Foreign Affairs

via USIP

Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So [...]]]> by Alireza Nader

via USIP

Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So Iran actually shares interests with the United States, European nations and the Arab League in opposing any use of chemical weapons.

But the Islamic Republic also has compelling reasons to continue supporting Damascus. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the geographic link to its Hezbollah partners in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran vehemently opposes U.S. intervention or any action that might change the military balance against President Bashar Assad.

The Iran-Syria alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. Tehran and Damascus have common geopolitical, security, and economic interests. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (the other being Libya) to support Iran’s fight against Saddam Hussein, and it was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, allowed Iran to help create Hezbollah, the Shiite political movement in Lebanon. Its militia, trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been an effective tool against Syria’s archenemy, Israel.

Relations between Tehran and Damascus have been rocky at times. Hafez Assad clashed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and was wary of too much Iranian involvement in his neighborhood. But his death in 2000 reinvigorated the Iran-Syria alliance. Bashar Assad has been much more enthusiastic about Iranian support, especially since Hezbollah’s “victorious” 2006 conflict with Israel.

In the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and at times even directed Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.

Fundamentalist figures within the Guards view Syria as the “front line” of Iranian resistance against Israel and the United States. Without Syria, Iran would not be able to supply Hezbollah effectively, limiting its ability to help its ally in the event of a war with Israel. Hezbollah wields thousands of rockets able to strike Israel, providing Iran deterrence against Israel — especially if Tel Aviv chose to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. A weakened Hezbollah would directly impact Iran’s national security. Syria’s loss could also tip the balance in Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, making the Wahhabi kingdom one of the most influential powers in the Middle East.

In the run up to a U.S. decision on military action against Syria, Iranian leaders appeared divided.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline lawmakers reacted with alarm to possible U.S. strikes against the Assad regime. And Revolutionary Guards commanders threatened to retaliate against U.S. interests. The hardliners clearly viewed the Assad regime as an asset worth defending as of September 2013.

But President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more critical line on Syria. “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” Zarif told a local publication in September 2013.

Rafsanjani, still an influential political figure, reportedly said that the Syrian government gassed its own people. This was a clear breach of official Iranian policy, which has blamed the predominantly Sunni rebels. Rafsanjani’s words suggested that he viewed unconditional support for Assad as a losing strategy. His remark also earned a rebuke from Khamenei, who warned Iranian officials against crossing the “principles and red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s message may have been intended for Rouhani’s government, which is closely aligned with Rafsanjani and seems to increasingly view the Syrian regime as a liability.

Regardless, a significant section of Iran’s political elite could be amenable to engaging the United States on Syria. Both sides have a common interest: preventing Sunni extremists from coming to power in Damascus. Iran and the United States also prefer a negotiated settlement over military intervention to solve the crisis. Tehran might need to be included in a settlement given its influence in Syria. Negotiating with Iran on Syria could ultimately help America’s greater goal of a diplomatic breakthrough, not only on Syria but Tehran’s nuclear program as well.

– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

*Read Alireza Nader’s chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in “The Iran Primer”

Photo Credits: Bashar Assad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via Leader.ir, Syria graphic via Khamenei.ir Facebook

by Farideh Farhi

Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Following declarations that the Obama administration could soon strike Syria, very little has been left unsaid. The fact that President Barack Obama has been a reluctant warrior lends weight to the justification of his attack, we are told. Surely a reluctant warrior would not use a humanitarian disaster as cover. We should also know that given the “red line” he drew last year, America’s credibility is on the line. And of course we are reminded of the need for the US to be the protector of the global and civilized norm against the use of chemical weapons.

None of these arguments will convince the critics of military action.

President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel are hardly Dr. Strangeloves sitting on a bomb directed at Damascus, but the lack of clarity on what happens the day after seems reckless. If the Assad regime used chemicals weapons, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that half-hearted military action — designed to punish but not remove Assad from power — will encourage further use of the weapons and more devastation?

Yes, US credibility is on the line, but attaching credibility to martial muscle could entail the further loss of it in more important areas. The revelation that in the midst of a humanitarian crisis the political class in Washington seems focused on launching cruise missiles can itself reflect a serious lack of credibility and failure in global leadership; this one built upon moral and ideological bankruptcy.

There may be some people in Syria and elsewhere in the region who will cheer military action, but if the Obama administration is unable to use it to exhibit some sort of leadership and bring an end to Syria’s tragedy through a serious political process like in Egypt, the move will be despised by all sides.

It’s been suggested that Obama’s military action in Syria will pose a dilemma for Iran’s new moderate government as it contemplates what to do in a domestic environment in which Iran’s hardliners will be pushing for a response. It won’t. Jasmin has already pointed to the mild reaction from Tehran. The reality is that Obama’s military action will make the Syria tragedy his and not Iran’s. And in Iran’s post-election environment, in which the country has moved towards national reconciliation — both among the elite and between the government and population — nothing suits the Islamic Republic better than divesting itself from this issue quietly.

The hardline argument for strongly supporting the Assad regime won in Tehran when his downfall was stated as Washington’s — as well as Riyadh’s and Tel Aviv’s — desired outcome in the name of weakening the Islamic Republic. But events in Syria are now well beyond the proxy war stage. They are out of control and have spilled into adjacent countries. Of course, Iran does not share borders with Syria. Rather and more importantly, the ideology that the Syrian tragedy has spawned with ample support from Saudi and Qatari funds — one that is anti-Shia, anti-Iran, anti-US and anti-Semite (even if it may not necessarily be virulently anti-Israel for now) — is more of a problem for whichever country ends up owning this issue. And owning it is exactly what the Obama administration is about to do, even if it acts in the name of credibility and/or punishment and reportedly only through a barrage of Tomahawks for a few days.

by Jasmin Ramsey

Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News Agency reports that during a telephone call with his German counterpart, Zarif welcomed the completion of the UN’s inspection of sites where chemical weapons were allegedly used, advised against making hasty decisions on the issue and strongly condemned any outside military force in Syria, saying that it would only make the situation worse.

But my question persists: why has Rouhani not made these statements himself as of yet? It could very well be that when push comes to shove, he will. LobeLog contributor Wayne White tells me that “quite possibly Rouhani simply wanted his government to be on the record as reiterating Iran’s opposition to chemical weapons use while at the same time planning not to accept that his Syrian ally used them and preparing to condemn anyone using force against the Assad regime for doing so.” But Rouhani’s chosen words on his English Twitter account could also be, as Suzanne Maloney noted to me, indicative of a “a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria”. This may be the case even if he submits to pressure for him to take a harsher stance.

And here’s another interesting angle to this story. The perceptive Laura Rozen reports that the visit of the UN’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman to Tehran at this time is a sign of intensifying UN diplomacy on Syria:

Feltman, in his meetings in Iran, discussed “the worsening situation on the ground in Syria, including the U.N.’s grave concerns about the potential use of chemical weapons and how the U.N. can work together with Iran and other states to end the bloodshed and suffering of the Syrian people,” [UN spokesman Farhan] Haq said.

“Unclear as yet is if, in exchange for Iran not overreacting to any U.S. action in Syria, the U.S. will acquiesce to Iran attending Geneva2, or indeed, given Feltman’s reported discussions in Iran, whether it had already done so. Both Russia and the UN’s [Lakhdar] Brahimi have repeatedly stated that Iran should be able to attend,” writes Rozen.

Adding to my fascination with all this is the fact Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said was also in Tehran this week. As this Economist editorial notes, the sultan has a history of serving as a messenger between Iran and the US and could be one on Syria:

Al-Hayat, a pan-Arab newspaper, quoted sources in Iran as saying that the trip was “not normal and does not fall under normal protocol”. Bahar, a publication linked to Iran’s newly-empowered reformist bloc, reported that the sultan was visiting as a precursor to future talks between America and Iran to negotiate a deal on greater nuclear transparency in exchange for sanctions relief. Fararu, a reformist-leaning website, has suggested that a new back channel might be established between the two countries, to pave the way for discussions over Iran’s disputed nuclear programme as well as the crisis in Syria.

Photo: Iranian FM Javad Zarifi meets with UN political affairs chief Jeffrey Feltman in Tehran. Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr

by Farideh Farhi

Much about various Iranian and non-Iranian narratives and reporting on the assassination of General Hassan Shateri (aka Khoshnevis) is unclear or contradictory. Let’s just say that reports cannot even agree on the date he died on. So I leave it to others to practice the art of speculation [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Farideh Farhi

Much about various Iranian and non-Iranian narratives and reporting on the assassination of General Hassan Shateri (aka Khoshnevis) is unclear or contradictory. Let’s just say that reports cannot even agree on the date he died on. So I leave it to others to practice the art of speculation regarding when and where he was killed and by whom, and what his “real” mission was.

But I do want to point out — and I am surprised that it has not been picked up by the English-language reporters – that if Shateri was indeed Khoshnevis, he was not unknown to the Treasury Department. In fact, Meir Javedanfar does not need “to assume“ that this person had “close contact” with Hezbollah. Hessam Khoshnevis and the organization he headed in Lebanon — the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (ICRL) — features in the Treasury department’s 2010 list of individuals and entities sanctioned precisely because of the connection to Hezbollah.

The 2010 Treasury Fact Sheet reports the sanctioning of “The Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (ICRL) and its director, Hessam Khoshnevis, for providing financial, material, and technological support to Hizballah…. Treasury also today designated ICRL director, Hessam Khoshnevis for providing technical support to Hizballah’s reconstruction efforts in Lebanon and to the expansion of the terrorist group’s private communications network. Khoshnevis also operates as President Ahmadinejad’s personal representative in Lebanon.”

A picture of Khoshnevis with a Lebanese man reportedly signing a reconstruction deal can be found here. (Fars News has a whole series on Iranian figures meeting with a variety of officials in Lebanon and visiting construction sites.)

So the Treasury will now have one less person on its sanctions list (and I suppose one more to add soon), provided that the Iranian press and devilish Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) folks are not leading us astray by making us think that Hassan Shateri is Hessam Khoshnevis or…

Reporting on Iran and its activities outside the country has become quite interesting. Since it is hard to do investigative journalism, many of us have developed a habit of sifting through obscure and not-so-obscure websites in an effort to find information regarding what is “really” happening inside the country. What is not said in public but perhaps said in smaller gatherings (and selectively reported only by particular websites) is taken at face value as being the real Iran or real Iran policy, particularly if what is said confirms our own pre-existing suspicions. The words of someone who may not even be in position to know what Iran’s covert operations consist of are taken as confirmation of what Tehran is really doing simply because it confirms what we already assume or even believe.

Just take a look at the sourcing for the possibility of the Mughniyeh-type secret work Shateri aka Khoshnevis was really doing. The source is one sentence uttered by a mid-rank cleric named Alireza Panahian who is among the students of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. By all accounts he is a hard-line preacher and has no official capacity. True, his Wikipedia page says he is an “influential” cleric but doesn’t explain why that is so. He certainly talks a lot and derides anyone accused of “sedition” or “deviation” — in other words, political competitors. According to his own account, he took a trip to Beirut a couple of years ago and did indeed meet Khoshnevis. Let us say he was even a good friend of Khoshnevis (although Panahian is younger and unlike Khoshnevis, there is no evidence that he was anything but a child during the Iran-Iraq War). Does it even make sense to assume that such a clever operator in Lebanon (who even fooled the Treasury department into thinking that his work includes offering technical and material support to Hezbollah’s reconstruction projects) would share his secret activities with a Panahian-type preacher?

Look, there should be no doubt that the IRGC has extensive operational links in Syria and with Hezbollah. The IRGC was present in Syria before the uprising and there is no evidence to suggest that links have been reduced. Nor should there be a surprise that efforts continue in order to transfer arms to Hezbollah via Syria even if the extent of success given the Syrian turmoil is unknown, at least to me. Along the same lines, we should not find ourselves surprised at the thought that Russian advisers have been deployed in Syria with new surface-to-air systems and upgrades for old systems, which Moscow has supplied since the uprising.

We also know for a fact that the only links that have been ruptured in Iran-Syria relations since the uprising are the economic links created by yearly trips taken by tens, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of religious pilgrims (many of whom travelled by bus via Turkey so a decrease in Turkey’s Iranian tourists can confirm this reduction). This by implication means that the number of Iranians who facilitated trips to Syria has also been reduced. That’s about it, as far as knowing goes. Meanwhile, there is really no need to assert secret evidence of other openly-acknowledged links and cooperation with either the Assad regime or Hezbollah. Tehran does not hide its alliance with Hezbollah and the Syrian government. It even calls it an axis of resistance and boasts about it.

The questions that remain unanswered regard whether there is evidence that events inside Syria have led to a significant operational transformation in terms of Iranian support for the Syrian regime; whether the survival of Assad’s regime up until now would have been possible without such an increase in support; whether the pursuit of a different strategy on the part of Tehran would have led or will lead to a better outcome than what we have today or hope to have tomorrow; and if so, whether something could have been done or could be done now by other players to convince Tehran to pursue a different approach.

Sometimes focusing on the trees makes you miss the forest.

Photo: General Hassan Shateri