by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually disciplined in terms of leaks but official briefings have indicated that some major technical issues are on the way to being settled. Encouraging? Yes, but from the beginning of the talks it was realized, or should have been, that the day would come when Iran’s long term plans for a sizable nuclear energy program and the need for large amounts of enriched uranium would be front and center.
The past is prologue. Roughly 5 decades ago, we negotiated for several years with Iran over future nuclear cooperation until there was little hope left and went aground for some time over who would control the possible reprocessing of spent fuel from the US supplied enriched uranium. In the reprocessing of spent fuel, small quantities of plutonium could be separated and used in power plants or nuclear bombs.
The US side offered a variety of solutions, such as a bilateral plant; buy-back of the fuel; shipping the spent fuel for reprocessing to European facilities; and multi-national enrichment and reprocessing firms. Iran, however, refused all such ideas until President Jimmy Carter and the Shah directly reached a compromise agreement. The president was able to satisfy the Persian monarch’s personal and national pride that Iran would not be treated unfairly. The success of the Iranian Revolution in February of 1979 prevented the legal enactment of that treaty.
Now the concerns over reprocessing have been replaced by deep concerns over enrichment. The present Iranian government, like its royal predecessor, has planned a substantial civilian power program that has tentatively selected 16 areas for the construction of 1000 MW reactors. None, it is believed, has had a shovel of earth removed as yet, however in the view of the lengthy construction time and the vast expenditures required for reactors, issues such as security and supply for sufficient enriched uranium are vital.
At present Iran has 9,000 first stage and 10,000 second stage — IR2 — centrifuges. In all the years that some of them have been operating, Iran has been provided a little over 11,000 kilograms — roughly 5 tonnes — of enriched uranium. This supply is sufficient for 5-7 bombs if further enriched but is totally insufficient for civil reactor needs.
For example, Iran’s one completed reactor at Bushehr needs roughly 21 tonnes of enriched uranium as yearly replacement fuel that will be sold by Russia. The new reactors — which are at least a decade away — will require roughly 70-80,000 tonnes of fuel to start power production, and annual replacement fuel of about 21-25,000 tonnes per reactor. Iran’s negotiators have proclaimed that to meet its future requirements, Iran will need at least 100,000 advanced centrifuges. If in fact Iran pursues its civilian objectives, that figure is modest.
So far Iran has insisted that its future needs must rely on domestic production and depending on imports would make Iran highly vulnerable to political differences and crises. This position is given added weight by the fact that the six powers across the table have been imposing sanctions for a decade.
The position of the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) has been that Iran should reduce its current centrifuges to a number that can only provide enriched material for medical research and isotopes, and depend on imports from reliable producers for future reactor fueling.
The parties are an ocean apart. In response to the negotiating crisis, emergency bilateral sessions took place between Iran and each of the P5+1 members to examine whether there is enough “give” to hold out the hope that compromises can emerge. (Unhappily, as with Carter and the Shah, we do not have leaders who understand or trust each other.) The bilateral talks also give Iran opportunities to test whether cracks are possible within the six. If each side holds to its position, the negotiating effort could be extended for at least a six month period or end.
One potential way forward that requires careful study would be to stipulate that a specific number of additional centrifuges may operate and that the enriched uranium should be put aside under especially rigorous security for a particular future reactor. Whether the US Congress, Israel and Iran’s conservative cabal, not to mention the other five powers, could live with this kind of solution is questionable. But each leader, especially Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, have put great effort into this possible opening of modest relations after three decades of mistrust.
Presumably neither views failure with equanimity, although Obama has consistently said that success was no more than 50% likely.
If failure seems likely, there are many questions that have to be addressed now and not await a crisis:
These are parlous times. Are we doing every thing possible to strengthen our hand?
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: US President Jimmy Carter and Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi share a drink in 1977, two years before the monarch would be overthrown by a popular revolution.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
A new Brookings Institution paper, “Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” has rightly attracted considerable attention. The author, Robert Einhorn, has a distinguished record and was Special Adviser for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the State Department from 2009 to 2013. His recommendations must be seen as authoritative.
The paper [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
A new Brookings Institution paper, “Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” has rightly attracted considerable attention. The author, Robert Einhorn, has a distinguished record and was Special Adviser for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the State Department from 2009 to 2013. His recommendations must be seen as authoritative.
The paper addresses the issues that are at the center of the ongoing negotiations in Vienna between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). Einhorn recommends key requirements for an acceptable agreement with Iran — requirements designed to prevent Iran from having a rapid breakout capability and to deter a future Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons.
Preventing a rapid breakout capability
Iran’s development of a capability to enrich uranium has been at the core of Western concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme for over a decade. The two enrichment facilities that Iran has built, at Natanz and Fordow, are being used to produce low-enriched uranium for civil purposes but could be used to produce highly enriched uranium for military purposes.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits the manufacture of nuclear weapons by states such as Iran but does not prohibit the possession of enrichment facilities. The West’s negotiators therefore have a delicate task: they must contrive to persuade Iran to accept restrictions on its use of this technology — restrictions that would give the UN Security Council enough time, reacting to evidence, to prevent Iran from producing enough weapons-grade uranium for one device (i.e. from “breaking out”).
Einhorn explains that the breakout timeline depends on the numbers and types of centrifuges used and on the nature of the uranium feedstock available for a breakout attempt (for instance, if the feedstock is already low-enriched much less time is required than if it is un-enriched).
He goes on to describe the implications of limiting Iran to between 2000 and 6000 first-generation centrifuges. This creates the impression that these are the sorts of numbers that ought to be agreed to in Vienna. That is unfortunate, because Iran has already installed 19,000 first-generation centrifuges and is using 10,000 of them — and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani has ruled out the dismantling of any existing capabilities (which his political opponents could portray as a humiliating surrender of Iranian rights).
Einhorn’s choice of what looks like an unrealistically low figure appears to stem from wanting to give the UN Security Council several months to react to evidence of a breakout attempt. However, as he himself implies, several months would be useful only if the Security Council were to want to impose sanctions before opting for force. In reality, since sanctions have proved ineffective as a tool for coercing Iran, the council would be well-advised to opt for force within a matter of days, and could do so if the P5+1 had pre-agreed that this would be the most appropriate response (see below).
A related concern is possible Iranian development of more advanced centrifuges. With a few thousand third-generation machines, using a low-enriched feedstock, only a few weeks would be required to break out. This concern could be resolved by placing limits on the scope of Iran’s centrifuge R&D, as Einhorn recommends. But tight limits may not be negotiable.
Yet another concern relates to the plutonium-producing potential of a 40MW reactor under construction at Arak. Einhorn describes ways in which this potential could be reduced. Recent Iranian statements suggest that they, too, are working up some proposals. So this concern is likely to be largely allayed, although the risk of a plutonium-based breakout may not be totally eliminated.
Deterring an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons
In the absence of watertight solutions to these breakout concerns (or to concern that Iran might break out using a small clandestine facility) the West’s negotiators will do well to devote at least as much effort to deterring breakout as to trying to make rapid breakout impossible.
Since 2007 US National Intelligence Estimates have drawn attention to the importance of influencing the cost/benefit calculations of Iran’s leaders, implying that this is likely to be the most effective way of ensuring that Iran does not become a nuclear-armed state.
The framers of the NPT perceived that the treaty’s impact would hang on the ability of parties to recognise a national security interest in supporting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Consequently the only deterrents envisaged in the treaty are verification of nuclear material use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the risk that non-compliance will result in UN sanctions or authorisation of force, and the certainty that non-compliance will lead to a loss of prestige and exclusion from the society of the treaty’s adherents (currently 190 states).
Since 2003 President Rouhani has shown that he understands all this very well. He knows that Iran would pay a high price for breaching its non-proliferation obligations and that acquiring nuclear weapons would bring no benefit, since Iran is not in need of a nuclear deterrent. The signs are that his political opponents, too, have figured that out.
All this needs to be borne in mind when determining whether any additional (going beyond the NPT) deterrents are necessary in the current context.
Einhorn believes that they are. The most questionable of his recommendations are that:
These recommendations betray a flawed understanding of Iranian psychology. Such public threats would be seen in Iran as humiliating, and would be resented. That resentment could be used to stir up opposition to the agreement and could even end up providing a motive for ditching it. The threats would serve no practical purpose since leading Iranians are already well aware of what they would risk were they to attempt breakout.
More in keeping with Iranian psychology and a more effective deterrent would be a private P5+1 intimation that they will be united in urging the Security Council to authorise force in the event of evidence of a breakout attempt. Nothing more is needed. Iranian diplomats are highly intelligent.
Conclusion
This paper is heartening. It offers reason to think that the Vienna negotiators can succeed in producing a resolution of Western concerns that Iran will have an interest in respecting. However, as Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif likes to remind us, a resolution will require flexibility from both sides. The West must try to avoid the over-bidding (in pursuit of over-insurance) that doomed the 2004-05 negotiations between Iran and the E3 (the UK, France and Germany).
Photo: Representatives of Iran and the P5+1 celebrate after an interim nuclear deal is signed in Geneva, Switzerland on Nov. 24, 2013. Credit: FARS News/Majid Asgaripour
]]>by Jim Lobe
I think the position laid out in this letter is referred to as a “non-starter” and marks the point at which Congress moves from playing “bad cop” to spoiler. For reasons why, you can read today’s Foreign Policy article by Colin Kahl and Alireza Nader. (I [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
I think the position laid out in this letter is referred to as a “non-starter” and marks the point at which Congress moves from playing “bad cop” to spoiler. For reasons why, you can read today’s Foreign Policy article by Colin Kahl and Alireza Nader. (I am personally embarrassed that Patty Murray from my home state of Washington put her name to this.)
]]>October 11, 2013
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500Dear Mr. President:
As representatives of the P5+1 and the Iranian government prepare to enter another round of negotiations to verifiably end Iran’s nuclear weapon program, we reiterate the four strategic elements articulated by 76 Senators to you on August 2, 2013 necessary to achieve resolution of the nuclear issue: (1) an explicit and continuing message that we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, (2) a sincere demonstration of openness to negotiations by Iran, (3) the maintenance and toughening of sanctions, and (4) a convincing threat of the use of force.
We support your efforts to explore a diplomatic opening, but we believe that the true test of Iranian sincerity is a willingness to match rhetoric with actions. The critical test will be Iran’s proposal to the P5+1 this week in Geneva. Iran’s first confidence-building action should be full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, fulfillment of its responsibilities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and implementation of all Resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program, to include immediate suspension of all enrichment activity. If the Iranian government takes these steps in a verifiable and transparent manner, we are willing to match Iran’s good-faith actions by suspending the implementation of the next round of sanctions currently under consideration by the Congress. In short, the U.S. should consider, with the other members of the P5+1, a “suspension for suspension” initial agreement – in which Iran suspends enrichment and the U.S. suspends the implementation of new sanctions.
For the P5+1 states, such an agreement would ease concerns that Iran is using the talks as a subterfuge while its centrifuges spin and for Iran it would suspend critical additional sanctions on its key economic sectors.
The intent of sanctions is to force Iran to halt and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Once this goal has been accomplished in a real, transparent, and verifiable way we will be prepared to remove existing sanctions in a measured, sequenced manner. However, at this time, we reaffirm that a credible military threat remains on the table and we underscore the imperative that the current sanctions be maintained aggressively, and call on you to increase pressure through sanctions already in place.
A nuclear weapons capable Iran threatens regional stability and international security and directly threatens U.S. national security interests. As we previously cautioned, Iran has historically used negotiations to affect progress on its nuclear weapons program. We must continue to realistically evaluate Iranian intentions, and we reiterate that the centrifuges cannot be allowed to continue spinning.
We reject Iranian statements that Iran should be able to continue enrichment in its own territory. Indeed, this is not a prerequisite for a peaceful nuclear energy program. Countries from Canada, to Mexico and South Africa benefit from peaceful nuclear energy programs, without indigenous enrichment programs. Iran does have a right to a peaceful nuclear energy program; it does not have a right to enrichment.
We remind you that the U.S. Department of State has characterized Iran as “the most active state sponsor of terrorism” and to be sure, verifiable dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear weapons program will not resolve the Iranian government’s deplorable abuse of basic human rights, denial of basic civil freedoms, or its ongoing activities that seek to destabilize the region.
We remain hopeful that talks next week in Geneva lead to concrete Iranian actions to prove to the world that Iran does not seek a nuclear weapons capability. However, if Iranian actions fail to match the rhetorical reassurances of the last two weeks, we are prepared to move forward with new sanctions to increase pressure on the government in Tehran.
Sincerely,
Sen. Robert Menendez
Sen. Lindsey Graham
Sen. Charles E. Schumer
Sen. Roy Blunt
Sen. Patty Murray
Sen. John McCain
Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski
Sen. Kelly Ayotte
Sen. Robert P. Casey, Jr.
Sen. Christopher A. Coons
by Peter Jenkins
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement to the UN General Assembly today leaves me feeling frustrated. There are more than 30 points in it that I would dearly love to discuss with him, either because they seem to be of questionable veracity, or because they are assertions [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement to the UN General Assembly today leaves me feeling frustrated. There are more than 30 points in it that I would dearly love to discuss with him, either because they seem to be of questionable veracity, or because they are assertions that are not backed up by evidence.
But perhaps I should count myself lucky that such an opportunity will never come my way. I suspect Mr. Netanyahu is a politician who finds it hard to concede a point or learn from his mistakes.
If this piece has any readers, let me assure them that I am not going to itemise all 35 of the Israeli Prime Minister’s questionable propositions. Instead I propose to react to a handful of Mr. Netanyahu’s points (paraphrased below) that touch on my experience of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues over the last eleven years…
Rouhani was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator between 2003 and 2005. He masterminded the strategy that enabled Iran to advance its nuclear weapons program behind a smoke screen of diplomatic engagement. Here’s what he said in his 2011 book: “While we were talking to the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in Isfahan.”
The US intelligence assessment is that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Francois Nicoullaud, who was France’s ambassador to Iran at the time, has written that it was Dr. Rouhani who, with the support of Iran’s Supreme Leader, ordered abandonment.
Iran’s completion of a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan in 2004 occurred with the full knowledge of Iran’s European negotiating partners, and indeed of the rest of the world, thanks to International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) inspection visits to the site. In doing so, Iran was not in breach of its 2003 agreement with Europe.
In 2002 Iran was caught red-handed secretly building an underground centrifuge facility in Natanz.
It is unknowable whether Iran intended the Natanz facility to be secret. In 2002, their safeguards agreement with the IAEA obliged them to declare new facilities 180 days before the first introduction of nuclear material. Well before the 180-day mark, an Israeli-supported anti-Iran organisation proclaimed to the world that Tehran was building a “secret” enrichment facility. An Iranian declaration followed in good time. Personally, I doubt the Iranians could have been naïve enough to intend a large facility to be secret.
In 2009 Iran was again caught red-handed secretly building a huge underground nuclear facility for uranium enrichment in a mountain near Qom.
A similar story. The US and its allies allowed their knowledge that this facility was under construction to leak. At much the same time Iran declared the facility to the IAEA. Would Iran have made that declaration had it not been for the leak? Would they have declared it later, 180 days before the introduction of material? These questions are unanswerable until the relevant Iranian archives are opened.
Why would a country with vast natural energy reserves invest billions in developing nuclear energy?
I wonder whether this question was ever put in the 1960s to the USA, Canada and the USSR. I wonder whether now Israel is putting it to the United Arab Emirates.
Iran has also continued work on the heavy water reactor at Arak; that’s in order to have another route to the bomb, a plutonium path.
To extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel a reprocessing facility is necessary. Neither the IAEA nor US intelligence has ever come across evidence of an Iranian reprocessing facility. Iran has assured friend and foe for the last ten years that it has no intention of acquiring a reprocessing capability.
Since Rouhani’s election — and I stress this — this vast and feverish effort has continued unabated… The sanctions policy today is bearing fruit.
These two assertions look to me to be contradictory. In any case, Iran’s “effort” hardly qualifies for the epithet “feverish”: 18,000 centrifuges installed over the course of seven and a half years; 10.000 kg of low enriched uranium produced over the same period (only enough for four or five nuclear devices, if further enriched, or for just over a third of a fresh fuel load for Iran’s sole power reactor).
In 2005, North Korea agreed to a deal that was celebrated the world over by many well-meaning people… A year later, North Korea exploded its first nuclear weapons device.
An alleged Iranian nuclear threat to global survival deserves more rigorous analysis than a vague argument by analogy. And this is an analogy that breaks down when exposed to facts. In 2005, the DPRK, unlike Iran, was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and was not subject to IAEA safeguards; it already possessed enough plutonium for at least ten nuclear devices. Its leaders knew that the US and its allies were unable to make a credible threat to end the DPRK nuclear weapons program by force or to retaliate for DPRK bad faith, because the DPRK was capable of killing millions of South Koreans in a matter of hours by conventional means. The DPRK has a record of reneging on deals with the US; Iran does not. The DPRK is a “loner” that has not the remotest chance of ever being elected to preside over the 120-nation Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); Iranians care passionately about the prestige and reputation of Iran, which currently presides over the NAM.
In standing alone, Israel will know that it will be defending many, many others.
I wonder whom Mr. Netanyahu has in mind. India? China? Japan? Indonesia? Malaysia or Thailand? Sub-Saharan Africa? Latin America? Europe? Russia? Iraq? Turkey? Syria? Egypt? Algeria? Oman?
I would like to conclude with a quotation from a political thinker whom I would expect Mr. Netanyahu to admire: Nicolai Machiavelli. “I believe that forced agreements will be kept neither by princes nor by republics.”
Israeli fears will never be dispelled by forcing Iran to give up uranium enrichment, nor by destroying its enrichment facilities. Safety lies in the US negotiating an agreement that Iran will have no interest in breaking but that will nonetheless be subject to stringent verification and and actionable under the NPT.
]]>A new report released by the International Crisis Group this week examines the efficacy and unintended consequences of sanctions on Iran and suggests steps that can be taken during the diplomatic process to unwind them and mitigate their humanitarian consequences while addressing the nuclear issue more effectively. “The [...]]]>
A new
report released by the International Crisis Group this week examines the efficacy and unintended consequences of sanctions on Iran and suggests steps that can be taken during the diplomatic process to unwind them and mitigate their humanitarian consequences while addressing the nuclear issue more effectively. “The Iranian case is a study in the irresistible appeal of sanctions, and of how, over time, means tend to morph into ends”, says Ali Vaez, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Iran. “In the absence of any visible shift in Tehran’s political calculus, it is difficult to measure their impact through any metric other than the quantity and severity of the sanctions themselves”.I’m still making my way through it, but it’s already clear that this is one of those don’t-miss reports for Iran-watchers and those who are interested in US-Iran relations. I’ve reproduced the recommendations from the executive summary below, beginning with the most important issue related to the sanctions regime — the healthcare crisis in Iran — which Lobe Log contributor Siamak Namazi wrote about today in the New York Times:
RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the healthcare crisis in Iran
To the government of Iran:
1. Streamline currency allocation, licensing and customs procedures for medical imports.
To the government of the United States and the European Union:
2. Provide clear guidelines to financial institutions indicating that humanitarian trade is permissible and will not be punished.
3. Consider allowing an international agency to play the role of intermediary for procuring specialised medicine for Iran.
To sustain nuclear diplomacy and bolster chances of success
To the P5+1 [permanent UN Security Council members and Germany] and the government of Iran:
4. Agree to hold intensive, continuous, technical-level negotiations to achieve a step-by-step agreement and, to that end, consider establishing a Vienna- or Istanbul-based contact group for regular interaction.
5. Recognise both Iran’s right in principle to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its soil and its obligation to provide strong guarantees that the program will remain peaceful.
To the governments of Iran and the United States:
6. Conduct bilateral negotiations on the margins of the P5+1 meetings or parallel to them.
To address the immediate issue of 20 per cent uranium enrichment
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
7. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment at 20 per cent level for an initial period of 180 days and convert its existing stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium to nuclear fuel rods; and
b) P5+1 members would provide Iran with medical isotopes; freeze the imposition of any new sanctions; waive or suspend some existing sanctions for an initial period of 180 days (eg, the ban on the sale of precious and semi-finished metals to Iran or the prohibition on repatriating revenues from Iranian oil sales); and release some of Iran’s frozen assets.
To address the issue of Fordow
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
8. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would refrain from installing more sophisticated Centrifuges at Fordow and implement additional transparency measures, such as using the facility exclusively for research and development purposes and allowing in-house International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resident inspectors or installing live-stream remote camera surveillance; and
b) P5+1 members would suspend sanctions affecting Iran’s petro-chemical sector or permit Iran’s oil customers to maintain existing levels of petroleum imports.
To reach a longer-term agreement
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
9. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would limit the volume of stockpiled 5 per cent enriched uranium, with any amount in excess to be converted into fuel rods; ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and implement Code 3.1; and resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA; and
b) P5+1 members would provide Iran with modern nuclear fuel manufacturing technologies; roll back financial restrictions; and lift sanctions imposed on oil exports; the P5 would submit and sponsor a new UN Security Council resolution removing international sanctions once issues with the IAEA have been resolved.
To rationalise future resort to sanctions on third countries
To the U.S. and European Union:
10. Consider setting up an independent mechanism to closely assess, monitor and re-evaluate the social and economic consequences of sanctions both before and during implementation to avoid unintended effects, harming the general public or being trapped in a dynamic of escalatory punitive measures.
11. Avoid where possible imposition of multi-purpose sanctions lacking a single strategic objective and exit strategy.
]]>