by Peter Jenkins
The absence of any late September breakthrough on the central issue in the nuclear negotiation with Iran—Iran’s mastery of uranium enrichment, a technology that can be used for both civil and military purposes—has triggered speculation that the November 24 deadline for a comprehensive agreement will be missed. It has also sparked renewed debate on whether no deal would be better than the best deal likely to be on offer…
The nub of the enrichment problem appears to be Iran’s reluctance to give up the potential to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one nuclear weapon (a “significant quantity” or SQ) in a matter of weeks (perhaps four to six). This puts Iran greatly at odds with the US and EU (and possibly Russia and China, but that is unclear), since the US and EU want Iran to be unable to produce an SQ (to “breakout”) in less than six months and would prefer at least a year.
This wide gap on enrichment and the lack of any reason to think that Iran’s negotiators will budge on this point are feeding speculation that agreement by the deadline will be unattainable.The underlying assumption is that the US and EU will not budge either.
I have accepted a poisoned chalice from the editors of Lobelog and will try with the following points to explain why tolerating the Iranian operation of nine or ten thousand—let’s say 10,000—first generation centrifuges (IR-1s) would be the lesser of two evils—the greater evil being no deal—provided it paves the way to a satisfactory settlement of all the other points on the agenda.
1) In the long run the US and EU will have to rely for a non-proliferation assurance, where Iran’s nuclear program is concerned, on the deterrence provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring of compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, and on Iranian fear that the consequences of non-compliance could be devastating. Perpetual restrictions on centrifuge numbers would imply a perpetual double standard for which there is no basis in international law—and would therefore be totally unacceptable to Iran.
The US and EU tell themselves that relying solely on deterrence will feel more comfortable in ten or twenty years time, because during the intervening years Iran will have been able to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its intentions. In doing so, they tend to overlook that since 2003 the IAEA has not reported any Iranian failure to declare the possession of nuclear material and has not detected any undeclared nuclear activities. Nor has Iran attempted to produce HEU during the last four years, when it could easily have done so.
These years could be seen as evidence of Iran’s intention to comply with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, and as grounds for confidence that it will not seek to breakout in the coming ten years…
The US and EU may also be overlooking that, if ten years from now Iran has had the potential to breakout in under six weeks but has not attempted to do so, then that will be a stronger reason for confidence in its peaceful intentions than if rapid breakout had not been a possibility.
2) A sense of perspective can be obtained by reflecting that several NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) have been and are in a position to breakout rapidly and that this is not generally considered cause for concern. Why not? Because it is assumed that they have no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. Nearly 30 years after Iran, also an NPT party, was first in contact with the A.Q. Khan nuclear supply network, to obtain enrichment technology, there is still no conclusive evidence that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, the US intelligence assessment is that no such decision has been taken.
3) The risk of Iran using the 10,000 centrifuges that it wants to retain to breakout is small. IAEA monitoring, and the impossibility of predicting the consequences of detection are deterrents. If Iran wanted one SQ of HEU, it would be better advised to try to build a small unmonitored enrichment facility to house more efficient second- or third-generation centrifuges.
(In that case, some might ask, why are the Iranians so determined to retain a capacity to produce one SQ in a matter of weeks at a monitored facility? In my view, the explanation must be that they want a quasi-deterrent. Being known to be able to breakout rapidly is not much of a deterrent but it is better than nothing—and it has the merit of not entailing any violation of the NPT.)
4) The US and EU reason that a reaction time of at least six months is needed in the event of a detected breakout, to allow the UN Security Council or a coalition of the like-minded to go through the gears before stopping Iran short of one SQ by destroying its means of production. Going through the gears means first persuasion and then coercion (sanctions). But it is highly unlikely that in breakout circumstances even good friends could persuade Iran to turn back; and there is now ample evidence that the greatest effect of sanctions is to stimulate Iranian defiance.
So in reality the US and EU, faced with evidence of an ongoing breakout, would have only one option: to destroy the 10,000 centrifuges as quickly as possible (unless, when it came to the crunch, the consequences of such action seemed likely to be worse than tolerating Iranian acquisition of HEU). To render the 10,000 centrifuges at Natanz inoperable would be an easy task for the US Air Force, and could be accomplished in well under a month.
The ministers of Iran and the P5+1 at the signing ceremony of the Joint Plan of Action reached on Nov. 24, 2013.
5) Assuming that other outstanding issues can be resolved satisfactorily, a comprehensive agreement on Nov. 24 offers a much fairer prospect than no agreement. A final agreement that includes the following provisions will generate a helpful reduction in tensions on at least one Middle Eastern front: frequent IAEA access to Iranian centrifuge workshops and assembly areas, and to Iranian fuel cycle facilities; changes to the design of the 40 MW reactor at Arak; and all the enrichment-related restrictions Iran offered in November 2013 and that Iran could hardly retract under a comprehensive agreement.
However imperfect, in Western eyes, such an agreement might seem if Iran continues to operate 10,000 IR-1s, it would be a better platform for developing the West’s relations with Iran in positive ways than no agreement. If Iran were given sufficient time, were offered EU as well as Russian civil nuclear cooperation, and were invited to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it might decide to adapt its nuclear program in reassuring ways. An agreement would ease political inhibitions to cooperation when Western and Iranian security interests coincide.
Conversely, no agreement could lead quickly to renewed expansion of Iran’s enrichment capacities, a reduction in IAEA access to the minimum required by the NPT, abandonment of the plan to modify the Arak reactor, and who knows what else on a broader canvas.
Those who have been advocating “no deal” seem to assume that a nice alternative would be on offer: continuation of the confidence-building measures that have been in place since January under last November’s Joint Plan of Action. But there is no guarantee that this would be the case.
To date, Iran’s gains in return for those measures have been modest (US and EU sanctions relief having been paltry and, in some cases, ineffective); they would not lose a lot by walking away from the Joint Plan. US and EU negotiators could also find it hard to detain them—their negotiating hand is weaker than “no deal” advocates imagine. If it were strong, this problem would have been resolved to Western satisfaction years ago.
Of course it would be wise of Iran to bear in mind that it will be very hard for the Obama administration to persuade Congress of the merits of a deal that does not make it impossible for Iran to breakout in under six months (irritating though it is for foreigners to be told by US negotiators that Congress will or will not tolerate this or that). It is a regrettable reality that this breakout issue has become totemic. The Iranian negotiators ought to be trying to identify room for compromise on some aspect of it. If they could find some way of excluding the option of using Iran’s stock of low enriched uranium as centrifuge feed material in a breakout, this would extend potential breakout estimates by several months. However, it would also make a quasi-deterrent less impressive. That may put this option on the wrong side of an Iranian “red line.”
Better Deal?
I can see that US and EU negotiators face a very difficult choice. They are not to be envied. All their instincts drive them in the direction of depriving Iran of an option (uranium enrichment) that other NPT parties enjoy. So often since 1979 the Islamic Republic has behaved in ways that have alarmed the West, or offended our moral sensibilities, that it is hard for us to leave Iran in possession of the capacity to make a nuclear weapon.
But, as Senator Dianne Feinstein reminded her colleagues in January, the nature of a nation can change over time. The Islamic Republic has sometimes shown scant regard for international law, not least breaching its IAEA obligations over more than a decade prior to 2003, but it does not follow that they are bent on using their enrichment capability to acquire nuclear weapons. There are plenty of reasons why it would be foolish for them to do so. And, frankly, it is not obvious that the US and EU will have a better option on Nov. 24 than to cut a deal on the basis of Iran continuing to operate 10,000 centrifuges.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, with one small exception, de jure. It is implementing fully the “voluntary measures” it undertook in the context of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Iran signed November 24, 2013 with the US and five other powers in Geneva. It has also implemented thirteen “practical measures” pursuant to its November 11, 2013 Cooperation Framework agreement with the IAEA. (Five additional practical measures were announced on May 21, 2014.)
The IAEA continues to certify that all the nuclear material declared to it by Iran is in peaceful use. The Agency mentions no evidence for Iranian possession of undeclared nuclear material, but cannot yet say with confidence that there is no undeclared nuclear material in Iran. That is a logical consequence of the incomplete nature of the IAEA’s information of Iran’s nuclear program; the November 11, 2013 agreement will help the IAEA round out its knowledge.
Since 2008, the stoking of suspicion as to Iran’s nuclear intentions has relied heavily on fragmentary indicators of what the IAEA refers to, more or less interchangeably, as “a possible military dimension” (PMD) or “nuclear-related activities”. So, arguably, the most interesting paragraph in the latest report is paragraph 56. There the IAEA states that Iran has “shown” the Agency that simultaneous test firings of Explosive Bridge Wire (EBW) detonators (one of the above indicators) took place for a civilian (and not a nuclear weapon) application.
This explanation is credible. There is widespread use of EBW technology in the mining industry, for example. But paragraph 57 makes clear that we must not expect the Agency to pronounce the explanation credible until they have obtained clarifications in relation to the other fragmentary indicators in their possession.
What the Agency says in paragraph 57 is that it needs to be able to conduct a “system assessment” of the outstanding [PMD] issues. That suggests a comprehensive but protracted process.
Also of particular interest is Iranian submission of preliminary design information for a 10MW reactor that will burn low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor is to be situated near the city of Shiraz. It seems likely that it is the first of four medical isotope-producing reactors of which the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, has spoken.
A 10 MW LEU reactor will probably be of less concern to Western counter-proliferation experts than the 40 MW natural uranium reactor under construction at Arak, since the plutonium content of spent LEU fuel is smaller and lends itself less to weaponization purposes. Indeed, one of the options under negotiation pursuant to the JPOA involves modernizing the Arak design to lower the reactor’s output and allow it to burn LEU.
Furthermore, the fuel needs of the newly announced reactor (and of a modernized Arak reactor) can provide Iran with a “practical needs” justification for retaining a limited LEU production capacity at its Natanz enrichment plant. Fuelling indigenously designed research reactors is a far more credible need than the oft-asserted need to fuel Russian-designed power reactors, since Russia will want to supply fuel for the latter throughout their operating lives, and since there could be proprietary data obstacles to Iran’s fabricating fuel for them.
Finally, the latest report confirms that, in fulfilling its JPOA commitments, Iran ceased producing 20% U235 UF6 on January 20 and has reduced its 20% UF6 stockpile to 8% of total production up to that date. Iran is now far from being in a position to use 20% U235 material as feed in the “break-out” scenario that some people, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assume Iran’s leaders are secretly conceiving.
The IAEA’s next report will be due in late August. Between now and then falls the deadline for the conclusion of negotiations pursuant to the JPOA. It would be nice if the reassuring picture of Iran’s nuclear program in this latest IAEA report were to influence downwards the demands made of Iran by US negotiators.
In reality, the reassuring picture is more likely to be discounted, cynically, as an indicator that Iran is making a show of cooperation to obtain better terms — and US demands are more likely to be influenced by unshakeable mistrust, and fear of Israeli displeasure, despite all the indicators that Iran’s leaders do not want nuclear weapons and believe NPT-compliance to be in Iran’s interest.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (left) and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araghchi shake hands October 28, 2013 at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Credit: Veysel Kuecuektas/IAEA
]]>by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The letter, which, normally reliable sources tell me, was initially drafted in the offices of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calls for a whole new round of sanctions to be imposed against companies and countries doing business with Iran, notably in its mining, engineering and construction-based sectors, as well as other measures that will “increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.” While noting that president-elect Hassan Rouhani was “widely perceived as the most moderate of the candidates” running in last month’s election and that its outcome “reflected considerable dissatisfaction by the Iranian people with an autocratic and repressive government that has internationally isolated Iran,” it stressed that the election “unfortunately has done nothing to suggest a reversal of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity.” “[T]here appears nothing ‘moderate’ about [Rouhani's] nuclear policies…”
“Our diplomatic goal,” it continues, “must be to reach a negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program.”
Now that last phrase is particularly provocative because, as everyone who has paid the slightest attention to intelligence community (IC) estimates and statements over the last five-and-a-half years knows, Iran suspended what the IC had previously believed was a nuclear-weapons program in 2003 and the country’s leadership, including Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not made a decision to produce a weapon. So what we see in this letter is deliberate disregard by 46 of the 47 HFAC members — both Democrats and Republicans — of the conclusions of the 17 agencies that make up Washington’s Intelligence Community. This is the same IC for which Congress last year approved nearly 54 billion dollars (not counting some $18 billion dollars more for military intelligence). Do you hear any echoes from Iraq here?
I’m prepared to believe that Iran is seeking a capability to build and deploy weapons relatively quickly; that is the same kind of capability as, say, Japan or Brazil has. Indeed, given the threats (and the pressure) to which it has been subject, seeking such a capability is hardly an unreasonable thing to do. In fact, it may even be possible that the expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, as cited by the letter, is a direct response to that pressure. If so, it would follow rather logically that reducing the pressure just might induce a reciprocal gesture on the part of Tehran. Conversely, ratcheting up pressure, as AIPAC and the HFAC members appear determined to achieve, may result in a further expansion and acceleration of the nuclear program, a result that would obviously be counter-productive to their professed goal of reaching a “negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program [which the $54-billion-a-year IC says does not exist].”
But let’s return for a moment to AIPAC’s and HFAC’s analysis of the meaning — or lack thereof — of Rouhani’s election last month. The letter points out that Rouhani “indicated his support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions [implying he wants nuclear weapons although he has explicitly disclaimed that goal -- please note the vagueness of "ambitions"] in his first post-election press conference” and contends that there “appears nothing ‘moderate’ about his nuclear policies…” But that’s a rather tendentious interpretation of what Rouhani said at that press conference. Here’s what he said when asked about the nuclear program:
By God’s grace, we will have more active negotiations with the P5+1. This is the main point. And we are of the opinion that the nuclear issue can only and only be resolved through negotiations. Neither threats, nor sanctions are effective. The solution lies in holding negotiations and reaching a mutual trust. The solution of reaching a mutual trust is possible. This was done before. We will benefit from previous experiences. The fact is that the Iranian nation’s undeniable rights will always be considered by the future government. And it [future government] will constantly make efforts to save the people from the cruel sanctions step by step, and to be able to build better relations with the countries of the world, particularly the neighboring states, as I emphasized before.
And this is a quote about the nuclear program from his last televised debate with the other presidential candidates — the same debate in which Ali Akbar Velayati quite publicly ripped hard-line nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili for the latter’s inflexibility in negotiations with the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program:
It’s nice for the centrifuges to run, but people’s livelihoods have to also run, our factories have to also run.
And here’s what he said about relations with the U.S. in his post-election press conference:
The issue of relations between Iran and the United States is a complicated and difficult issue. It’s not a simple issue. After all, there is an old scar. Prudence has to be adopted to cure this scar. Of course, we will not pursue continuing or expanding tensions. We will not pursue adding to tensions. It would be wise for the two nations and countries to think more of the future. They should find a solution to the past issues and resolve them. They should think of the future. But any talks with the United States have to take place based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and mutual stances. It definitely depends on certain conditions. And those conditions have to be fulfilled. First, as stated in the Algiers Accord [brokered by the Algerian government between the United States and Iran to resolve the Iran hostage crisis in 1981], the Americans have to confirm that they will not interfere in Iran’s internal issues ever. Second, they have to officially recognize the Iranian nation’s rights, including the nuclear right. Third, they should avoid unilateral or bullying policies against Iran. And of course, under such circumstances, the grounds [for holding talks] would be ready. If we feel there is goodwill involved, then the grounds [for talks] would be different. But everyone should know that the future government will not ignore the rightful rights of the Iranian nation under any circumstances. And on this basis, we would be ready for the tension to become less, and even if we see goodwill, it would be possible to take steps toward building trust within a framework that the Islamic Republic of Iran has. And I have pointed out the framework.
Rouhani also actually referred to “Israel” by its chosen name, forgoing the traditional aversion to pronouncing the name of the “Little Satan.”
These statements may, of course, disguise much more sinister and radical designs, but they sound pretty “moderate”, at least by Iran’s standards of the last eight years or so. And it’s worth remembering that they were made publicly in front of a large domestic audience whose votes appear to have actually been counted and who probably formed certain expectations that his words could translate into policy. That the AIPAC/Royce/Engel letter takes absolutely no account of any of this demonstrates the extent to which the 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are actually paying the slightest attention.
Of course, in the event that any attention was paid to Rouhani’s words and the circumstances in which he offered them, the letter falls back on the familiar old chestnut that, of course, it is Khamenei, not Rouhani, who will decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, so the president-elect doesn’t really count (despite the fact that (a) Khamenei supposedly “allowed” Rouhani to win, and (b) he’s served on the Supreme National Security Council for some 15 years, many of them as Khamenei’s representative). And here we are reminded that Khamenei “has recently reiterated his view that Iran has no reason to normalize relations with the United States.” Well, he may indeed have said that recently (although I can’t find a recent quote to that effect, but it should be pointed out that Iran doesn’t have to normalize relations with the U.S. in order to reach an agreement over its nuclear program with the P5+1. Indeed, the whole issue of normalization in the context of the nuclear program is pretty much a non sequitur.
But let’s look more closely at what Khamenei has been saying. Here’s what he said on June 26, according to a Reuters dispatch:
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday the dispute over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme could easily be resolved if the West were to stop being so stubborn.
While accusing the West of being more interested in regime change than ending the dispute, Khamenei did express a desire to resolve an issue which has led to ever tighter sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the wider economy.
“Some countries have organised a united front against Iran and are misguiding the international community and with stubbornness do not want to see the nuclear issue resolved,” Khamenei’s official web site quoted him as saying.
“But if they put aside their stubbornness, resolving the nuclear issue would be simple,” he said, without setting out what specific concessions he wanted Western nations to make.
…”The Islamic Republic has acted legally and transparently in the nuclear debate and offers logic in its arguments, but the aim of the enemies is through constant pressure, to tire Iran and change the regime and they will not allow the issue to be resolved,” Khamenei said.
…”Of course the enemies say in their words and letters than they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words,” he said.
Again, this may all be deception, or “taqiyya”, as neo-cons who fancy themselves expert in matters Shi’a love to invoke when insisting that you can’t trust anything a Shiite tells you. But it certainly doesn’t preclude the possibility of reaching a deal based on such unimperial concepts like “mutual respect,” reciprocity, and international law.
As to relations with the U.S., there’s this other Reuters report that may be of interest to the 45 congressmen and women from June 12:
NEW YORK/ANKARA (Reuters) – Five months ago Iran’s foreign minister sent an unusual letter to the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was time, Ali Akbar Salehi wrote according to two sources who read the letter, to reach out to Tehran’s arch foe by entering into “broad discussions with the United States.”
The supreme leader, though cautious about the prospect, sent a reply to Salehi and the rest of the Cabinet: he was not optimistic but would not oppose them if they pursued the initiative.
The fact is, public debate about direct negotiations with the U.S. was more or less a taboo in Iran as recently as 18 months ago. But it is now openly talked about, even in public debates by candidates close to Khamenei, and it appears that the Supreme Leader himself is not necessarily averse. In light of the results of last month’s elections and Rouhani’s own words on this question, why are those 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee so certain that nothing has changed in Iran and that more pressure is the only solution, particularly when so many actual Iran experts agree that the election has created a major opportunity that Washington would be foolish to squander. Maybe it’s time for the Committee to consult with the IC’s analysts to see what they think. And maybe it’s time for members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to stop reflexively signing onto letters because they’re told AIPAC drafted them. It’s almost as embarrassing as giving Bibi Netanyahu 29 standing ovations.
Meanwhile, here’s a letter that has begun circulating in the House that offers a different approach (compare it to the one that follows):
Dear Colleague:
On June 14, the Iranian people elected Hassan Rouhani president, overcoming repression and intimidation by the Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform.
This is not the first time that Iran has elected a president on a platform of moderation and reform, and history advises us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change. The Iranian government’s actions in the months ahead will certainly speak louder than Dr. Rouhani’s words.
Even so, given the stakes involved for the United States, Israel, and the international community, it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani’s election represents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We must also be careful not to foreclose the possibility of such progress by taking provocative actions that could weaken the newly elected president’s standing relative to Iran’s hardliners, who oppose his professed “policy of reconciliation and peace.”
We invite you to join us in sending the attached letter to President Obama urging him to reinvigorate U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The letter does not take a position on whether current sanctions should be strengthened or relaxed, nor does it take a position on the potential use of military force by the United States or its allies. We know our colleagues hold different views on these sensitive issues, but we should all be able to agree on the need for a renewed diplomatic push as part of our broader strategy toward Iran.
If you would like to sign or have questions about this letter, do not hesitate to contact George McElwee with Rep. Dent (5-6411) or Asher Hildebrand with Rep. Price (5-1784).
Sincerely,
CHARLES DENT
Member of CongressDAVID PRICE
Member of Congress
[gview file="http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf"]
]]>by Peter Jenkins
In defence of his 2003-05 record, Iran’s president-elect Hassan Rouhani writes, “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work in Isfahan.”
Some claim [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
In defence of his 2003-05 record, Iran’s president-elect Hassan Rouhani writes, “While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work in Isfahan.”
Some claim this as evidence that Rouhani duped and tricked his European counterparts in the negotiations that took place in Tehran in October 2003.
That interpretation is wrong. I will explain why.
The agreement that British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and his French and German counterparts (the E3) reached with Rouhani on 21 October 2003 specified that Iran would suspend “all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]”.
The E3 hoped that Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, would produce a definition of enrichment that would stop work at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan, which was due to start converting uranium ore (yellowcake) into uranium hexafluoride, the feed material for centrifuge enrichment, in the course of 2004.
Instead, ElBaradei defined enrichment as the operation and/or testing of centrifuges; the installation of centrifuges; the introduction or use of material in any facility capable of isotopic separation; and the construction, testing or operation of any isotopic separation facility.
In doing so, ElBaradei opened the way for Iran to complete, hot test and start up production at the UCF without breaching the Tehran agreement with the E3. Iran also continued to manufacture, assemble and test centrifuge machines — while honouring its commitment to suspend the activities specified by ElBaradei…
As soon as the E3 could, they set about trying to renegotiate the Tehran agreement to close these loop-holes; but it was only in November 2004, in Paris, that they finally got Iranian agreement to extend the suspension to “all enrichment related activities, and specifically the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; and all tests or production of any uranium conversion installation”.
It follows that Rouhani is entitled to claim that the agreement he negotiated in October 2003 allowed Iran to complete and start up the UCF. This achievement, however, stemmed from ElBaradei’s judgement that a narrow definition of enrichment would be more accurate than a broad definition. The achievement was not the result of trickery or deceit.
Let me also deal with the breakdown of the Tehran and Paris agreements in the course of 2005.
Trickery and deceit played no part in that breakdown. The essential cause of the breakdown was the E3’s rejection of an Iranian proposal, in March 2005, that Iran resume enrichment to a limited extent and under rigorous IAEA monitoring. The rejection led Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to think that the E3 sought an indefinite suspension of enrichment, which he had never intended to concede (as the E3 knew full well). The proximate cause was a resumption of activity at the UCF in August 2005, on the Supreme Leader’s orders.
The E3 took the view that Iran had gone back on its side of the Tehran and Paris bargains, but did not consider that reversal treacherous or dishonest, because Rouhani had never undertaken to maintain suspension indefinitely.
Instead, seeing the reversal as releasing them from their side of the Tehran bargain, the E3 set about arranging for the IAEA to forward to the UN the Director General’s 2003 report of Iranian safeguards non-compliance. They hoped that the UN Security Council would turn suspension from a voluntary measure into a binding requirement, and that Iran would feel obliged to comply. The Security Council delivered; Iran’s lack of compunction in ignoring the Council’s diktat was plain for all to see.
As I have written before, the big misfortune in October 2003 was that no one insisted on linking Iranian suspension to the completion of IAEA investigations under the Additional Protocol. The justification for suspension was a (palpable and widespread) loss of confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions. An IAEA assurance — under the Additional Protocol — that all nuclear material and plants in Iran had been declared, would have re-built confidence and led all but a handful of IAEA members to conclude that Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium for civil purposes under IAEA safeguards. The hold-outs would have been unable to persuade the Security Council to make suspension mandatory and impose sanctions.
Anyway, the lesson to be drawn from Europe’s experience nearly a decade ago is that Iran’s president-elect is not some wily Oriental who cannot be trusted; he is rather a defender of Iranian interests who drives a hard but honest bargain and is true to his word.
Photo Credit: Abdolvahed Mirzazadeh
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
For most Israeli politicians, the news of the election of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, is not good. That it is considered good news by anyone else makes it that much worse.
In Poland last Wednesday, two days before Iranians went to [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
For most Israeli politicians, the news of the election of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, is not good. That it is considered good news by anyone else makes it that much worse.
In Poland last Wednesday, two days before Iranians went to the polls, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared that the results would bring about no meaningful change in Iran. Hours before reports of the election’s outcome began to be announced, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a pro-Israel think tank, that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, would decide who the next Iranian president would be. The imminent Iranian election would change nothing.
As news of Rouhani’s garnering more than half the votes cast in Iran began to emerge, Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Yigal Palmor, echoed the widespread view that it is Khamenei who makes all the decisions concerning the Iranian nuclear program, not the Iranian president. “After the elections, Iran will continue to be judged by its actions, in the nuclear sphere as well as on the issue of terror,” Palmor said in a statement.” Iran must abide by the demands of the international community to stop its nuclear program and cease the dissemination of terror throughout the world.”
In a cabinet meeting on Sunday morning, Netanyahu derided not only the possible impact of a Rouhani-presidency on Iran’s policies, but also whether Rouhani even deserved to be considered a moderate since Khamenei had allowed him to run:
“Let us not delude ourselves,” Netanyahu said. “The international community must not become caught up in wishes and be tempted to relax the pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear program. It must be remembered that the Iranian ruler, at the outset, disqualified candidates who did not fit his extremist outlook and from among those whose candidacies he allowed was elected the candidate who was seen as less identified with the regime, who still defines the State of Israel [in an address last year] as ‘the great Zionist Satan.’”
Referring to the unexpected election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s president in 1997, the Israeli Prime Minister reminded his cabinet that “Fifteen years ago, the election of another president, also considered a moderate by the West, led to no change in these aggressive policies.”
Perhaps Netanyahu should be reminded that in 1992, he claimed Iran was “3 to 5 years” from having a nuclear weapon. That same year, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (Israel’s current president) told French TV that Iran would have a nuclear warhead by 1999. This contention, shared by Netanyahu’s political rival, Yitzhak Rabin and echoed here by the Israel lobby, provided much of the impetus to push harder for the anti-Iran sanctions that were a major factor in constraining the ability of the last reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, to improve the economy and gain political capital against regime hard-liners.
In an interview with AP and Reuters, Peres made the opposite argument, praising the election results as a blow to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “who was sure that the people would vote according to his decision.” According to Peres, Rouhani will now have to be judged by his actions, rather than his words.
(Now what would happen if the U.S. were to judge Israeli leaders by their actions rather than their words, with regard to resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict or coming clean about Israel’s nuclear weapons program?)
Knesset Foreign Relations Chair Avigdor Lieberman of the hardline Israel is Our Home party, barred from assuming the post of Foreign Minister until the pending corruption charges against him are resolved, sized up Iran’s president-elect as being “not more moderate, but more sophisticated” than his predecessor. “We have not heard from [Rouhani] any announcements that he plans to stop the nuclear program.”
Minister of International Relations Yuval Steinitz, whose ministerial duties include “Israel’s intelligence efforts on Iran,” told Army Radio on Sunday morning that “the results are a credit to the Iranian people,” but expressed doubts as to whether Supreme Leader Khamenei, who “actually manages foreign affairs, national security and Iran’s nuclear program,” would alter Iran’s “path and behavior.” Steinitz asserted that the election results would have no effect on Iran’s nuclear progress, which he claimed is ever-closer to crossing the nuclear “red line.” Were any changes in to occur, he opined they would come about solely as a consequence of “increased pressure” by the international community. Steinitz therefore insisted that international sanctions against Iran “must continue, regardless of the desire of the Iranian people for progress.”
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni – praised by J-Street last year when she resigned from the Knesset for defining “the ideal of public service in Israel, pursuing her vision of the best interests of Israel with passion, dignity and integrity,” but who immediately jockeyed for and won a cabinet position in the right-wing Netanyahu government elected in January — also told Army Radio that Rouhani’s election would test the West’s determination to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. While Rouhani might seem like a more moderate face for Iranians, Livni was in agreement with her Likud colleagues that it would be “wise” to continue pressuring Iran. “The test will be that of action,” Livni said, parroting the official Israel position that Iran’s new president should be judged by actions instead of words.
MK Zahava Gal-on of Israel’s pro-peace and progressive Meretz party, which is in opposition to Netanyahu’s government, issued a sardonic statement of condolence to Israel’s political leadership on the departure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who for the past eight years has provided a treasure trove of anti-Israel invective that Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have been able to quote when making their case that Iran is an imminent threat to Israel:
I extend my sympathy to the Israeli government that, with heavy heart and head hung low, must bid farewell to Ahmadinejad, who served as propaganda card and as an excellent source of excuses to avoid dealing with Israel’s real problems,” she said in a statement.
Where will the prime minister turn to now, when someone asks him about the Palestinian conflict? What about the out-of-control budget deficit for which he was responsible?… What about the racism that exists within Israeli society?… What will he do?”
I fear that the election of the moderate Rouhani is not just a blow to the extremists in Tehran, but also to the extremist leadership in Israel, which will now have to replace intimidation with actions.”
Gal-On’s sarcasm is closer to reality than it might sound. After Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of the contentious 2009 runoff presidential election, despite charges that his opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, had received more votes, the pro-settler, nationalist news site Arutz Sheva included some quotes reflecting the attitudes of many Israeli politicians and pundits about the 2009 victory of the outgoing Iranian president who Israeli leaders have delighted in comparing to Haman and Hitler, among them:
- Mossad director Meir Dagan told the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that “if the reformist candidate Mousavi had won, Israel would have had a more serious problem because it would need to explain to the world the danger of the Iranian threat.”
- Ephraim Inbar, director of the Begin Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University, explained to CBS News, “If we have Ahmadinejad, we know where we stand. If we have Mousavi we have a serpent with a nice image.”
- Political commentator Ron Ben Yishai declared Ahmadinejad “a diplomatic asset for the West in general and for Israel in particular. His Shi’ite fanaticism and Holocaust denial have frightened Arab and Western countries and assisted in creation of a global anti-Iranian front.”
So it’s not surprising that, as the results of the 2013 Iranian election became known on Saturday, Deputy Defense Minister Gilad Erdan expressed concern that Rouhani’s reputation as a centrist and the support he received from Iran’s reformists might tempt the West to give Iran “more leeway in diplomatic contacts over its rogue nuclear drive,” agreeing to more talks, and then more talks.
Regardless of the outcome of any Iranian election offering the possibility of change — admittedly not the prospect or an outright promise — Israeli politicos will be displeased, and for the wrong reasons. Expect to hear more from them in the days and weeks ahead in the media, and from the Israel Lobby in the United States.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a top adviser to Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seems like a reasonable fellow with respect to Iran’s nuclear stance in this March 12th interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.
On the West’s issue with Iranian enrichment of uranium to 20%, Mr. Larijani says we simply need [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a top adviser to Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seems like a reasonable fellow with respect to Iran’s nuclear stance in this March 12th interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.
On the West’s issue with Iranian enrichment of uranium to 20%, Mr. Larijani says we simply need to go back to the era when Iran was able to buy the fuel it needs for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). “The minute they sell it to us, the amount we need for the Tehran reactor, there is definitely no need to produce it,” he said.
On the issue of Iran’s slow but steady advancement of is nuclear program, Mr. Larijani argues that Iran’s enrichment of uranium is an “honest to God right” that’s also covered by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and “we are a moving nation, we are going to capture higher levels of scientific achievement” regardless of Western demands. Then the reasonable part kicks in full-swing: however, if concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are related to the issue of nuclear armament, Iran understands and shares that concern, claims Mr. Larijani, adding that Iran is “willing to accept all mechanisms under the NPT” to safeguard against such development.
And with respect to the possibility of bilateral talks between Iran and the US (which already occurred back in October 2009), Mr. Larijani is less direct. He doesn’t confirm or reject the possibility, but does offer a “recommendation” that a “new model” be designed for relations between Iran and the United States which acknowledges that Iran does not want to be more than “what we are” and ends US hostility toward Iran.
Excluding Mr. Larijani’s comments about the political battle between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s ruling elite, which Mr. Larijani describes as part of Iran’s “democratic structure”, all this raises the question of why Iran isn’t perceived as reasonable during negotiations or can’t be as reasonable as Mr. Larijani seems to be here with Amanpour on CNN, and why progress on the diplomatic front remains slow at best or simply nil. Deep mutual mistrust, acknowledged by the most knowledgeable US-Iran analysts, is perhaps the main reason for the lack of substantial results, as are those pesky details that need to be agreed upon by both sides before a deal can be reached.
Then there’s that lingering issue of whether progress can even be hoped for before Iran’s 2013 Presidential election, and for that I turn to the experts. I’ll have an interview that touches on that issue and the nuclear negotiations as a whole with Farideh Farhi up next week.
]]>by Dina Esfandiary
Iranians negotiate like they’re in the bazaar. Westerners negotiate like they’re shopping at Macy’s. These negotiating styles could not be more different, making it difficult to get an actual result. But the West needs to decide whether it’s naming the price or really negotiating because at [...]]]>
by Dina Esfandiary
Iranians negotiate like they’re in the bazaar. Westerners negotiate like they’re shopping at Macy’s. These negotiating styles could not be more different, making it difficult to get an actual result. But the West needs to decide whether it’s naming the price or really negotiating because at present, there is a significant failure of communication and understanding. The burden is on the West to fix it.
A misunderstanding of how the Iranians conduct themselves in negotiations continues to hang over talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security council plus Germany). The Iranian bazaar mentality results in the Iranians aiming for the lowest price that they can hope for, expecting it to be rejected and receiving a counter-offer. The point of their first offer is to calibrate the subsequent discussion, not to generate an immediate result.
In contrast, the P5+1 and the US have recently been expecting to pay the price on the sticker. In other words, they regard Iranian offers as a sign of their unwillingness to talk rather than an opening to negotiations. This was what led to the unsubstantial outcome of the three rounds of negotiations that took place in 2012.
There is also a misunderstanding on the part of the West over public statements coming from Iran regarding its nuclear program. As is the case for many countries including the US, most official Iranian statements are for domestic consumption rather than an indication of their position vis-à-vis the P5+1. This is the context in which Ali Khamenei’s statement last week must be seen. The Supreme Leader’s words echoed those of the past twenty years. They are primarily directed at the Iranian public, reassuring them that they will not be ‘sold out’ to the ‘Great Satan’.
In fact, Khamenei will be the last person in the regime to change his stance on talks with the West. This is because of the high political cost of any appearance of weakness on the part of the Supreme Leader. Remember that Khamenei has constructed Iran’s nuclear program as a symbol of Iranian defiance of the West. He cannot be seen as giving in to anyone, especially not to America and on this issue.
As was the case recently for the US, the presidential election in Iran is looming and for this reason, short of a miraculous breakthrough, it’s unlikely that the next round of talks will be conclusive. (This is tied to Khamenei’s desire, once again, not to be viewed as weak.) The Supreme Leader does not want President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — a political thorn in his side — to get credit for a resolution of this long-standing crisis. In addition, should talks resume and subsequently fail after the presidential elections, Khamenei will be able to deflect the blame on the new president. As is the case for President Barak Obama, the cost of failure is only second to appearing weak in the face of a long-time adversary.
Although there are misconceptions on both sides, the greater onus is on the West to break this deadlock. Why? Structurally, Iran has something the West wants and not the other way around. Iran is the player developing the nuclear program, and the P5+1 along with Israel want Iran to give it up.
If there is no resolution to the nuclear issue through negotiation, the US’ hope is that (barring successful military action — itself almost impossible) the Iranian regime will collapse and a new government will be willing to make a deal. But Iran’s position is that if talks collapse, they will continue to develop their nuclear program in spite of sanctions. Given these two scenarios, Iran appears more likely to succeed.
– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
To say that President Barack Obama’s visit this spring to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan is the proverbial gamble is an understatement. He may end up (rightly) congratulating himself on his wisdom and courage in taking this step and doing so at this time — and [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
To say that President Barack Obama’s visit this spring to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan is the proverbial gamble is an understatement. He may end up (rightly) congratulating himself on his wisdom and courage in taking this step and doing so at this time — and being thus recognized as a truly valid recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize conferred on him 3 years ago. Or, he may deeply regret venturing into such troubled waters and ending up, like so many of his predecessors, with not much to show for his pains in trying to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
In any event, he has now embarked on a course that he must see through to the end or risk making matters worse, possibly for the regional parties and certainly for the reputation of the United States. Yet if he is prepared to do so — with demands that will match anything else in foreign policy that he has done in his presidency — the payoff will be immense, not just in the Levant but throughout the Middle East.
The lack of success in creating a viable Palestinian state, at peace with Israel and with both peoples living in mutual security, is not from a lack of effort from many senior, talented and dedicated people in the 34 years since President Jimmy Carter’s summit at Camp David with Egypt’s Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Menachem Begin launched what were then called Autonomy Talks for the Palestinian territories.
Nor is the lack of success in producing what is known as the “two-state solution” a failure of ideas. These have been fussed over for decades, but have come down pretty much to a consensus on a few cardinal points, looking toward “Final Status.” These were best put in a brief statement by President Bill Clinton in December 2000, following the abortive Second Camp David Summit and a scant four weeks before he left office. They can be found here.
In brief, they propose a swap of land between Israel and the West Bank, so that about 80 percent of Jewish settlers on the West Bank would be incorporated into Israel; the state of Palestine would have contiguity (which implies some link to Gaza); Israel could keep troops in the Jordan Valley for a 3-year transitional period, plus long-term warning stations; arrangements would be made for Jerusalem that boil down to there being two capitals in one city with respect for everyone’s religious sites; there could be any one of five Clinton-suggested approaches to dealing with Palestinian refugees, with at least some being admitted into Israel proper; and Palestine would be a “non-militarized state” with an “international force for border security and deterrent purposes.” With a colleague, I later proposed that this “international force” be NATO, and that idea has gained currency.
Compared with the reams of negotiating documents and the years of talk, this is a simple formulation. It is also recognized by almost everyone who has actually been engaged in these negotiations — as I have — as probably the best that can be achieved and a balanced approach from which all can gain and that could, finally, bring the conflict to an end.
These Clinton Parameters, the obvious solution, were advanced 12 years ago, yet the conflict continues. The reason is manifold: part has been a general lack of political will to move forward, especially with the complex — if not tortured — politics in both Israeli and Palestinian societies; part is the natural human difficulty of taking a leap in the dark after decades of stasis; and part is what else has been happening. And it is this “what else has been happening” that Obama cannot avoid addressing during his visit and that will still be there when he departs, no doubt after applying his well-honed skills of inspiration, intelligence, and honest application to tough problems. This will be so even though opinion polling has long shown that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians want the conflict to be over and done with.
Obama will no doubt reassure all parties of US commitment to be engaged until the job is done — and if he is not prepared to “walk the walk” as well as “talk the talk”, he should stay home — ; to provide reassurances to Israel about its security and to Palestinians about the importance of what they call justice; and to call on peoples and political leaders to seize this particular moment. This should include a major address to the Knesset and some form of symbolic (as well as substantive) encounter with the Palestinians.
Then to the “what else is happening.” On the Palestinian side, Hamas’ control of Gaza and the on-again, off-again nature of its relations with the Palestinian Authority led by Mohammed Abbas on the West Bank are far from propitious, if not now impossible to resolve. Abbas will also insist, once again, that the US president get the Israelis to stop settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and to ease significantly the isolation of Gaza.
On the Israeli side, current preoccupation is not with Palestine peacemaking, but with a trifecta of Iran, Syria and Egypt, all of which involve real or potential Security with a capital “S.” In Israel, Obama will no doubt be pressed, and pressed again, to confirm that “containment” of an Iranian nuclear capability is unacceptable to the United States and that all options — including the use of military force — are “on the table.” That will certainly not make negotiations any easier with the Iranians, in whatever form and whatever timing they take, and it will be even more difficult for Obama to change the US negotiating position to something that might have a chance of working — e.g., by recognizing that US, Israeli, and Iranian security concerns must all be accounted for. Prime Minister Netanyahu will also underscore Israel’s continuing concerns with attacks coming from Gaza and Iranian support for Hezbollah. And he will want the US strategic commitment to Israel to be further bolstered in concrete military terms.
Israel is also deeply concerned by the civil war in Syria, which, depending on what happens when President Assad departs (assuming that that will happen,) could turn that country into what Lebanon has so often been — a haven for attacks by Hezbollah and maybe others on Israel. President Obama can offer reassuring words, but the US may have little to offer, including in forestalling a larger, slow-burning civil war between the region’s Sunnis and Shi’ites, a byproduct of the misguided US invasion of Iraq a decade ago. And Israel is meanwhile very carefully watching what is happening in Egypt, where the 1979 peace treaty has been the bedrock of Israel’s strategic confidence ever since.
Nothing that President Obama says or does on his trip to the region will change fundamentally any of these factors. And, as usually happens when any positive possibility seems to be emerging in Arab-Israeli relations, a terrorist incident during the president’s trip is highly likely, further stimulating the fears of all those who would like to move forward, and undercutting moderate politics.
All this is the bad news. The good news — or at least potentially hopeful news — is that for the US to become again engaged in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is an essential ingredient: despite talk over the years that “we Americans can’t want peace more than the parties,” it has been proved repeatedly that only the US can press the parties forward. (That statement includes whatever other members of the so-called Quartet that the US fostered in 2002 — the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia — will try to do but where they have no capacity to be of much consequence.) It is also true that, when the US commits its prestige and that of its president, “things happen.” This effort is also coming at the start of Obama’s second term, whereas Bill Clinton got engaged seriously only when he was about to leave office — and thus was in no position to put US political muscle behind any forward progress.
Experience also confirms that serious negotiations on Final Status can only truly begin when the US plunks down for consideration the draft text of a complete treaty, perhaps for presentation purposes doing it jointly with the other three Quartet members. At the very least, President Obama needs to outline parameters for a settlement during this trip — whether he just calls them “Clinton” or a more proprietary “Obama” Parameters. He will need to paint himself into a corner in terms of his own personal commitment to success, however long and hard the slog may be.
There is some other news regarding Obama’s spring trip, the impact of which has yet to be proved; it raises questions about why he is acting so soon, other than to splash a big rock in the pool and thereby get everyone’s attention that “the US is back.” Happily, he has appointed a Secretary of State, John Kerry, who is deeply committed to success on this issue, calling failure a “catastrophe.” Yet, by the time Obama goes to the region, Kerry will not have had time to even put his State Department Middle East team together and get his key officials confirmed by the Senate. The NSC staff in the White House will have had to be beefed up with top-notch people in this area; and the nominated Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, who will need to offer strong backing — especially to reassure Israel of US strategic and military engagement — is not yet even in office. There is also precious little time before the president leaves for the Near East, for the White House to do the essential prior consultations with the Congress and key US constituencies, especially leadership of the Jewish community, if his trip to Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan is to be – as it must now be – about substance and not just symbols.
For Obama to offer more than his own commitment and symbolism of “being there,” he must be ready to take one further step, if Kerry is to be spared having to spend a massive amount of his time and energy on the Middle East account, which regularly eclipses other priorities. That is to appoint a senior-level negotiator who will do what it takes for as long as it takes. The one person with experience who could also provide the necessary political clout as Obama’s personal emissary is obvious: former President Bill Clinton.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
There has been good news out of Israel this week – all the more welcome for being relatively infrequent where Iran is concerned.
Sheera Frenkel, a McClatchy correspondent, reported on Monday that Israeli intelligence officials had told the news service over the last two months that they [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
There has been good news out of Israel this week – all the more welcome for being relatively infrequent where Iran is concerned.
Sheera Frenkel, a McClatchy correspondent, reported on Monday that Israeli intelligence officials had told the news service over the last two months that they now estimate that Iran will be unable to build a nuclear weapon before 2015 or 2016.
This estimate will have come as no surprise to those who monitor official US statements for insights into related US judgements. Back in August 2012, a National Security Council spokesman stated: “We continue to assess that Iran is not on the verge of achieving a nuclear weapon.” And since late 2007, US National Intelligence Estimates have been pushing the date at which Iran would reach the nuclear threshold (an ability to make nuclear weapons) towards 2015.
Nor is the latest Israeli estimate unprecedented. On 9 January 2011 the Washington Post reported that outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan had told Israeli reporters that Iran could not build a bomb before 2015 at the earliest.
However, the estimate raises questions about the performance of Israel’s Prime Minister during last autumn’s UN General Assembly. Mr. Netanyahu seemed to want listeners to believe that Iran could make a nuclear device as soon as mid-2013.
For those of us who are outside government, and without access to intelligence reports, reconciling such contradictions is all but impossible. If, though, I had to hazard a speculative guess, I would say that Mr. Netanyahu was focusing solely on Iran’s ability to produce sufficient highly enriched uranium for one device, and that Israeli intelligence officers are looking beyond the production of fissile material to Iran’s ability to produce a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Anyway, what really matters is that this latest Israeli estimate will make it much harder for the Israeli government to convince the US government that the “window of opportunity” for diplomacy is closing and will have closed before 2013 is out.
That is a godsend — all the more helpful as the days and weeks pass, confusion and uncertainty mount, and the prospect of Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) getting into a serious nuclear negotiation recede towards the second half of 2013, after the installation of a new Iranian president (early August). Helpful, too, in quelling the concern some will feel when they read a Reuters report that Iran is at last about to install more efficient centrifuges at the Natanz plant, to produce low enriched uranium (under 5%).
Suggesting that good news, and not just Shakespearian sorrows, come “not as single spies”, a 25 January Daily Beast report from Davos quoted outgoing Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak stating that: “What we basically say is that if worse comes to worst, there should be a readiness and an ability to launch a surgical operation that will delay [Iran] by a significant time frame and probably convince them that it won’t work because the world is determined to block them.”
This sentence seems to imply that the Israeli government is now aligned with its US counterpart in drawing a line at a point where there is evidence that Iran has decided to cross the threshold and embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
This would be a significant development. For years Israeli politicians have been saying that Iran cannot be allowed to retain a dual-use uranium enrichment capability, and that Iran’s enrichment plants should be destroyed by force unless Iran agrees to their dismantlement. Now Mr. Barak is saying that the use of force should only be contemplated “if worse comes to worst”. I suppose that could mean: “If Iran refuses to capitulate to Israeli demands”. But “if Iran embarks on nuclear weapon production” seems like a more natural interpretation.
If that is so, it is a second boost in a matter of days to nuclear negotiation prospects. There has never been much likelihood that Iran would agree to surrender its dual-use enrichment capability — and EU insistence on it doing so was the prime cause of the breakdown of the promising negotiation between three EU members and Iran that was launched in October 2003. But Iranians have often alluded to their readiness to back up their word with practical measures when it comes to respecting their non-nuclear-weapon state treaty commitments.
Of course, Mr. Netanyahu has just been re-elected, and, on past form, he may not be deterred from raising a hue and cry by anything as dull as evidence-based logic. Still, the odds on him being taken seriously in Washington seem to have lengthened since last Friday.
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