by Jasmin Ramsey
Mary Rezaian, the mother of Jason Rezaian, the Washington Post reporter who was detained in Iran last week with his wife Yeganeh Salehi without charge or access to a lawyer, makes a heartfelt plea to Iranian authorities in this video to release her two loved ones.
Reza Marashi does [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Mary Rezaian, the mother of Jason Rezaian, the Washington Post reporter who was detained in Iran last week with his wife Yeganeh Salehi without charge or access to a lawyer, makes a heartfelt plea to Iranian authorities in this video to release her two loved ones.
Reza Marashi does a beautiful job of describing Jason, a friend and former IPS contributor, in this piece, and many, myself included, share the helplessness Reza conveys about the situation.
Jason’s American mother displays incredible grace in this clip, despite the agony she must be feeling, wearing a head scarf, speaking partially in Farsi, and asking rather than accusing or commanding. That’s Jason’s way, too.
“From an early age Jason noticed how Iran was negatively portrayed in the US and world media. He became a journalist to help build bridges of understanding and to share Iran’s rich cultural heritage with the West,” said Rezaian last week.
“His work was not controversial, but an honest record of his encounters with the people and the soul of Iran.”
Exactly.
]]>by Farideh Farhi
On April 3 the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on EU Strategy towards Iran. It proposes the opening of a EU delegation in Tehran; cooperation in a number of areas such as the fight against narcotic drugs, environmental protection, and exchanges of students and academics; engaging [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
On April 3 the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution on EU Strategy towards Iran. It proposes the opening of a EU delegation in Tehran; cooperation in a number of areas such as the fight against narcotic drugs, environmental protection, and exchanges of students and academics; engaging with Iran on ending the Syrian civil war; stabilising Afghanistan; and outlining the prospect of lifting nuclear-related sanctions against Iran once there is a final agreement on the nuclear issue.
The resolution was offered as a signal of the EP’s desire to embark on a new relationship with Iran, but its questioning of the legitimacy of Iran’s 2013 presidential election and recommendation for parliamentary delegations that visit Iran to meet with dissidents angered Tehran and led to the cancellation of a visit by an Iranian parliamentary delegation to Strasbourg in eastern France. Even Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was compelled to question the powers of the EP, saying it does not have the political and ethical standing to “preach to others.”
I contacted Eldar Mamedov to learn about the politics of this resolution and how it came to be after a couple of visits to Iran by the European Parliament’s delegation. Mamedov is the Political Advisor for the Social-Democratic Group in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. I saw him in Tehran last October when he accompanied a delegation from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats — this was the first European parliamentary delegation to visit Iran since 2007. He later accompanied the delegation headed by Tarja Cronberg who is a member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, its subcommittee on Security and Defence, and the Chair of the Iran delegation. It was this delegation that extended the now cancelled invitation to Iran’s parliamentary members to visit Europe. Mamedov agreed to talk to me in his private capacity and emphasized that the views expressed here are not necessarily the position of the Social-Democrat Group or the EP.
Farideh Farhi: Before discussing the politics of the EP resolution that was just passed, can you elaborate on the powers of the EP and the role it has in EU foreign policy decision-making? Does it have significant powers to influence the policy direction of the European Union or is the message mostly a statement of sentiments?
Eldar Mamedov: The EU, as a union of 28 nations, has a complex institutional architecture. All essential foreign policy decisions are taken by the Council of the EU, the institution representing EU member state governments. That’s where ministers from each member state meet and decide on laws and policies.
After the major reform of the EU in 2009 known as the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has acquired new powers on foreign policy. In addition to its power over the EU budget, including the foreign policy appropriations (which it already had before 2009), it can now grant or withdraw consent to international agreements concluded in the name of the EU with other countries. That means that if, for example, the EU signs a trade agreement with Iran it must be ratified by the EP.
But EP positions on foreign affairs carry weight, even if they are not legally binding, because they are expressed by the only directly elected body of the EU and therefore are considered important political messages.
Q: Since the election of Hassan Rouhani, two EP delegations have visited Iran. The EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton also visited Tehran in March. These visits suggested a desire to recalibrate Europe’s relationship with Iran. What explains the EP’s decision to adopt a resolution at this time?
This is not the first EP resolution regarding Iran. There have been many others that call on Iran to improve its human rights record. But this one tried to set a new tone.
The previous EP report on EU strategy on Iran, known as the Belder report, was adopted in 2011. It was a hawkish report drafted by a rapporteur known for his close links to Israel. It called to maintain and expand the sanctions regime against Iran, condemned Iran´s regional policies and scarcely outlined any areas of possible cooperation. The overall context — Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the post-2009 election crackdown — made it very difficult for supporters of engagement to press their case. After the election of Hassan Rouhani as the president of Iran, and especially after the Geneva interim nuclear deal on 24 November 2013, prospects for the normalization of relations between the West and Iran improved and it was felt that the time has come to adjust the EP’s position to the new situation and make a constructive contribution to EU policy on Iran. The Parliament is in a better position to do so than the European External Action Service (EEAS), which operates under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton or the Ministerial Council, where taking bold steps requires lengthy and complicated negotiations, and where some big countries, such as the UK and France, have a tough approach to Iran.
The Socialists & Democrats Group (S&D), the main progressive group in the Parliament, stepped in and assumed initiative on the Iranian file. In October 2013, even before the Geneva deal, a delegation of the S&D led by its president, Hannes Swoboda, visited Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials, including former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Larijani. This was the first visit from the EP to Iran in 6 years. Subsequently the S&D’s Spanish member Maria Muniz became the rapporteur on Iran and prepared the first draft for consideration in the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Q. The way you describe it, there was quite a bit of political wrangling regarding the language of the resolution, and the intent was to push for improved relations with Iran rather than reiterate the EP’s concerns regarding Iran’s domestic affairs. What was the process leading to the adoption of the report?
First, the rapporteur presented her draft. Then it was opened to amendments by different members representing their political groups. The method in the EP is to work on compromises between the original text and the amendments. Those amendments that cannot be deemed as covered by the compromise have to be voted on separately.
When the amendments were tabled, it became apparent that there were broadly two approaches: the forward-looking, constructive one advocated by the S&D rapporteur and other progressive groups, which included Liberals, Greens and United Left, and the one put forward by conservative groups such as the European People´s Party (EPP). The EPP includes Christian-Democrats and other mainstream centre-right political groups. It is the biggest group in the EP. Other conservative groups involved in this process included the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) with British Tories and associated right-wing allies, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD), which includes far right groups such as the UKIP or Italy´s Northern League.
The conservative block sought to minimize or deny the positive elements of the resolution by using three strategies: 1) making any improvement in relations, however modest, conditional on a final and comprehensive nuclear agreement; 2) while welcoming the Geneva deal, emphasizing that Iran is still in violation of several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions; 3) questioning the legitimacy of Rouhani as the president of Iran by pointing to the “non-democratic nature” of Iran’s elections and associating him with the steady rise in executions during the last few months.
In its most extreme form, the conservative line dismissed the Geneva deal for allowing Iran to preserve its enrichment activities and called for continuing a “robust sanctions regime” (language used by the EFD). The EFD also asked to defend the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries from the Iranian threat. Interestingly, conservative group members (some of them with links to the exiled Iranian opposition group, the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), such as Spanish EPP member Alejo Vidal-Quadras and British ECR member Struan Stevenson) proposed amendments deleting the call for an opening of the EU office in Tehran, fully in line with the position of their supposed enemies — Iranian hardliners.
It must be said that not all in the EPP held such a hawkish position, but the hardliners were better mobilized to press their case than the moderates. This allowed them to win the internal EPP debate.
For the rapporteur and the progressives, the conservative strategies were not acceptable for several reasons. First, there are areas that require an urgent dialogue with Iran, such as ending the civil war in Syria and stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, which is why the EU can ill afford to postpone discussion of other issues except the nuclear one until after a final deal is reached. Besides, cooperation in areas of mutual interest may create trust and good will necessary for a successful final nuclear deal. Second, insisting on Iran´s violations of UNSC resolutions makes little sense when the same UNSC members plus Germany have negotiated the Geneva deal, which tacitly recognizes Iran´s right for limited enrichment. Thus, welcoming the Geneva deal and insisting on the UN resolutions is contradictory. Third, doubting the democratic credibility of Rouhani´s election serves no other purpose than to undermine his legitimacy, as does linking him with Iran’s sharp increase in executions, which is, by the way, under the purview of the judiciary, not the president.
Since the progressive and conservative blocks are roughly equal in the EP, there was a need to reach compromise on these issues to make the final text acceptable to the large majority.
Q: Can you explain the nature of compromises made in the final text?
The final text as adopted reflects the compromise achieved between the progressives and conservatives, but it is actually more progressive-leaning.
Here are some examples:
- The final text insists on simultaneous and reciprocal action from both sides to make sure the Geneva accord (the Joint Plan of Action) leads to a final deal. Reciprocity is the key notion here, instead of insisting on one-sided Iranian concessions.
- In a concession to the conservatives, the final text states that the presidential elections were not held in accordance with European democratic standards. But in the next sentence it refers to “President Hassan Rouhani” and acknowledges his readiness for more open and constructive relations between the EU and Iran. This means that the resolution recognizes Mr. Rouhani as the legitimate president of Iran.
- While the text does identify Iran’s nuclear activities as in contradiction to previous UNSC resolutions, it rejected (or did not include) the EPP/ECR amendment to the effect that the Geneva accord does not change the fact that Iran is still in violation of those resolutions.
- The text vocalizes EP support for the Geneva agreement and considers it vital for the comprehensive agreement to be reached within the agreed time-frame. It gives clear support for continued diplomacy even though a defeated EFD amendment criticised the Geneva deal and called for a “robust sanctions regime.”
- The text stresses that there can be no alternative to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the nuclear issue and that Iranian security concerns and sensitivities should be taken into account. The EPP wanted instead to have “the peaceful solution as the best solution.” Little nuance, but an important one: “no alternative to a peaceful solution” is stronger language than merely stating that it would be the “best solution”. And the notion that Iran has legitimate security concerns is also recognized.
- The text welcomes the decisions of the EU [ministerial] Council to partially lift sanctions — it also outlines the prospect of lifting nuclear-related sanctions altogether after the final deal is agreed.
- The conservatives’ desire to introduce strict conditionality linking any further improvement of relations with Iran to a final agreement on the nuclear issue was rejected. The final text only states that more constructive relations with Iran are contingent merely on progress in the implementation of the Joint Action Plan.
- The call for the opening of the EU delegation in Tehran was opposed by the conservatives but was approved for the final text.
- The final text calls on the Council of the EU to consider a number of important areas for cooperation with Iran such as a joint fight against drug trafficking, environmental protection, technology transfers, infrastructure development and planning, education, culture, and health. The EPP wanted to make this all conditional on a final agreement. But the text only states that it should be “subject to substantial progress in nuclear negotiations”, which is merely stating the obvious, but not adding new restrictive conditions.
- This text also expresses concerns over possible outbreaks of infectious diseases due to medicine shortages caused by the sanctions — a rather bold admission for an EP resolution.
- Concerns about the environmental situation in Iran are noted and there is a call for cooperation with Iranian scientists and environmental organisations.
- The importance of fostering trade with Iran is emphasized.
- The text calls on EU institutions not merely to increase exchanges of students and academics but to make a concerted effort to assist the process. This is meaningful, since too often different branches of the EU bureaucracy do not coordinate their actions sufficiently.
- The text calls for a more independent EU policy towards Iran. This is a very important statement, meaning mainly not to simply follow US policies.
- The text calls on Iran to be involved in all discussions on ending the Syrian civil war. “All” implies Iran’s inclusion in the Geneva II process. Conservative amendments only condemned Iran for its support for the Assad regime.
- The text encourages the EU to facilitate dialogue between Iran and GCC countries. In contrast, a defeated EFD amendment called to protect the GCC from the Iranian threat.
- The text calls for joint efforts in Afghanistan — again, an EPP amendment tried to delete this part.
Q: And what were the compromises related to human rights in Iran?
This is the most critical part of the resolution. Both progressives and conservatives agree that the human rights situation in Iran continues to be unacceptable. But there are still nuances. The text acknowledges the release of some political prisoners, including the Sakharov prize awardee Nasrin Sotoudeh, by the Rouhani government. It also “notes with interest” President Rouhani´s initiative on a new “citizenship chapter”.
It calls on Iran to issue a visa to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran Ahmad Shaheed, which Iran doesn´t like, since it doesn´t accept that its human rights record is bad enough to warrant the appointment of a special rapporteur. It also calls on the UN HR High Commissioner Navi Pillay to accept Iran´s invitation to visit the country.
The most offensive part according to the Iranians is the language interpreted as obliging EP delegations visiting Iran to meet with dissidents. But this is a standard practice in the EP, and Iran is not being singled out on this. Moreover, the resolution does not make any future visits to Iran conditional on such meetings, but merely recommends to future delegations “to be committed” to meeting the opposition and civil society representatives. This is a recommendation and a wish, not a condition. Besides, the next European Parliament will decide on future delegation visits on a case-by-case basis.
Q: How has the EP’s views on Iran’s human rights record been shaped?
The information used in the resolution comes from respected human rights organizations that focus on Iran, such as the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre, and the Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation.
While some EP members might have close ties with the Israeli government or the MEK, this had a negligible effect on the human rights chapter of the resolution. Iran’s high number of executions and discrimination against LGBT people and Bahais are universal concerns in the EP.
Q: Is Iran singled out on human rights?
No. The EP issues critical resolutions on human rights and democracy even on its own member states. Hungary is a case in point. Also on allies: in 2005-2006 there was a whole special committee to investigate Guantanamo and secret rendition flights and prisons in the context of the “war on terror”.
This March the EP adopted a strongly critical report on Saudi Arabia (with S&D MEP Ana Gomes as the Rapporteur). It was actually more critical than the recent resolution on Iran: it criticised Saudi Arabia for its role in promoting Wahhabism/Salafism worldwide and supporting extremist forces in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Q: But reports are different from resolutions, no?
The difference is merely procedural. Resolutions are prepared faster, but in terms of the political status and impact, there is no difference. The final text should be measured not against what would be ideal, but against the political realities and correlation of forces in the EP. As such, it is always a result of compromise and debate. From this point of view, this was the most forward-looking text on Iran that this Parliament has ever produced.
Q: Given that this is not the first time a resolution has been adopted, why do you think it created such uproar inside Iran this time while previous resolutions were ignored? Given the cancellation of the Iranian delegation’s visit, do you think the progressives’ efforts to pave the way for improved interactions with Iran may have ended up being counter-productive? The way it sounds, the intention was to change the direction of the EP, but perceptions in Iran, devoid of context, were otherwise. Is this a dilemma for EP progressives?
The reactions in Tehran were not surprising, but we now have dialogue, which didn’t occur in the past. When you talk to people, you also receive reactions. So, it might sound counter-intuitive, but in a way these reactions testify to the progress that we´ve been able to achieve in recent months.
That said, these reactions are mostly about politics in Iran. The conservatives use the resolution to embarrass the reformists and moderates who support engagement with Europe and US. We have exactly the same situation in Europe: our hardliners attack the progressives as the “appeasers of mullahs”. Both European and Iranian hardliners converge in one point: they don´t want a more constructive relationship between Europe and Iran. But Iranian conservatives and hardliners are not the only target audience of this resolution. The reformists and the moderates have noticed the positive elements in it. I think it would be a great idea to translate this resolution into Persian so that the Iranian people might draw their own conclusions.
In any case, even if some factions strongly disagree with the resolution, cancelling the visit of the Iranian parliamentarians to Europe was a bad idea. If you want to make a point, you have to talk. In the absence of dialogue, the only winners are groups like the MEK, who organised a conference in the European Parliament to use the reactions to the resolution as supposed “proof” that nothing has changed in Tehran.
Photo Credit: © European Union 2014 – European Parliament
]]>by Derek Davison
The CIA and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have been embroiled for several weeks in a dispute over the declassification of a sweeping Senate report, the product of an investigation into the George W. Bush-era CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation” program. The SSCI’s chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), has accused the CIA of [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The CIA and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have been embroiled for several weeks in a dispute over the declassification of a sweeping Senate report, the product of an investigation into the George W. Bush-era CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation” program. The SSCI’s chair, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), has accused the CIA of removing documents related to the investigation from the committee’s computers, and of attempting to intimidate committee staffers by requesting a Justice Department review into how the committee was able to obtain an internal CIA review of the program. Now, as the White House and CIA review the SSCI report for declassification, its major findings have been leaked to the public, and they reveal that the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and the conditions under which it held its detainees, were “brutal and far worse than the agency communicated to policymakers.”
While the public still does not know what the committee’s report says (the committee voted 11-3 on April 3 to declassify its executive summary and conclusions, but the CIA and White House must conduct a final review before it can be released), members of the committee have talked openly about its findings. Senator John McCain said that the report “confirms…that the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners is not only wrong in principle and a stain on our country’s conscience, but also an ineffective and unreliable means of gathering intelligence.” Defenders of the program, like Fox News contributor Liz Cheney, argue that it produced important intelligence that helped the United States to thwart terrorist plots and to degrade Al-Qaeda’s capacity to sponsor further attacks, but what we know of the findings of the SSCI report contradicts that argument. Not that it should matter; any debate over the enhanced interrogation program must, as Vincent Warren of the Center for Constitutional Rights has argued, reckon the morality of torture, not its effectiveness.
It is torture that we’re talking about, euphemisms like “enhanced interrogation” aside. In a remarkable editorial in the April 11 Washington Post, former contract interrogator Eric Fair described what he saw and did during his time in Iraq:
In April 2004 I was stationed at a detention facility in Fallujah. Inside the detention facility was an office. Inside the office was a small chair made of plywood and two-by-fours. The chair was two feet tall. The rear legs were taller than the front legs. The seat and chair back leaned forward. Plastic zip ties were used to force a detainee into a crouched position from which he could not recover. It caused muscle failure of the quads, hamstrings and calves. It was torture.
Fair concludes that the “stain” of the torture program demands a full accounting, for the sake of the nation as well as those who participated in the program directly.
History tells us that we should not be surprised by the Obama administration’s reluctance to fully investigate allegations of wrongdoing by its predecessor. Barack Obama made it very clear, even before he took office, that he preferred to “look forward as opposed to looking backward” when it came to the subject of investigating potential Bush administration crimes, and he has adhered to that position over the past five-plus years.
Obama is not the first president to turn a blind eye to possible transgressions by a former administration. The obvious example of this phenomenon was Gerald Ford’s decision to pardon Richard Nixon for any crimes related to the Watergate scandal, in 1974. But Ford had been Nixon’s Vice-President, making his act somewhat understandable. Bill Clinton’s decision not to investigate alleged crimes that took place under the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations was, as Robert Parry notes, motivated by the same desire to focus on advancing his own agenda, to “look forward as opposed to looking backward,” which Obama intimated as president-elect.
While it may behoove a particular administration to avoid the appearance of vindictiveness toward previous administrations, the decision not to investigate something as pernicious as the officially sanctioned torture of prisoners sacrifices the US’ credibility in the long run. It should not go unnoticed, for example, that while the US Ambassador to Kosovo is urging that nation to conduct a tribunal over the issue of organ trafficking by Kosovar Albanian militias in order to “build up its international credibility,” two branches of the US government are openly at odds over whether to even publicly acknowledge the past abuses of our “interrogation” program. It probably doesn’t go unnoticed that while the US refuses to reckon with its abuse of detainees, it is also refusing to issue a visa to Iran’s newly appointed UN Ambassador on the grounds that he was a background participant in the 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran (he’s now part of Iran’s “reformist” camp). If the US can’t honestly reflect on its own past, how does it have the standing to demand the same of other nations?
The CIA’s resistance to a candid assessment of its torture program, even under an administration that firmly and officially disavowed that program upon taking office, speaks to an overall unwillingness to face accountability for any excesses wrought by the US’ ongoing “War on Terror.” While the Senate has investigated the failures in pre-war intelligence that led to the Iraq War, there has been no consequence to anyone involved in those failures. It is safe to say that there will be no consequences for anyone involved in the torture program as well, given the Obama administration’s deference to CIA efforts to stonewall even the release of a report detailing what actually took place.
It is impossible to imagine, then, that any future administration will have any interest in reckoning with other morally and legally questionable national security policies of this period, like the use of drones or the enlargement of the surveillance state. When it comes to the “War on Terror,” the rule seems to be “what’s past is past.”
]]>The summary mass trial and conviction of 529 Egyptians to death this week is yet another example of Egypt’s descent into lawlessness and blatant miscarriage of justice. The rushed decision showed no respect for the most basic standards of due process under the military dictatorship.
The Egyptian court spent less than a [...]]]>
The summary mass trial and conviction of 529 Egyptians to death this week is yet another example of Egypt’s descent into lawlessness and blatant miscarriage of justice. The rushed decision showed no respect for the most basic standards of due process under the military dictatorship.
The Egyptian court spent less than a minute on each of the 529 defendants before sentencing to them. Defense lawyers were barred from challenging state “evidence” and defendants were not allowed to speak. Yet, the Sisi government and the pliant Egyptian media did not question the sentences.
The U.S. State Department issued a statement in Secretary of State John Kerry’s name condemning the sentences. Kerry said he is “deeply troubled” and called on the Egyptian interim government to “remedy the situation.”
The decision, according to the statement, “simply defies logic” and fails to satisfy “even the most basic standards of justice.” Amnesty International deemed the death sentences “grotesque.” Most Western countries have expressed “deep concern” over the sham trial and convictions and the hope that the decision would be overturned on appeal.
In his heady rush to seek the presidency, however, Field Marshall turned civilian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, however, is not paying much attention to America’s warnings or to international condemnations of the Minya judge who dispensed the ruling.
Sisi sees the Obama administration moving away from values of good governance and the rule of law in Egypt to a myopic doctrine of national interest, which includes coddling Arab dictators and tribal ruling potentates.
Since the Arab upheavals of 2011, President Obama has identified American values of tolerance, justice, fairness, and democracy as a guiding principle of post “Arab Spring” relations with Arab countries. These values, the U.S. President frequently said, “define who we are” as a people and as a nation.
Sisi, on the other hand, much like Putin’s power and land grab in Ukraine, feels empowered to defy the U.S. because he perceives it unwilling or unable to confront him or to shun him or cut military aid to Egypt. He counts on Washington’s inaction against him despite rising lawlessness by state institutions because of Egypt’s pivotal standing in the region.
By ignoring the Egyptian constitution and its traditional claim of judicial independence, the Egyptian judiciary seemed to kowtow to the military-run interim government.
The mass death sentences coupled with Sisi’s announcement of his candidacy for the presidency seem to bring the coup that toppled President Mohamed Morsi full circle. For Sisi, the January 25 Revolution is history, and the demands for democracy are now subsumed under the rubric of fighting “terrorism”, which he equates with the Muslim Brotherhood.
It’s symbolic that Sisi made the announcement on Egyptian television in military uniform even though he had just resigned as minister of defense and as member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). He told the Egyptian public he would continue the struggle “against terrorism” and would fight to “regain Egypt” and restore its “dignity and stature.”
Sisi must have taken a page from the American Tea Party book about “taking back America” and from Putin about taking back Crimea. As if someone has stolen America from Tea Party, or Ukraine from Russia, or Egypt from Sisi.
In fact, it was Sisi and the military junta that stole Egypt from the January 25 Revolution in a military coup. It was Sisi’s regime that has put over 15,000 Egyptians — Islamists and secularists — in jail through illegal arrests, sham trials, and without due process for challenging the coup.
Sisi envisions his presidency to rest on a three-legged stool of pliant media, submissive public, and adulation of him as a rising “selfie” star. In the name of “serving the nation,” Egyptians are being brain-washed not to question the personality cult of Sisi’s budding populist dictatorship.
In addition to frightening the public into submission, Sisi has also shuffled SCAF by sidelining potential challengers like General Ahmed Wasfi and promoting supporters like General Sidqi Sobhi. He sees these actions as an insurance policy against a possible coup that could topple him, much like he did against Morsi.
Although much has been written about Egypt in recent days, the death sentences and Sisi’s presidency have created two serious concerns, which Washington and other Western capitals must confront. First, these actions likely will result in a growing radicalization of some elements within the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups in Egypt.
Radicalization usually begets violence and terrorism.
It would be a nightmare scenario for any Egyptian government if the new radicals join forces with Salafi jihadists in Sinai. Such coordination, which could create an opening for al-Qa’ida in Egypt, would wreak havoc on the country and on Western interests and personnel there.
Second, continued instability, lawlessness, and repression in Egypt under a Sisi presidency would begin to attract Islamist jihadists from Syria to Egypt. Unlike their counterparts from Afghanistan, the new jihadists are honed by combat experience and trained in the use of all kinds of weapons. A jihadist base in Egypt would certainly spread to neighboring countries, including the Gulf tribal monarchies.
To stem this nightmarish tide, The United States and its Western allies must urge Gulf monarchies to start serious dialogue with their peoples toward inclusion and tolerance.
They also must convince Sisi that no stable political system would emerge in Egypt without including secularists and Islamists in the process. An adoring public, a pliant media, a sycophantic government, and an unfettered and corrupt military are a formula for disaster for Egypt and the region.
]]>Despite escalating tensions and anti-government demonstrations, the Venezuelan government has not addressed any human rights issues regardless of the rising death toll and captive political prisoners, a panel of experts stressed Monday.
Issues such as humanitarian rights, economic policies and governance problems were discussed at the Americas Society/ Council [...]]]>
Despite escalating tensions and anti-government demonstrations, the Venezuelan government has not addressed any human rights issues regardless of the rising death toll and captive political prisoners, a panel of experts stressed Monday.
Issues such as humanitarian rights, economic policies and governance problems were discussed at the Americas Society/ Council of the Americas panel discussion “What’s Next for Venezuela?”.
The panel agreed that the country faces many challenges such as insecurity, rising inflation and lack of staple products, and that the Venezuelan government has been unable to make any swift negotiations, decisions or changes to curb the crisis.
Many of the protests, which began in January, have ended in violent clashes where the death toll has risen to 28, over a thousand arrests have been made and political prisoners have become an issue.
Students and relatives of protesters recently killed in Venezuela march in Caracas on Feb. 22. Credit: Estrella Gutiérrez/IPS
Although students sparking these demonstrations are bringing attention to humanitarian issues, the government has not responded to their cause, the experts said.
“This has been one of (President Nicolas) Maduro’s most serious mistakes. If you look at the demands of the students, the first is the human rights issues of political prisoners. This has become more central as the protests went on,” said Javier Corrales, professor of Political Science at Amherst College.
In February, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for the protection of human rights of all Venezuelans, and urged authorities to listen to the protesters’ demands.
The Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council also drew attention to the unnecessary use of force and violence against protesters and journalists. However, the Maduro government has not made any serious efforts to investigate human rights abuses.
Accountability for the lack of action has been drawn towards the poor decision making process within the government and the apparent absence of political knowledge.
“The decision making process has been hijacked internally. For them to survive they need to solve the decision making process. So far politics is not in its toolkit. So the first reaction we see is repression and censorship,” said Luisa Palacios, head of Latin America Macro and Energy Research.
The panel referred to the arrest of opposition leader Leópoldo Lopez as part of President Nicolás Maduro’s government’s failure in decision-making.
“They don’t really know how to play politics,”Palaciios said, pointing out a flawed decision-making process that commits the mistake of putting Leópoldo in jail, making a martyr out of a political prisoner.
Palacios also emphasised that international involvement is very important in solving the crisis. She said that the Venezuelan government would not understand the consequences or the point of view of human rights unless it becomes an international issue.
“International involvement will make this a much safer process as we go along. If Venezuelans are left to their devices I remain concerned due to the lack of the government’s political tools.”
Corrales stated that the U.N’s response to the instability and unrest has been far more forceful and remarkable than usual as the U.N’s involvement in Latin American affairs is usually quite low.
He made a comparison to the protests in Brazil and Chile where the governments were able to make immediate negotiations, changes in cabinet and new programmes despite larger demonstrations.
“In Chile, only one person died during two-and-a-half years of protests. The protests were massive, perhaps more massive than in Venezuela. The international community complained about the police force in Chile and only one student died and there were about 1,800 arrests,” Corrales said.
Since Maduro took office in April 2013, he has been accused of following former President Hugo Chávez’s failed policies.
Jassmyn Goh is a trainee at the IPS United Nations bureau in New York City.
]]>by Tyler Cullis
Earlier this month the UN Special Rapporteur for Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson, released his annual report to the UN Human Rights Council (the “Emmerson report”). He had been charged with determining best practices for States to respect human rights while engaging in counter-terrorism operations and highlighting [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
Earlier this month the UN Special Rapporteur for Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Ben Emmerson, released his annual report to the UN Human Rights Council (the “Emmerson report”). He had been charged with determining best practices for States to respect human rights while engaging in counter-terrorism operations and highlighting human rights violations when and where they occurred. While these two elements were fully on display in the report, the Special Rapporteur left us both with more questions than answers and made an urgent appeal that the legal uncertainties surrounding counter-terrorism efforts (especially those of the United States) be resolved so that the rule of law can take root and be observed.
Much attention has been given to the Emmerson report’s determination that States have an obligation to undertake an impartial investigation into civilian deaths, as a matter of human rights and humanitarian law, when those deaths were not expected. The report sifts through 30 cases, most involving the United States, where civilian deaths have been reliably alleged and where the dual duties of investigation and transparency have thus been triggered. Whatever the merits of this conclusion (and I have doubts as to whether the law of armed conflict contains within it a legal requirement for States to undertake investigation into civilian deaths), it is an important one and will go a long way to granting legal advocates another argument to force the Obama administration to be more transparent over its drone program and the civilian deaths that are alleged to have resulted in specific instances. It remains a disconcerting feature of the post-September 11 world that President Barack Obama has not only the power to determine who is a target and to strike at that target, but to do so without any substantive oversight.
But perhaps the most consequential feature of the Emmerson report is its outline of the legal uncertainties that surround not just the US’ drone program, but also its entire “War on Terror.” The lack of consensus on the law applicable to the US conflict with al-Qaeda — whether it is an armed conflict triggering the laws of war or whether it fails to meet the requisite threshold for armed conflict and instead remains a captive of human rights law — has permitted the US to define the rules of the game for itself. In some ways, Bush administration lawyers, who claimed that the traditional way of doing business was rendered an anachronism thanks to the threat posed by transnational terror groups like al-Qaeda and who were rightly derided for the aggressiveness with which they upended basic principles of international law, have won the day. What once seemed like settled law is no longer, and the Emmerson report is a measure of how much we’ve allowed consecutive US administrations to set the parameters of the debate.
Some major areas of international law that remain or have become ambiguous (thanks to US practice) as outlined in the Emmerson report, are:
- Is the United States in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda? This question is central to determining both the extent of US presidential authority (such as whether the White House has the power to include US citizens on a “kill list”) and what constraints are placed upon US activities abroad.
- If the US is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, are members of al-Qaeda to be regarded as combatants, civilians, or some third category of persons as the International Committee of the Red Cross has advocated? How we define a member of al-Qaeda under the laws of war determines the conditions under which the President can use force against them. If regarded as combatants, for instance, then all members of al-Qaeda and their affiliates would be legitimate targets of the US, and criticism over drone operations would lose much of its force.
- Is the “unwilling or unable” test that the United States has put forward to justify its intervention in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia a new exception to the traditional prohibition on the use of force in the territory of another State? If so, what precedential value does this set for other States, and how does it undo the constraints the UN Charter placed on recourse to war?
These are critical questions. Prior to September 11 and for some time thereafter, the answers were clear. Many did not believe the United States could regard itself as in an armed conflict with a transnational terror group. Many believed that members of al-Qaeda should be regarded as civilians, targetable only for self-defense purposes or when directly participating in hostilities against the United States. Few were attuned to the argument that the prohibition on the use of force contained an exception for when a State proved “unwilling or unable” to end cross-border attacks from an insurgent group. It was only over time (and largely thanks to US practice) that the question arose as to whether the law was not as clear, coherent, and complete as international legal practitioners had believed.
Quite adeptly, the Emmerson report centers this legal uncertainty and urges States, legal scholars and practitioners, and human rights groups to build consensus on these questions. Absent a global consensus, the United States is granted de facto authority to lead by the sheer force of example. And as we’ve seen for more than a decade now, that example has proven to be an exceptionally troubling one.
Photo: A protest in Peshawar, Pakistan against drone strikes on Sept. 13, 2012. Credit: Ashfaq Yusufzai/IPS.
]]>via IPS News
While U.S. and Iranian negotiators prepare for another round of nuclear talks in Geneva next month, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has been silent about another matter that could be even more indicative of his willingness to take on hardline conservatives.
On Sept. 22, the Iranian [...]]]>
via IPS News
While U.S. and Iranian negotiators prepare for another round of nuclear talks in Geneva next month, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has been silent about another matter that could be even more indicative of his willingness to take on hardline conservatives.
On Sept. 22, the Iranian parliament passed a law with an innocuous title but frightening potential. The “Protection of Children and Adolescents without Guardians or with Bad Guardians” allows a man to marry his stepdaughter or adopted daughter, in effect legalising child abuse.
The law repeals a previous piece of legislation passed by parliament in February that forbade such marriages. However, the Council of Guardians, a clerical body dominated by hardliners, disapproved the earlier law, finding it against sharia.
The latest iteration added an article (27) which says that a father may marry his stepdaughter or adopted daughter if the marriage is approved by the State Welfare Organisation and a court. In spite of this addition, many Iranians fear the new law will undermine the welfare of thousands of families with stepdaughters and adopted daughters.
Iranian women’s organisations and human rights activists both inside Iran and in the diaspora have organised massive protests against the law on Facebook. The rights groups and activists assert that the law legalises pedophilia, child abuse and rape under the guise of protecting children. Most Iranians were not aware of the controversy until the second bill passed in parliament last month.
Women’s sexuality is one of the most sensitive battlefields within the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Iran, women’s bodies are a political subject; control over their bodies is a reflection of political power. Women’s sexuality is a tool for Islamic conservatives to demonstrate their interpretation of Islamic ideology and identity.
While President Rouhani has talked repeatedly of his respect for women’s rights, he has been silent about the new law. In ratifying the law on Oct. 2, the 12 Islamic conservatives who make up the Council of Guardians demonstrated that they still have power and control over the most sensitive political matters. These are the same individuals who, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will approve or reject any nuclear compromise Rouhani makes with the United States.
Women’s rights activists are wondering whether Rouhani will speak out about the marriage law in the near future. If the president and his cabinet oppose this radical and immoral law, he will show that he supports democracy and equal rights for women. If he is silent, it will show that he either will not or cannot oppose the Islamic conservatives on a crucial matter.
Iranian women have shown that they have potential power to affect change in Iran in the direction of more democracy and human rights. Iranian women have been fighting for their rights for more than a century and the women’s movement began with the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Beginning in the 1920s, women began to attend universities although they did not achieve the right to vote and be elected to office until 1963.
Women were also in the front lines of the 1979 revolution against the Shah. But the Islamic government that replaced the monarchy diminished women’s rights, scrapping the Shah’s progressive family law and reducing the legal age of marriage from 18 to nine.
A re-invigorated movement succeeded in raising the age to 13. Today the average age of marriage for girls is 24. Iranian women have also attained a high educational standard, comprising more than 60 percent of university students. Population growth has slowed as women have become more educated; the average number of children women bear has dropped from seven in 1960s to two in 2010.
Women are also the most organised element of Iranian society, with about 5,000 women’s groups. They work together to promote their rights despite differences in religious beliefs, ethnic identity and political factions.
The best known effort is the One Million Signatures Campaign for Gender Equality, which has been promoted by key figures including human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. The campaign has mobilised several thousand women debating women’s rights and collecting signatures to change laws that discriminate against women.
More than 70 women’s activists were arrested and sent to prison for their participation in this campaign, which was the most organised element during the 2009 Green Movement. “Women will build democracy in Iran,” Ebadi has said.
A victory for Iranian women is a failure for Islamic conservatives who view controlling women’s sexuality and oppressing women’s organisations as part of conservatives’ fight for survival.
In negotiating with Iran about its nuclear program, the Obama administration should not forget about women’s rights and the need to strengthen civil society and support for human rights and democracy in Iran.
– Fariba Parsa is a visiting scholar at the Centre for the Study of Gender and Conflict, George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
]]>via IPS News
Bahraini opposition groups announced on Tuesday their opposition to participating in the dialogue that is supposed to start tomorrow. According to the Bahrain Mirror, the five opposition groups that signed the joint statement included al-Wifaq, Wa’d, al-Minbar, al-Tajammu’, and al-Ikha’.
The statement maintained that during [...]]]>
via IPS News
Bahraini opposition groups announced on Tuesday their opposition to participating in the dialogue that is supposed to start tomorrow. According to the Bahrain Mirror, the five opposition groups that signed the joint statement included al-Wifaq, Wa’d, al-Minbar, al-Tajammu’, and al-Ikha’.
The statement maintained that during the eight months of the so-called national dialogue, the government exploited the process as a public relations tool and did not show seriousness of purpose, a clear agenda for reconciliation, or a date certain for closure. The government ignored the six points that the opposition presented at the beginning of the second round of the dialogue in late August.
These points called for halting anti-opposition incitement, which the regime feverishly pushed through its media; promoting genuine national reconciliation; releasing political prisoners; and ending violations of peoples’ homes, such as breaking down doors; vigilante justice; and unlawful arrests.
Since the hiatus in the dialogue in the past few weeks, regime arrests and repression continued unabated, violations of human rights proceeded at a faster pace, the arrests of protesters, including minors, increased, fired workers have not been allowed to return to their jobs, and the regime’s actions against the Shia majority became much uglier.
The adoption of the 22 amendments by the pro-government legislature has given the prime minister and the king added “legalistic” leverage to proceed with their policy of sectarianism and discrimination. Sham trials and unreasonable lengthy jail sentences have been meted out to hundreds of protesters.
The international community, including most Western countries, have condemned these practices and called on the Al-Khalifa regime to cease and desist from these policies and begin a process of serious national reconciliation.
Some mainstream opposition activists in the past week came under heavy pressure from their “friends” to participate in the dialogue. Tuesday’s statement shows the opposition did not succumb to the pressure from pro-regime elements to participate in the dialogue. They accuse the government, instead, of focusing on the “process” of the dialogue, not its substance.
The regime continues to deprive some Bahrainis of their citizenship and push others to leave the country, while at the same time giving Bahraini citizenship to Sunni foreign nationals in order to decrease the size of the Shia majority. Some within the opposition have supported participating in the dialogue, arguing it would be better to engage the regime despite its insincerity and continued repression.
Other opposition activists fear that their non-participation would engender more regime violence, cause more deaths and injuries, and increase arrests and sham trials. Many mainstream activists within the opposition have shunned the dialogue because they doubted it would yield tangible results.
The regime has spent much time on the process of “a dialogue about the dialogue” and not on putting the country on a stable peaceful path. It relies on this charade to avoid making serious concessions to the Bahraini people.
The ruling family’s refusal to respond to the people’s demands for power sharing and genuine political and economic reform will continue regardless of whether the dialogue resumes Oct. 30 or not. The Al Khalifa’s actions against their people belie their public statements in defence of national reconciliation.
The Al Khalifas seem to be playing a dangerous chicken and egg game, which, in the long run, will deepen sectarianism and violence and will make national reconciliation much more difficult.
International human rights organisations, the European Union, and the United Nations have all seen through this game and have condemned these tactics and policies.
The Al Khalifa family, like other Gulf Arab families, believes it is entitled to rule the country as it sees fit because it owns it. The regime hopes that perceived diminishing U.S. influence in the Arab region, especially the rift between Washington and Riyadh, will push the Bahraini crisis to the back burner of regional policy. The regime continues to buy nasty and deadly weapons to fight public demonstrations.
Having failed to silence their people’s calls for justice, equality, and freedom for two and a half years, the king and his prime minister would be foolish to think they could succeed in the coming months and years.
Instead of bogus dialogue, the king should exercise real leadership by having his son and crown prince lead a true national reconciliation dialogue in which all segments of society will participate. The decision of the five opposition groups against participation in the dialogue was correct and legitimate.
]]>by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one area of notable recovery: oil exports. As an experiment in post-authoritarian nationhood, the Libyan situation may be more troubling than at any time since the end of the struggle against the Qadhafi regime.
The central government recently has been in a state of flux. Beleaguered Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced at the end of July he will decrease the number of cabinet positions or try to govern more effectively by meeting with a smaller group of core ministers. So far, however, the only notable result has been Deputy Prime Minister Awad al-Barasi’s resignation on August 3, blaming “a dysfunctional government where my powers are lost.” Meanwhile, despite the passage of time since the former regime’s demise, central authority has stagnated and instability has been on the rise.
Symptomatic of this problem is the continuation of various autonomous local governing entities centered on armed groups left over from the struggle against Qadhafi. They dominate various regions, one major city, many urban neighborhoods and frequently defy or hound portions of the central government even in the capital of Tripoli.
One salient ongoing dispute revolves around the status of literally thousands of political prisoners often languishing in miserable, improvised local holding pens outside government control. The most notorious case is that of Saif al-Qadhafi, the deceased dictator’s most important son and senior lieutenant. Despite repeated demands for custody on the part of the central government and the International Criminal Court (ICC), Saif remains in Zintan in Libya’s arid central mountains, a prisoner of the local Berber militia that originally captured him. The only outside contact he has had was a meeting last year with his Australian ICC-appointed defense attorney, who was then also detained for three weeks. Since then, new charges have been brought against Saif by authorities in Zintan: allegedly giving his ICC attorney “national security information.”
Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani recently declared that the central government would not allow “Mickey Mouse trials.” However, militias holding the real power in many locales claim the national judiciary remains dominated by officials from the former regime; they have stormed Marghani’s office in anger over delays and enforced their own justice in areas they control. To wit, the autonomous militia controlling Libya’s third largest city, Misrata, sentenced Qadhafi’s former Education Minister, Ahmad Ibrahim, to death on July 31. Technically, the Libyan Supreme Court must confirm such a sentence before he faces a firing squad, but whether that will happen is questionable.
It seems encouraging to many Americans that Washington finally handed down an indictment against some of those responsible for the Benghazi consulate attack last year, most notably local Benghazi militia chief Ahmad Abu Khattala. Yet, US authorities involved in the investigation such as the FBI have been hampered seriously by the woeful law enforcement situation across Libya — also the reason it took this long to bring charges against at least some of those involved in that infamous assault.
Such difficulties should come as no surprise. In a country flush with competing local and regional identities as well as all manner of weaponry in the hands of various armed groups, Benghazi alone has been hit with a wave of political killings over the past couple of weeks. Those murdered include judicial officials, lawyers, political activists, a senior police official and other members of the Libyan security services. Most recently, on August 9, the anchor of a popular Benghazi TV show was assassinated. Many of the victims spoke out against or sought to curb the power of local militias. At the end of July, there also were two bombings — one near a courthouse and the other close to a Justice Ministry office. Some of these incidents have triggered demonstrations or attacks by angry mobs against sites associated with Benghazi-based armed groups presumed responsible, in one case, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another glaring example of central government weakness came shortly after the attack on the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood: a riot inside and around Benghazi’s al-Kwafiya Prison that resulted in the breakout of roughly 1,200 prisoners. Most escaped inmates were accused of serious crimes or had been associated with the Qadhafi Regime; intervention to contain the situation by government special forces apparently had relatively little effect. The mass escape most likely reinforced the determination of autonomous local authorities and militias not to turn over their prisoners to the government.
Despite the unrest, the unexpectedly rapid rebound of Libya’s oil export capabilities had been one major success. Yet, since July, a wave of protests and strikes by oil workers and guards has shut down two key oil export terminals, Libya’s largest refinery, and threatened to reduce production at inland oil fields. Oil exports for July were down 20 percent; so far August exports are down a staggering 50 percent. Workers are reacting to management and pay issues.
A resolution to this crisis does not yet seem imminent, in part because Oil Minister Abelbari al-Arusa initially took a defiant stance. Now, however, Prime Minister Zeidan has warned that Libya’s national budget is imperiled, and there are talks. In fact, the two terminals re-opened over the weekend, only to close only hours later today without any oil being lifted. Meanwhile, foreign investors already reluctant to inject money into an unstable Libya have been further shaken.
The overriding question at this point may not be how a way out of this maelstrom can be charted, but whether any truly game-changing progress can be made in the near-term. Most all Libya’s challenges today are deeply enmeshed in the complex fractured politics of a country with the least developed sense of national identity and civil society among the five key Arab North African states. So the ability of the international community to help is limited (compounded by drawdowns in diplomatic personnel and curtailed travel inside Libya in view of the dangers now posed by serving there).
Consequently, there is the very real possibility Libya could remain unstable for quite a while. Such a situation would, of course, continue to provide havens for extremist elements both foreign and domestic stemming from exceedingly weak, insufficiently coherent and geographically constrained national governance (as with the recent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb intrusions into southeast Libya and last year’s Benghazi consulate assault).
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
The Turkish government and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have only themselves to blame for both the widening protests gripping Turkey, and the negative, sometimes distorted, global perception of what they’re doing to their people. The heavy-handed response to what was an isolated demonstration has blown [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
The Turkish government and its leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have only themselves to blame for both the widening protests gripping Turkey, and the negative, sometimes distorted, global perception of what they’re doing to their people. The heavy-handed response to what was an isolated demonstration has blown the cork off a pressurized situation in Turkey. The attempted media blackout has only served to magnify global disgust and raised a simplistic view of a very complex dynamic.
The protest that sparked all of the upheaval was a small one. In a sign of the real, underlying issues, the Turkish police reacted to the sit-in at Gezi Park with a large show of force, which prompted expanding and spreading demonstrations. Almost immediately, Turkish activists took to social media, because, miraculously, the protests were completely invisible on most of the major networks in Turkey (as well as, shamefully, some of the international ones). Turkey isn’t Syria, and it’s doubtful that the media blackout — even within the country — was all that effective. You see, Mr. Prime Minister, there is this thing called the internet…
The comparisons to the “Arab Awakening” are somewhat exaggerated, but the dynamic in Turkey is significant for precisely that reason. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are legitimately in power. Erdogan is not a dictator, he has been elected three times in free and fair elections, and he’s won a bigger plurality each time. Erdogan and the AKP have, in the past, pushed reforms forward and managed a very solid economic recovery.
But in the past couple of years, more and more Turks, particularly those among the “other half” of Turkey that didn’t vote for the AKP in the last election, have grown more nervous. Three broad issues — growing authoritarianism from Erdogan, Turkey’s increasingly partisan role as a regional leader and the heightened influence of religion in Turkish law — have been on a rolling boil in recent years and overflowed in the past week. The Gezi Park protest was merely the triggering point.
Turkey has long struggles with serious shortcomings on significant human rights issues. It is to the AKP’s credit that for much of its first two terms in power, it made strides with a number of them. Notably, upon their initial election, the AKP eased some restrictions on the Kurdish language and culture, and capitalized on the existing cease-fire to ease some of the tensions, although they have gradually risen anew ever since. The AKP brought in neo-liberal economic policies, and in this case they have worked to strengthen an economy that was in severe crisis not long ago. On the other hand, the press, never free, has been increasingly harassed recently.
The hugely excessive police response to the Gezi Park demonstration and subsequent protests cannot be disconnected from the arrogant and tone-deaf response to these events from Erdogan himself. Dismissing the protesters as thugs, radicals and “foreigners” served only to display the very root of the problem with Erdogan. After three successful elections, he believes he has a mandate to lead the country where he sees fit, and need not concern himself with the many millions of Turks who see things differently.
The Syrian uprising is another worrisome issue for many in Turkey. No doubt most would agree that Turkey has a legitimate interest in the outcome in Syria, but so do many states. The question is: what should it do in response to that interest? Many Turks are unhappy with their government’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, and many are particularly concerned about what it means for Turkey’s regional policy. The AKP has a lot in common with the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region, and has been supporting that piece of the Syrian rebel force. Thus, for many Turks, Turkish involvement in Syria has not just been about unseating Bashar al-Assad or protecting Turkey’s border, but advancing a regional agenda that, while certainly less worrisome than other religious ideologies fighting for supremacy in the Arab world, is not well aligned with Turkish values of secularism. This also casts a pall on what many Turks have been pleased to see as Turkey’s enhanced status in the region.
The increasing influence of religion has manifested itself in recent new laws restricting the sale of alcohol and public displays of affection. One of the points of pride for the AKP has been its ability to blend the strong secular tradition in Turkey with the rising influence of Islam in the country, but these laws have rekindled fears about Erdogan, who was imprisoned in his younger days because of his Islamist views.
Ultimately, all of this feeds into concerns about the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for 2014. Erdogan is hoping to amend the constitution to create a strong presidency that would replace the central position of the prime minister. And, of course, he very much hopes to be that president, a position he could hold for the subsequent decade. It is no wonder that so many in Turkey are concerned about Erdogan’s ambitions and willingness to cede power.
For all of these fears and matters of concern, though, it is important to keep in mind that Turkey is not Syria, nor is it Egypt or Libya. Erdogan is an elected leader, and he has gotten a lot of support in those elections. Whether he still has that support today, though, is a matter of some speculation.
At Al-Monitor, Barbara Slavin ascribes a lot of what has happened in Turkey to Erdogan overstaying his welcome in office. There is certainly a lot of truth in that point. It certainly explains the hubris of Erdogan’s reaction to the protests, the excessive force with which the protests were met from the outset and his attempts to marginalize such large swaths of the Turkish population.
But in some ways, Erdogan and the AKP are victims of their own success. Turkey under Erdogan has been praised by many (myself included) for the progress it made in integrating a large Islamist community with an overriding, and overwhelmingly popular, secular government. Turkey was being pointed to as the model for new governments in the Arab Awakening by some (many of whom, it’s fair to note, were in the US and Europe). As a result, Erdogan seems to have become convinced that it’s his economically and socially conservative base, and his party’s inclination toward a greater role for Islam in Turkish law, that should simply have its way because, after all, those with different ideas keep losing.
Hence these protests. Like those seen in recent years all over the world, including the United States, the groups are diffusive and diverse and there is no structured leadership. The demands are the same as well: more justice, more democracy. But the eagerness to label this as a “Turkish Awakening” misses the fact that Turkey, with all its very deep flaws, is a democracy. Erdogan is a legitimately elected leader, and he can still be voted out. Indeed, he may well have destroyed much of his own legitimacy with his reaction to these demonstrations and thereby endangered his own political future.
Turks are defending and trying to expand their democracy. Erdogan may well have become a threat to that democracy, but he has not destroyed it. The protesters want their press to be free, they want minorities to be fairly treated, they want the secularism that the government has been based on for years to endure (even while accommodating the large Islamist movement) and they want to make sure that even if a party wins a large plurality of the vote, everyone else’s interests won’t become meaningless.
There is more here as well: an objection to the excesses of Erdogan’s neo-liberal policies, even while most Turks understand that the AKP has done a lot of good for the country’s economy. Add to that the continuing march toward democracy from a government that was once a religious empire and later a secular but unstable government that had far too many features of fascism, some of which still remain and are being used by Erdogan (once a victim of that very discrimination); these include the government’s intimidation of the press as well as the misuse of anti-terrorism laws and the harsh discrimination faced by the Kurds, Alevis and many leftists.
Turkey is facing the problems of its past mixed with ongoing growing pains of its very real democracy. The country should be supported, and the goals of the protests need to be recognized as noble ones. The government needs to be rebuked sufficiently to deter it from its violent and anti-democratic course. But Turkey should not be confused with Syria.
Photo: Protesters gather in Taksim Square in Istanbul, not far from Gezi Park, where protests were sparked last week against the government’s most recent urban redevelopment project. Credit: Jillian Kestler-D’Amours
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