by Jasmin Ramsey

The title of this post is a quote from Shaul Bakhash, a George Mason University professor who moderated a panel discussion, “Iran, the Next Five Years: Change or More of the Same?“ at the Wilson Center today. “In a way, we’ve been here before,” said the esteemed scholar, referring [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

The title of this post is a quote from Shaul Bakhash, a George Mason University professor who moderated a panel discussion, “Iran, the Next Five Years: Change or More of the Same?“ at the Wilson Center today. “In a way, we’ve been here before,” said the esteemed scholar, referring to the presidencies of centrist leader Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, when the country was perceived as moving towards openness at home and abroad. But while Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s administration includes individuals with past ties to those movements, Bakhash says the conservatives “remain the strongest political body in Iran”.

While nothing can stay the same forever, many people worried (some still do) that the Islamic Republic would continue down a path of conservatism verging on radicalism before the surprise presidential election of Rouhani in June 2013. Since Rouhani took over from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — whose former conservative allies couldn’t effectively unite in time to support another conservative into the presidency — those worries have changed. Now the question on everyone’s mind is: can Rouhani successfully navigate Iran’s contested political waters in his quest to implement foreign, economic and social policy reforms?

A lot depends on Iran’s 2016 parliamentary elections, according to panelist Bernard Hourcade, an expert on Iran’s social and political geography. “Elections matter In Iran”, said Hourcade, echoing Farideh Farhi. What happened in 2009 (when large groups of Iranians protested the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and were violently repressed) proved that “elections have become a major political and social item in [Iranian] political life.”

Hourcade uses official data to back up that point. Most interestingly, he shows that due to population migration patterns, the most important political divisions no longer exist between Iranian cities and villages, but between city centers and suburbs. Consider, for example, the typology of presidential votes for Rouhani in Tehran province. Hourcade’s diagram shows that while Rouhani had strong support in the northern part of Shemiran, he didn’t get a majority in central Tehran. Why that occurred is more difficult to answer, according to Hourcade, due to limited data resources.

How political divisions play out in Iran’s upcoming parliamentary elections, which could give Iran’s currently sidelined conservatives more power, will also impact the Majles’ (parliament’s) reaction to the potential comprehensive deal with world powers over Iran’s nuclear program.

In other words, even if Iran’s rock star Foreign Minister can negotiate a final deal with the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approves, Iran’s parliament still has to ratify it, and if conservatives who oppose Rouhani dominate the majles, we may have another problem on our hands.

There were many other important points offered by Hourcade and his co-panelists, including Roberto Toscano, Italy’s former ambassador to Iran. He noted that former President Mohammad Khatami didn’t have the same chances as Rouhani because he was “too much out of the mainstream”. Rouhani, a centrist cleric and former advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, wouldn’t have won the presidency without pivotal backing by both Khatami and Rafsanjani. So, as Toscano argues, Rouhani is in the mainstream (for now). But whether he and his allies will be able to maintain support from these important players moving forward, especially in 2016, will seriously influence whether he, like Khatami and Rafsanjani will be ultimately sidelined, or achieve a presidential legacy in Iran like nothing we’ve seen before.

Photo: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani walks by former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani following his June 2013 presidential vicotry. Credit: Mehdi Ghasemi/ISNA

After intense negotiations between Iran and world powers (chiefly among them the United States), November 24 saw a historic breakthrough. In a six-month interim agreement, Tehran has committed itself to a substantial freezing of its nuclear program in return for “modest relief” — according to US [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Ali Fathollah-Nejad*

After intense negotiations between Iran and world powers (chiefly among them the United States), November 24 saw a historic breakthrough. In a six-month interim agreement, Tehran has committed itself to a substantial freezing of its nuclear program in return for “modest relief” — according to US President Barack Obama — in sanctions. The agreement will be a first step towards achieving a comprehensive solution, with which the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program will be ensured while all sanctions against the country would be lifted.

There has been much speculation over the degree in which the decade-long transatlantic Iran strategy of coercive diplomacy was responsible for reaching this diplomatic victory. Was it the permanent threats of war or the increasingly crippling sanctions which, in the eyes of many Western observers, led Iran to “give in”?

Arguably, it rather was a shift away from that policy of threats and pressure, and towards serious diplomacy aiming at a reconciliation of interests (especially during the month of November), which rendered the deal possible. But yes, without any doubt the sanctions did have an impact.

The sanctions have severely deepened Iran’s economic malaise, considerably harmed a variety of social groups, while part of the power elite quite comfortably adjusted to the situation. Consequently, the power gap separating the state and (civil) society was even boosted.

Yet, the immense damage that sanctions have done to society does not bear much relevance for policy-makers. However, what has gone largely unnoticed by supporters of the sanctions policy is the realpolitik fact that, contrary to its stated goal, the escalation of sanctions was accompanied by an escalation in Iran’s nuclear program. When Obama entered the White House, there were not even 1,000 centrifuges spinning in Iran; today, the figure stands at almost 19,000.

The reason for this is that the West views sanctions through a cost-benefit lens, according to which it can only be a matter of time until the sanctioned party will give in. In contrast, Tehran sees sanctions as an illegitimate form of coercion, which ought to be resisted, for the alternative would be nothing less than capitulation.

Nonetheless, many commentators sardonically insist on praising the sanctions’ alleged effectiveness for aiding diplomacy. This is not only a sign of analytical myopia, but also constitutes the not-so-covert attempt to shed a positive light on the coercive diplomacy that was pursued so far.

In reality, Iran’s willingness to offer concessions is rooted within a wider context.

Firstly, Iran already demonstrated its readiness to compromise over the last three years [28], which the Obama administration did not dare to accept due to domestic political pressures (i.e., his re-election).

Secondly, and this is likely to have been crucial in achieving the agreement in Geneva, Iran’s current foreign policy is primarily not a result of pressure through sanctions. Instead, it is embedded within a specific foreign-policy school of thought which is characterized by realism and a policy of détente.

Notably, with Hassan Rouhani’s election, the “defensive realist” school of thought reasserted power, which had previously been ascendant during Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s and Mohammad Khatami’s administrations. Their prime objective was a policy of détente and rapprochement, especially with the West, but also with neighboring Arab states — specifically, Iran’s geopolitical adversary, Saudi Arabia.

In contrast to the “offensive realists” who took the lead under the Ahmadinejad administration, “defensive realists” do not view foreign policy as a zero-sum game but instead as an arena where win-win situations ought to be explored – especially with the United States. Another pivotal difference between these schools of thought is their estimation of US power.

While “offensive realists” see the superpower’s power-projection capabilities rapidly declining, the “defensive” camp rightly acknowledges that even a US in relative decline can inflict substantial damage on weaker countries like Iran. The historically unprecedented Iran sanctions regime is a prime illustration of the veracity of the latter view.

Ultimately, the nuclear agreement in its core has to be seen as a U.S.-Iranian one, which expresses the will of both sides to secure their interests in a rapidly changing regional landscape. To what extent this will affect Washington’s traditional regional allies in Tel Aviv and Riyadh will be highly interesting to watch.

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*  Ali Fathollah-Nejad is a PhD candidate in international relations at both the University of Muenster in Germany and the School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS) at the University of London.

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[Note: A version of this article will be published in the next issue of the German Middle East journal, Inamo [29]. This article was translated from German into English by Manuel Langendorf [30].]

by Shawn Amoei

Foreign Affairs

via USIP

Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So [...]]]> by Alireza Nader

via USIP

Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So Iran actually shares interests with the United States, European nations and the Arab League in opposing any use of chemical weapons.

But the Islamic Republic also has compelling reasons to continue supporting Damascus. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the geographic link to its Hezbollah partners in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran vehemently opposes U.S. intervention or any action that might change the military balance against President Bashar Assad.

The Iran-Syria alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. Tehran and Damascus have common geopolitical, security, and economic interests. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (the other being Libya) to support Iran’s fight against Saddam Hussein, and it was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, allowed Iran to help create Hezbollah, the Shiite political movement in Lebanon. Its militia, trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been an effective tool against Syria’s archenemy, Israel.

Relations between Tehran and Damascus have been rocky at times. Hafez Assad clashed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and was wary of too much Iranian involvement in his neighborhood. But his death in 2000 reinvigorated the Iran-Syria alliance. Bashar Assad has been much more enthusiastic about Iranian support, especially since Hezbollah’s “victorious” 2006 conflict with Israel.

In the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and at times even directed Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.

Fundamentalist figures within the Guards view Syria as the “front line” of Iranian resistance against Israel and the United States. Without Syria, Iran would not be able to supply Hezbollah effectively, limiting its ability to help its ally in the event of a war with Israel. Hezbollah wields thousands of rockets able to strike Israel, providing Iran deterrence against Israel — especially if Tel Aviv chose to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. A weakened Hezbollah would directly impact Iran’s national security. Syria’s loss could also tip the balance in Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, making the Wahhabi kingdom one of the most influential powers in the Middle East.

In the run up to a U.S. decision on military action against Syria, Iranian leaders appeared divided.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline lawmakers reacted with alarm to possible U.S. strikes against the Assad regime. And Revolutionary Guards commanders threatened to retaliate against U.S. interests. The hardliners clearly viewed the Assad regime as an asset worth defending as of September 2013.

But President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more critical line on Syria. “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” Zarif told a local publication in September 2013.

Rafsanjani, still an influential political figure, reportedly said that the Syrian government gassed its own people. This was a clear breach of official Iranian policy, which has blamed the predominantly Sunni rebels. Rafsanjani’s words suggested that he viewed unconditional support for Assad as a losing strategy. His remark also earned a rebuke from Khamenei, who warned Iranian officials against crossing the “principles and red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s message may have been intended for Rouhani’s government, which is closely aligned with Rafsanjani and seems to increasingly view the Syrian regime as a liability.

Regardless, a significant section of Iran’s political elite could be amenable to engaging the United States on Syria. Both sides have a common interest: preventing Sunni extremists from coming to power in Damascus. Iran and the United States also prefer a negotiated settlement over military intervention to solve the crisis. Tehran might need to be included in a settlement given its influence in Syria. Negotiating with Iran on Syria could ultimately help America’s greater goal of a diplomatic breakthrough, not only on Syria but Tehran’s nuclear program as well.

– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

*Read Alireza Nader’s chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in “The Iran Primer”

Photo Credits: Bashar Assad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via Leader.ir, Syria graphic via Khamenei.ir Facebook

by Farideh Farhi

Okay, it is time to admit that the only thing predictable about Iranian politics these days is its unpredictability!

There are people who know Iran well and as early as a few months ago thought that the next president of the country was already decided by the powers [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Farideh Farhi

Okay, it is time to admit that the only thing predictable about Iranian politics these days is its unpredictability!

There are people who know Iran well and as early as a few months ago thought that the next president of the country was already decided by the powers that be. There are also others who will say that they predicted all this. I am not one of these.

I am stunned. As of late yesterday (Friday), I did not think that former president and current Expediency Council chair Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would run for the presidency. All the talk about his entry – and the previous talk and hope about former president Mohammad Khatami’s entry – was mostly tactical, I thought. The loud calls – and pleas – for either Khatami or Hashemi Rafsanjani to run were to show the depth of their support among various sectors of Iranian society, from a good number of the urban middle classes to the business community. I thought it was sort of a flexing of social power muscle. But, given the hysterical reaction both former presidents elicit from the hardliners, I thought they would ultimately be reluctant to run, in the end preferring to throw their support to another candidate who would try to carefully pull the country to the middle.

Khatami had said that if he thought his candidacy would cause further turbulence and polarization, he would not run and made clear in the past week that his candidacy was not forthcoming. Hashemi Rafsanjani had explicitly stated that he would only run with the consent of the Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. I thought he would act the same way as Khatami.

Well, I was wrong big time! The 78-year-old Hashemi Rafsanjani decided to run and with him came a whole slew of candidates signing up at Minute 90 (what else but a soccer reference). Former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati also walked into the Interior Ministry at the last minute. So did Saeed Jalili, Iran’s current nuclear negotiator, who had previously said he would not run; and so did Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, Ahmadinejad’s beloved who has been talked about as Medvedev to his Putin. Against all tradition (and perhaps even the law), Mashaie, in presenting his candidacy was flanked by Ahmadinejad himself and several other cabinet ministers, raising eyebrows about whether his interior ministry can run an impartial election when the president is so openly supporting one candidate.

So here we are. There are now more than 35 relatively well known candidates and over 600 unknown candidates, including 30 women – one of whom named Eshrat Kazemi insists on being called Elizabeth! The Guardian Council will have five days to go through these applications and disqualify almost all of them. Given the high number of well-known candidates, the Council may eventually extend its examination period for another five days in order to figure out what to do. But that’s all the law allows. Campaigning in full force among the very few who get past the Guardian Council for the June 14 election will begin no later than ten days from now.

So what does it all mean and how will it all work out? In this rather competitive political environment, it is very hard to say. It is like trying to guess the next move in a three-dimensional chess game. Folks who have called upon Rafsanjani to run -– including Khatami, as well as the conservative MP Ali Mottahari who visited Rafsanjani just a couple of hours before he made his decision to run — have done so based on the argument that second-tier centrist or reformist candidates will not be strong or popular enough to issue a significant challenge and change the direction of the country from its trajectory of the last four years which, from their point of view, has underwritte both its domestic economic troubles and international woes.

No matter what the reason, both Hashemi Rafsanjani’s and Mashaie’s candidacy pose a couple of challenges for the political system as well as for the conservative political players.

First, there is the question of their qualification by the Guardian Council. It is hard to imagine how the this body can disqualify the current chair of the Expediency Council. Hardliners – including the current Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – have accused Rafsanjani of being the “source of sedition,” a reference to the former president’s statement that he had foreseen the post-2009 election turmoil and had a tape of his warnings to prove it. So the Guardian Council could conceivably disqualify him on these grounds. But then this move will shine the spotlight on Khamenei who re-appointed Rafsanjani to chair the Expediency Council after the 2009 protests.

Mashaie’s disqualification may be less of a challenge. After all, there is already a public letter written by Khamenei to Ahmadinejad asking for the Mashaie’s removal as first vice-president. So, conceivably disqualifying him for president given the fact that he was not seen as suitable for vice-president should not be that hard. Nonetheless, some may argue that now that Rafsanjani is running, the Council will more likely approve Mashaie’s candidacy to block Rafsanjani. In this view, the two would then split the anti-systemic vote and allow a conservative to rise. This to me is not a convincing argument. Mashaie’s candidacy arguably poses more of a challenge to conservatives due the likelihood that it would draw votes away from whichever candidate they eventually develop a consensus around, if, in fact such a consensus is in the cards. I cannot fathom the Guardian Council risking the election going to a second round – a real possibility with multiple candidates – with Rafsanjani and Mashaie as the two top candidates running against each other. But all bets are off at this point. In this messy political environment, I have a hard time believing that a backroom deal has been made to qualify both Rafsanjani and Mashaie, but I will no longer be surprised if the latter is qualified.

Which brings me to the second challenge Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy poses. This one is to the conservatives – or the Principlists as they are called in Iran – who have been acting more like a herd of cats than a solid political front. Unlike 2005, when Rafsanjani was challenged by both conservatives and reformists, this time he will be coming in with solid support from the reformists. It is true that the reformists are also a herd of cats, but few doubt Khatami’s ability to convince the herd to rally behind Rafsanjani. In fact, most reformist and centrist candidates have already said that they will withdraw if Rafsanjani runs. The exception may be former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, but, without support from Rafsanjani or Khatami, he will not be a significant candidate anyway. In effect, if Rafsanjani is qualified by the Guardian Council and if he chooses not to back off in favor of another candidate, the conservatives will be facing a centrist/reformist consensus candidate who may even peel away some of their own, particularly the ones in the commercial sector and many in the clerical community in Qom and elsewhere.

The conservatives meanwhile have not been able to reach consensus on a candidate of their own. The hard-line conservatives now have at least three candidates – former health minister Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, MP Alireza Zakani, and Saeed Jalili. They now have to decide whether to field one of the three – both Lankarani and Zakani have said that they will withdraw if Jalili runs – or join others in finding yet another candidate behind whom they can all mobilize. But they are not the only ones facing the need for readjustment with Rafsanjani’s entry into the race.

The most important conservative alliance – involving former foreign minister Velayati, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Parliament speaker Gholamreza Haddad Adel – has also not been able to decide which one of them should run. All three have now registered, and there is a real possibility that both Qalibaf and Velayati will run. Finally, there are the old-style traditional conservatives. Deputy speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Hassan Abutorabifard has registered on their behalf but so has former foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki who chose to ignore the choice of traditional conservatives and enter the race himself.

Rafsanjani’s entry into the fray with solid support from Khatami and his followers will force the conservatives not only to scramble for a consensus candidate, but also search for one who is relatively popular or at least better known. The opinion polls reportedly suggest that the most popular conservative candidate is Qalibaf because of his widely hailed management of the city of Tehran. He also has quite a following in his home province of Khorasan Razavi and where he won in the first round of the 2005 presidential election (Khorasan Razavi is one of the most important provinces in electoral calculations given its population of over 5.6 million, second only to Tehran as the country’s most populous province).

Qalibaf, however, has a problem with the most committed base of the Islamic Republic. In fact, in the 2005 election, it was that base that shifted its allegiance from him to Ahmadinejad, reportedly due to its anger over the flamboyant and western-style campaign he ran. This time around, Qalibaf is not making the same mistake. In his interviews and public speaking he is emphasizing that he is NOT a “technocrat,” a term used to refer to Rafsanjani supporters and worldview. He keeps talking about jihadi economic management and jihadi foreign policy –which presumably combines revolutionary ideals and strivings with competence and prudence – to distinguish himself from the technocratic brand that the die-hard conservative base considers a liability. He may do a Romney and move to the center if he emerges as the consensus conservative choice, either through negotiation prior to the June 14 election or by process of elimination if he manages to get to the second round. But his path to becoming the consensus conservative candidate is not smooth.

Meanwhile, the hardliners who really don’t like Qalibaf will be scrambling to push for another consensus conservative candidate. Whether that candidate will be Jalili – who doesn’t have any executive experience and as such raises the specter of another Ahmadinejad in terms of his management capabilities at a time when competence and prudence are central campaign issues – or Velayati “because he is really the candidate Leader Khamenei wants,” or somebody else is yet to be determined.

Also yet to be determined is the extent to which this election will end up being relatively tamper free among the candidates who are cleared by the Guardian Council. Lack of clarity regarding who is really the “system’s favorite candidate” should work in favor a competitive election; that is, within the ideological confines of the Islamic Republic, of course. But with Rafsanjani’s entry, a rather intense battle over the direction of the country has been unleashed with many players having to reassess their previous stances based not only on who they would like to see win but also who they think might win.

Starting with his famous July 17, 2009 post-election speech, Hashemi Rafsanjani has repeatedly made clear that he does not think the highly securitized turn the country has taken has been the right approach. He has also harshly criticized Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and erratic management style and has expressed serious concern about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy. Finally, he has also made the case that, in the face of the external threats the country faces, domestic reconciliation among all significant forces should be the framework for the next government which he says must include representatives from across the political spectrum.

In the coming month, the Iranian electorate will listen to what he and others have to say and will have to decide whether their own participation will also make a difference in the country’s direction. After the traumatic 2009 election experience, the decision to participate on the part of a good number of voters cannot be considered a given. But my bet is that Rafsanjani’s candidacy has just made the Iranian election a bit more interesting even to them.

Many Western governments insist that Iran’s nuclear program is aimed at creating weapons, a charge Iran denies. The accusation [...]]]> Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the United Nations’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, told a press conference that an Iranian nuclear bomb would be a “strategic mistake” and create a “disadvantageous situation” for Iran.

Many Western governments insist that Iran’s nuclear program is aimed at creating weapons, a charge Iran denies. The accusation also misses some of the nuance between an Iranian “breakout capability” — the ability to quickly weaponize a fully-realized peaceful nuclear program — and an actual nuclear weapon.

Reuters has the report on Soltanieh’s comments:

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), suggested the Islamic Republic could never compete in terms of the numbers of warheads possessed by the nuclear-armed major powers.

It would therefore be at a disadvantage in relation to these countries if it developed atomic bombs, Soltanieh said.

“That is the reason we will never make this strategic mistake,” he told a conference at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. “We are as strong as those countries without nuclear weapons.”

Iran’s revolutionary leader and subsequently, first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, reportedly used to say that nuclear weapons are evil and kill innocent civilians, which is prohibited by Islam. Therefore, nuclear weapons are un-Islamic.

But a letter from Khomeini, released in 2006 by former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, has challenged this assertion.

The 1988 letter reportedly said that Iran would need nuclear weapons to end the then-long-running war with Iraq, according to the BBC.

Soltanieh’s position gets some support from former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans. In the latest Reuters report, Evans implies that Iran merely seeks a breakout capability:

Gareth Evans, co-chair of an international commission which last year issued a report on eliminating nuclear threats, told the same gathering he believed Iran “is to be taken seriously when it says it will not actually weaponize.”

There are “a number of reasons for thinking that Iran will … stop well short of actually making nuclear weapons that it may soon have the capability to produce,” the former Australian foreign minister said in a speech.

They included the risk of an Israeli attack, zero Russian and Chinese tolerance for an Iranian bomb, even tougher international sanctions and the fact that Islam does not accept weapons of mass destruction, he said.

“This is not a factor to which Western cynics would give much credence but I have to say it is echoed very strongly in every private conversation I’ve ever had with Iranian officials,” Evans, a veteran diplomatic trouble-shooter, said.