by Dina Esfandiary

Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Dina Esfandiary

Another round of talks between world powers and Iran begins in Vienna this week. Today, both sides want a deal, and fast. The positive atmosphere that characterised the recent rounds will likely endure. Gone are the days of “procedural nonsense,” according to a European negotiator, replaced by “frank discussions.” But there remain significant obstacles to a final nuclear agreement. It is unlikely that anything ground-breaking will be achieved in this round of talks. Instead, parties will explore areas of possible convergence and make steady progress towards a potential final deal.

All negotiations are about what parties want and how much they can compromise. What has changed here is not what the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran want, but how badly they want a solution. Both sides are painfully aware of the downsides of no agreement. In the words of a participant at a recent workshop hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement is in this case “very bad” — likely, more sanctions and an Iran closer to a rapid breakout capability. This is why there is a strong incentive to explore areas of potential agreement.

What does each side want? The P5+1 want substantial reductions and the dismantlement of some of Iran’s nuclear program. The main issues of concern are Iran’s enrichment capacity, its Arak heavy water (HWR) reactor and the past possible military dimensions of its program. Iran however, aims to preserve as much of its program as possible, and perhaps even expand its capacity. It wants (preferably total) sanctions relief and a clear guideline on the duration of the final agreement. So far, this doesn’t bode well.

Former US official Bob Einhorn encourages negotiators to focus on Iran’s “practical needs”. The November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA) called for a “mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs”. The P5+1 believe that Iran’s enrichment needs for a civilian nuclear program can largely be met through foreign supply and that Tehran does not need to enrich on its soil. But after years of political and economic investment into enrichment, Iran can’t just forgo it. The P5+1 demonstrated their understanding of this conundrum when they stopped asking for enrichment to be fully suspended and accepted it on Iranian soil. The trick now will be to find enough common ground over lengthening Iran’s breakout time by addressing the number and efficiency of centrifuges, while meeting Iran’s current and future needs. Iran repeatedly insists that dismantlement is not on the agenda. Whether that is accurate or part of pre-negotiation posturing, exploring P5+1 condoned research and development into advanced centrifuges as an additional sweetener could make Tehran more amenable to such roll-backs.

The Arak HWR also poses a proliferation concern because of its ability to open up the plutonium route to a bomb for Iran. Despite requiring a reprocessing plant, which Iran does not have and so far does not intend to build, the P5+1 have made it clear that maintaining it in its current form is unacceptable. Iran’s nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi spoke of the country’s willingness to modify the reactor to produce less plutonium to allay Western fears. But the true test is whether the P5+1 can coax Iran to allow the modification of Arak into a light-water reactor. Once again, the P5+1 seem to be exploring positive incentives to address this.

One area of greater agreement is over transparency and verification. Iran insists it is prepared to accept intrusive verification measures to prove the “peacefulness” of its program. In fact, it already did so under the JPA. But the Additional Protocol (AP) is a difficult sell back home. Iranian negotiators are prepared to implement some of its safeguards as long as it’s not branded as such. Iran is also adamant that the scope and duration of these measures must be clearly defined.

This brings us to another important part of these talks: rhetoric. Today more than ever, there seems to be an understanding on both sides about what the other faces back home. Iran knows that US President Barack Obama walks a fine line on these negotiations when it comes to Congress, while the West is clearly more perceptive of the difficulties posed by the hardliners in Tehran and Iran’s need to save face. The P5+1’s willingness to accept suggestions such as implementing intrusive verification measures without naming the AP or framing talks in terms of modernising the Iranian program rather than dismantling it demonstrates this. Some officials recognise the need to ignore Iranian rhetoric, knowing full well that like in the West, the most uncompromising statements are often intended for a domestic audience.

The road to a final agreement is long and complicated. Anything from a small statement by an Iranian or American hardliner to Russian disengagement from the negotiations because of the crisis in Ukraine could derail the talks and take us back to square one. But we keep forgetting how far we’ve come in so little time. A year ago, no one would have thought that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would embrace a more moderate president or that he would agree to an interim deal constraining Iran’s nuclear program. Today, both sides are negotiating wholeheartedly. What they want has not changed. What has changed is how much they want a final solution.

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Photo:EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton (L) opens with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (R) during E3/EU+3 – Iran Talks meeting in Vienna on March 18,2014.

After a long night, the results came in on Saturday: Hassan Rowhani, former foreign minister, former nuclear negotiator and reformist by default will be the Islamic Republic of Iran’s next president. The outcome of this seemingly unfraudulent election has led to surprise and hope both inside and outside Iran. But how much [...]]]> by Dina Esfandiary

After a long night, the results came in on Saturday: Hassan Rowhani, former foreign minister, former nuclear negotiator and reformist by default will be the Islamic Republic of Iran’s next president. The outcome of this seemingly unfraudulent election has led to surprise and hope both inside and outside Iran. But how much is Iran’s next president willing to do, and perhaps more importantly, how much can he do?

Predicting the outcome of Iranian elections is a thankless exercise — after all, the last four presidential elections in Iran were surprises. But after months of crackdowns and statements that no dissent would be tolerated”, it seemed this election would come and go with no notable change other than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being shooed out in favour of an appointed hardline conservative. Although the crackdown that followed Iran’s fraudulent 2009 election and Ahmadinejad’s turbulent presidency had damaged the system, it seemed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would not risk another four years of uncertainty for a little bit of legitimacy gained from freer elections. But, again, we were surprised.

Iranian authorities even kept polls open late to accomodate a surge of voters who had initially refrained form voting, feeling that their vote would be ignored. But it became apparent that the government was intent on repairing some of the damage done to its system by demonstrating it was capable of holding elections with a high turnout (80% according to the government) and “only minor issues that were fixed quickly”, as stated by the Guardian Council.

Iranians have made clear their desire for change. Some will paint this as a victory for the sanctions regime, while others will see it as Khamenei’s willingness to act leniently in the face of public pressure. But a problem remains: constitutionally, the Iranian president has little power — Khamenei is still the ultimate decision-maker, which suggests the big picture won’t change much.

The president is responsible for the state of the Iranian economy (which Ahmadinejad did little to improve) and the general mood and direction the country is taking. Depending on their relationship, Iran’s new president might be able to sway the Supreme Leader’s views on some subjects.

Rowhani has not revealed his plans for tackling Iran’s major economic problems like rampant inflation, unemployment and the drop in the value of Iran’s currency, the rial. But he has stated that he will begin to address economic problems first. During his campaign, he often criticised government policy on a range of issues, from the nuclear negotiations to the treatment of prisoners, indicating that he would try to tackle them. And during his first press conference as President-elect, to the great relief of many international watchers, Rowhani highlighted that he would make Iran’s nuclear program more transparent and help build mutual trust to end Iran’s international isolation.

But the pessimist in me remembers that Rowhani passed the Guardian Council’s screening. He is a cleric with a long tradition of loyalty to the Islamic Republic; he did not support the opposition in 2009 and supported the clampdown on student protests in the nineties. Some (even more pessimistic than I) believe his recent liberal tendencies were intended to woo the reformists and reinvigorate those who had lost confidence in the system.

And that’s just the first layer of suspicion. Willingness and ability are two separate things. Think Mohammad Khatami’s presidency — his hands were tied.

It is likely, that as many Western analysts are predicting, not much will change, especially in Iran’s foreign policy. The Islamic Republic has already invested far too heavily in Syria for example, and at no point did Rowhani indicate he would revisit this policy during his campaign. On the nuclear front, he focused on critiscizing the government’s handling of the negotiations, not the existence of the nuclear program.

Having said that, it would be foolish to dismiss the events of the past twenty-fours hours because substantial change, especially vis-a-vis the outside world, seems unlikely. Past presidents have been successful in influencing politics as well as the general mood and image of the country. Khatami was also able to loosen some of the restrictions on the daily lives of Iranians. Moreover, the Iranian population is tired of the current state of affairs; they want breathing space from international pressure to address domestic concerns. This recent victory, no matter how uncertain, has made space for some hope and cautious optimism.

– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

According to Micah Zenko, the International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) and Hillary Clinton’s recent endorsement of a March deadline for Iran nuclear talks is a pressure tactic resulting from exasperation over the lack of progress thus far. (His focus on US reasoning gives more weight to the claim that the [...]]]> via Lobe Log

According to Micah Zenko, the International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) and Hillary Clinton’s recent endorsement of a March deadline for Iran nuclear talks is a pressure tactic resulting from exasperation over the lack of progress thus far. (His focus on US reasoning gives more weight to the claim that the IAEA is heavily influenced by the US.) But Zenko doesn’t point out that March 2013 had also been established as a key month by Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu back in September.

During his speech at this year’s UN Annual General Assembly, Netanyahu used a much-ridiculed cartoon graphic to show that Iran could complete the second to last stage of uranium enrichment required to create a bomb by the Spring or Summer of 2013:

Where’s Iran? Iran’s completed the first stage. It took them many years, but they completed it and they’re 70% of the way there. Now they are well into the second stage. By next spring, at most by next summer at current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium enrichment and move on to the final stage. From there, it’s only a few months, possibly a few weeks before they get enough enriched uranium for the first bomb.

He concluded that Iran could be stopped if a “credible” “red line” was set. Netanyahu’s assessment was critiqued by the non-proliferation focused Arms Control Association, among others, as “overly alarmist“. And until now, the US has defied Israeli pressure to set their line according to Israel’s, so what’s with this March deadline? Zenko’s analysis:

The answer depends greatly on whether the timeline to attack Iran is based on Israel’s national interest and its military capabilities, or those of the United States. Israeli officials have stated at various times that redlines should be “clear” (without providing clarity) and that they “should be made, but not publicly.” One also said, “I don’t want to set redlines or deadlines for myself.” Since November 2011, Israeli officials have also warned about a “zone of immunity,” which Barak has described as “not where the Iranians decide to break out of the non-proliferation treaty and move toward a nuclear device or weapon, but at the place where the dispersal, protection and survivability efforts will cross a point that would make a physical strike impractical.”

It is unclear how dispersed, protected, or survivable Iran’s nuclear program would have to be, but Secretary Clinton’s warning of “components…on a shelf somewhere” could indicate that the Obama administration is moving toward the zone of immunity logic. But what are these components, how many would be required to assume “weaponization,” and how would this new intelligence be presented as a justification for war? In addition, it is tough to make the case for going to war with Iran because it refused to concentrate its nuclear sites (that are under IAEA safeguards) in above-ground facilities that can be easily bombed.

Previously, U.S. officials have been less eager than the Israelis to define a specific redline, largely because the two countries have different perceptions of the Iranian threat and vastly different military capabilities. Setting a March deadline provides some certainty and perhaps coercive leverage to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. But declaring deadlines also places U.S. “credibility” on the line, generating momentum to use force even if there is no new actionable intelligence that Iran has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Based on what we know right now, that would be a strategic miscalculation.

Some analysts are meanwhile suggesting that Zenko is completely off the mark. Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the non-proliferation and disarmament program at the international Institute for Security Studies, called Zenko’s analysis “alarmist” today on Twitter: ”With respect, you are wrong about the meaning of the March deadline for #iran to answer IAEA Qs. It only means new Resolution,” he said.

“If anyone else had written an alarmist claim the US set a March deadline for war, @MicahZenko would have roasted it,” said Fitzpatrick.

Laura Rozen has an exclusive on alleged Iranian attempts to establish back-channel contacts with non-official Americans ahead of the (hopefully) resumed nuclear negotiations:

Mostafa Dolatyar, a career Iranian diplomat who heads the Iranian think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), which has close ties to Iran’s [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Laura Rozen has an exclusive on alleged Iranian attempts to establish back-channel contacts with non-official Americans ahead of the (hopefully) resumed nuclear negotiations:

Mostafa Dolatyar, a career Iranian diplomat who heads the Iranian think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), which has close ties to Iran’s foreign ministry, was tapped by Iran’s leadership to coordinate contacts with American outside-government policy experts, including those with former senior US officials involved unofficially in relaying ideas for shaping a possible nuclear compromise, the analysts told Al-Monitor in interviews this week. The IPIS channel is for coordinating non-official US contacts, which in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, have formed an important, if not unproblematic, part of Iran’s diplomatic scouting and Washington’s and Tehran’s imperfect efforts to understand and influence each others’ policy positions.

The appointment is the result of a desire “on the Iranian side for a more structured approach to dealing with America,” Mark Fitzpatrick, an Iran nuclear expert at the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, told Al-Monitor in an interview Monday, adding that he now doubts that there are agreed plans for direct US-Iran talks after the elections.

But last week former top CIA South Asia specialist Bruce Reidel warned that Iran is sending signals that it will respond forcefully to attacks:

Iran’s capabilities to inflict substantial damage on the Saudi and other gulf-state oil industries by cyberwarfare are difficult for outsiders to assess. Iran is a relative newcomer; until now, it has been mostly a victim. Iranian and Hizbullah abilities to penetrate Israel’s anti-missile defenses are also hard to estimate. Those defenses are among the best in the world, thanks to years of U.S. military assistance and Israeli ingenuity. So it is hard to know how hard Iran can really strike back if it is attacked. Bluffing and chest-thumping are a big part of the Iranian game plan. But the virus and the drone together sent a signal, don’t underestimate Iran.

Presuming the reports are true, it appears the Iranians are making a show of strength prior to the talks, just as the US has with its relentless sanctions regime. This may be because the Iranians want to put more pressure on their negotiating partners to offer a mutually acceptable settlement, or, as Iran hawks claim, because they are stalling for more time to develop a bomb to unleash against the world. While the latter scenario is certainly flashier, it doesn’t exactly square with the facts.

But progress in the next round of talks is still a possibility, according to the Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball. “Whatever happens after the election, the most important thing is that the P5+1 process resumes and that it be a much more dynamic negotiation that is not simply a reiteration of previous well-understood positions,” he said in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Iran expert and Lobe Log contributor Farideh Farhi meanwhile warns that inflexibility on both sides will impede a peaceful resolution to this decades-long dispute:

This lonely press briefing issued today by the United Nations about ongoing political imprisonment in Iran reminds us that the more the international community focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, the less attention is given to Iranian human rights. These rights are consistently endangered and violated not only by the Iranian [...]]]> via Lobe Log

This lonely press briefing issued today by the United Nations about ongoing political imprisonment in Iran reminds us that the more the international community focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, the less attention is given to Iranian human rights. These rights are consistently endangered and violated not only by the Iranian government, but by sanctions and threats of war too.

Iran’s rial is once again in free fall while Iran and the United States remain in political gridlock. Bibi Netanyahu may have backed off his Iran campaign for now but is unlikely to stop agitating for conflict. Today during an event at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mark Fitzpatrick said that Iran is unlikely to change it’s stance prior to the Iranian presidential election in June 2013 because no one wants to grant Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a diplomatic success while he is in office. Fitzpatrick added that the West is likely to implement even more sanctions during to this time.

So while Iranians are being strangled by the Islamic Republic’s ever-present hand in their public and personal lives, so too ar they being forced to endure a strangulated economy that will only worsen. This feeling of impending suffocation — imposed from above and below — was at the core of Asghar Farhadi’s oscar-winning film “A Separation” which resonated so strongly with Iranians. In Iran the personal is political and vice versa while absurdity has become the norm.

In a recent interview with Nazila Fathi, the Iranian human rights defender Shirin Ebadi explained that war on Iran would “stir nationalistic feelings and rally the people behind the government to defend the country” as well as “save Iran’s rulers.” But she didn’t or couldn’t provide any indication as to what can be done to ease the burden being imposed on Iranians by their government and foreign governments.

“I don’t favor more sanctions against Iran, but I do not want to see the world ignore what the regime is doing to its people,” said Ebadi.

What then is in store for Iran’s people?

News and views relevant to US mideast foreign policy for Sept. 20

“Iranian policymakers should understand that failing to limit the enrichment program will eventually trigger war”: The Security Times carries a commentary by Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential British think tank. Outlining the continuing [...]]]> via Lobe Log

News and views relevant to US mideast foreign policy for Sept. 20

“Iranian policymakers should understand that failing to limit the enrichment program will eventually trigger war”: The Security Times carries a commentary by Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, an influential British think tank. Outlining the continuing difficulties in negotiating an agreement on Iran’s enrichment activities, Fitzpatrick notes that the lack of an agreement means that pressure will grow to take military action in the coming years:

…. Iran already is nuclear capable – now possessing all the materials and technology, requiring only a political decision – and, while unpalatable, this status has not triggered military action.

The problem is that the red line separating nuclear-capable from nuclear-armed will become less clear as Iran’s enrichment program makes further advances. At present, Iran is still months away from being able to make a successful dash to produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). Because IAEA inspections take place on average twice a month, any such ‘breakout’ at declared facilities would be detected in time.

If, however, the Iranians sought to produce HEU at clandestine plants, they could not be confident the work would remain hidden. Twice already, secret enrichment plants have been exposed. Iran might judge that it could get away with such exposure, claiming, as it does today, that it does not need to follow IAEA rules about early notification of new nuclear facilities.

If this is Iran’s calculation, it could well backfire. Iran does not know how close it could come to crossing the line to weapons production before its adversaries determined it was too close. If Iran’s enrichment program continues unabated, at some point Western intelligence agencies will judge that because the uranium stockpile is too large, the technology too advanced and the hiding places too many, a dash for the bomb cannot be detected in time. The red line of weapons production will have become too blurred to serve as an effective tripwire.

“Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations”: The Congressional Research Service asks “Has Iran Violated the NPT?” in a new report and concludes that the matter is “unclear” though the IAEA believes Iran “has violated its safeguards agreement” and was, until at least 2003, pursuing military research as part of the program. It notes that investigations are still ongoing over claims that Iran violated the NPT’s Article II, “which state[s] that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties shall not ‘manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear  explosive devices’ or “’seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’”

The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate assessed in 2007 that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

In response to an IAEA Board of Governors ruling that Iran had not met its disclosure (and safeguards) obligations, the Iranian press reported that “Iranian Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani said that the most recent resolution issued against Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency raises doubt about the benefit of being a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”

“Who’s Sabotaging Iran’s Nuclear Program?”: Building off an earlier New York Times report on allegations of sabotage against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Daily Beast’s Eli Lake questions if this is an act of escalation by the perpetrators:

Fereydoun Abbasi, Iran’s vice president and the chief of its nuclear-energy agency, disclosed that power lines between the holy city of Qom and the underground Fordow nuclear centrifuge facility were blown up with explosives on Aug. 17. He also said the power lines leading to Iran’s Natanz facilities were blown up as well. On the day after the power was cut off at Fordow, an inspector from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asked to visit the facility.

The disclosure is significant. To start, it is the first piece of evidence to suggest opponents of the Iranian program are targeting the country’s electrical grid and doing so on the ground.

The US has publicly denied it is carrying out attacks on any facilities and military or civilian targets in Iran. An NBC investigative report from the summer reported that Israel, not the US, is actually orchestrating the bombings and assassinations. Rather than risk discovery of its own network in the Islamic Republic, the NBC said that the Mossad relies on members of the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (PMO) to carry out these operations.

“Poll: Majority of Palestinians, Israelis say attack on Iran would result in major war”: Haaretz reports on a new poll in Israel expressing growing concern among Israeli citizens and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories that a war with Iran would “would ignite a major regional war,” though the poll also noted that a significant number of respondents do not believe a war is likely this year anyway:

According to the study’s finding, 77 percent of Israeli respondents and 82 percent of Palestinian respondents said that an Israeli attack on Iran would result in a major regional confrontation.

Regarding the possibility of an Israeli strike without U.S. backing, 65 percent of Israelis were against such a course of action, an increase from 52 percent in June.

Also, the study found that 70 percent of Israelis did not believe Israel would strike Iran in the coming months, with only 20 percent of respondents saying they believe the Iranians’ goal is to destroy Israel.

The Israeli press also reported that US diplomats have warned their Israeli counterparts that should Israel attack Iran this year, it would jeopardize Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt.

Writing in Al-Monitor, Mark Fitzpatrick, an expert on Iran’s nuclear program, explains why the International Atomic Energy Associations’s new report on Iran isn’t good, but doesn’t amount to disaster either:

In a pre-emptive move of their own, White House officials gave their own spin to the latest developments several days [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Writing in Al-Monitor, Mark Fitzpatrick, an expert on Iran’s nuclear program, explains why the International Atomic Energy Associations’s new report on Iran isn’t good, but doesn’t amount to disaster either:

In a pre-emptive move of their own, White House officials gave their own spin to the latest developments several days before the IAEA released the report. While not underplaying their concern over Iran’s continued defiance, the Obama team noted that the new numbers are not a “game changer.” The new centrifuges are not (yet) being used for enrichment and the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium has not grown since May because half of it has been converted to an oxide form for use in fuel plates.

The danger posed by Iran’s nuclear program is heightening incrementally: The numbers grow arithmetically, not by orders of magnitude. In response to those advocating military action, one must ask how it is justifiable to launch a war, with all the predictable costs, over a 10% increase in centrifuge machines.

A proportionate response would be to incrementally increase the sanctions pressure on Iran. The EU, for example, is likely to tighten its sanctions against the Iran Central Bank, which to date have been partial. Additional companies associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines may be subject to an asset freeze. The US also will likely impose sanctions on more Iranian institutions, adding to the designations announced on July 31.

From beginning to end (including questions) this “Engaging Iran” discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is worth watching. Chaired by Mark Fitzpatrick, the panel featured the Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick, Sir Richard Dalton and Mahan Abedin. You can read IISS’s summary of the event here, but [...]]]>

From beginning to end (including questions) this “Engaging Iran” discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is worth watching. Chaired by Mark Fitzpatrick, the panel featured the Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick, Sir Richard Dalton and Mahan Abedin. You can read IISS’s summary of the event here, but a few quick notes of my own:

- Lamont, the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and now chairman of the British-Iranian Chamber, argues that while U.S. sanctions on Iran make life harder for business people, they are not changing the government’s behavior or bringing down the regime (he uses Cuba as an example of how sanctions have been unsuccessful, noting that the government would have likely fallen a long time ago had sanctions been removed). Lamont also notes that sanctions have forced Iranian businessmen to deal with the revolutionary guard in order to bypass them. In this way sanctions are bringing the people closer to the regime, rather than distancing them from it.

- Lamont argues that the best way to deal with Iran is through a “combination of pressure with incentives”, adding that Iran’s security needs should also be considered. “Ttalking about Iran today without remembering the Iran-Iraq war is rather like talking about Britain in the late 1930s without remembering WWI,” he said. Lamont reminds us that while Iran’s recent history informs its antagonism towards the occupying forces around its borders, it still cooperated with the U.S. during the invasion of Afghanistan.

- British-Iranian journalist, Mahan Abedin, made some interesting comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which he believes are geared towards nuclear latency, or know-how, rather than weaponization. He notes that Iran’s use of proxies has greatly benefited it security-wise as a deterrent, adding that if not for them, Israel would have attacked it. Isolated diplomatically and geopolitically, Iran’s resulting lack of self-confidence, notes Abedin, is the main reason why it is pursuing nuclear latency and security through proxies. If it can achieve nuclear latency, its relationship to the region and the U.S. may change, says Abedin, since it would no longer be solely focused on safeguarding its security.

- Former British ambassador to Iran and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Sir Richard Dalton, notes that while both parties are on narrow and confined diplomatic “tramlines”, there is still time to negotiate a deal that will satisfy the requirements of the U.S. and Iran. This deal would begin with acceptance of Iran’s nuclear programme within operational limits and with the export of enriched uranium and later imports of materials to be allowed when Iran has a genuine need for them for its civil nuclear energy industry.

- All panelists agreed that while sanctions produce social consequences, they will not achieve the political aim of ending Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions.

I haven’t read the book yet, [...]]]> Steven Simon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dana Allin, Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, just came out with a new book called The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America and the Rumors of War.

I haven’t read the book yet, but got an overview from the authors on Monday at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. What seems to be remarkable about the book is that Allin and Simon — from the U.K. and Washington’s establishment think tanks – wrote it.  And their views are eminently reasonable.

Take this statement from Allin: “War with Iran would be a mistake, not just bad or tragic, but a mistake in the sense that it would be worse than not going to war.”

That was just the launching point.

Allin and Simon gave a frank talk — at a Congressionally-funded establishment think tank, no less — about the need to reevaluate the direction of U.S. policy toward Iran. Namely, because war is worse than not going to war, they think that perhaps it’s time to address “containment” as a potential policy.

“The U.S. will have to build and rely on a regime of contaiment aginst Iran, whether or not it succeeds in building a nuclear weapon,” Allin said.

Containment means two things: 1) Living with a potentially nuclear Iran; and 2) making sure the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stops being the gift that keeps on giving for Iran — that is, contra Israeli and neoconservative statements, linkage is very much a concern.

“In thinking about containment, there is an important element of linkage to the Israel-Palestine issue,” said Allin. He quoted Mark Heller, an Israeli researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, who told the New York Times over the weekend that linkage is “a total illusion.” But Allin said Heller’s construction was setting up a “straw man.” Allin responded that if Heller wants to talk about “illusions,” it is also appropriate to speak of “delusions”:

It is a delusion to deny that there are things Israel can do and has been doing that makes the US ‘s challenges in the Middle East more difficult… The building of settlements in the Occupied Territories is near the top of the list.

Containment, as constructed by Allin and Simon, is not some policy of quiescence to all Iranian demands. Rather it’s a multi-pronged strategy of conventional power, nuclear superiority, and political deterrent. As Allin said, their plan is intentionally ambiguous about whether it seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon or using one once it does — because the plan seeks to do both.

However, containment presupposes a rational actor in Iran — something Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with all his blustering about the “tyrants of Tehran” and the “messianic apocalyptic cult” that is the government, might be loathe to accept.

Nonetheless, Simon explicitly does not view Iran this way:

I think I’m speaking for both of us here: We tend to see Iranian foreign policy as essentially cautious and opportunistic… We tend less to see the Iranians as doing something really outrageous. Against this background of caution and opportunism, they can do some nutty things.

Simon went on to say that, obviously, the Israeli calculus is that a nuclear armed Iran will be emboldened to do even more “nutty things.”

“When we talk about an undeterrable, crazy, messianic regime, it is a little scary to acknowledge those elements,” added Allin. “On the other hand, it doesn’t mean that we throw strategic cost benefit out the window.”

And therein lies the rub: Simon and Allin didn’t take on the usual mantra that U.S. and Israeli interests dovetail perfectly — instead, there was a brutally honest discussion of where they diverge, bringing linkage back into the fold.

“The respective issues of Israel and Palestine and what to do about the Iranian nuclear question raise questions about what are the reciprocal obligations of allies,” said Allin. “Jerusalem does not trust Washington when Washington says that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable, particularly because there are now people in this city, like now [Simon] and I, who are writing that the U.S. may have to live with a nuclear Iran.”

“There are differing threat perceptions at work,” acknowledged Simon. “At the end of the day, Iran is simply not as threatening to the U.S. as Israel. This differential threat perception is something that concerns Israelis quite a lot.”

“The second [issue] is a gap between U.S. redlines and Israeli redlines on the Iranian nuclear program. It seems that at the moment, our red line is a breakout capability and their red line is an enrichment capability,” he went on.

Allin added: “We hedge it and we’re mushy in the end, but we do argue that our version of redlines include weaponization” — or taking the actual step of turning a breakout capability into a nuclear weapon.

It’s worth noting the Israeli red line posited here — enrichment — has already been (and continues to be) transgressed by the Iranians. What exactly would drive Israel to act militarily against Iran to enforce an end to enrichment? Or, as Simon put it: “The question is: under what circumstances do they do it?”

“There’s a poster that is ubiquitous in the Israeli Defense Ministry and Air Force (offices) of Israeli warplanes overflying Auschwitz,” he said. ”This is a useful image to have in mind when you think about how Israelis view the stakes.”

The first Israeli consideration, said Simon, would be what the U.S. thought about an attack — it’s not in the interest of any Israelis to “fundamentally alienate the U.S.” That said, Simon acknowledged the possibility that Israel could nonetheless take action that “would disappoint any U.S. administration” — noting that former President George W. Bush opposed an Israeli attack on Iran during his tenure at the White House.

Secondly, said Simon, Israel has its own cost-benefit analysis: “Israelis would have to think that they’re going to get three to five years relief out of a raid. That is to say that they’d push back the Iranian (nuclear) program three to five years before having to go back and mow the lawn.”

But many analysts think an airstrike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would delay the program less than three years, due to the dispersal of Iranian nuclear assets and the difficulty in simultaneously wiping them out. Furthermore, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted, an attack on Iran “will make them absolutely committed to obtaining nuclear weapons.” Many analysts think that, absent an attack, the Iranian regime will stop short of a weapon and be satisfied with a breakout capability.

Simon added three further conditions for an Israeli strike: that diplomacy had run its course (in order to protect what’s left of Israel’s international standing); that no one else (i.e., the United States) was going to strike; and that the prospects for regime change in Iran become very dim, meaning so too would prospects for a regime that is less threatening even with bombs.

Simon added, “Historically Israel has acted when it sees its back against the wall. In 1981 (attack on Iraqi reactor) and (a 2007 strike on a Syrian facility) are examples of this. Each of these bold military moves took place when the Israeli cabinet sees their backs as against the wall.” Simon said the U.S. should try to “keep them from feeling this way.”

And how to do this? The aforementioned “containment regime,” for one. But there is also another tack that hasn’t been fully tried — and can’t be tried in ernest amid military threats (despite the latest version of an old canard that Arabs only understand force, as articulated by Netanyahu’s calls for a “credible threat of military action” to back up diplomacy).

“There is an argument you hear made that real game-changing engagement with Iran has not yet been tried,” said Allin. “That might be true. If you wanted real game-changing engagement with Iran you wouldn’t be talking about military options and tightening the noose of economic sanctions.”