by Farideh Farhi
Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the mother of Sattar Beheshti, a blogger who was tortured and died while in custody, during her recent visit to Iran.
I do not know if the reason given for the dinner cancellation is true. There are indications that Ashton may have been occupied in Brussels with discussions on EU sanctions against Russia, and her spokesperson said there were no plans for dinner in the first place. At some level, it is irrelevant whether this is true or not. It is now a “fact” and other reports that the respective deputies of these chiefs did have dinner together are irrelevant since this particular public dance and drama over human rights in Iran is not about policy but about appearances and posturing.
The released photo of Ashton’s meeting with the activists tells it all. Although there were other women in the room, Ashton is presented with only two (besides her translator) — Narges Mohammadi and Gohar Eshghi. The first is a human rights advocate whose inhumane treatment in prison while she was ill, and her quiet dignity in the midst of it all, became a legend; the second is an aggrieved mother from a working class neighborhood who carries a framed picture of Beheshti (her son) everywhere. I would like to know who released the photo and with what intent. But that may also be irrelevant because when it comes to Iranian politics, like elsewhere, what something turns into usually overtakes intent, many times even undermining it.
Ashton is gone and the political storm she ignited has been left behind. She has no EU parliamentarians asking questions about what she did in Iran. The symbolic photo is of good use for placating the constituencies who worry the EU will abandon human rights for the sake of a nuclear deal. She reportedly showed compassion. She told Eshghi that she sympathized because she is also a mother and that she would talk to authorities regarding her desire for a public trial on charges of first degree murder (a trial has been set for the accused in early April for second-degree murder). There is no evidence that Ashton actually carried out her promise of talking to an official before she flew out of Tehran. But the photo is for keeps.
In Tehran, though, pandemonium and controversy combined with quite a bit of comedic relief have been the order of the day. As was the case when a European Parliament delegation met with Sakharov Prize winners Nasrin Sotudeh and Jafar Panahi, no government official is taking responsibility for Ashton’s itinerary. Everyone is feigning aghast at what happened, but on the question of who allowed it to happen, the official response is more like mystification.
Meanwhile Iranian hard-liners could have limited themselves to making a big fuss and hurling insults at the appearance and age of the female leader, as they usually do in response to US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman’s statements. Additionally, the 40 or so hard-line MPs, generally close to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s Steadfastness Front, could yell at the foreign and intelligence ministers for either permitting the meeting or not preventing it; drag them in for questioning and explanations that would not be satisfactory in any case; warn against the rise of sedition yet again; and then move on to another controversy.
But for the opponents of Hassan Rouhani’s government, Ashton’s meeting was both an opportunity and challenge. An opportunity because Ashton’s sudden turn towards human rights, after so many years of being known solely as someone leading negotiations with Iran, was a timely confirmation of the point made again last week by Leader Ali Khamenei: Western pressure will not end even if the nuclear issue is resolved. He has repeatedly stated that they will come after us for other stuff including human rights. (One colorful cleric took this further during a Friday Prayer by saying that after human rights it’ll probably be animal rights).
Ashton’s photo gave hard-liners an opportunity for a twofer: questioning Western motives in nuclear talks and screaming sedition at domestic opponents. One MP announced thunderously that Iran is not Ukraine! But the photo also provided them a winning point regarding Western hypocrisy. A poster that showed up in Tehran, collating Ashton’s half-face with Saddam’s — highlighting the human costs of the chemical weapons supplied to Iraq by Europeans during the Iran-Iraq War — was intended to remind everyone that the humanitarian impulse is applied very selectively when state interests are involved.
The photo is nevertheless also a challenge since it exhibits what the defenders of doctrine fear most: a collusion of dissidents and the usually devoted, working-class poor against doctrine and injustice. So threatening is the photo that the Javan daily decided to do its own reframing. It simply used Photoshop to delete Eshghi’s image (state TV did the same a few days later) and then, when Javan was ridiculed (since the photo with Eshghi in it had already been published by a reformist paper) said it did not want to offend the aggrieved mother by placing her next to a “seditioner.” (The seditioner in question, Mohammadi, was even called a terrorist by a female MP, a charge Mohammadi responded to with her pen).
According to Javan’s explanation, the deletion had nothing to do with the discomfort caused by Eshghi’s appearance, which so resembles that of thousands of other mothers who saw their sons “martyred” in the Iran-Iraq War. Even more discomforting is that the photo of her son she carries everywhere brings to mind the images displayed throughout Iran of the many young Iranian “martyrs” who died in the Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Republic has celebrated the courage, endurance, patience, and piety of these mothers and sons unremittingly. Separating Eshghi from the mothers who sent their sons to the war front, who suffered quietly and longingly when their boys died but still took pride in what they died for, makes the digital elimination of her image the only possible solution to a very uneasy predicament.
In the words of the young and very funny Iranian satirist, Aydin Sayar, writing for the Qanun daily, all this explains why Photoshop is the greatest of human inventions: it allows us to visualize every desire. But Javan’s editorial staff should really be faulted for not using Photoshop to its full potential. In Sayar’s vision, they could have, for instance, transposed Eshghi to a photo of Ashton meeting with former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Eshghi and Jalili, meeting Ashton together, confirm doctrine and assure continued political clout.
My bet is that with the reported creation of a “truth commission” in the Parliament to examine the “issue of Ashton’s meeting with an element of sedition” this round of loud criticism directed at the foreign and intelligence ministries will likely last longer than the previous round involving members of the European Parliament. But it will also eventually pass, probably when a better opportunity arises. (It should be pointed out that Zarif is getting it from the other side as well. Mohammadi wrote a public letter criticizing him for calling her a seditioner in an interview; never mind that the reporting of Zarif’s statement was in Mashreq, a hard-line news site that’s not usually a reliable source for exact wording.)
Zarif, like other cabinet members in general, is in the process of perfecting the art of lying low and not reacting much. But he did increase the drama when he stated on his Facebook page that for the sake of the “national interest” he will remain silent for now. He also called on all to avoid hasty judgments and instead focus on the joy of the World Cup victory of the Iranian wrestling team in Los Angeles as the Iranian New Year approaches. Expressions of humility and positivity in the face of an aggressive opponent’s charge are as good as the foreign minister is going to give for now.
Beyond the immediate situation, though, the loud noise surrounding Ashton’s visit does reveal a point regarding the effectiveness of external pressure in relation to human rights. Her visit has been used by hard-liners to yell sedition ad nauseam but it has also stirred a conversation regarding whether foreign officials (including ambassadors) should be allowed — or are entitled — to meet with the opposition without controversy. After all, it is said that Iranian officials meet with opposition figures in other countries all the time. So the reality of Iran’s polity being contested, and its civil society alert, opens up the possibility of using external concerns for Iranian human rights to push for some sort of change.
But loudness may also undercut efficacy. For instance, in the past couple of months, several prominent Iranians, including former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and MP Ali Mottahari, have made the point that negotiations for the release of former presidential candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi (and his spouse Zahra Rahnavard) were getting somewhere but came to a halt when there was too much noise. According to Motthari, who has repeatedly called for the release or trial of these political leaders, the lifting of limitations on them was in the works in October but was derailed by discussions of the issue in the press and “the reformist claims of victory.” He went on to say that the intent is “to remove the limitations gradually in a way that is not really noticed.”
It is hard to see how such politically charged issues can be managed in an unnoticed way but the appeal for quiet diplomacy inside Iran as well as gradual and incremental (mini-steps, really) is nevertheless offered as a better alternative to making more drastic demands or moves that carry the potential of turning the hard-liners’ screams into reactionary policy. With the experience of the reformist era in everyone’s mind, the worry is that drastic moves or bold and unattainable demands at this point will end up frightening and again pushing the more middle of the road conservatives into the hard-liners’ arms.
Not surprisingly, there is evidence of the government’s preference for — and perhaps a degree of effectiveness in — quiet and incremental change. Last week the charismatic student leader Abdollah Momeni was released one day before his 5-year term was over. According to an interview his wife gave to the Europe-based Rooz Online, he was taken out of prison quietly and left in the middle of the street to find someone to take him to his home and spouse. She suggested that this was done to prevent a noisy greeting party the day he was supposed to be released. This was certainly not a decent thing to do, but the fact that no new charges to prevent the release of this political prisoner were made up could also be considered a quiet step.
Another tiny step was taken yesterday when Mousavi and his wife were allowed to visit Rahnavard’s old and ailing mother. When they encountered a dozen other visitors by chance, the guards, after some resistance, ultimately allowed the family to briefly talk to each other. This surprising event was seen as a sign of opening up made possible by Rouhani; minimal, but nevertheless a change.
The debate over how fast or how loudly to challenge the issue of political prisoners is also happening among the reformists. Even some reformist political prisoners who have in the past written public letters criticizing the conduct of the highest officials have gone quiet in the past couple of months, perhaps persuaded that quiet diplomacy will work better for now. Others have not.
Even if the government manages to persuade most of Iran’s citizens that this is the time for patience and tiny, step-by-step incremental change, it cannot convince everyone. Nor can it control the impatience of many networks outside of Iran that monitor Iran’s human rights situation on a daily basis with its slow pace of change and even occasional reversals. Any opening energizes them to call for more. This is just the way human rights activism works throughout the world.
This leaves the Rouhani government with a delicate balancing act between taking mini-steps for change and defending itself against pressures and charges that will come from forces on both sides of the political spectrum. So far, Rouhani is more or less managing the situation; Zarif met with Ashton this morning and it was all nuclear talk.
]]>by Robin M. Mills
Hassan Rouhani is known as a man who sprays air-freshener in the room before a meeting. When it comes to Iran’s oil industry, Iran’s fastidious president-elect may have a great deal of spring-cleaning to do.
Much outside attention has been paid to the impact of sanctions on Iran [...]]]>
by Robin M. Mills
Hassan Rouhani is known as a man who sprays air-freshener in the room before a meeting. When it comes to Iran’s oil industry, Iran’s fastidious president-elect may have a great deal of spring-cleaning to do.
Much outside attention has been paid to the impact of sanctions on Iran and global oil markets. There has been less discussion of what Iranian policymakers should be doing with their oil, and what effect different policies would have within the country. Turning around the petroleum sector is crucial to Iran’s economy, and in turn, to the success of the centrist-reformist current that the pragmatic Mr. Rouhani is now representing.
During the phase of post-war reconstruction under Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, oil production rose by more than 3 percent annually and grew by more than 1 percent per year under Mohammad Khatami as major foreign investment flowed in from European, Russian and Asian companies. In 1995, Bill Clinton vetoed a contract for US oil company Conoco to develop the offshore Sirri fields, which allowed France’s Total to step in. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as well as domestic engineering and service companies also significantly improved their technical capabilities.
In contrast, the economic consequences of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were oddly similar to those of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela — the replacement of skilled oil technocrats by less qualified allies, leading to stagnant output. Two giant oil field discoveries of the early 2000s, Azadegan and Yadavaran on the Iraqi border, have barely been developed.
Driven by South Pars, the world’s largest field — shared with Qatar — natural gas production continued to rise impressively under Ahmadinejad, albeit at a slower rate than with his predecessor. But with lines being drawn all over the map like spaghetti, minimal progress was made on gas export plans — to Turkey and Europe; Pakistan and India; the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman — and as liquefied natural gas. The country that, according to British Petroleum, now has the world’s largest reserves, is barely a net exporter of gas.
Development of the oil sector was, of course, hampered by increasingly tight sanctions. Western companies essentially suspended new activities by 2008, while Chinese and Russian firms did no more than keep a foot in the door. But bigger barriers — already apparent during Khatami’s second term — were unattractive contract terms, interminable negotiation periods and decision-making paralysis.
Three of Ahmadinejad’s nominees for oil minister were rejected by the Majlis in 2005; in 2011 he attempted to act as his own oil minister, again ruled out by parliament. As Kevan Harris has documented, from 2006, Ahmadinejad accelerated a process already underway since the 1990s — the pseudo-privatisation of a wide range of state-controlled entities, including oil development and engineering companies and petrochemical plants. In a process reminiscent of the “nomenklatura capitalism” of post-Soviet Russia, many of these companies have fallen under the control of regime insiders and government bureaucrats.
High and rising oil prices permitted complacency as Iran received more oil revenues than in the entire previous century of production during Ahmadinejad’s two terms as president. An increasingly overvalued exchange rate made domestic industry uncompetitive and attracted a flood of cheap imports in a vain attempt to keep down inflation sent soaring by excess liquidity. In a curious reversal of monetary orthodoxy, Ahmadinejad insisted that interest rates not exceed the inflation rate.
The main positive achievement of Ahmadinejad’s administration was reforming Iran’s ruinous energy subsidy scheme, which was replaced by direct cash payments to families. The plan was conceptually sound and surprisingly well-executed; consumption fell and the basic income provided made a substantial difference for poorer Iranians. But the scheme stalled as a result of further infighting between the Majlis and president, the sanctions-induced collapse in the rial, severe inflation and the failure to compensate affected businesses.
The administration did not anticipate how successful the US would be, from early 2012 onwards, in cajoling both allies and rivals to eliminate or cut oil purchases from Iran, as well as targeting insurance, shipping, financial transactions and exports of other Iranian products. Iran’s oil sales fell by a million barrels per day, while increased output from Saudi Arabia and from the US itself prevented global prices from rising too far.
The path of Iran’s oil industry under Dr. Rouhani will depend on progress made in nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions, as well as his administration’s domestic policy choices. A military conflict with the US and/or Israel would have highly unpredictable but damaging effects on Iran’s oil industry and possibly those of its neighbours.
If the current sanctions regime remains in place, Iran’s new administration will have to do its best to survive on a severely diminished income. As the Mossadegh government did in the early 1950s under somewhat similar circumstances, it can reorient the economy further towards domestic production and consumption, eliminating the luxury imports that boomed over the past decade. Better management and tackling corruption would reduce the social impacts and inequality — at the potential cost of harming some leading regime figures.
Bringing back Iran’s capable technocrats — and some of its talented diaspora, with more relaxed social conditions, as under Khatami — would keep oil production steady. Two candidates helped manage Rouhani’s campaign – former deputy oil minister Akbar Torkan and former refining and petrochemical chief Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh. Discounts, loopholes and disguised shipments can maintain exports, even at a reduced level. Over time, the enforcement of the sanctions can be eroded.
But, with the demand for OPEC oil set to be stagnant or falling over this decade, the prospect of lower oil prices, and Iraq’s taking an increasing share of the pie, the path ahead could be hazardous. Iran’s purported ally Russia has no interest in encouraging a competing oil and gas exporter. Given the Islamic Republic’s paranoid (if not unjustified) suspicion of the West, it would be ironic if it ended up yet more dependent on the Kremlin and China.
In the event of a breakthrough on the nuclear issue, and a lifting of most oil-related sanctions, the stage would be set for a pragmatic, Rafsanjani-style reconstruction. If the shutdown could be managed correctly, oil production could bounce back to near pre-2012 levels quite quickly.
But fully realising Iran’s petroleum potential requires foreign investment and expertise, ideally including Western companies. This will have to be under better contractual terms than the “buybacks” offered in the early 2000s that provoked so much nationalist debate within Iran.
Giving international companies a long-term stake in fields can be done with modern contracts that still provide Iran with full sovereignty and control over its industry. This would achieve two objectives. First, it would ensure efficient operations and maximum recovery from the country’s mature fields while encouraging technology transfer. Second, it would give momentum to the removal of remaining sanctions and create a barrier against their reinstatement.
In the same way, gas exports — to the GCC, Turkey and Pakistan — would anchor Iran more tightly within the regional economy and make it indispensable to its neighbours. The window for major exports to Europe has probably closed, with Azeri and Iraqi Kurdish gas set to flow. But Iran could still resurrect its liquefied natural gas plans, where it has fallen infinitely behind Qatar.
Domestically, Iran’s subsidy reform needs to be revived — more propitious when the economy is growing and government finances are increasing. The web of pseudo-privatisation also needs to be untangled and replaced by a balance of true private investment and commercially focused state enterprise.
The sine qua non is a resolution to the nuclear issue and an end to the major sanctions. A whole-hearted pursuit of these policies would amount to a revolution in Iran’s energy affairs — likely to provoke major domestic opposition and run into significant international hurdles. But even a pragmatic, technocratic house-cleaning of Iran’s oil sector would help set the economy on a path to recovery and give hope for the success of Dr. Rouhani’s tenure.
– Robin M. Mills is Head of Consulting at Manaar Energy and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis and Capturing Carbon. Email him or follow him on Twitter.
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