Jim Lobe and I wrote The Center for American Progress’ Matt Duss has a piece up on Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel. He points to the ample evidence in the WikiLeaks cables that Arab leaders see the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a serious impediment to containing and deterring an increasingly powerful Iran.

Jim Lobe and I wrote an IPS article last week challenging the right-wing talking points that the WikiLeaks cables were a nail in the coffin for those in the Obama administration who believe, as does the military’s top leadership, that linkage is an important concept if the U.S. is going to contain Iran and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Duss writes:

Basically, the “linkage” argument holds that continued irresolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hinders America’s ability to achieve its national security goals in the region, both by serving as a driver of extremism and a source of anti-American sentiment. Critics of the argument contend that the significance of the conflict has been vastly overblown, and that “the Palestinian issue” is simply an excuse used by violent extremists and lacking genuine salience among Arabs, despite what they may say in public.

Duss reviews the many WikiLeaks cables in which Arab diplomats endorse the concept of linkage and the countless op-eds from Iran hawks claiming that WikiLeaks shows that Arab leaders don’t care about Palestinians or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

He writes:

All of this would seem to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the linkage argument. In reality, what it demonstrates is the willingness of some analysts to ignore evidence.

But, despite the overwhelming evidence in the cables, hawkish groups such as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) have shown a shocking willingness to misrepresent and twist the words of Arab leaders and the Foreign Service Officers who wrote the cables.

Duss concludes:

It is of course true that hostility toward Israel and its U.S. patron will not simply dissipate upon the end of Israel’s occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state — the completeness of that de-occupation, and the contours of that state, matter greatly. There are also problems and pathologies in the Middle East that have nothing to do with Israelis or Palestinians. Securing a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will, however, make addressing some of those problems easier, by sealing up one well of resentment from which demagogues and extremists have for decades drawn freely and profitably.

Indeed, the WikiLeaks cables provide abundant evidence that Arab leaders collectively agree that containing Iran–and in the process weakening Hezbollah and Hamas–requires removing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the lightening rod for anti-West, anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiments in the Middle East.

While one Western official who attended the talks told Slavin, on the condition of anonymity, that the Iranians “were not terribly [...]]]> Barbara Slavin, writing for IPS, has a post-game analysis of the P5+1 talks that ended yesterday. She then looks at where the talks might be heading when they resume next month in Turkey.

While one Western official who attended the talks told Slavin, on the condition of anonymity, that the Iranians “were not terribly serious” in their willingness to engage in a constructive manner, they also added that the Iranians did discuss their nuclear program—something that they had promised not to do in the days leading up to the talks—but “mainly to complain about the IAEA.”

Indeed, the WikiLeaks cables have given the Iranians much to complain about. Slavin writes:

An October 2009 cable disclosed recently by Wikileaks quotes an unnamed U.S. diplomat as saying that IAEA chief Yukiya Amano of Japan is “solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision”. That contrasts with Amano’s predecessor, Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei, who often criticised the U.S. approach to Iran. It is not clear whether the Iranians brought up the comment at the Geneva meetings.

U.S. officials had hoped to revive discussions of a fuel swap agreement but, after the United States and its partners rejected a swap brokered by Brazil and Turkey in May, it appears the discussion of such an agreement did not occur this week.

Slavin writes:

The Western official said there had not been “much discussion of a revised TRR” this time in Geneva, suggesting that the U.S. and its allies did not think enough progress had been made to reopen the topic.

The Iranians, for their part, had said going into the talks that they would be willing to discuss limitations on uranium enrichment.  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had said that talks would only progress once U.N. sanctions were lifted.

Slavin writes:

With the Geneva talks brought to a close Slavin looks at what we can expect from next month’s resumption of talks in Turkey.

Some analysts have suggested that Iran will feel more comfortable resuming negotiations in Turkey, whose Islamic- leaning government has expressed understanding for Iran’s position and need to keep face in front of a restive domestic audience.

And

The Geneva talks were “pretty much what we expected”, the Western official said. “We are trying to start a process that will have practical steps that can begin to build confidence. We’ll see where this leads. Good thing we still have time and can continue to ratchet up sanctions pressure.”