by Peter Jenkins
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the lead author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, has two objectives: to help American readers understand the Iranian perspective on the fraught US-Iranian relationship, and to advocate a sustained attempt to break the cycle of hostility that was triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Such is the suspicion on both sides of this relationship that some readers may wonder about the extent to which Mousavian’s descriptions of the Iranian perspective can be trusted. This reviewer’s opinion is that Mousavian—a former Iranian ambassador who has been living in the US since 2009—whom the reviewer has known since 2004, is not trying to pull wool over anyone’s eyes. There is corroborating evidence for much of the information he advances. If in places the reader senses that he or she is not getting the full story, a respectable explanation is to hand: those who have worked at the heart of a government, as Mousavian has done, are bound to be “economical” with certain truths, as a British cabinet secretary once put it.
The Iranian political establishment can be reduced, simplistically, to two broad currents. The first contains those who nurture so great a sense of grievance towards the US, and so deep a mistrust, that they have no wish to end the intermittent cold war of the last 35 years. In the second current are those who understand that nurturing grievances is futile, who recognise that the US has legitimate grievances of its own, and who believe that a measure of détente is in the interest of both countries.
Mousavian belongs to the second current. So do Iran’s president since August 2013, Hassan Rouhani, and his foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator, Mohammed Javad Zarif. Iran’s ultimate decision-maker and religious leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, straddles the two camps. He is deeply distrustful of the United States, which he suspects of being bent on the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and of having no interest in détente, but he is ready to give the second current opportunities to prove him wrong.
Iran’s president from 2005-13, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—who created a deplorable impression in the West, and gifted Israeli propagandists, by denying the reality of the Holocaust—came to office as a member of the first current, a “hard-liner.” But one of the revelations of this book is that he made more attempts than any previous leader to engineer a thaw in relations with the United States.
Mousavian’s intriguing thesis is that Ahmadinejad believed that achieving détente would be so popular with Iranian voters that it would help him to become Iran’s equivalent of Vladimir Putin.
Amb. Mousavian was the spokesman for Iran in the negotiations over its nuclear program with the international community 2003-05.
The middle section of the book is given over to an account of the US-Iranian relationship from the author’s first-hand experience. Mousavian does not flinch from addressing all the episodes that have generated a sense of grievance on one side or the other, from cataloguing the false starts and missed opportunities, or from exploring the incidents that have set back relations just when an improvement seemed to be in the offing.
He has been so well connected to several leaders of Iran’s nezam (establishment) during most of the last 35 years that these chapters amount to a fascinating story, told from the inside of a political system that many foreigners find opaque.
It is somewhat remarkable how often relations have been set back just when it seemed that a thaw was about to set in. In 1992, intelligence about Iranian nuclear purchases undermined the good will created by Iran’s intercessions to secure the release of US hostages in the Lebanon. In 1996, the Kolahdooz incident set back relations with Europe that had been improving since the early 90s. In 2002, the Karine A incident negated the cooperation that the US had been receiving from Iran since 9/11, and it led to the infamous naming of Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil” in a State of the Union address.
Mousavian suspects that these and other setbacks were not coincidental; they were the work of people who had no interest in a thaw. That theory would account for the haste with which Iran’s enemies have asserted Iranian responsibility for such incidents. But in the last analysis, answers to these puzzles of responsibility have yet to be authenticated.
In any case, how realistic is it to suppose that an improvement in US-Iran relations can be achieved?
Mousavian admits that there are formidable obstacles to a full normalisation, and he seems to doubt that the US and Iran will become best buddies any time soon.
Chief among the obstacles, seen from the US side, are Iran’s refusal to modify its view that the Jewish character of the Israeli state, proclaimed in Israel’s constitution, is bound to result in injustice, oppression and humiliation for Palestinians living in Israel, and has in fact done so—plus Iran’s determination to support a fellow-Shia movement that Israel and the US deem to be terrorist, Hezbollah.
On the Iranian side, Ayatollah Khamenei fears the consequences of anything more than a modest rapprochement. In his view, the opening of a US embassy in Tehran, for instance, would create opportunities for US subversion of the Islamic Republic; and greater exposure of the Iranian population to all things American would undermine respect for Islamic values. He remains convinced that the US seeks the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
Yet Mousavian believes that there is a middle ground between mutual hostility and full normalisation. He sees scope for the US and Iran to work together, on a basis of mutual respect, to achieve common objectives in areas where their interests coincide. At present those areas include Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, WMD counter-proliferation, energy security, and combating the Jihadi threat in Iraq and Syria.
Developing what Mousavian terms “a framework for cooperation” should be accompanied, he suggests, by an agreement to lock the drawer that contains both sides’ equally long lists of historic grievances, and by a commitment to eschew the rhetoric of enmity and aggression.
The key to taking relations on to a new plane, he argues, is resolving the dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities. This dispute has been fuelled by Israel, partly perhaps for Palestine-related reasons, and by the US’ strategic balance of power considerations.
He believes that a resolution is nonetheless possible. The progress made by American and Iranian negotiators since September 2013, and the alarm that this has caused Israel’s prime minister, suggests that he is right.
Mousavian warns his readers against pressing Iran to cut back its uranium enrichment capacity from the current level, which, objectively, is modest and cannot reasonably be construed as threatening as long as its use is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He fears that the US and EU negotiators will fail to appreciate the cultural and psychological factors that would lead the Iranian nezam to prefer no deal to the kind of capacity reductions that the US and EU have been seeking.
The Islamic Republic is rooted in nationalist as much as in religious values, he explains. The nezam is quick to perceive threats to Iran’s sovereignty and national dignity. They would rather defy than be humiliated. They are ready to engage in reasonable compromise but they will not capitulate.
It is these insights into the Islamic Iranian mind-set that are likely to make this book exceptionally interesting for all but students of Iran—and even they may like to compare their views with those of Mousavian.
He will doubtless be pleased if the book sells well, as it deserves to do. But what will please him most, I suspect, is if it contributes to a better understanding of Iran in the US and in Europe, and if it helps bring to a close a quarrel that reflects well on neither side.
]]>Some of the most recent efforts to derail a nuclear agreement with Iran have been focusing on what has come to be called “possible military dimensions” (PMD), a term that refers to any work Iran has performed in the past on designing nuclear weapons. One of the latest such efforts is a letter that the leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Edward Royce and Eliot Engel, have circulated for signature by their Congressional colleagues. The letter essentially says that all questions about PMD need to be cleared up before we can reach any agreement to restrict Iran’s nuclear program.
The government of Iran will not issue during the next couple of months a public confession about past research or design work on nuclear weapons. This simply won’t happen. So for the United States or its negotiating partners to make clearing up of all questions about PMD a prerequisite to signing an agreement would be a deal-killer. Most of those pushing the PMD issue hardest probably recognize it would be a deal-killer, which is why they are pushing it.
The Royce-Engel letter attempts to relate past behavior to future requirements in enforcing an agreement by asserting there must be a “baseline” of information about the past to assess Iran’s current and future nuclear activity. That assertion lacks logic. Baseline information is important in many things, where what matters is the amount and direction of change in a continuing process—such as what is measured by achievement test scores in education, or by blood tests tracking the level of an antigen produced by the human body. But under an agreement with Iran no work on nuclear weapons would be allowed. It’s not a matter of comparing the pace of current activity with the pace of past activity. Any such activity would be a clear violation of Iran’s obligations under the agreement, as well as its existing obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The single biggest reason, from the standpoint of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon, for completing the agreement under negotiation is to extend and expand the inspection arrangements—already, under the preliminary agreement, unprecedented in their scope and intensity—including full adherence to the Additional Protocol governing inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. That is what is needed to be confident that the Iranian nuclear program remains peaceful—not some fessing up about something done in the distant past. Besides, if the Iranians really wanted to cheat, they would be stupid simply to pick up or duplicate what they had done in the past (and which they already knew Western governments and intelligence services were on to).
The distant past is getting steadily more distant, and even more irrelevant to present concerns. The publicly expressed judgment of the U.S. intelligence community on this subject is that Iran did work on the design of nuclear weapons but that it ceased such work in 2003, now more than a decade ago.
The basic choice in handling the PMD issue in the negotiations now in progress is between attempting to get a confession about behavior that ended more than a decade ago and getting an agreement that provides the best possible assurance that there will be no Iranian nuclear weapon in the future. The advantage of choosing the latter option should be obvious enough when the choice is phrased that way. It should be even more obvious when considering that in terms of actual results, the realistic alternatives are, on one hand, being hardline on the PMD issue and getting neither the confession nor an agreement, and on the other hand, getting an agreement that restricts and monitors Iran’s nuclear program to an extent that years of pressure and hardlining on our side never were able to achieve.
In the history of nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the failures—including one conspicuous case of not acknowledging either past or current activity—have been offset by successes that have included several cases, ranging from Sweden to South Korea, in which states with nuclear weapons programs moved away from them and decided instead to commit themselves to a nuclear-weapons-free future. Isn’t that what we supposedly want from Iran today? Those earlier cases did not involve past confessions but instead a straightforward commitment to keeping national nuclear programs peaceful in the present and future. In a speech on the floor of the Senate in January, Senator Dianne Feinstein referred to such earlier cases in stating, “I believe countries can change. This capacity to change also applies to the pursuit of nuclear weapons.” The question before us, said the senator, is whether Iran is “willing to change its past behavior.” It is change from past behavior, not a public confession about past behavior, that matters. It is the “job of diplomacy,” said Feinstein, “to push for that change.” It is the job of analysts and pundits to realize that agreements need to be assessed according to how they shape future behavior, not just make some statement about the past.
This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.
]]>by Chas Freeman
Negotiators from Iran and the P5+1 are meeting amidst rapidly evolving international and regional circumstances. Whether they succeed or fail, their discussions will have an impact on much more than just nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. They will affect the geopolitics of that region, relations between the world’s greatest powers, and the emerging pluripolar world order.
Ironies of the Current Situation
1) Despite international anxieties about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the program itself remains a conjecture and allegation rather than an established fact. The world’s most highly regarded intelligence agencies affirm only that some Iranians were doing some work on nuclear weapons until 2003, when the Islamic Republic ended this venture. The official worry is now that Iran’s mastery of the full nuclear fuel cycle and its development of missiles will give it “nuclear latency”—the future capacity to weaponize nuclear materials on short notice. The intelligence agency consensus is that Tehran has not made a decision to do this. Still, the seldom-rebutted popular narrative is that Iran is going all out to build a bomb. Even those who reject this narrative do not trust Iran not to make a decision to acquire nuclear weapons in future. This distrust is deep-rooted. It will not be easy to overcome.
2) Iran’s supreme authorities have proclaimed that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are forbidden by Islam. They say that Iran is morally barred from building the bomb. Iran’s history makes it hard to dismiss this declaration out of hand. After all, despite an estimated 100,000 deaths from Iraqi nerve gas attacks, it was on this basis that Tehran declined to develop its own chemical weapons capability during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
The only threats to Iran from countries wielding weapons of mass destruction now come from those most agitated about Iran’s possible acquisition of them—Israel, the United States, and (to a lesser extent) France and neighboring Russia—all of which have nuclear arsenals and a record of assaulting Muslim states. It is logical that Iran should want a nuclear deterrent to bar attack by such nuclear-armed enemies. Powerful interest groups and politicians in Israel, Saudi Arabia, France, and the US assign more weight to this logic than to the findings of their own intelligence agencies. Israelis recall that they ran their own clandestine nuclear weapons program decades ago amidst constant denials that they had such a program. Israel’s government doubts that Iran is any more truthful about its nuclear programs and their objectives than Israel was in the past.
3) Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf Arabs don’t want a deal that allows Iran to continue to enrich but, in the absence of a deal, Iran would certainly continue to develop its nuclear sector without effective international constraint.
Current Geo-Political Trends
1) There is a lot at stake in the current negotiations. Recent international trends and developments are both adding to their complexity and magnifying the consequences of their outcome. But the world, the region, and all the parties to the negotiations need a deal.
2) Over the past year, relations among the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) and the situation in the region have both changed substantially. Tensions between the EU, US, and Russia have become acute and have reduced Russian interest in deferring to Western policies when its own interests in the Middle East and elsewhere suggest a different course. In August, Russia reportedly agreed to buy an initial 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil for resale on world markets, including China, with an option for twice as much. In the absence of UN legitimation of sanctions, China has been importing about 675,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day. India imports almost 300,000. Russia and China are unlikely to cooperate with further sanctions.
The EU has little appetite for more sanctions against Iran. European interest in trade and investment in Iran is all the greater because the EU now needs more than ever to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Israel’s influence in France, Germany, and the UK has weakened. In this atmosphere, an Israeli effort to block or sabotage agreement would potentially split the P5+1 along yet another axis.
3) The structure of the global economy is changing in ways that reduce American power. US dollar hegemony, the basis for the effectiveness of the current sanctions regime, has begun to visibly erode. New trade settlement mechanisms that avoid the dollar are becoming available. The Indo-Pacific region’s economies are already 1.5 times the size of NAFTA or the EU and are growing more rapidly. The implications of this are clear. The era in which the United States and/or Europe can effectively sanction other countries without the support of the UN Security Council and the great non-Western powers is drawing to a close. Despite Congressional hubris, which is boundless, efforts to tighten sanctions probably won’t work.
Meanwhile, the rise of the group that calls itself the Islamic State and the drawdown of Western forces in Afghanistan have made cooperation with Iran on regional issues more attractive.
The net effect of these changes has been to create new diplomatic options and opportunities for future sanctions avoidance by Iran. Given the strategic situation, Iran is in a seller’s position for the first time.
Bottom Line
A breakdown in the negotiations or an agreement that falls apart due to opposition from Israel’s American partisans would see the US Congress seek to ratchet up sanctions against Iran. Israel would be forced to decide whether to mount a unilateral attack on Iran or suffer a loss of credibility as its repeated threats to do so were revealed to be a bluff. Iran would have to choose between its professed aversion to weapons of mass destruction and its need to deter attack by Israel or the United States. Iran might follow North Korea in withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The role of international law in non-proliferation efforts would suffer a debilitating setback. The prospects for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be greatly enhanced. The struggle to craft a strategy to deal with the spreading phenomenon of Islamist extremism, including the so-called “Islamic State” now straddling the Iraq-Syria border, would be further complicated. Another extension of the negotiating deadline would lack credibility and—to one degree or another—entail some of the same negative consequences as a failure to close a deal or to implement one.
An agreement between Iran and the P5+1 that survived Israeli and Gulf Arab second-guessing could (and likely would) stall, if not preclude, further nuclear proliferation in the region. It could also catalyze progress toward Iranian rapprochement with the United States and other Western countries. Its regional impact would depend in part on whether it was judged as likely to prove effective in curbing Iran’s presumed nuclear ambitions. If so, it could facilitate the regional accommodations necessary to restore stability in the Middle East and wider Muslim world.
One way or another, an agreement would produce a chance for all parties to discover common interests in combating and containing extremism, whether Sunni or Shia in origin, and an opportunity for creative diplomacy to replace military contention with peaceful coexistence and competition. These opportunities might not be seized, of course. But they would not exist at all in the absence of a successful outcome to the current negotiations.
– Chas Freeman served as US ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the war to liberate Kuwait and as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1993-94. Since 1995, he has chaired Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based firm that creates businesses across borders for its American and foreign clients. He was the editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica entry on “diplomacy” and is the author of five books, including “America’s Misadventures in the Middle East” and “Interesting Times: China, America, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige.” This essay is based on remarks presented at a Sept. 29 panel at the 2014 Leadership Conference of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC).
]]>by Adnan Tabatabai
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani arrived in New York yesterday with the clear understanding that he’s being carefully watched back home. The official purpose of his trip is to address the United Nations General Assembly, but much more is at stake. Rouhani made solving the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program the centerpiece of his presidential campaign, but while the Nov. 24 deadline to reach a final accord is steadily approaching, no deal is in sight. Meanwhile the president of the United States—essentially Iran’s main negotiating partner in the talks—is facing growing pressure to develop a coherent strategy against the radical militia that calls itself the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL). The course of the next few months could define both leaders’ presidential legacies.
No matter how you look at it, resolving both these issues requires a modus operandi between Iran and the United States. Bilateral talks between the two long-time adversaries have almost become routine over the last year; the latest meeting between Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry lasted for more than an hour Sunday in New York. But the debate over the definition of a “functional relationship” with Washington is among the most sensitive issues in Iran with competing political factions exercising extreme skepticism against each other.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is (and has always been) trying to cover all his bases: those backing the Rouhani government’s path towards constructive engagement, and those for whom rapprochement with the US is a red line.
Last week, an infographic published on the ayatollah’s website illustrated why talks with the US in the past 12 months have been harmful to Iran. Two days later, a compilation of quotes by the Supreme Leader supporting the negotiations was published on the same site.
Critics Seek Center Stage
Some of the Rouhani government’s most outspoken opponents convened on Monday for yet another press conference in Tehran to voice their concerns about Iran’s foreign policy. Since May this year, these hard-line conservative MPs, clerics and think tankers—also known as “the concerned” (delvaapasaan)—have routinely set up meetings whenever a new round of nuclear talks is taking place between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1).
Through lectures and a Q&A session with journalists, the panelists of the “Path and Pit” meeting outlined the “dos and don’ts” for Rouhani’s trip and warned against yet another “inappropriate action”—their reference to Rouhani’s last-minute telephone conversation with US President Barack Obama during last year’s UNGA.
The concerns identified by the delvaapasaan are based on a variety of issues that extend far beyond the nuclear negotiations. The group mainly criticizes the Rouhani government for:
- Abandoning resistance as the main theme defining foreign affairs
- Leaning towards appeasement vis-à-vis Washington
- Selling out Iran’s right to scientific progress in the nuclear talks
- Falling short of informing the parliament about the nuclear talks
- Not allowing a critical debate about their foreign policy in the media
- Not following the path outlined by the supreme leader
Panelist Mohammad Hassan Asafari, a member of the parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs, credited Iran’s “strong” position in the region to its policies of resistance and expressed worries about Rouhani’s approach to ending the sanctions regime. “We should not show the enemy that we are eager for the sanctions to be lifted,” he said. “It would pave the way for the enemy’s benefit if Iran looks too keen.”
Hamid Rasai, a MP and leading member of the hard-line Endurance Front who got one of Rouhani’s ministers impeached, argued that direct talks with the United States have not only resulted in no benefit but also been followed by harsher rhetoric from Washington and additional unilateral sanctions.
Rasai also stressed that “Rouhani should know he is the president of the Islamic Republic, not just the president of the people of Iran.” He must therefore seize the opportunity provided by the UNGA “to spread our message to the world”—which former President Ahmadinejad managed to do, according to Rasai.
Mohammad Ali Ramin, a former deputy minister under Ahmadinejad, argued that the group is not only concerned about the nuclear issue but also about the broader picture in which the supreme leader is the Imam of the global umma (community) and not just the Iranian nation. Rouhani should therefore recognize that he is “administering just a corner of that umma” and consider the leader’s viewpoints, said Ramin.
The last speaker in the group, University of Tehran Professor Saeed Zibakalam, said he expects the Rouhani government to whitewash Washington’s position towards Iran, and criticized the negotiating team for substantially exaggerating the benefits of the Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva last year. The plan does not acknowledge Iran’s right to enrich uranium and no sanctions were lifted, argued Zibakalam.
Asked by journalists to identify the difference between the current and previous administration on Iran’s nuclear file, Rasai said that under Ahmadinejad, the nuclear issue was taken care of by the Supreme National Security Council, whereas now it is processed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it is under the scrutiny of “no one but Rouhani”.
Rasai further complained about state media being controlled by a government that he said prevents critical debate and criticized other media for promoting rapprochement with the United States. Rasai even asked a journalist from the reformist daily Etemad why his paper is “waiting for Rouhani to have a meeting with the Satan.”
Rasai and Zibakalam both agreed that the Iranian people would not accept bowing down to the US and would oust any president who attempted to do so.
Political Realities
The meeting was yet another indicator that criticism of Iran’s foreign policy goals has reached a new peak on the home front.
In recent days, far-right conservative outlets like Fars News, Kayhan, Vatan-e Emrouz and Raja News ran features and op-eds warning against the acceptance of a nuclear deal limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment and any rapprochement with the United States.
Indeed, almost immediately after it was reported by the New York Times, public opposition was voiced in Iran to a “face-saving” proposal that would allow Iran to keep its centrifuges in place but suspend operations. “This proposal is ridiculous…If such a proposal is formally presented by American officials, it indicates their childish outlook on the negotiations or the stupid assumptions of the Iranian side,” said Hossein Sheikholeslam, a deputy to the speaker of parliament, according to Fars News.
As I wrote two months ago, the Rouhani administration is not desperate for a deal—especially not one that would be difficult to sell at home.
A recent poll suggests that more than 70% of the Iranian public would not accept a deal that forces Iran to dismantle up to half of its operating centrifuges and limit its nuclear research capacities. A large majority of Iranians also believe that their nuclear program is just an excuse for foreign powers to exert pressure on Iran, according to the poll.
Regardless of whether or not the survey’s methodology is reliable (accurate polling is hard to come by when it comes to Iran), the overall results reflect what one would hear and read in Iran.
While hope persists, we should not expect another big step with regards to US-Iran relations during Rouhani’s trip to New York this year—no phonecall, no handshake, and no joint press conference.
Even if there were a political breakthrough—which seems unlikely at this point—the timing isn’t right. Such political staging would result in harsh political blowback in Washington and Tehran for both presidents.
We should therefore expect the nuclear talks as well as any debate on fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq to be conducted in a private and prudent fashion.
Meanwhile, Iran has been making history with other world powers. The meeting today between Rouhani and French President Francois Hollande was widely publicized by both countries. The expected meeting between Rouhani and British Prime Minister David Cameron would be the first of its kind in 35 years.
Iran’s international outreach should not be interpreted as solely bent on rapprochement with the United States. In this light, Rouhani has a lot to gain from his second visit to New York deal or no deal.
Right now, meeting w/ the President of #France @fhollande re expansion of bilateral ties. #ConstructiveEngagement pic.twitter.com/1QxwADd26e
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) September 23, 2014
Iranians are open to a nuclear settlement along the lines of what their government has already proposed in ongoing negotiations with world powers, according to a survey of Iranian public opinion jointly conducted July 11-17 by the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). However, their willingness to accept further Iranian concessions for an agreement is limited by the belief that Iran’s nuclear program is important for the country’s future advancement, a sense that Iran should not be singled out on the issue of nuclear power, and deep mistrust of US motives in its dealings with Iran.
With respect to the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, Russia, France, China plus China), the survey gave the more than 1,000 respondents a list of nine hypothetical concessions that Iran could offer toward reaching a deal and asked whether they believed each concession “is acceptable,” “could be acceptable,” or “is not acceptable.” A majority said that four either were or could be acceptable: 1) giving the P5+1 assurances that Iran will never produce a nuclear weapon (79% acceptable); 2) allowing current international inspections to continue (76%); 3) permitting more inspections (62%); and not enriching any uranium above 5% for an agreed-upon period (57%).
Two concessions, however, were deemed unacceptable by the majority: 1) dismantling “about half” of Iran’s currently operating centrifuges (70% unacceptable); and 2) limiting nuclear research (75% unacceptable). Feelings about the remaining three concessions were mixed: limiting stockpiles of enriched uranium for an agreed-upon period (49% acceptable vs. 44% unacceptable), freezing the number of active centrifuges for an agreed-upon period (46% vs. 45%), and not upgrading centrifuges for an agreed-upon period (42% vs. 47%).
While the devil is always in the details, the findings suggest that the Iranian public is open to, or will at least tolerate a deal that puts temporary limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment program (even freezing it at current levels, as Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif recently suggested) and that includes substantial international oversight. But they will not accept a deal that rolls back that enrichment program or hinders Iran’s nuclear research.
Feeding into these sentiments is a deep Iranian mistrust of the P5+1’s motives—or really U.S.’s motives—in targeting Iran’s nuclear program in the first place. When asked why America is concerned with Iran’s nuclear program, 75% responded agreed with the statement “Iran’s nuclear program is only an excuse and the U.S. is pursuing some other goals.” Asked what those goals are, 53% cited an American desire to “dominate Iran or block its development,” while 11% said the U.S. “is trying to change Iran’s domestic political order.”
The Iranian people seem particularly concerned with the importance of nuclear research to Iran’s scientific development (94% say a peaceful nuclear program is “necessary,” and limiting nuclear research activities is the least popular possible Iranian concession). There could be an opening for a deal along the lines of the one proposed earlier this week by the Arms Control Association, which would allow Iran to continue its nuclear research while delaying the deployment of whatever advances it makes, but the Iranian public seems unlikely to accept the ACA’s requirement that Iran scale back its existing enrichment program.
Iranians also do not trust that the United States will actually follow through on promises to lift sanctions if Iran complies with its obligations under a final agreement—74% believe that America would maintain the sanctions and simply change the rationale behind them.
During a Sept. 17 event to unveil the poll’s findings, the CISSM’s John Steinbruner pointed out that “our prime problem is conveying to [the Iranians], in a credible way, that we do not intend to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” a task that (as he noted) is complicated by the fact that, well, some of “us” actually want to do precisely that.
The data, as former diplomat Hillary Mann Leverett noted, also suggests (in line with what Adnan Tabatabai wrote here in July) that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani does not “need” a nuclear deal to ensure his political future. Study co-author Ebrahim Mohseni reported that, when asked who they would blame most if the nuclear talks fail, 40% of respondents named the US and another 20% cited the P5+1. Only 9% said that they would primarily blame the Iranian government for a failure. And only 28% would place any blame at all on Iranian officials if the talks were to collapse, compared with 59% who would not blame them at all. This suggests that, as Leverett said, “there is no significant constituency in Iran” that would support a nuclear deal concluded entirely on Washington’s terms just for the sake of making a deal.
Moreover, the survey found that only 18% of Iranians expect Rouhani will be “very successful” in concluding a nuclear agreement, and only 14% expect him to be “very successful” in getting economic sanctions against Iran reduced. Yet 85% of Iranians have a favorable opinion of him (51% “very favorable”), and 68% credit him with improving Iran’s economic situation even with most of all the sanctions still in place. When it comes to those sanctions, 85% agree they have had a negative impact on Iran’s economy, but a slight majority, 53% say that the economy is “good,” suggesting that the pain of the sanctions isn’t driving Iranian public opinion. Rouhani’s domestic support appears strong and is unlikely to be heavily affected if the talks fail, since Iranian expectations on that front are not especially high.
Panelists at the CISSM event also emphasized the degree to which Iranian attitudes are dictated by their sense of fairness under international law, and of Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Mohseni noted that there is “a great deal of eagerness [for Iran] to be a cooperative member of the international community,” but not if that membership comes at the cost of Iranian sovereignty or its nuclear rights. Iranian officials have said that they will not accept what they term “nuclear apartheid,” an outcome where Iran’s nuclear program is subject to international scrutiny and requirements that are not placed on other NPT signatories.
Ultimately, the results of the UTCPOR/CISSM survey suggest that the Iranian public will accept some level of extra scrutiny and requirements for a defined period of time, but there are limits to what they will tolerate.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued its latest quarterly report on Iran. The IAEA Board will consider the Sept. 5 report during the week of Sept. 15.
Much initial comment has centred on signs that the process launched on Nov. 11, 2013, when the IAEA and Iran [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued its latest quarterly report on Iran. The IAEA Board will consider the Sept. 5 report during the week of Sept. 15.
Much initial comment has centred on signs that the process launched on Nov. 11, 2013, when the IAEA and Iran agreed on a framework for addressing all outstanding IAEA concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program, is starting to stall. But first the good news:
- Iran no longer possesses any declared uranium enriched to 20% U235 in gaseous form. Fed into a sufficient number of centrifuges, 20% U235 can quickly be enriched to weapon grade. All this material has either been down-blended or converted into uranium oxide for fuel plates.
- Iran has started to convert its stock of uranium enriched up to 5% U235 from gaseous form into uranium oxide. Once the whole stock has been converted, drawing on it to produce weapon-grade U235 would be an unattractive option.
- Iran has not brought any additional centrifuge cascades into service since the last IAEA report. It is operating 54 cascades at the Natanz plant and four cascades at Fordow.
- IAEA inspectors have been granted access to Iran’s centrifuge workshops and storage facilities, and have had access to a centrifuge research and development centre. These visits have enabled the agency to confirm that the production rate of rotors, a crucial centrifuge component, is consistent with a program for replacing damaged centrifuges (and points away from any clandestine centrifuge acquisition program).
- Iran continues to meet all its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed between the US and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) last November.
- All nuclear material known to be in Iran’s possession continues to be accounted for and to be in peaceful use.
Together these findings suggest that the purpose of Iran’s uranium enrichment program is the production of reactor fuel, as declared, and not the production of nuclear weapons, which would be a violation of Iran’s obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is open to Iran at any time to change course and start using facilities that are inherently capable of serving both civil and military purposes for a military end, but there is no indication in the latest report that Iran has the ‘political will’ to do any such thing.
There is cause for concern, however, in what the agency reports about the implementation of the Nov. 11, 2013 Cooperation Framework. Having addressed all the issues raised by the agency on that date and Feb. 9, 2014, Iran has been slow to address two of the five issues raised on May 20 (but has now done so) and has only just begun to discuss two more.
The two issues on which Iran appears most reticent relate to allegations that Iran has engaged in research and experimentation into certain uses of high explosives, and has studied the application of neutrons to compressed materials.
What concerns the IAEA is that this work could have been relevant to a clandestine nuclear weapon research program. (It is not clear whether the agency has evidence that the work is ongoing. The US intelligence community has stated on record that Iran abandoned systematic nuclear weapon research in 2003.)
Worryingly, the agency reports that on Aug. 28 Iran wrote that “most of the issues” that the agency views as outstanding are “mere allegations and do not merit consideration”. This echoes the Iranian position during a long period that preceded the agreement last November, which seemed to herald a more constructive approach.
Neither party is to be envied. The IAEA has said that its concerns are based on more than intelligence material (which, almost by definition, may or may not be worthy of trust), and cannot retreat without losing credibility. Iran has backed itself into a corner by often denying ever having had any interest in developing nuclear weapons, and may well be nervous about the consequences of self-incrimination, not least because US politics make those unpredictable.
It must be recalled, however, that this process is entirely independent of the process launched two weeks later by the JPA. The JPA does not stipulate that resolution of all IAEA issues is an indispensable pre-condition for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. The IAEA has made clear that it is working to a much longer time-scale than those trying to negotiate a peaceful outcome to their nuclear dispute within the framework of the JPA.
So Iran has time to reflect on its position. It also has time to consult the US and others about how they would react to any admission of past weapon-related research, and to exchange assurances. That could be one way out of this impasse.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano at a press conference with Dr Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice President and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran during his official visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran Aug. 17, 2014. Credit: Conleth Brady/IAEA
]]>by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
On Aug. 29 the US Treasury added 28 Iranian individuals and entities to its ever-expanding sanctions list. Expectedly, Tehran denounced the decision.
“They are in conflict with the spirit of talks. They are unconstructive in my opinion,” said Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during an Aug. 30 news conference broadcast [...]]]>
by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
On Aug. 29 the US Treasury added 28 Iranian individuals and entities to its ever-expanding sanctions list. Expectedly, Tehran denounced the decision.
“They are in conflict with the spirit of talks. They are unconstructive in my opinion,” said Iranian President Hassan Rouhani during an Aug. 30 news conference broadcast on State TV.
“We should resist such an aggression with all might and power,” he said. “We consider some of the sanctions crimes against humanity.”
This is not the first time the United States has imposed sanctions on Iran since the historic interim nuclear deal achieved between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) in November 2013, but Rouhani’s words mark a shift in Iran’s reaction. The Iranian president spent considerable time decrying the sanctions in a harsher tone than ever before. Rouhani was sending a message to the United States.
US sanctions on Iran, which have been consistently expanded by Congress and executive orders since 1997, have become so byzantine that they are hindering the activities of countless businesses, Iranian or multinational. The net of financial sanctions has been crafted with such a tight mesh that even harmless, routine trade is constrained and sanctioned.
In concrete terms, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the body responsible for the enforcement of trade and financial sanctions, has extended its regulations to such a degree that many Iranian private businesses are struggling to survive as basic business functions have become nearly impossible. Iranian Banks cannot easily send or receive money abroad, especially if that money needs to be converted into dollars for the transaction, or if the funds must pass through a major bank that conducts significant US business. Airlines cannot readily purchase parts, or refuel in foreign countries. Factories cannot easily secure the inputs of production, or sell their goods overseas. The fact that any private business remains in Iran at all is a testament to the wherewithal of Iranian executives and technocrats.
One could argue that the challenges facing Iran’s business community are offset by the fact that Iran is back at the negotiating table. But Iran expressed a willingness to negotiate before the harshest sanctions were imposed, and the direct consequences of OFAC’s actions have also led to considerable human suffering that could take years to remedy.
When banks, airlines, and factories cannot readily engage in their basic operations, three groups suffer: consumers, employees, and shareholders. In Iran, as in all countries with a private sector, these three groups represent the constituencies of civil society. When sanctions impact banking, it precipitates inflation and currency devaluation that wipes out the real value of savings accounts, leaving families broke or in a state of uncertainty. When sanctions hit airlines, passengers are left boarding ageing and poorly maintained aircraft. Although the US claims it is not targeting average Iranians, financial sanctions constrain factories that process food, manufacture medicines, or refine oil, leaving consumers with ever-increasing prices for basic goods like bread, antibiotics, and gasoline.
Since 2006, when the Iran Sanctions Act was strengthened and extended, Iran’s Consumer Price Index increased from about 40 points to 195 points in 2013, according to data from the Central Bank of Iran. Similarly, the Producer Price Index shot up from its record low of 153 points in 2008 to almost 550 points in June 2014. Most troublingly, monthly food inflation has averaged 38% for the last two years and has only recently begun to stabilize.
As a result, sanctions harm civil society, which we in the West claim to cherish as the foundation of moderate politics. Compounding Iran’s problems, unemployment creeps upward, and business owners cease investing in growth and innovation because they have to search for ways to preserve their wealth, which leads to capital flight. According to the World Bank, Iran’s economy shrank by nearly 6% in 2013. Although last year’s interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action, offered Iran modest sanctions relief, Iranians, especially the middle class, are still struggling to lead normal lives. Today Iran’s economy remains closer to the brink of collapse than to recovery.
So as OFAC has strengthened its position, sanctioning individuals and business entities while demanding record fines from entities that have long traded with Iran—European banks in particular—the Iranian people have unduly suffered. This has not been unknown to policymakers in Washington. Countless papers from think tanks, academic institutes, and government offices have highlighted the ways in which sanctions have harmed ordinary Iranians. But the collateral damage seemed justified during the overlapping Ahmadinejad and Bush presidencies, when there was no hope for détente.
Yet the presidential election of Rouhani last year paved the way for a new era in US-Iran relations. The cautious optimism was boosted by the interim nuclear agreement. Now the role of OFAC must come under greater scrutiny. President Barack Obama has clearly expended immense effort and political capital to push forward the negotiations since Rouhani became president. Yet OFAC and its agents take extraordinary measures to sanction companies, many of whom claim they have done nothing more than try and survive in an impossible economic and regulatory environment. Should OFAC tow the line of anti-engagement proponents in Congress and hawkish advocacy groups, we may be condemned to a further decade of antagonism with Iran, the resilient and capable partner sorely needed in a region descending into chaos.
– Esfandyar Batmanghelidj is a founding partner of the 1st Europe-Iran Forum, a conference to be held in London in October focused on commercial opportunities in Iran. He has conducted extensive research on Iranian political economy and social history.
Photo Credit: Behroz Khosravi/Fars
]]>by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was elected to office largely on his promise to lift the economy out if its deepest recession since the Iran-Iraq war. One year later, evidence of a recovery is hard to find, but he has achieved a few significant accomplishments.
Rouhani’s most visible accomplishment [...]]]>
by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was elected to office largely on his promise to lift the economy out if its deepest recession since the Iran-Iraq war. One year later, evidence of a recovery is hard to find, but he has achieved a few significant accomplishments.
Rouhani’s most visible accomplishment is lower inflation, down by more than half from over 40 percent a year ago. The runaway inflation of the last three years that alienated the middle class and even many conservatives from former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is now back to a level that Iranians consider normal.
Containing inflation was achieved at considerable cost, though, by keeping government expenditures to a minimum and forgoing any kind of fiscal or monetary stimulus. Rouhani even managed to increase energy prices last April without any protest, indicating that his popularity has so far survived austerity. The energy price hikes were substantial enough to close the budget gap left by Ahmadinejad’s generous — some would say irresponsible — cash transfers. The price of gasoline was increased by 75 percent, diesel by 67 percent, and other energy prices by about 30 percent.
Rouhani’s second economic achievement was restoring the business confidence lost to the erratic economic management of the Ahmadinejad years. He did this by simply getting elected and by appointing a competent team. His election stopped or at least slowed down the hemorrhaging of Iran’s economy, which has been hit by draconian international sanctions and bad domestic policies.
Rouhani’s greatest economic success came in the form of a political victory. He overcame substantial domestic opposition to rapprochement with the West to sign the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) with world powers last November. The economic impact of the JPA has been underwhelming, but without it the economy would have continued to slide.
The agreement can be credited with the strengthening of Iran’s currency, the rial, which is a good indication of rising business confidence. Since November, Iran’s oil exports have also increased by 30 percent, about $7 billion of Iran’s frozen funds have been released, and petrochemical exports, which received specific sanctions relief, have increased.
This spring, auto production (also marked for sanctions relief in the JPA) was up by a whopping 90 percent compared to a year ago according to Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, the minister for industry, mines and commerce. He also mentioned increases in petrochemicals production by 9 percent and durable goods by 30 percent.
These improvements are most likely lost on the average Iranian, whose job prospects and income has not increased since Rouhani took office. The obvious culprit is, of course, the financial and shipping sanctions that limit Iran’s access to its foreign exchange earnings and continue to choke large sections of its industries. Manufacturers are still using cumbersome and costly channels to procure their raw materials and parts. For them, the optimistic official statements and newspaper headlines proclaiming the imminent “collapse of the sanctions regime,” is just talk. Indeed, while Western critics of Iran’s limited sanctions relief, particularly in Washington, point to the flood of foreign business missions to Tehran, no actual investment has occurred due to the continued uncertainty about the future of the sanctions.
The latest disappointing jobs report shows the limited impact of the JPA so far. Industry as a whole continued to lose jobs last spring, more than 6 months after the signing of the agreement.
There were 700,000 fewer industry workers employed in spring 2014 than when Rouhani took office. These numbers cast doubt on the claim made in a recent report published by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Roubini Global Economics that the economic benefit of the JPA “is reflected in increased economic output and improvements in employment within Iran.” National accounts data published last week shows that industrial output for 2013/14 as a whole was down by 4.5 percent and industrial employment has been falling through spring 2014.
Data on personal incomes and consumption published by the Statistical Center of Iran also indicates that economic recovery is yet to come. For the Iranian year that ended on March 20, 2014, real household consumption fell by 5 percent for urban households and 12 percent for rural ones. Their real food expenditures meanwhile fell by 14 percent.
So does the anemic economic recovery weaken Rouhani’s hand in the nuclear negotiations and should the West therefore toughen its position now in order to extract further concessions from Iran?
Sanctions have no doubt increased Iran’s willingness to negotiate, but it would be a mistake to think that more sanctions always brings more concessions. Most Iranians believe their government has held its part of the bargain since last November, so they would see more sanctions now as bad faith on the part of the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) and blame the failure of the negotiations on them. This would reduce pressure on Rouhani to make further concessions.
Furthermore, the Iranian middle class, after having survived eight years of Ahmadinejad, still regards Rouhani as the best leader to champion its interests. The poor, who, despite years of sanctions are decreasing as a proportion of the total population, are meanwhile relatively well protected. Thanks to the cash assistance program instituted by Ahmadinejad (about $40 per person per month in international dollars) in 2012/13, when average real incomes and expenditures were falling, poverty rates actually fell. At the time, only 5 percent of the population was counted as poor, based on a $5 per day poverty line (in international dollars). Iran’s effective income assistance programs can be adjusted to protect them against further economic deterioration.
The more interesting question is how the course of the talks could affect Rouhani’s presidency beyond its first year.
As they stand now, Rouhani’s plans are helping the private sector lead the economic recovery and letting markets form the basis of economic life in the Islamic Republic. If the talks succeed in the next four months and sanctions are gradually lifted, Iranian businesses are sure to spring into action, as they do when oil money starts to flow. Rouhani will be then be well on his way to a second term.
But Rouhani has reservations about this scenario. In the past, oil-induced booms have deepened Iran’s dependence on the outside world, something that runs counter to the vision of a “Resistance Economy” identified with the Supreme Leader.
If the talks fail, as the Washington hawks seem to wish, Rouhani would have to reverse course; instead of re-integrating Iran into the global economy with the private sector in the lead, he would promote economic self-reliance and resistance to outside pressures, a strategy that fits much better with the state and its para-statals at the helm.
In the narrow, security-focused discussion of Iran that passes for analysis these days in the US, the broader issues of importance to Western leaders are easily lost. But for those interested in longer-term relations with Iran, it helps to bear in mind that the current negotiations are not just about Iran’s nuclear activities; they are also about the direction that Iran’s economy will take in the coming decade, and who could benefit from it.
Photo: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visits the Shahid Rajai Port Complex port in Hormozgan Province on Feb. 25, 2014.
]]>by Ellie Geranmayeh
In recent weeks, hard-line members of the US Congress have stepped up their game of obstructing diplomacy with Iran. Resolving the Iranian nuclear conflict has been used as a chip in domestic politics rather than a foreign policy issue pursued through a multilateral track. Opposition to incentivized diplomacy with Iran is [...]]]>
by
Ellie GeranmayehIn recent weeks, hard-line members of the US Congress have stepped up their game of obstructing diplomacy with Iran. Resolving the Iranian nuclear conflict has been used as a chip in domestic politics rather than a foreign policy issue pursued through a multilateral track. Opposition to incentivized diplomacy with Iran is likely to intensify with the looming US mid-term elections and the November 24 deadline for the extended negotiations. Powerful factions in Congress are signaling that they will try to tie the hands of the US executive when it comes to fulfilling its obligations under a reasonable final deal. Given how sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program operate, the hawks in Congress are not just a problem for the US president — they are a problem for Europe, too.
President Barack Obama has presidential authority to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program and issue temporary waivers on easing sanctions. At some point, the administration and Congress will have to see eye to eye in order to legislate for permanent sanctions relief as part of a comprehensive agreement. The on-going debate on Capitol Hill around this issue has vast implications for European companies that have been severely limited in their ability and willingness to do business with Iran due to the secondary effect of US sanctions. European companies took a large financial hit to endorse the sanctions regime against Iran since 2006. They understandably want a durable deal allowing them to trade with Iran without risking US Treasury penalties or a future US president dramatically altering the policy on Iran to Europe’s detriment.
Europeans companies have good reasons to worry that Congress won’t play ball as part of a final deal agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia plus Germany. US lawmakers have called for fresh sanctions and/or for existing sanctions, which are suspended under the interim nuclear deal, to be reinstated. These measures would clearly spoil the spirit of good faith in the negotiations and go against the interim nuclear deal agreed to last November. Other members of Congress have proposed restricting the presidential waivers on sanctions against Iran. Most recently, a bill attempting to restrict the president’s ability to implement a final deal unless Congress can be satisfied that the funds released to Iran are not directed at terrorism or human rights abuses has also been circulated. This puts a huge burden on implementation timelines for a final deal and an impossible bar for the US executive to meet.
Powerful lobby groups and senators have campaigned Congress to shift the goal posts for the nuclear talks to include Iran’s role in sponsoring terrorism and its human rights record. Representative Eliot Engel has predicted that even if a final deal was reached, Congress would not allow the lifting of sanctions until Iran stopped being a “bad actor” in the region. Engel unhelpfully omitted to note what exactly this means or how to measure when Iran is being a force for good. Although these are all areas of concern for the West, they are unconnected to Iran’s nuclear program and rest outside the parameters of the nuclear talks. Proponents of these measures know well that the outcome of actually endorsing such conditions will squeeze Iran out of the talks. The European strategy of tackling human rights issues in tandem with supporting the nuclear talks provides a better model for progress on both issues.
The position of Congressional hawks is at odds with the P5+1’s overriding objective of removing potential threats posed by Iran’s nuclear program and lifting associated sanctions. Focusing on this goal is partially easier for the EU, which, unlike the US, has maintained clear divisions between sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program and those directed at human rights and terrorism. Europeans also have a different psychology when it comes to tacitly accepting Iran’s limited enrichment capability. For example, the UK Foreign Affairs Committee recently backed diplomacy with Iran and publicly acknowledged that “there is probably no prospect of a lasting deal which does not allow Iran to enrich uranium”. This stands in stark contrast to the hard-line position by Israel and certain members of Congress insisting Iran dismantle all its centrifuges and cease uranium enrichment on its own soil.
Without doing Obama’s job for him, Europeans should outline their interests and reasons for backing a final nuclear deal within the US political debate. Although this may not have much sway with the hawks, it could have a noticeable impact on those members of Congress who are sitting on the fence when it comes to diplomacy with Iran. Sceptics must be reminded that Iran has fully implemented the interim nuclear deal, which has in turn provided a stringent inspection on Iran’s nuclear program. A final deal can fulfill the checklists Western powers need to ensure Iran is unable to make a clandestine dash for the bomb. The alternatives to diplomacy, of upping sanctions or engaging in military conflict, cannot wholly eliminate Iran’s capacity for nuclear weapons. These actions will further destabilize an already turbulent and unpredictable region. They would also remove the potential for Iran to become a constructive actor in countries like Iraq.
Diplomacy with Iran has been a true exercise in patience, and there is a long road ahead. Congress should be wary of being perceived as the unreasonable actor in the nuclear talks. After all, it was the Europeans who in the early 2000s persuaded a reluctant US administration to follow the dual-track approach of sanctions and dialogue that avoided war and resulted in last year’s interim accord. But it was also Europe, rather than the US, that accepted the high costs associated with sanctioning Iran’s oil and banking sector, which was fully endorsed by Congress. If the US legislature obstructs a final deal without due cause, the international consensus behind sanctioning Iran to address proliferation concerns would be in danger. This could result in unwanted consequences not only in the Iranian case, but also in building future partnerships with Europe on sanctions, notably with respect to Russia.
– Ellie Geranmayeh is an ECFR policy fellow and the author of the recently published report, “Détente with Iran; how Europe can maximise the chances of a final nuclear deal.”
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier brief the press about their bilateral consultations during negotiations with Iran in Vienna on July 13, 2014.
]]>The recently extended nuclear negotiations with Iran have had to compete for front-page attention with acute crises elsewhere. The agreement to extend both the negotiations and the interim commitments associated with them for another four months has nonetheless provoked comments from the usual quarters, including those who have never wanted any agreement [...]]]>
The recently extended nuclear negotiations with Iran have had to compete for front-page attention with acute crises elsewhere. The agreement to extend both the negotiations and the interim commitments associated with them for another four months has nonetheless provoked comments from the usual quarters, including those who have never wanted any agreement with Iran and continue to try to sabotage the negotiations. Here are some key facts to bear in mind about the extension itself:
The extension makes possible a continuation of major negotiating progress. The progress to date has been remarkable. Few would have predicted it even a year ago. As Secretary Kerry commented in a statement on Friday, it was less than a year ago that a U.S. secretary of state and an Iranian foreign minister met for the first time in more than three decades. The key events making this possible were the advent of a new Iranian president with a much different orientation from that of his predecessor, and the willingness of the United States and its negotiating partners to seize this opportunity. The negotiations have gone from a standing start with no communication to an important interim agreement and a common text for a final agreement, with some remaining bracketed language and gaps yet to be negotiated.
The need for an extension is not surprising. In fact, the interim agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action, that was reached last November specifically provided for the possibility of an extension beyond the original target date. The matters being negotiated are complicated and highly technical, from the design of nuclear reactors to the details of international financial transactions.
Both sides are negotiating seriously. The Iranian side has demonstrated its seriousness through its compliance, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with all of its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. It also has demonstrated its seriousness through its acceptance already of lopsided concessions while gaining little so far in return (see next key fact). Nothing in the history of these talks, or of the history of the Iranian nuclear issue before the talks began, suggests that Iran needs to be squeezed harder to get it to negotiate earnestly and flexibly.
Iran already has the biggest motivation to conclude the negotiations swiftly. The P5+1 (the United States and its negotiating partners) clearly got the better deal in the interim agreement. The Joint Plan of Action froze or rolled back the aspects of Iran’s nuclear program with the most concern regarding possible weapons proliferation, as well as introducing international inspections more intrusive and frequent than what any other nation undergoes. In return Iran got only minor sanctions relief, involving peripheral matters such as airplane parts and access to a small fraction of its overseas financial assets to which it has been denied access. This pattern continues under the additional agreement struck as part of last week’s extension of the talks. Iran has committed to hasten the conversion of its remaining supply of medium enriched uranium into reactor fuel plates, which would make it even more difficult to use the material in weapons. In return it gets access to only a small additional slice ($2.8 billion out of more than $100 billion) of its frozen overseas financial assets. The main, debilitating sanctions regarding oil and banking remain in place. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani directly, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indirectly, have a big economic and political stake in reaching a final agreement promptly.
Diplomacy remains the surest way to preclude an Iranian nuclear weapon. The extension does not change this reality. With a negotiated agreement, Iran’s nuclear activities would be subject to the most extensive international inspection and monitoring arrangements ever implemented, and Iran would have multiple major motivations not to let the agreement break down. Without an agreement, there would be far less comprehensive inspections, much less of an Iranian stake in keeping its program peaceful, and a political swing in Tehran away from those most determined to keep it peaceful.
This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry sits across from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Vienna, Austria, on July 13, 2014, before they begin a bilateral meeting focused on Iran’s nuclear program. Credit: State Department
]]>