Russia has accelerated plans to shift its attention, [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
As Ukraine’s internal stability continues to deteriorate, the United States and European Union have imposed additional sanctions against Russian leaders, punishing them for what increasingly appears to be Kiev’s failures. In the face of US and, especially, European hostility, Russia has accelerated plans to shift its attention, and its business interests, elsewhere.
Russian President Vladimir Putin declared on Wednesday that his military was “pulling back” from Russia’s border with Ukraine, though “NATO officials” claimed that there was “no immediate sign that Russian forces had pulled back.” In his statement announcing the pullback, Putin called for the Ukrainian government to cease military activity in Ukraine’s separatist southeast. Violent clashes in recent days between pro-Russian paramilitaries and Ukrainian troops near the eastern Ukrainian city of Slovyansk have killed and wounded dozens of troops and pro-Russian fighters, and an untold numbers of civilians who may be caught in the crossfire. The deadliest fighting took place in the southern Ukrainian port city of Odessa, where a confrontation between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian groups on May 2 killed “more than 40” people, including “dozens” of Russian sympathizers who were killed when a government building, in which they had barricaded themselves, caught fire.
While Moscow and Kiev blame each other for the violence, particularly the catastrophe in Odessa, the inability of Kiev’s governing coalition to bring any kind of stability to the country looms large. The interim government has seemingly been purged of anyone who could successfully reach out to separatists in the east and south, while the ultra-nationalist, and openly hostile to Russians, Svoboda Party is a key participant in the cabinet. Yet the US and EU have apparently elected to blame Moscow for the violence. On April 29, the two western powers imposed a new round of targeted sanctions against prominent Russians, including General Valery Gerasimov, head of the Russian General Staff (the equivalent of America’s Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak. Still more sanctions are reportedly being developed, in the event that Russia “dramatically ramped up aggression against Ukraine.”
In the face of these punitive economic measures, Russia has, quietly, been expanding its economic and military activity into Asia, conducting its own “Asian pivot” along the lines of US President Barack Obama’s promised, though unfulfilled, plan to refocus American foreign policy attention away from Europe and the Middle East and on to the Asia-Pacific region. In April, it was reported that the Russian natural gas firm Gazprom was “close” to reaching a long-term deal to supply natural gas to China (via a pipeline that would be built as part of the deal). Russian and Chinese officials have been negotiating such an agreement for over a decade, with Russia reluctant to reduce its prices in order to compete with the gas that China has been buying from former Soviet Republic Turkmenistan. However, tensions over Ukraine and the possibility of Europe looking elsewhere — to America, to Qatar, or even to Iran — for its energy needs, and the potential collapse of Russia’s under-construction Black Sea South Stream pipeline, may have spurred Gazprom to make concessions, possibly reducing its prices in exchange for considerable up-front payment by China (though the Ukraine crisis has likely weakened Gazprom’s negotiating leverage).
Economic ties between Russia and China are increasing in general. China has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, and its banks are expanding their business in Russia even as American banks are scaling back. There is a strong likelihood that a Chinese government firm, the China Railway Construction Corporation, will be involved in constructing a car and rail bridge to connect mainland Russia directly to newly-annexed Crimea, and Chinese investors are backing a multi-billion dollar natural gas exploration effort on Russia’s northern Yamal Peninsula.
Russia is also in talks with India to build a $30 billion oil pipeline that would connect the two countries through the Chinese province of Xinjiang, which would expand Russia’s energy footprint into South Asia. While the pipeline project could be thwarted by Chinese-Indian tensions or escalating unrest among Xinjiang’s Uyghur population, it still reflects a major commitment by Russia to seek out new Asian markets for its energy supplies. Russia is also expanding its reach into North Africa, boosting its energy exploration and arms sales in Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and elsewhere on the continent. Given that competition with China over emerging African markets and resources is a key driver behind America’s Asian pivot, Russian moves here can be seen in a similar light.
It should be noted that these moves do not represent a change in Russian policy, but an acceleration of its already apparent commitment to expanding its economic and energy presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia completed a massive expansion of its East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline last year, and analysts have predicted that this expansion will make Russia “a major infrastructure player” for crude oil in the Asia-Pacific region and, not coincidentally, will give Moscow “more leverage over Europe.”
Russia’s increased economic interest in Asia seems to be, according to the US, accompanied with an increase in Russian military activity in the Pacific, with long-range Russian flights skirting close to Guam and even California, but these activities pose no greater threat to the US than similar American military activities pose to Russia. However, Russia’s economic moves in Asia and elsewhere will, over time, greatly reduce the impact of US and EU sanctions, and call into question the logic behind further punitive measures, particularly at a time when Western efforts could be much better spent encouraging the new government in Kiev to cut ties to far-right groups and take steps to deescalate, rather than provoke, tensions with its separatist south and east.
]]>by Sara Vakhshouri
The tension between Russia and the West, and particularly the European Union, over Crimea has once again raised questions over the security of energy supplies and the use of energy as a tool of foreign policy and diplomacy. On the one hand, energy exports are a vital source of [...]]]>
by Sara Vakhshouri
The tension between Russia and the West, and particularly the European Union, over Crimea has once again raised questions over the security of energy supplies and the use of energy as a tool of foreign policy and diplomacy. On the one hand, energy exports are a vital source of income for Russia. On the other hand, its massive energy resources and supply dominance in the EU have deterred the EU and US from sanctioning the Russian energy sector.
More than 90 percent of Russian natural gas, and 80 percent of its crude oil exports, go to the EU. Taken together, this accounts for about 50 percent of Russia’s federal budget. Russia supplies about 30 percent of the EU’s natural gas and, crucially, more than half of this is transported via Ukraine. Russian natural gas also plays an important role in Ukraine’s energy basket. Natural gas accounts for 40 percent of Ukraine’s overall energy consumption — more than half of this comes from Russia. Before the Crimean crisis, Ukraine was receiving more than a 30 percent discount on Russian gas, and was also heavily dependent upon Russian crude oil.
Russia’s calculus
The EU and Ukraine’s energy dependency has so far played in Russia’s favor. During the March 25 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, US President Barack Obama and EU leaders warned that they would enact broader sanctions against Russia in order to check its expansionist ambition in Ukraine. They mentioned that sanctions could expand to cover whole sectors in Russia including, crucially, its defense and energy industries. However, Moscow knows that in the short-term there is no substitute for its energy supplies, particularly to the EU.
Indeed, the first American liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargo delivery will not be available until late 2015 or early 2016. Some countries in Eastern Europe are also highly dependent on Russian gas transferred via pipeline — as they lack substantial LNG facilities. Yet US crude oil stockpiles in its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) are also a factor. In 2013, the SPR held 695.9 million barrels of crude oil. At this rate the US could supply 4 million barrels of oil per day (mb/d) for 90 days. This could, conceivably, help offset any fluctuations in prices in the event of an interruption of Russia’s 7.2 mb/d in exports of crude oil.
Regardless, in the medium-term Russia’s moves in Ukraine are going to hurt its interests in European and global energy markets. Gazprom, the Russian giant gas company with ownership of one-fifth of global natural gas reserves, hasn’t yet threatened to cut off its natural gas. But the Crimea crisis has damaged European trust in Russia as a reliable supplier.
The issue of reliable supply, coupled with diversification, is also a crucial factor in any country’s overall energy security. As Winston Churchill said, “safety and certainty in oil lies in variety and variety alone.” European countries have already started rethinking their strategies to diversify their energy suppliers. Russia was planning to increase its natural gas market in Europe by 23 percent in the next two decades, but its annexation of Crimea seems to have strongly damaged its future market share in Europe, particularly when one considers possible imports of American Shale Gas.
Coupled with energy sanctions on Iran, the Ukraine crisis has increased US awareness that their massive shale oil and gas resources could be converted into a strategic weapon and diplomatic tool. Debates on removing the ban on US energy exports have recently spiked and taken on a new intensity. US oil and gas supplies are not going to scare Russian President Vladimir Putin right now, but in the long-term Moscow will need to seriously consider the competition from US exports, which will require new market planning and strategic shifts from Moscow, some of which may be very uncomfortable for the Kremlin.
Still, not everything is bleak for Russia. Asia’s energy market, and particularly China, has always been a long-term objective. In fact, China could be a substitute for possible future European market losses. Last month, Chinese imports of Russian crude oil reached their highest in 7 years: 2.72 million metric tones. This was three times more than the average of Chinese oil imports over the past decade, and made up 12 percent of overall Chinese oil imports. The decline of Iranian imports for China has also shaped this calculus. Historically the third largest supplier of crude oil to China, Iran’s market share there has dropped from 11 percent of China’s oil needs in 2011 to 8 percent this past year. With China facing continued restrictions in importing Iranian crude, it may now see Russia as a reliable source of supply diversification.
Indeed, the tensions between Russia and European countries over Crimea could change the dynamics of global energy flows. Europe is in search of new suppliers; Russia is seeking new energy markets. This changes the traditional suppliers and consumers in the global energy market; it would bring China and Russia closer together, with the effect of solidifying strategic ties and the alliance between Europe and the US. This will also have profound implications for global energy markets and energy security.
Advantage Iran?
Perhaps ironically, Iran could also benefit from these changing dynamics. Europe faces possible energy supply interruptions and high-energy prices in the short-term. With the nuclear-focused negotiations between Iran and world powers known as the P5+1 moving along, some European countries could once again rethink their bans on Iranian oil imports. In other words, any energy supply interruption from Russia due to US and EU sanctions could have the unintended effect of undermining the regime of global sanctions against Iran.
In the short-term, Iran’s massive domestic consumption doesn’t leave much capacity for Iranian exports to Europe to substitute an offset of Russian supplies. But because Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world after Russia, it has always seen Europe as a huge potential market. If Iran succeeds in overcoming sanctions through a constructive nuclear deal with the P5+1, European companies will be more inclined to invest in the Iranian energy industry than ever before. Losing some of its shares in the Asian and Chinese energy market, combined with weaning Russian energy influence in Europe, could give Iran a chance to once again strengthen its energy ties with the West and find a new market for natural gas exports.
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