by Peter Jenkins
An article in the latest issue of the International Security journal goes to the heart of US and European nuclear non-proliferation policy. The author, Scott Kemp, an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, raises a fundamental question: is proliferation best prevented by supply-side measures [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
An article in the latest issue of the International Security journal goes to the heart of US and European nuclear non-proliferation policy. The author, Scott Kemp, an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, raises a fundamental question: is proliferation best prevented by supply-side measures (attempts to restrict the availability of certain technologies) or by influencing the demand side (the national interest calculations that underpin decision-making on nuclear weapon acquisition)?
The question has divided the US nuclear community since 1945 and is unlikely to be resolved by this one article, well-researched and highly intelligent as it is. Nonetheless, Kemp’s conclusion merits substantial debate, not least in the wider foreign policy community. It is that a rebalancing of nuclear non-proliferation policy is advisable, away from over-dependence on supply side restrictions and towards greater reliance on influencing states’ motives and calculations.
Kemp justifies his conclusion by surveying the extent to which controlling one type of nuclear technology — the use of centrifuges to enrich uranium — can be relied on to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and by demonstrating that controls have been and will be porous and permeable.
Technological and industrial developments since 1945 have moved the proliferation-potential boundary outwards to where the building of a uranium enrichment plant lies within the reach of many states. The required information has long been in the public domain. The tools and equipment needed to build rudimentary centrifuge machines are unsophisticated. The risk of remote detection of a small clandestine plant is small. Thirteen of the twenty states that have built enrichment facilities have done so without recourse to outside help — and several others could have gone it alone.
Kemp is careful to distinguish between over-reliance on technology controls and denying that controls have any merit. He is not advocating the elimination of controls. On the contrary, he recognises that controls can make the task of building and operating centrifuges more arduous by forcing states to develop the technology indigenously and to spend time troubleshooting the challenges that will inevitably arise. Controls can also limit the ability of states to build high-performance centrifuges.
But where centrifuge technology is concerned, Kemp’s sympathies clearly lie with Niels Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, and other Manhattan Project scientists who warned that controls could only provide a temporary hurdle, not an insurmountable barrier. Like them, he also believes that enduring protection “can only come from the political organization of the world”.
Mercifully, much of that political organization now exists, thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Early doubts about how effective a barrier the NPT would be have been confounded. All but the four nuclear-armed states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) and South Sudan, which has had more pressing priorities, are parties to it. Only nine states are known or suspected of having engaged in clandestine nuclear activities after becoming parties; and all but two of those (Iraq and Syria) have chosen or been persuaded to abandon their clandestine activities well short of nuclear weapons acquisition.
Why has the NPT been so effective? Kemp leaves that question to be answered by others. My sense is that NPT parties see mutual security benefits in maintaining this regime for as long as possible, certain grievances notwithstanding, and have no appetite for engaging in a nuclear arms race with their neighbors. An element of deterrence may also enter into the equation: latecomers to the nuclear-armed clubhouse cannot be sure of getting in unscathed.
But I hope someone more qualified than I will undertake the thorough assessment Kemp calls for at the end of his article:
While the specific causes of proliferation abstinence lie beyond the scope of this article, the subject clearly merits deeper analysis by both policymakers and academics as such factors are probably the most viable basis for the future of the non proliferation regime.
More immediately, Kemp’s conclusion begs important questions in relation to the current negotiations between Iran and the P5+1: if technology restrictions can never be more than a hurdle to centrifuge-based nuclear weapon acquisition, is it essential that the US and EU insist on a dramatic cut in the number of operating centrifuges at Iran’s disposal during the interim phase of a comprehensive solution?
Would the US and EU be wise to walk away from the negotiation if, for domestic political reasons, Iran were to refuse to dismantle any of its 19,000 centrifuges and to operate any fewer than 9,000 at any one time?
Should the US and EU be ready to close the deal if Iran can demonstrate convincingly that it has no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons — with no motive for incurring the near-universal condemnation that a nuclear “break-out” would trigger — and backs up the demonstration by accepting that verification of its nuclear program can remain at current levels indefinitely?
I know what I think. But what, I wonder, do the US administration’s “counter-proliferation” experts think, and what advice are they giving to the US secretary of state and president? I fear they may be on the other side of the post-1945 divide.
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland on April 1, 1974. Credit: UN
]]>To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to [...]]]>
To date, negotiators on both sides of the talks over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, which resume next week, have been remarkably discreet. Even at the political level, people have been unusually quiet. This is an excellent omen. In the past, too many opportunities have been nipped in the bud due to an excess of statements calibrated for domestic purposes (a special mention to Wendy Sherman, the chief US negotiator, for saying so little, amiably, in many background meetings with the press). The involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the negotiations has also been of inestimable value. The Agency offers unique expertise and notarizes regularly the way in which Iran complies with its commitments. It contributes therefore decisively to the smooth progression of the discussions.
Quite unexpectedly, Iran’s negotiators have been the driving force in this process. They have seized President Hassan Rouhani’s initiative to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program and have kept it ever since, setting the targets as well as the tempo. Iran’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said on April 7 that the drafting of the final agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) should start in May, and that all efforts should be taken to complete the negotiations by the official deadline of July. The Iranians seem set to resolve the conflict over their nuclear program as fast as possible, once and for all.
The Rouhani administration’s determination serves in pleasant contrast to the rather stiff and slow Iranian behavior that was especially exhibited during the Ahmadinejad era, but also, at times, in the most favorable of circumstances, during the 2003-05 period, when Rouhani was himself Iran’s chief negotiator. At that time, the Iranian diplomats on the frontline were subjected to a heavy-handed system of control, which tended to stifle their movements. Having learned from this experience, President Rouhani, elected last June, has obtained a carte blanche from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. While the Leader did issue a set of red lines last month (English diagram), and has issued specific warnings every now and then, he has consistently supported Iran’s diplomats while keeping domestic criticism of Iran’s team at a manageable level.
Indeed, Rouhani may not own the horse, but he controls the reigns. One of his first acts as president was transferring Iran’s nuclear negotiating file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign affairs. That enabled him to build a “dream team” of seasoned negotiators, perfectly comfortable with the codes and practices of their Western counterparts. Iran’s new and refined team has stood out in stark contrast to the collective clumsiness of the P5+1 negotiators, as in the early November 2013 episode, when four Western Foreign Ministers rushed prematurely to Geneva, spurring the media to believe, mistakenly, that a deal would be signed (it was signed 10 days later). But, as Marshal Foch used to say: “After leading a coalition, I have much less admiration for Napoleon…”
Getting to the heart of the matter, many points seem close to being settled. Iran is ready to cap at 5% its production of enriched uranium and to limit its current stockpile from further enrichment. The controversial underground facility of Fordow will probably end up as a kind of research and development unit. The Arak reactor’s original configuration allowed the yearly production of about ten kilograms of plutonium, enough for one or two bombs. Ali Akbar Salehi, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), has hinted that this configuration could be modified in order to accommodate low-enriched uranium fuel rather than natural uranium. This would reduce Arak’s plutonium production capacity by a factor of five to ten. And Iran has already confirmed that it has no intention of acquiring the fuel reprocessing capacity indispensable for isolating weapon-grade plutonium.
Depending on the pace of sanctions relief, Iran also seems ready to return to a kind of de facto implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which would provide enhanced monitoring over all of Iran’s nuclear activities. Iran should be ready to initiate the Protocol’s ratification process as soon as the United Nations Security Council shows itself ready to remove the Iranian nuclear file from its agenda, thus erasing the burning humiliation of 2006, when it passed its first resolution on the subject.
The make or break issues
To date, five sticking points remain on the table.
The most difficult issue concerns the format of Iran’s enrichment capacity. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), adopted last November, speaks of “parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities”. But the West has focused on “breakout time”, that is, the time needed to acquire enough highly enriched uranium for a first bomb if Iran decided to renege on its commitments. This delay has been estimated at about two months in the current state of Iran’s enrichment program. To extend it significantly, Iran would have to bring down the number of its centrifuges from the present 20,000 to 2-6,000.
A drastic reduction of the number of centrifuges, however, would be a deal-breaker for Iran. Following the conservative elements of the regime, the Supreme Leader has recently excluded any kind of bargaining on Iran’s nuclear achievements.
Fortunately, other solutions can alleviate the West’s concerns. First, having enough highly enriched uranium for one bomb does not mean having the bomb. Several more months would be necessary to make it ready. Second, one wonders why the international community would need more than one or two months to properly respond to an Iranian rush for a bomb. If it can’t make it in two months, why would it succeed in six? Third, this infamous breakout time could be extended without reducing the present number of centrifuges by using, as fast as possible, the low enriched uranium produced by Iran as fuel for nuclear reactors, rendering it unserviceable for further, weapon-grade, enrichment. Here, feeding the Arak reactor with domestic low-enriched uranium could solve a good part of the problem.
It is unfortunate, though, that the Iranians have made so little effort up to now to identify the “practical needs” mentioned, at their initiative, in the Geneva agreement. The spokesman of the AEOI has announced recently that a “comprehensive document” was being elaborated on the subject, and would be submitted for approval to the Iranian Parliament. But this process will probably extend beyond the time limit set for the negotiations.
In the meantime, we know that the Russians are bound to provide for eight more years the low enriched fuel necessary for the Bushehr nuclear plant. After this period, they will resist the introduction of Iranian fuel into the Bushehr reactor, as the selling of fuel is for the Russians the most profitable part of their contract with Iran. Their attitude will be the same when discussing the construction and operation of more reactors in Iran. By all means, new Russian reactors, or any reactors from other origins, will not be active before a decade. All of this is to say that if the current number of 20,000 centrifuges was accepted by the international community, the Iranians would have no “practical need” in the offing to justify a raise of this number in the years to come.
Another difficult point is the question of nuclear research and development. The West would like Iran to forsake such activities, especially in the field of centrifugation. Again, this is a red line for the Supreme Leader and the conservatives, as Iran’s engineers are working on models up to fifteen times more efficient than the present outdated model forming the bulk of its program. Here, a simple solution has been suggested by Salehi: instead of setting a cap on centrifuges, which could be circumvented by using more efficient models, the parties should define this cap in “separative work units”, the equivalent of horsepower in the field of enrichment. The introduction of more efficient centrifuges would thus reduce in due proportion the total number allowed.
A third difficult point is the ongoing exploration by the IAEA of the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. This demand, reiterated by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, has been fiercely resisted by Iran. In fact, it was the head of the US national intelligence community who said, in 2007, that the Iranian weaponization program was stopped before completion by the end of 2003. Ten years have since passed, and the people involved in that program must have been granted some kind of protection in exchange for their compliance, hence the inherent difficulty for the Iranians of authorizing outsiders to probe too deep into this subject. In former similar occurrences, such as with Egypt, South Korea and Taiwan, the IAEA has accepted not to divulge details on the wrongdoings discovered by its inspectors, once assured of the cancelation of these programs. A similar way out should be explored with Iran.
The fourth sticking point evolves around Iran’s ballistic missiles. The West wants to include them in the negotiations, as a source of worry identified by the UN Security Council, but this has been outright rejected by Iran. Recall that Iran has accepted to negotiate over its nuclear program as a civilian program placed under the aegis of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Negotiations over missiles pertain to a different world, the world of defense and disarmament, in which negotiations are by definition collective, save for unilateral measures imposed upon a defeated country. If there is a solution here, it would require a separate, multilateral discussion on the level and distribution of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with the aim of convincing concerned states to join the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, adopted in 2002 in the Hague.
The last point, little talked about, but hardly the least difficult, concerns the duration of the future comprehensive agreement to be signed by Iran and the P5+1. Under the Geneva JPOA, this agreement, once fully implemented for the duration of all its provisions, will be replaced by the common regime applicable to all NPT members. Iran would then be freed of specific commitments such as the limitation of its enrichment activities, on which extensive IAEA controls, of course, would remain. Such a shift would mean that the International community would be fully reassured about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.
However, to reach such an assessment, the general behavior of the Iranian regime and the quality of its relations with the outside world would be as important as the state of its nuclear program. How long should the assessment process last? These considerations cannot be put into writing. The Iranians will probably insist on no more than five years, while the West would be happy to see this regime of special constraints indefinitely extended. This point could be the last outstanding issue in the discussions. Hopefully, if solutions are found on all the previous questions, there will be a strong incentive to find a compromise here to ensure a final deal once and for all.
Photo: EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at a joint press conference following talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Vienna, Austria on April 9, 2014. Credit: AFP/Samuel Kubani
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
The talks between Iran and the “P5+1” countries last week bring to mind Winston Churchill’s 1942 description of World War II: “It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
This characterization is even more profound than it [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
The talks between Iran and the “P5+1” countries last week bring to mind Winston Churchill’s 1942 description of World War II: “It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
This characterization is even more profound than it first appears. Today we are witnessing a roll of the dice throughout the Middle East. The “negotiations” over Iran’s nuclear program betoken a major shift in psychology and perceptions, notably about power, influence, and national interests. They involve the United States and almost all other countries in the region, which for so long have assumed the immutability of the Iranian-Western confrontation. Of course, that confrontation could now begin to crumble, with wide-ranging geopolitical implications in the region and beyond.
Most immediately, the talks appear to be getting down to brass tacks regarding what Iran is doing with its nuclear program; what it will do to reassure the world that it will not acquire a nuclear weapon or even move toward what is called a “breakout capability;” and what the United States and others will do in exchange. “In exchange” involves the sanctions that have been progressively imposed on Iran since the Islamic Republic’s birth in 1979. But it could also include other steps, some tangible, some intangible, whereby Iran would be readmitted as a legitimate state in international society, free from the shackles on its potential as a highly educated and creative nation with the most American-friendly population in the region.
So much of what will happen now involves the technical details of Iran’s nuclear program, which only a handful of people, both in Iran and the West, really understand.
More important, however, is the politics. Will the Iranian government move far enough to embrace a deal acceptable to the US and the other P5+1 members (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany)? Will the P5+1 accept that Iran does have the right to a peaceful nuclear program and some level of uranium enrichment? And, if there is a meeting of the minds, can a potential deal be sold to Iran’s Supreme Leader and the multiple constituencies in the West that claim the right to be heard?
The answer to the first part of this last question may depend on the will of a single individual (and his own complex politics). The answer to the second part will depend not just on President Barack Obama and the other P5+1 leaders — but also on the US Congress and especially Israel. US allies and partners lining the Persian Gulf and outliers like Turkey must also be satisfied.
If a potential deal does take shape, a titanic struggle will take place in this country, pitting President Obama against those who would oppose virtually any deal, however reasonable by objective standards, measured in terms of US national interests. Those parts of Congress responsive to Israel’s perspective will be joined in opposition by the “Friends of Saudi Arabia” and other regional oil countries. Silently in the corner will be the Western companies that pour advanced weaponry into the Arab States of the Persian Gulf — although, if the US does take pressure off Iran, arms sales to still-anxious countries could even increase.
But far more is at stake in the Middle East than Iran’s nuclear program and creating barriers against its ability to build a bomb. We are seeing the first break in the solid containment wall that was erected at the end of the 1970s due to fears that an Islamic revolution would spread its contagion. Except in a few places, that did not happen. Indeed, the greater threat both to Western interests and to regional countries now comes from al-Qaeda and its ilk (which, unlike Shia Iran, are Sunni).
In recent years, concerns have focused on Tehran’s nuclear program. But even before that, there was a policy of containing Iran, in many ways reflecting a general regional contest for power and influence. This contest reflected worries that Tehran and Washington might one day be reconciled. It is perhaps the best explanation for the (opaque) reasoning behind Saudi Arabia’s first campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and then, when successful, abruptly declining it. Indeed, with a break in the diplomatic barrier to Iran, Saudi Arabia is less sure that it will continue to stand higher in US regard than an Iran that is “behaving itself” — thus its recent antics. Ironically, the Saudi’s initial pursuit of the UNSC seat had always seemed strange: Security Council members are expected to set and follow standards that are alien to Riyadh.
For its part, Israel is competing for regional influence and to preserve, unchallenged, all the primacy it has in the US. It has effectively used the legitimate fears of an Iranian bomb to oppose any reconciliation between Washington and Tehran while positioning itself as America’s only friend there. This gambit was always risky; should the US and Iran come to terms on the nuclear issue and unfreeze other aspects of their relations, Iran could again become a “player” for influence, at least in the Middle East, with Israel and the oil-producing Arab states.
What happened in Geneva last week, therefore, is only “Act Two” of a lengthy play with elements of a psychological drama (“Act One“ was the Obama-Rouhani phone call). But if Iran plays its part (by no means certain); and if — assuming that a reasonable nuclear deal can be struck — President Obama shows the mettle with domestic naysayers that he showed on debt and default, then major, positive developments may become possible in the Middle East for the first time in years.
]]>via IPS News
Geneva – Iran offered a new proposal in English during talks over its nuclear program here today in a meeting with the P5+1 negotiating team (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany).
In a closed-door morning session, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif presented [...]]]>
via IPS News
Geneva – Iran offered a new proposal in English during talks over its nuclear program here today in a meeting with the P5+1 negotiating team (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany).
In a closed-door morning session, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif presented a 3-phased offer to the world powers in a PowerPoint presentation titled, “Closing an Unnecessary Crisis and Opening New Horizons,” according to Iranian press reports.
Few details, positive first takes
Iran’s proposal has only been made available to the participating negotiating parties, but both sides concluded the day with positive statements.
“For the first time, very detailed technical discussions continued this afternoon,” said Michael Mann, the Spokesperson for EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton.
A senior State Department official offered the same statement.
Mann later reiterated his positive first take while speaking to reporters but said “there’s still a lot of work to be done,” adding that tomorrow’s session would involve more detail-work.
Iran’s FM, who has been appointed by President Rouhani to lead the Iranian negotiating team, was only present during the morning session. The talks will continue through the 16th at the deputy ministerial level.
Zarif, who is reportedly suffering from intense back pain, did manage to have a bilateral meeting with Ashton following the afternoon plenary.
Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi later met bilaterally with lead US representative Wendy Sherman, the State Department’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
A senior State Department official said the discussion was “useful, and we look forward to continuing our discussions in tomorrow’s meetings with the full P5+1 and Iran.”
Sense of Iran’s new proposal
“We have explained our negotiation goals,” said Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Persian to a swarming crowd of reporters before the afternoon session began.
“We want to guarantee Iran’s right to nuclear technology and assure the other side of the table that our nuclear program is peaceful,” said the Deputy FM, who will be Iran’s lead representative to the P5+1 during the remainder of the Geneva talks.
“The first step includes rebuilding mutual trust and addressing the concerns of both sides,” he said, adding that the “verification tools” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be utilized during the process.
The final step includes using Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Fatwa (a religious ruling) against Iran building nuclear weapons as “the most important point,” stated Araghchi.
“Iran will use its own nuclear facilities including its nuclear research reactor for peaceful purposes,” he noted, adding that the last phase of Iran’s offer includes “the lifting of all sanctions against Iran.”
Hope in Iran, roadblocks in the US
Inside Iran, people were hopeful for a resolution to the international conflict over Tehran’s nuclear program, which has resulted in rounds of unilateral and multilateral sanctions against the country.
Iran’s economy has suffered from a major reduction in its vital oil exports. Almost exactly one year ago, Iran’s currency, the rial, also dropped to more than half its dollar value.
Maliheh Ghasem Nezhad, a 65-year-old retired teacher, told IPS she had voted for Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in June and was “very hopeful that this new team can finish this issue soon.”
“We want a conclusion that is good for us and our economy,” she said.
“No one in Iran wants nuclear bombs but we have the right to safe energy. We just want less stress in our daily lives,” Nezhad told IPS.
After years of increasing isolation and economic pressure from the US and other world powers that intensified significantly during the final term of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, much of Iran seems at least open to a deal with the West.
Supreme leader Ali Khamenei raised more than a few eyebrows around the world when he said he wasn’t “opposed to correct diplomatic moves” during a Sept. 17 speech to commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to Iranian press reports.
“I believe in what was described years ago as heroic flexibility,” he said.
But some Iranians remain skeptical about the possibility of a deal.
“I do not think they can get to an agreement because from many sides there are a lot of pressures,” Bahman Taebi, a bank employee who’s 39 years old, told IPS.
“There are countries in our region that do not want Iran and the West to get close, so they try to do everything they can to impede an agreement,” he said, adding that he believed “Mr. Zarif and his team were very capable for the talks and much better than the previous teams.”
Still, the Iranian delegation’s trip to the United Nations General Assembly, which resulted in a historic phone call between Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani and a private meeting between Zarif and his US counterpart John Kerry — the highest-level official meet between the two countries since Iran’s 1979 revolution — have left Iranians wanting more.
“All I want Dr. Zarif and his team do in Geneva is to continue with the same approach they had in New York,” Reza Sabeti, a 47-year-old private company employee told IPS.
“From what saw in New York, I guess this will be another diplomatic victory for the Rouhani government and also for the US because both sides need an agreement,” he said.
But Iran’s insistence that its right to home-soil enrichment must be recognized as part of any deal remains a problem for the US Congress.
In an Oct. 11 bipartisan letter sent to Obama, 10 senators said “Iran does have a right to a peaceful nuclear energy program; it does not have a right to enrichment.”
The senators, including traditional hawks Sen. Robert Menendez, Sen. Lindsey Graham and Sen. Charles E. Schumer, as well as more moderate Democrats, said they “prepared to move forward with new sanctions to increase pressure on the government in Tehran.”
“The administration has to do much more hard lobbying to prevent Congress from enacting measures that could spoil the chance for a sound agreement with Iran,” Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst, told IPS.
“The presence of names of otherwise reasonable members of Congress on such letters is evidence of the political power of those endeavoring to subvert the negotiation of any agreement with Iran,” he said.
Photo: Talks between Iran and the world powers including EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton and Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif in Switzerland, Genevam on Oct. 15. Credit: European External Action Service/Flickr
]]>by Wayne White
The latest round of frustrating nuclear talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its next session with the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) set for February 26 have generated more arguments that Western demands are excessive and Western concessions insufficient [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The latest round of frustrating nuclear talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its next session with the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) set for February 26 have generated more arguments that Western demands are excessive and Western concessions insufficient to merit a serious response from Tehran. Likewise, there are renewed assertions that Iran should be entitled to continue its nuclear enrichment program much as it wishes, why Tehran is therefore justified in standing its ground, how continuing assurances on the part of the Iranian regime that it has no interest in nuclear weapons should be taken at face value, and that continued Israeli and US threats of potential military action against Iran are mostly bluff.
Yet, although I sympathize with some of these arguments, it seems clear that key players like the IAEA, the P5+1 and most significantly of all, Israel and the US, remain unimpressed and probably will not change their position that Iran ultimately may be seeking a nuclear weapons capability and therefore must be convinced (or somehow compelled) to downgrade its nuclear enrichment program.
And, personally, I do not find it as easy as some others to brush aside years of UN resolutions, Iranian concealment and suspicions concerning Iran’s nuclear program cited by the IAEA and a number of governments as utterly without foundation (especially after seeing examples of Tehran’s duplicity on other issues I observed while inside the US Intelligence Community). Iran’s simultaneous pursuit of an aggressive ballistic missile program also is troubling in this overall context. Finally, amidst obviously deceptive Iranian assurances concerning the fairness of national elections, highly suspect denials of its thousands of human rights abuses, and so on, I am leery about dismissing all doubts about the ultimate aims of Tehran’s nuclear program based merely on various official regime claims of disinterest in — or opposition to — the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Admittedly, the various parties pressing the Iranian regime for a robust inspection regime and a downgrade of its enrichment program could be the victims of a certain amount of “groupthink.” After all, as many argue, the UK, the US and others possessing supposedly impressive intelligence capabilities were wrong about Iraq’s nuclear, WMD and missile programs back in 2003. That devastating and (to a considerable extent on the US side) politically-driven blunder was especially galling because monitoring agencies had been given unprecedented access to relevant Iraqi facilities after Iraq’s defeat in 1991, oversaw the destruction of much of the capabilities in question and had a vast database from which more accurate conclusions could have been drawn.
The Iranian case, however, is not a valid parallel. The international community has never had anything approaching such sweeping access on the ground to what Iran has been working on (especially in recent years), so doubts about what it has been doing are less surprising. While this does not mean all officially stated concerns about Iran are on target, likewise it may be a tad cavalier to dismiss most all doubts about Tehran’s nuclear intentions.
And, naturally, it is troubling that some writers on opposite sides of this debate appear to have assumed, effectively, roles similar to those of prosecutors or defense attorneys. On one side are those who seem determined to ignore all inconsistencies that could undermine allegations of suspicious or questionable Iranian nuclear activity. Then, at the other end of the spectrum, there are those who appear to have little doubt that most everything Iran says in its defense is valid, and all accusations and concerns to date are without any merit. As each phase of this impasse plays out, often I find myself caught in the middle — unconvinced by some allegations, but concerned about a few others, and with suspicions that Tehran has neither revealed all its nuclear activities nor, possibly, accurately described its ultimate intentions.
Word of a new “serious and substantial” P5+1 offer in upcoming talks with Iran is not all that heartening since all my hopes of breakthroughs at various other junctures have been dashed. Thus, I remain dubious about some of the actions of all three sides in this controversy: Tehran, the US along with Israel especially, and some of those observers instinctively critical of the P5+1, the US and Israel.
So far, Tehran seems fairly confident it can simply continue scoffing at suspicions and pushing back hard against proposals aimed at limiting or rendering more transparent its nuclear program (even at times exaggerating its own progress) — all without much risk of military consequences. Indeed, on the eve of the upcoming talks, according to the IAEA, Tehran has begun installing more advanced systems at its main uranium enrichment facility and advancing its work on another key plant.
Meanwhile, Israel and the US appear convinced the “military option” against Iran would not produce the destabilizing (and quite possibly prolonged) crisis in the Middle East region with uncertain consequences I fear so greatly. But there are those who maintain that neither the US nor Israel would act on their threats because of the supposed weakness of their case concerning Iran’s activities, a relatively soft domestic consensus for military action, practical concerns related to such action, or all three.
Yet, a recent Iran Project report, “Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran”, supported by a group of typically more reasoned and cautious Washington insiders, although not taking a position on the military option, adopted as part of its “Shared Understandings” that a “nuclear-armed Iran would pose dangerous challenges to US interests and security.” That position is a step toward reinforcing, at least implicitly, the premise that without a diplomatic settlement, military action should at least be worth considering.
So unless US and Israeli threats (backed by certain underlying assumptions) are, in fact, little more than bluster, continued diplomatic stalemate could lead to major conflict in the region at some point. And if the US were to engage in military action against Iran, or is drawn into the fray by an Israeli attack, the scope of what Washington reportedly has had in mind would mean war. Highly misleading is the notion circulated by too many Washington politicians that military action against Iran merely would be “surgical” in nature.
Consequently, still more focus needs to be placed on examining why US characterizations of potential attacks against Iran as “surgical” or “limited” are so off-base. Decisive military action against most all of Iran’s vast nuclear infrastructure and a broad swathe of Iranian military defenses would not be “limited.” Nonetheless, that assurance is likely to be a key portion of any attempt on the part of political Washington to sell such a conflict to the American people. Finally, more work also should be done on why a nuclear-armed Iran probably would not be the self-destructive, bomb-throwing caricature advocates of military action have made it out to be in order to justify what they call “pre-emptive” or “preventative” attacks.
Continuing attempts to convince broader American audiences that Iran can be taken at its word that it is not seeking nuclear weapons simply will not work given the extent of longstanding, widespread American mistrust and hostility toward post-1979 Iranian governments. And some of Tehran’s assurances might turn out to be false in any case. So, changing various exaggerated impressions in the public mind associated with the likely behavior of a nuclear-armed Iran and distortions related to the supposed ease of acting militarily to crush Iran’s nuclear program prior to its full development are of the highest priority.
Photo: The P5+1′s chief negotiator Catherine Ashton meets the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, on on April 14, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS
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