by Ali Reza Eshraghi

News media accounts of reactions from Iran to the recent talks in Geneva remind me of a joke that has gone viral there:

A salesman shows a variety of hearing aids ranging in cost from one to a thousand dollars to a customer, who then asks, “How well does [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Ali Reza Eshraghi

News media accounts of reactions from Iran to the recent talks in Geneva remind me of a joke that has gone viral there:

A salesman shows a variety of hearing aids ranging in cost from one to a thousand dollars to a customer, who then asks, “How well does the one dollar one work?” The salesman responds, “It doesn’t work at all! But, people speak louder when they see you wearing it.”

For the first time, different political factions within the Islamic republic of Iran are in agreement about President Hassan Rouhani’s method for resolving the nuclear issue and negotiating with the United States. But local and international media coverage has focused on Iranian radical groups who have shrunk in size and been marginalized after June’s presidential election. While this group occupies a small space in Iran’s current nuclear discourse, it has been presented as a major actor by the media.

Much of this coverage focuses on Kayhan, the Iranian daily newspaper, and its editor-in-chief, Hossein Shariatmadari, who has openly criticized the Iranian delegates for keeping the details of their negotiations with the P5+1 powers (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany) confidential. For Shariatmadari, this secrecy is an indication that the Iranian delegation is making a bad deal.

Of course, Khayan and Shariatmadari are not the only ones who have criticized Iranian diplomats for keeping things under wraps when it comes to the nuclear issue. In October 2009, when the Saeed Jalili-headed negotiation team was trying to make a deal with the P5+1 in Geneva, Iranian reformist media also complained about the lack of available details on the discussions.

At that time, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the sidelined candidate of Iran’s 2009 presidential election, accused the negotiators of trading the long-term interests of Iranians for “nothing” in a statement.

And last year — amid rumors of a meeting between Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, with American officials — Kalameh, the flagship website of the opposition Green Movement, demanded that the negotiations be “transparent and [conducted] in front of people.”

Shrinking prominence

This time it’s the hardline Kayhan that has printed the loudest complaints against the confidential negotiations. But things are different now. Not long ago, each time Kayhan started a game of ball, it was immediately picked up and passed around in the Principlist front. Today, no one is willing to play along with the well-known daily.

Indeed, other conservative media outlets affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) apparently have no problem with the nuclear negotiations remaining confidential. Here is Sobh-e Sadeq, the official IRGC weekly, expressing satisfaction in its post-Geneva talks coverage:

“The Iranian delegation stressed the importance of respecting Iranian nation’s red lines, as well as the need of change in the position of the West from selfishness to a win-win interaction. [Our delegation] would not back down from the nation’s rights.”

Even more surprisingly, the IRGC has absorbed Rouhani’s vocabulary and is talking about a “win-win interaction with the US.” The Javan daily, another media outlet associated with the IRGC, stressed on Monday that the actions of the Rouhani administration “have the permission of the Supreme Leader.” Javan took this a step further by arguing that even if the administration was unsuccessful in the negotiations, Iran would still emerge victorious because it would be obvious that it was the Americans who, contrary to their claims, have no interest in resolving disputes and restoring relations.

Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, the head of the Majlis Principlist faction whose daughter is married to the Supreme Leader’s son, has also supported the confidentiality of the nuclear negotiations. Considered a hardliner, Haddad Adel, who used to favor Kayhan, could have remained silent in this debate. But he has criticized the newspaper for basing its suspicion of Iran’s diplomatic team on what he considers “the words of the Zionist media.”

With such remarks, Haddad Adel is — perhaps unintentionally — paving the road for reformists to launch a more powerful attack against the radicals. Mir-Mahmoud Mousavi, the former Director General of the Foreign Ministry and the brother of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has also accused Iranian hardliners of using the language of Israeli hardliners. He believes they both “are trying to weaken Iran’s position in the talks.”

The position of Haddad Adel, the IRGC or even Ahmad Khatami, the radical and sometimes callous Tehran Friday Prayers Leader who also said Rouhani’s administration should be trusted, has confused analysts who measure Iranian politics with a who-is-closer-to-the-Supreme-Leader tape. These pundits are uncomfortably surprised each time they come across such perplexing results. The last such surprise occurred during Iran’s 2013 presidential election when Saeed Jalili, Iran’s nuclear negotiator who was touted as a favorite of the Supreme Leader, lost the vote.

After Ahmadinejad

Of course, it’s crucial to observe certain significant developments in Iran’s nuclear and foreign policy discourse that have occurred since Rouhani took office a few months ago. First, Iranian media can now write more openly and include a variety of opinions about their country’s controversial politics. This is why Mohammad Mohajeri, the editor-in-chief of the popular Khabar Online website and former member of the editorial board of Kayhan, reminded Shariatmadari that Jalili’s former negotiating team had tougher restrictions for the press. Before, “the press would get some burnt intelligence and were then told not to even discuss that useless information because of the confidential nature of the talks.” Compare that situation to the present when trying to gauge the level of change. Last week, for the first time, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif took a group of Iranian reporters from various media outlets to Geneva. Each day they were briefed repeatedly by members of the Iranian team.

That the reformist media are not alone in attacking and quibbling with the hardliners is another new development. The moderate and progressive Principlists, in an unwritten division of labor with the reformists, have taken on the task of silencing the radicals themselves. Popular news websites affiliated with the Principlists like Alef, Khabar Online and Tabank have constantly — albeit with a softer tone — criticized Iran’s radicals since the talks in Geneva.

Bijan Moghaddam, the managing director of the widely circulated Jam-e Jam daily and the former political editor of the hardliner Fars News Agency, has warned the radicals that the “Iranian society has banished them” and asked hardliners to voice their criticism logically and “without creating a ruckus and swearing.”

Finally, there is now a visible rhetorical shift in the debate over Iran’s foreign policy. Critics of Rouhani’s diplomacy team do not merely rely on mnemonic tropes and the Islamic Republic’s ideological repertoire in their arguments. They are also invoking Iran’s “national interest” in criticizing the administration’s diplomatic method. Such changes are even visible in Khayan’s tone. For example, the daily recently criticized Rouhani for publically announcing ahead of the Geneva talks that the treasury is empty, saying that such statements would weaken Iran’s negotiating position.

In such an atmosphere, it’s not surprising that critics of the government’s foreign policy claim they are aiding the administration’s negotiating strategy. As a radical commentator recently said in an interview with the Javan daily, “President Rouhani can use the views of those opposing the talks with the US as powerful leverage to haggle with the US.”

Photo: Gholam Ali Haddad Adel greets Hossein Shariatmadari. Credit: Jam News

by Farideh Farhi

I read about the Obama-Rouhani phone call in Farsnews, the hardline Iranian agency sometimes referred to as False News for the way it manages to distort certain events. (The official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) was apparently the first to report the call). Feeling skeptical, I turned [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

I read about the Obama-Rouhani phone call in Farsnews, the hardline Iranian agency sometimes referred to as False News for the way it manages to distort certain events. (The official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) was apparently the first to report the call). Feeling skeptical, I turned to the New York Times where no mention of the event could be found as of yet. By the time I turned to CNN International — which, unlike its American counterpart, thinks its audience deserves better than frivolity and drama — Obama was already talking about Syria with the streaming headlines below his image confirming the phone call.

Obama’s words were not that different from his conciliatory speech at the UN General Assembly, but the news of the phone call between him and Hassan Rouhani has been met with silent awe by all and smiles from most, as documented here by Ali Reza Eshraghi.

I have been in Tehran since the beginning of this month, mostly absorbing conversations everywhere about what Rouhani can do, cannot do, and should do. But I have also heard plenty of talk and questions about Obama and his presumed lack of backbone.

Conversations usually begin with a question directed at me, the American political scientist in the room, about the rhymes and reasons of US policy on Iran. Of course, the questions are usually rhetorical since everyone in the room is more of a political “expert” than I am. This is Tehran, after all…

It usually takes a few seconds before the cacophonous discussion turns to the influence of Israel and Israeli lobbies in the US. “They would not allow it” is the repeated declaration and lament.

But Obama’s UN speech and phone call is raising eyebrows — even a momentary silence. It’s now time to watch and be cautiously optimistic about Obama’s ability for a pushback.

Meanwhile, the Iranian President is also impressing people with his presumed grit. I heard someone say yesterday that Rouhani probably would not have arranged to receive the phone call had the hardline press not acted so pleased with his refusal to shake Obama’s hand and not made fun of the reformist press for hoping for such an encounter.

Rouhani has accomplished more than what most expected from him both domestically and internationally. The release of some political prisoners; a returning degree of calm to economic expectations; the resurgence of a vibrant political press; the opening of the cultural arena; and public commitment to the resolution of the nuclear issue all confirm a re-direction at the top in response to public sensibilities. But few expected this re-direction to have palpable results so soon. The mood remains patient, but clearly pleased.

Yes, a shoe was thrown at Rouhani upon his return from New York City from a group of about 50 or so male demonstrators. But there were more supporters than detractors. It is also true that the intractable Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan has found 5 “lamentable” aspects of Rouhani’s trip and performance (including the way the President answered the Holocaust question, his reference to Israel instead of the Zionist regime, and of course, the phone call). But he has also had to defend himself against the charge of sounding more like Bibi Netanyahu than the Leader’s representative to the state-run newspaper.

No one expects Iranian opposition to the easing of tensions with the United States to go away. Over 4 million people voted for Saeed Jalili, Iran’s former nuclear negotiator deemed as the candidate who would continue Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s path. In fact, one of the anti-Rouhani demonstrators was identified as a senior worker on Jalili’s presidential campaign by a few websites. But there is also no denying that at least for now, the detractors are in the minority and mostly focused on the naïve nature of the current Rouhani policy and the presumed trust he may have in the possibility of real change.

They are preparing the ground for their “we told you so” six months from now. In the words of Mehdi Mohammadi, “then no one can say that not seeing the village chief is the problem. Now that they are sitting in front of the one they have called the village chief… If [the problem] is not resolved do we have the right to say that the problem lays elsewhere?”

This is why Obama is also intently watched in Iran. Most are hoping that he will sustain the unexpected fortitude he has shown while others are counting on his failure to overcome domestic and regional opposition to constructive bilateral talks to underwrite the ascent of their point of view that talking to the US is at best a pointless exercise.

Photo Credit: President Barack Obama talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran during a phone call in the Oval Office, Sept. 27, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

by Ali Reza Eshraghi

Following the phone conversation between Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, the atmosphere in Iran has taken a happier turn while remaining surprisingly calm. Contrary to predictions made over the past week and during Rouhani’s trip to the UN, it appears the Iranian president has little problem in [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Ali Reza Eshraghi

Following the phone conversation between Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, the atmosphere in Iran has taken a happier turn while remaining surprisingly calm. Contrary to predictions made over the past week and during Rouhani’s trip to the UN, it appears the Iranian president has little problem in dealing with Iranian hardliners on his diplomatic approach with the USA. What exactly is happening here?

Upon arriving at Mehrabad airport in Tehran, a huge crowd of the president’s supporters welcomed him by slaughtering a sheep — a religious and cultural ritual of thanking god for the safe and successful return of travellers. They chanted, “Rouhani, Rouhani; thank you! thank you!” But, a few miles further down the road, a group of young hardliners known as Basijis or Hezbollahis stopped his car by chanting “Down with USA.” They accused Rouhani of crossing the regime’s redlines by negotiating with America and threw shoes and eggs at him.

In Iranian news media this unpleasant incident was reported only as a gathering of a hundred young protestors, an indicator that hardliners have lost their political influence in Iran for now. Only a few individual radical bloggers and hardline websites such as Rajanews, which is affiliated to the Paidari (Perseverance) Front and backed former chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili’s presidential bid criticized Rouhani for talking to Obama.

Unsurprisingly, Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing editor of the hardline Kayhan, described Rouhani’s action as “bad and evil.” Kayhan wrote that Rouhani hasn’t gained anything from the US “except a bunch of empty promises and an old Persian artifact which was stolen” — referring to the 2,700 year-old silver drinking cup which was returned to Iran last week.

Many Iranian political analysts consider Shariatmadari the mouthpiece of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. One of my colleagues, for example, sarcastically calls him the Supreme Leader’s Thomas Friedman.

But Kayhan was the only newspaper that criticized Rouhani on its front page while other Iranian dailies, even Javan — affiliated to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and Resalat run by orthodox principlists — were mute.

Shariatmadari would probably be very happy to be known as the Supreme Leader’s voice to the public, but he is not alone. Khamenei has different mouthpieces with different functions and neither one represents his views precisely and completely.

For example, the former speaker of the Majlis, Gholam Ali Haddad Adel, whose daughter is married to the Supreme Leader’s son and ran against Rouhani in June’s presidential election, called Rouhani’s speech at the UN General Assembly smart and didn’t criticize his phone conversation with Obama, saying instead that “it can create an atmosphere for Iran to become more active in the international arena.”

To interpret the systematic reaction to Rouhani’s diplomacy with the US one should refer to the Friday prayer sermons across Iran, which were delivered only a few hours prior to the phone call. It is the Supreme Leader who directly appoints Friday prayer leaders and the political part of their sermons are dictated by an institution called the “Friday Prayer Leaders’ Policymaking Council,” also directly supervised by Khamenei. All Friday prayer leaders have unanimously praised the positions declared by the president during his New York trip.

The Friday prayer leader in the city of Mashahd, Ayatollah Ali Alamolhoda — known as a diehard hardliner — considered Rouhani’s words an example of “heroic leniency,” (an expression coined by the Supreme Leader). In legitimizing Rouhani’s actions Alamolhoda explained, “This administration has been successful in balancing its two responsibilities of safeguarding the honor of Islam [read the Iranian regime] and safeguarding the interests of Muslims [read the Iranian nation].”

Yet, one must not be surprised to hear “Down with USA” still being chanted at the same venue in which the lmams of the Friday prayer expressed their support for Rouhani. This paradox simply shows that contrary to what Iran experts say, the phone call will not suddenly end Iran’s domestic propaganda against America.

A considerable number of Iranian members of parliament, which is currently dominated by Principlist lawmakers, have supported Rouhani. This includes Mohammad Hossein Farhangi, a member of the Presiding Board who described the phone conversation “in line with national goals and interests and [in line with] the values of the Islamic revolution.” On the other hand, the powerful lawmaker Ahmad Tavakkoli warned that one should not become irrationally overexcited about this incident because “overexcitement is not in the interest of the Iranian nation and will reduce the bargaining power of Iranian authorities.”

The same goes for the Revolutionary Guards. Their commander, Major General Mohammad Ali Ja’fari, and the commander of the Qods Force (the international branch of the IRGC,) Qasem Soleimani, both have supported Rouhani’s diplomacy. On Saturday, the Sobh-e Sadeq weekly, which belongs to the IRGC, published its latest edition one day after the headline-making phone call. It had a very positive tone with regards to Rouhani’s behavior and described Rouhani’s op-ed piece in the Washington Post as “useful.” It also stressed that the IRGC will cooperate with Rouhani’s administration.

The IRGC’s positive reaction might force many analysts who believe the political and economic interests of the IRGC are against reducing tensions with the US to reconsider their positions. One must not forget that IRGC commanders have a behavior similar to the current Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, who — despite initially warning against the dangers of US intervention in Syria — ultimately defended Obama’s strike proposal during a Senate hearing earlier this month.

Interestingly, both Iranians and Americans are asking the same question about the Rouhani-Obama phone conversation: who requested it? The Iranian side says the US was the one to initiate the call while the American side argues the opposite. This highlights the fundamental kinship between the two old adversaries in their mode of politicking.

The debate also extends to another issue that some Americans, such as Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, believe: without sanctions, none of this would have happened. On the other hand, Iranians like Ahmad Tavakkoli believe it was Iran’s resistance against international pressure that has forced the US to enter talks with Iran.

Such debate seems ceaseless. But as of today it appears that Obama will have a more difficult time in convincing Congress to accept talks with Iran than Rouhani will in convincing Iranian hardliners. In a letter written in the the late 1980s to Revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — who was Rouhani’s boss at the time — called for an end to the taboo of talks with the US. “Treading this pass will be difficult after you[r demise],” he wrote.

Now, twenty-four years after Khomeini’s death, Iranian politicians are smoothly treading this pass. It is wrong to think that Iran’s current Supreme Leader has suddenly made this decision. Just a year ago, around this time, Khamenei’s official website published commentary by Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi — the Supreme Leader’s former representative in the city of Shiraz — tacitly implying that supporters of the Supreme Leader must not be surprised by his decision for peace: “This is a test for the nation [to determine their] submission to the Leader.”

Except for a few figures who autonomously criticized Rouhani for his phone call with Obama, in the lower levels of Khamenei’s constituency all other supporters have taken to their social media networks to discuss the right or wrongfulness of this incident. Usually these discussions end with the justification that for the time being, they must remain silent and wait for the Supreme Leader’s explanation. As one famous Hezbollahi ring leader writes, “the most important things is following the “order of our master [Khamenei] whatever it may be.”

– Ali Reza Eshraghi was a senior editor at several of Iran’s reformist dailies. He is the Iran Project Manager at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and a teaching fellow in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

– Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati/ISNA

by Farideh Farhi

After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as an indication of the task-oriented “competent” government to come, Rouhani followed through on his promise to announce his picks on Aug. 4.

The parliament will begin the confirmation process, which should not take long, next week. There is no guarantee that all the ministers will be approved (several of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ministers who were nominated in his first term were not). But as of today, the bet is that they will all pass, even if a couple face a few hurdles.

Cabinet appointments are watched closely in Iran, not only because ministers are key actors in guiding the direction and management of their ministries, but also because they say something about how the newly elected president will run the country and the compromises he is willing to or must make. In any contested political terrain, including Iran, compromises result from negotiations with other centers of power.

I will get to Rouhani’s compromises shortly but let me first say a little about the power of Iranian ministers.

Traditionally, ministers mostly have substantial control over the operation and appointment of their ministerial team. They are hence vulnerable to individual parliamentary interpellation and impeachment if deemed of insufficiently fulfilling their duties.

I say mostly because this tradition of ministerial independence was severely violated during the Ahmadinejad era, when he and members of his office routinely intervened in the internal matters of various ministries, underwriting many expulsions of top-level appointees as well as the ministers themselves.

Other presidents have also intervened in the appointment process of various ministries. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani appointed a conservative minister of interior but then intervened in the appointment of many provincial governors, which is the prerogative of the interior minister. Driven by his interests, Ahmadinejad went much further and in effect became a meddling president at every level. Rouhani has promised to change that dynamic and the list of his cabinet nominees suggests he has mostly chosen individuals who will be agenda-setters in their own ministries and not agenda-takers. But he did make compromises and in the areas where he made major compromises, such as the Interior Ministry, he will likely act like Hashemi Rafsanjani and influence the gubernatorial appointments.

Hard Choices

The choice for the Interior Ministry is Abdulreza Rahmani Fazli, who is currently the director of the Supreme Audit Court, which is connected to the parliament. This body’s most important task is to issue yearly assessments of the financial operations of all government institutions and the extent to which their financial operations have been keeping in line with the budget as passed by the legislature.

Rahmani Fazli has been in the news for the past couple of years because of his office’s reports on missing funds that were discovered during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. But he is also a traditional conservative and a very close ally of parliament speaker Ali Larijani. His appointment was therefore a disappointment for Rouhani’s reformist backers who had hoped for someone with a clear record of support for citizens’ political and civil rights. (The interior minister also appoints the chief of police and licenses political parties and civil society organizations).

Rouhani also caved in at the last minute by nominating Mostafa Pourmohammadi, currently the head of Iran’s Inspectorate Office and Ahmadinejad’s minister of interior before he was fired at the end of the previous president’s first term. More importantly, Pourmohammadi was a prosecutor of the revolutionary courts and then deputy intelligence minister in the 1980s. He was implicated in some of the most horrific acts, including mass executions, against political prisoners.

Pourmohammadi is not a hardliner and in fact ran for president as a traditional conservative. But appointing him as justice minister does pose a question, to say the least, for a president who campaigned with the slogan of moderation and descuritization of the political environment — even if the justice minister is effectively the least powerful cabinet position.

It is true that the minister of justice is chosen among the four nominees offered by the head of the Judiciary and has no power in the selection of judges or its internal workings. It is also true that there is a saying in Iran that the justice minister is essentially the mailman between the Judiciary and the other two branches. Still, the appointment is a cave-in, likely to protect other ministerial nominees considered more important to Rouhani and effectively more essential in terms of influence.

In the arenas of foreign policy and economy, Rouhani did not make compromises and nominated individuals who are very close to him and his views. In foreign policy, Rouhani’s dilemma seemed to have been not about compromise but choice. He ultimately chose Javad Zarif over his deputy at the Center for Strategic Research, Mahmoud Vaezi, who was also considered a very strong choice. Others have written about Zarif’s appointment as an “olive branch” to the US. But it is a more important signal to the rank and file of the Foreign Ministry as well as the country as a whole.

Zarif represents the best and the brightest that the post-revolution Foreign Ministry has produced. He climbed the ranks without the help of religiously or politically important familial relations. Zarif’s important appointment is therefore a confirmation of Rouhani’s promise of a competent government. Yet to come, of course, are other foreign policy related appointments, in which Zarif will have quite a bit of say, including on Iran’s representative at the UN and a couple of deputy ministers. The latter becomes particularly important if the decision is made to return the handling of the nuclear file to the Foreign Ministry and send someone in the rank of US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman to talks with the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team.

Vaezi, meanwhile, went to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, where he was director general many years ago. I am not sure if Vaezi is happy with this appointment. There are even rumors — and rumors in Iran should never be trusted — that at the end of the day, Vaezi had to be convinced to take up the position at the prodding of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. He does however have Rouhani’s strong backing and personality to lead the effort if the decision is made to reduce the influence the Islamic Revolutionary Guards has wielded in this ministry (an IRGC commander was leading it during the past couple of years).

This ministry’s revenues from cellular service usage is enormous. Last year it was the third highest depositor of money into the Treasury after the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (which is in charge of taxation).

The question of the IRGC being engaged in too many economic activities is now front-and-center in Iranian politics. Prominent MP Ahmad Tavkoli even went as far as suggesting that the country’s leadership has to be decisive in limiting the IRGC’s and security forces’ role in the economy. Vaezi will be at the center of this fight should it take place.

Tackling Iran’s economy

In general, the desire to get state organs out of the economy seems to be the glue that holds together a largely neo-liberal economic team. It is one of the strange ironies of Iranian politics that the leftists of the 1980s were turned politically reformist and economically mostly neo-liberal in the late 1990s and continue to be so. It is true that the reaction Mohammad Khatami’s neoliberal policies elicited in the form of Ahmadinejad’s justice-oriented populism — at least rhetorically — has now been acknowledged and the economic policies pursued will try to strike a balance between “development” and “justice” and not simply assume that development will lead to the downward trickling of wealth. But the thrust of Rouhani’s center-reformist economic appointments indicates more concern with production and productivity in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.

Almost all of the economy-related ministers — with the exception of the minister of energy, Hamid Chitchian, whose political affiliation is not clear to me and seems to be a bureaucrat who has climbed the ranks of that ministry — are of a center-reformist mold. Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, who was Khatami’s petroleum minister, is nominated to return. Mohammadreza Nematzadeh, who was the co-chair of Rouhani’s campaign, will lead the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Commerce. Abbas Ahmad Akhundi will lead the Ministry of Road and Transportation, Ali Rabii will lead the Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives, and Welfare and Mahmoud Hojjati, who was Khatami’s minister of road and transportation, will return as minister of agriculture.

The only odd appointment in this list of like-minded and highly experienced officials is the minister of economy and finance, Ali Tayebnia, who comes in with little known experience and a mostly academic background. He was reformist candidate Mohammadreza Aref’s economic advisor during the presidential campaign and reportedly has academic expertise in monetary and taxation policies. It’s an odd appointment because of his dearth of experience. But perhaps the idea is that he will be part of an economic team that will be led by two key Rouhani economic advisors: Ishaq Jahangiri, a founding member of the center-reformist Servants of Construction party, former governor and minister of industry, who will be the first vice president — and Ali Nobakht, who will likely head the resurrected Management and Planning Organization. Also involved in economic decision-making is Rouhani’s chief of staff, Mohammad Nahavandian, currently the head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Not yet known is the person who will be appointed as the head of the Central bank of Iran (CBI). This position, like the positions of the first vice president and head of the Management and Panning Organization, does not require parliamentary approval. So far, the heads of Iran’s two largest private banks have been mentioned as potential CBI appointees.

Political boldness

Irrespective of whether one approves of the neo-liberal tendencies of these individuals, one has to marvel at the fact that three of these nominees were former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s 2009 campaign advisors, and one is possibly former president Khatami’s closest political advisor. These appointments come in the midst of dire warnings by Hossein Shariatmadari of the hardline Kayhan Daily against appointments of “supporters of sedition” to key positions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Zangeneh will have a tough time getting by the parliament. But he is backed by his stellar record in both the ministries of energy and petroleum and the fact that his diehard opponents have so far failed to find any financial shenanigans on his part. He is “squeaky clean,” an academic who lives in Tehran told me.

Another minister who may have difficulty getting through is the nominee for the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, which supervises the university system. Jafar Milimonfared was not Rouhani’s first choice. His first choice was received as too reformist and elicited harsh reaction from hardline and conservative forces. Still, Milimonfared was deputy minister of the same ministry during the Khatami era and even became its caretaker for a short when it was between ministers. This position elicits sensitivity because the new minister may reverse the Islamicization trend that has been pursued in Iran’s universities and remove some of the appointed faculty in the past 8 years. So, the fight is over both ideology and pork.

Interestingly, the nominee for Irans’ Education Ministry, Mohammad Ali Najafi, is expected to pass through relatively easily. He is also a founding member of the centrist Servants of Construction party and was until recently a member of the Tehran city council. Many considered him to be a more appealing reformist candidate for president than Mohammadreza Aref, who withdrew his candidacy in order for the reformists to line-up behind Rouhani. Najafi was the director of the Planning and Budget Organization (later renamed as the Management and Planning Organization) under Khatami. He was also the minister of culture and higher education when Mousavi was prime minister,.

This leaves the three key ministries of Defense, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Intelligence — all of which ended up with a compromise choice. Note how I say a compromise choice and not an imposed choice. If the reported names are valid, none of the three nominees  – Hossein Dehghan for Defense, Ali Jannati for Culture and Islamic Guidance and Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mahmud Alavi for Intelligence — were among Rouhani’s first choices. But these individuals cannot be considered as anyone else’s imposed choice either.

All three have worked for Hashemi Rafsanjani or Khatami and all three have a good relationship with Rouhani. Dehghan is a member of Rouhani’s Moderation and Development party, and Alavi was his link to Qom during the presidential campaign. And Jannati, whose father Ahmad Jannati is the Secretary of the Guardian Council, is much closer ideologically to Hashemi Rafsanjani than his father. He was deputy minister for international affairs at the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency and ambassador to Kuwait during Khatami’s presidency. He has the distinction of being removed from office by Ahmadinejad twice; once as deputy minister of the interior and once as Iran’s ambassador to Kuwait. Those working in the art, music and publishing world would have preferred a more reformist-minded nominee, but they are not complaining — at least not yet. This ministry has operated in such an erratic manner — for example by granting permission for movies to be made and then refusing to allow their release after much cost and effort — that anyone who brings consistency as well as lesser interference will be appreciated for now.

All in all the cabinet seems well-balanced with regard to Iran’s widely disparate political strands as well as the electorate that coalesced to make Rouhani’s victory possible. Expectedly, it features no hardliners since they were the clear losers of the presidential election. It does include a number of traditional conservatives but the cabinet mostly bends to the middle, as promised, while some individuals who are very close to former reformist president Khatami have been slated for key positions.

We’ll just have to wait and see if they will survive their confirmation hearings. The deputy-level appointments, which for many of those who deal with the various ministries are sometimes even more important than the ministerial heads, come next. It will take quite a few months before the depth of Rouhani’s efforts and commitment to instilling change will become clear.

Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati

via IPS News

As the five-day registration period for presidential candidates began here Tuesday, the question of whether Iran’s upcoming election will represent the will of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the people of Iran is uppermost on many people’s minds, including those of the potential candidates.

In the [...]]]> by Yasaman Baji

via IPS News

As the five-day registration period for presidential candidates began here Tuesday, the question of whether Iran’s upcoming election will represent the will of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the people of Iran is uppermost on many people’s minds, including those of the potential candidates.

In the crowded field of former and current officials who have declared their intent to run, many have already made a point of declaring their total allegiance to the Leader’s dictates. For instance, the repeat presidential candidate, conservative Mohsen Rezaee, promised on Apr. 1 that his administration will be “the most coordinated administration” with the Leader ever.

Even some reformists, who are known to be critics of the Leader, have called for the candidacy of someone who will not provoke Khamenei’s opposition or sensitivities.

But this is not a position taken by many other reformist individuals or groups. Since mid-March many individuals and groups, through public letters and meetings, have called upon Khatami to become a candidate. Their call is premised on Khatami’s popularity and the belief in the continued attractiveness of his ideas and conduct as president.

Similar calls have been made for former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to run. Neither of the past presidents has committed himself, and both have said that they will not run unless the leader agrees to their candidacy. Their argument has been that, without such a nod, the political environment will just become too contentious and tension-ridden.

In Rafsanjani’s words, “if Ayatollah Khamenei does not agree with my candidacy, the result will be counterproductive…If there’s a situation where there is a difference between me and the leadership of the state, all of us will suffer.”

In fact, mere talk of runs by Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani has led to overwrought accusations on the part of hardliners.

Hossein Shariatmadari, the intractable editor of the hardline Kayhan Daily, called Khatami “corrupt on earth” and a “supporter of sedition,” a reference to his backing of former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mussavi and Mehdi Karrubi who remain under house arrest due to the protests that followed the 2009 presidential election.

According to Shariatmadari, “supporters of sedition… will undoubtedly be disqualified.”

The hardline minister of intelligence, in turn, went after Rafsanjani, calling him “the source of sedition.” His language was so harsh that it elicited a response from several members of Parliament who scolded the minister for his overt political involvement and accusations against someone who continues to serve as the chair of the Leader’s own advisory council.

No one doubts that these attacks are intended to intimidate the two former presidents. Whether Khamenei himself is behind them is also a subject of much speculation. After all, Shariatmadari is appointed by Khamenei, while the minister of intelligence, Mohsen Heydari, was protected from being fired by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad through Khamenei’s personal intervention.

Even more fundamental is the question of whether the upcoming election will once again turn into an arena of confrontation between the presumed desired candidate of the Leader and the one chosen by society, as many believe was the case in the 2009 election when Ahmadinejad was swiftly declared the winner.

While the protests have long since ended, many voters continue to believe that there was extensive fraud in 2009. Furthermore, given his ardent support for Ahmadinejad’s re-election, many hold Khamenei responsible for the downward economic spiral the country has faced and their own economic woes.

In the words of a 73-year-old taxi driver, “I used to believe in Khamenei, but when I saw that he wants everything for himself and is ready to take the country into ruin in order to insist that he made the right choice, I no longer support him. Every day I curse him for the sake of the youth in this country.”

Talk about potential runs by Khatami and Rafsanjani had created hope that Khamenei might have finally seen the mistake he made in 2009 and become willing to entertain honest competition among a whole slew of candidates representing the diverse sentiments of society.

But the harsh attacks by Shariatmadari and Moslehi have again created doubts about the potential for a fair election and Khamenei’s calculations.

According to a well-known novelist who spoke to IPS on condition of anonymity, “Khameni wants us to back down and acknowledge his leadership as a principle of the constitution but when we back down, he wants more. When we say we accept the constitution, his supporters say it is not enough to accept his constitutional role; you have to completely give in to his leadership.

“When we say we will participate in the election, they say we must recant our actions in 2009. But he himself is not willing to take any responsibility or acknowledge mistakes for the mess Ahmadinejad has created in the country.”

Reformists are no longer the only critics. A prominent conservative who wished to remain anonymous told IPS that he considers Khamenei a failed leader who has tried to become like the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

This conservative politician believes that Khamenei has never understood the two main differences he has with Khomeini. “First of all Khomeini was a charismatic leader who had an organic relationship with the society while Khamenei has an organisational relationship,” he said.

“Secondly, Khomeini was clever enough to accommodate popular sentiment even if they were against his own wishes while Khamenei obstinately and vindictively stands against them.”

Many citizens who participated in the 2009 election and continue to think that their vote was “stolen” will not vote in the Jun. 14 election. But everyone will be watching to see whether Khamenei will again insist on having his wish become the choice of the country.

You will not hear me say this often, but Hossein Shariatmadari — Iran’s irascible and intractable editor of the hardline Kayhan daily — makes one important point in this editorial. Although a few months ago Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei referred in general terms to the fact that Iran had been [...]]]> via Lobe Log

You will not hear me say this often, but Hossein Shariatmadari — Iran’s irascible and intractable editor of the hardline Kayhan daily — makes one important point in this editorial. Although a few months ago Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei referred in general terms to the fact that Iran had been involved against Israel’s previous attacks against Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008), this is the first time that both the Iranian and Palestinian leaderships have officially and unabashedly acknowledged Iran’s military support.

Shariatmadari does not address the question of what has led to this new official posture since his piece is really not about what has brought about this change but a convoluted attack — based on fabricated quotes — on reformists who in his words have been directly or indirectly supported by the Israeli government in order to weaken the Islamic Republic’s support for the “resistance.” What else could the protestors’ chant — Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I give my life to Iran” — in the post-2009 election environment have meant but “playing in the wolves’ team,” Shariatmadari asserts. But what Shariatmadari takes for granted is that the hardline position on the need for Iran’s support for resistance in Palestine has not only been vindicated but become common sentiment as well.

This is a debatable assumption since one of the basic disagreements between those in Iran who have called for a less confrontationist foreign policy, and those who continue to push for an offensive or aggressive foreign policy (siast khareji-ye tahajomi), has been over Iran’s role beyond the Persian Gulf region. While the former does not see Iran’s involvement in broader regional issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as serving the long-term interests of the country, the latter argues that regional links will check Israeli threats and enhance Iran’s standing vis-à-vis the United States. While the former worries about the additional threats an offensive foreign policy — which it calls adventurist — will bring for Iran, the latter insists that the only deterrent to international “bullies” is a show of strength and resolve combined with just a pinch of Nixonian madman posture.

But the decision on the part of Iran to publicly own up to its military and financial support for Hamas does hint at the possibility that the hardline position may have become consensus at least for tactical purposes as Iran prepares to re-engage in nuclear talks with the United States within the 6-world power (p5+1) framework.

As I mentioned in a previous post on Iran and Gaza, Tehran’s initial response to the Israeli attack was rather cautious and conceding of Egyptian leadership. The chair of the Parliament’s National Security of Foreign Policy Committee, Alaeddin Borujerdi, went as far as to say that Iran had nothing to do with Hamas’ rocket attacks on Israel. But in the span of a couple of days — surely after a meeting of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) — a decision was made to not only announce Tehran’s financial and military support, but also state the country’s pride in doing so. Similar language used by Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and IRGC commander Mohammad Jafari — both members of the SNSC — suggests prior coordination.

This was done despite at least one warning in the press that the Gaza attack was “an Israeli conspiracy to destroy the opportunity for talks between Iran and the West.” It was also done despite worries that the war was mostly about testing the Iron Dome and deterrence against Iranian missiles. I am unable to access the editorial in the daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami from a few days ago, but if I remember correctly, it said something like Israel now knows a lot more about Iran’s capabilities than the other way around.

Despite these concerns, Iran’s assertive posture is probably the result of the calculation laid out by Sadeq Kharrazi, deputy foreign minister in the reformist era and current publisher of “irdiplomacy”, a website dedicated to foreign policy. He suggests that Iran’s concrete support for Hamas essentially steers attention away from Iran’s conduct in Syria and towards the “paradoxical behavior” of the “traditional leaders of the Arab World and Turkey” which “do not take any measures to militarily support the Palestinians while they continue to send ships filled with ammunitions and arms to Syria’s opposition.”

But his hopes, which I think also underwrite Iran’s openly supportive posture towards Gaza, are as follows:

The complicated crises of the Middle East and its equations are becoming more complex day by day, and one cannot confront them with the policies of the past. The US and other world powers must know that the equation of the Middle East region will not be solved without the presence of all regional powers. Perhaps one of the objectives of the Zionist regime behind attacking Gaza was to weaken or delay the possibility of dialogue between Iran and the US—and to overshadow it—but it seems that the crisis in Gaza, more than ever before, proved to Obama that he needs to interact with Iran as the proponent of dialogue, revolutionary and Jihadist ideas in the region, so that part of the problems of the region, from Syria to Gaza, can be solved with Iran’s support.

Bottom line: the Islamic Republic is making a point that it is part of a variety of problems in the region; making it part of the solution to these problems will require a different US approach.

This is an argument that Kharrazi, proponent of a grand bargain with the US, has been making for a long time. The glitch in this argument is that US policy makers have remained unimpressed with Iran’s regional clout either because they do not find it impressive enough (despite trumpeting it for domestic purposes), or because they think Islamic Iran is structurally unable to be helpful in wielding its clout. They have instead opted for isolating Iran through a ferocious sanctions regime.

Now, with Gaza, the Islamic Republic is making the same argument in a more concrete fashion. The problem of course is that in the Middle East, playing hardline usually begets hardline.

Nevertheless, hardline is what Tehran has decided to play at this moment and public announcements about Iran’s military support for Hamas in spite of presumably crippling sanctions should be viewed as a statement — bluster or not — regarding the failure and even danger of policies that try to bring about regional security at the expense of Islamic Iran’s insecurity.

- Farideh Farhi is an independent researcher and an affiliate graduate faculty member in political science and international relations at the University of Hawaii-Manoa.

The neoconservative hawk and deputy editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal, Bret Stephens, has once again figured it all out. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States since 1979, and no US president since then, including Ronald Reagan and George [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The neoconservative hawk and deputy editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal, Bret Stephens, has once again figured it all out. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States since 1979, and no US president since then, including Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, has done anything but appease that evil regime for reasons that befuddle us all.

Hence, it is now of paramount importance to halt the current president’s “outreach” to Iran because all previous attempts motivated by Washington’s “excess of decency” have allowed “33 years of Iranian outrages” to go “unavenged” and “undeterred”.

Stephens, a former editor of the Jerusalem Post, was an avid supporter of the US invasion of Iraq and a fierce critic of the planned 2011 troop withdrawal, arguing that the US should have maintained a “serious tripwire force in Iraq as a hedge against Iran and other bad forces in the region” instead.

Now, again, he is amplifying his call to arms with fear mongering and a line that fellow neoconservative pundit Michael Ledeen has been using for years – Iran and the US are already at war, so the US should start acting like it:

Maybe the president thinks decency obliges him to give diplomacy another chance. But it is from an excess of decency that 33 years of Iranian outrages have gone unavenged, and Iran now proceeds undeterred. Sensible policy on Iran begins not with the question of how to avoid a war—that war was foisted on U.S. in 1979—but how to win it. Anything less invites further terror and dishonors the memory of Iran’s many American victims.

Following this line of reasoning requires diverting the conversation from how best to effectively engage with Iran in order to stop its nuclear program, to how to wage a successful war against an intractable and wicked enemy. Stephens’ conclusion is based on a litany of Iranian offenses (some of which remain questionable, let alone unproven) from the hostage crisis to bombings and kidnappings in Lebanon in the 1980s, the Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi Arabia, “thousands of U.S. troops killed by IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan” and the curious case of Mansour Arbabsiar, the Iranian-American who recently pleaded guilty to attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US in collusion with Iranian counterparts. This, according to our militarist pundit, has been the Iranian record against the United States.

And what of the US record against Iran? Why, an “excess of decency” of course! For reasons that Stephens doesn’t have time to get into or simply cannot explain, the US leadership from Reagan to Obama has repeatedly chosen the soft line with Iran. Perhaps the inherently peaceful character of the US has led to its impressive military hardware being reserved for only special occasions, which, in the case of the Middle East, Stephens forgets to mention, has somehow been deployed since the first 1991 Gulf War with no hiatus in between.

With this in mind, there really is no reason to waste time over the nuclear issue. Stephens wants a war to “avenge” the Islamic Republic’s 33-year long record of crimes and does not shy away from declaring his unhappiness regarding the direction of the Iran conversation in the US. The idea that sanctions are working unsettles him because it suggests that there is still time for serious and public diplomatic engagement with Iran to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all. (And no, I am not talking about a Reaganesque mission to secretly dispatch a national security adviser with a cake and bible to Tehran.) Even attempting peaceful conflict resolution is difficult for Stephens to accept because it “dishonors the memory of Iran’s many American victims.” For Stephens and many of his neocon colleagues, the real issue goes beyond the nuclear impasse; what we should really be concerned about is Iran’s history of “dishonoring” America since its Revolution.

Interestingly, this argument echoes talking points made by Iranian neoconservatives (which we often refer to as hardliners). Just read any column by Hossein Shariatmadari, the intractable editor of Kayhan Daily, and you will understand what I mean.

What are the similarities? First there is the victim mentality. Nothing the US or Iran has done can outdo the “bad” things that are done to them. From Shariatmadari’s point of view, the Islamic Republic has always been on the receiving end of Western “savagery” (a term also recently used by Leader Ali Khamenei to describe US conduct vis-à-vis Iran) because of its values, principles, and its daring resistance against US “arrogance.” From Stephens’ point of view, nothing the US has done – like siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and at a minimum engaging in a collusion of silence over Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran’s military and civilians, or shooting down, even if accidentally, an Iranian civilian airliner and then promoting the naval commander responsible for it – is even worth mentioning. Iranian conduct always occurs in a vacuum and is only worth noting in terms of the harm that is imposed.

From the neoconservative point of view — in the U.S. and Iran — correct values, “decency,” and the desire to be a beacon of goodwill, is the only mark of their respective countries. And the violent and disdainful conduct of the other side is the only conduct that needs to be noted. I am sure that, in the minds of folks like Shariatmadari and Stephens, that is indeed the only conduct noted.

This is why Stephens refers to the “crippling” sanctions that Governor Romney and President Obama referenced in Monday night’s debate as more of a “campaign prop than policy tool.” The notion that “unprecedented” sanctions that target the financial core of another country — not to mention killing nuclear scientists and sabotaging nuclear facilities — could also be considered an act of war is incomprehensible for Stephens.

Beyond feigned or actual feelings of victimhood, there is also a similarity in their avoidance of responsibility for the outcome of their proposed solutions. Neoconservatives in both Iran and the United States have had their chances at influencing their respective countries’ foreign and security policies. George W. Bush’s “muscular foreign policy” promoted by the likes of Stephens brought the US the debacle that has been Iraq — which, if anything, has actually strengthened Iran — and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s “aggressive foreign policy,” pushed by folks like Shariatmadari, has brought Iran crippling sanctions.

Do they take responsibility for any of their disasters? Absolutely not! Stephens’ push for another war in the Middle East is clear evidence that he does not see himself or his cohorts as responsible for the fiasco in Iraq. In fact, he has said so plainly. The war was not the “original sin,” he wrote in 2007. In fact, it was no sin at all. Things went wrong because of mistakes that occurred after the neoconservatives lost their influence in the Bush administration when Condoleezza Rice became Secretary of State (this being, by the way, the reason Stephens vehemently opposed Rice becoming Romney’s running mate).

A similar argument is now being parlayed by Iranian neoconservatives. Things always begin to go wrong when the Iranian government indicates a willingness to talk with the United States, they say. It exhibits weakness, and it is only through a show of strength and “will”– a favorite mantra of neoconservatives everywhere — that “bullies” like the US can be deterred.

Let me end by pointing out that despite the uncanny similarities of their worldviews, there is at least one critical difference between Iranian and US neoconservatives. This difference does not exist in their self-satisfied and belligerent poses; it relates to the location of their respective countries in the geopolitical and economic order.

It is the United States and its allies that are trying to strangle Iran economically, not the other way around. And of course it is the United States that will be engaging in yet another version of “shock and awe” if folks like Bret Stephens have their way, not the other way around.