by Wayne White

In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

In his Oct. 29 Foreign Policy article, “How We Won in Iraq”, General David Petraeus characterizes the 2003 US invasion and departure of US troops in 2011 as an American victory. This triumphant — though distorted — version of that searing saga seems acceptable to many Americans not only because it has been repeated so often, but also because it is so reassuring. Yet, despite the immense effort and sacrifice on the part of the US military and civilian personnel who served in Iraq, there are profound reasons to question such an upbeat conclusion.

Losers and winners

The Bush administration’s goal extended far beyond the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and initially focused on the destruction of his alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). No WMD were found. The administration also planned to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy that would function as a beacon to those suffering under nearby authoritarian regimes. Instead, even now Iraqis are saddled with an abusive, dysfunctional, non-transparent, corrupt, and sectarian-based government that resembles a democracy more in appearance than substance.

Rather than achieving a quick victory followed by a swift, orderly transition, the US became embroiled in a prolonged and bloody anti-insurgency campaign that cost well over 30,000 American casualties. The invasion also gave birth to al-Qaeda’s most damaging subsidiary, cost over $1 trillion, and for over five years diverted a huge amount of focus, military power, and spending from the important NATO effort in Afghanistan. Finally, instead of the US, the West, and moderate Arab states having considerable influence with Iraq’s new leaders, Baghdad’s most influential partner is Iran, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is supporting the Assad regime in Syria.

As for the Iraqis, Sunni Arabs have been disenfranchised by the Shi’a-dominated successor regime, untold numbers of them have been killed, many of their communities have been ravaged by war, and well over a million were driven from their homes and businesses in the greater Baghdad area. A majority of Iraq’s roughly one million Christians have been forced to flee in the face of killings, church burnings and attacks on their businesses. Even the dominant Shi’a majority have suffered terrible casualties and great loss of property at the hands of the robust Sunni Arab insurgency back in 2003-2007, the depredations of their own rogue militias, and the drumfire of terrorist attacks and bombings on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to this day.

For Arab Iraqis, insurgent sabotage and waves of looting following the invasion have devastated most of the country’s state industries, large private businesses, and all government ministries save one. Universities, hospitals, schools, banks, archives, much of Iraq’s electrical and oil infrastructure and the country’s rich archaeological heritage have also been severely damaged.

If there is a relative winner, it could be Iraq’s Kurdish community. Separated from the rest of the country by their own militias defending the borders of the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KRG), the majority of predominantly Kurdish areas have been spared the high levels of casualties and damage experienced elsewhere. In fact, the KRG now enjoys considerable prosperity (and more autonomy than at any time since the creation of the modern Iraqi state) with a host of Arab Iraqis taking advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan’s booming tourist industry every year to seek a respite from life farther south. Nevertheless, from late 1991 until Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, most of the Kurds now within the KRG already had been largely protected from Saddam’s rule within a northern sanctuary with much the same borders as the KRG.

The troop surge myth

Frontloaded prominently in Petraeus’ discussion of the “Surge of Ideas” is the new strategic approach he brought to the table. Petraeus’ shift toward increasingly embedding US troops within Iraqi communities and other tactical innovations was indeed more enlightened than the approach of his predecessors. Nonetheless, he does suggest strongly that the additional 30,000 US troops made a substantial difference. Yet, of the latter, only 5,000 were sent outside Baghdad to address severe problems in mainly Sunni Arab areas, so only in Baghdad was that reinforcement of any real significance.

Buried far below and evidently rated second to Petraeus’ “clear, hold and build” strategy was the US decision to exploit the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening.” His description of the emergence of this phenomenon — the most critical game changer from late 2006 through 2008 — contains some notable errors.

First off, the decision on the part of many Sunni Arab insurgent and allied tribal leaders to seek a deal with American forces did not “begin several months before the surge” when one “talented US army brigade commander” decided to work with one “courageous Sunni sheikh” at Ramadi. The first Sunni Arab offer to cooperate with US forces — and in a far more sweeping manner — was brought to Washington’s attention in mid-2004, over two years before the events outside Ramadi in 2006. Senior military officers in the field at the time told me that other offers at least as significant as the one Petraeus cites occurred as early as 2003.

Petraeus is correct in his assertion that in 2003 many Sunni Arabs, despite their association with the former regime, still hoped to play a constructive role in the new Iraq. However, their offers of help were cast aside by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Jerry Bremer, when he dismissed the entire Iraqi Army even while giving Petraeus writ to reach out locally in the latter’s northern 101st Airborne Division sector.

It is therefore wrong to place the blame for missing this opportunity exclusively on “Iraqi authorities in Baghdad” (who had precious little authority relative to Bremer’s at that point). In fact, senior US military officers on the scene acting on instructions (some pre-dating the invasion) recruited many thousands of Sunni Arab officers willing to remain in the Iraqi army to help maintain order; they also were waved off by Bremer.

Missed opportunities, lingering effects

In the summer of 2004, the US army and Marines fighting in various sectors west and northwest of Baghdad were approached by a number of insurgent and tribal leaders seeking a broad-based deal with US forces. They did not regard Iraqi forces as a significant foe, nor did they trust the largely Shi’a/Kurdish Iraqi central government. Yet, so serious were these Sunni Arab leaders about stopping the fighting with Coalition forces & turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that they agreed to meet with Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in Tikrit, even though an agreement between the Sunni Arab leaders and Allawi could not be reached.

So, instead of grasping this outstretched hand that would have spared vast numbers of US and Iraqi casualties over the following two bloody years, the Bush administration deferred to an Iraqi government dominated by anti-Sunni Arab elements. Only when the uncontrollable maelstrom of bloodshed described by Petraeus erupted in early 2006 did the administration reluctantly decide to make the proverbial “deal with the devil.” This was driven by the need to gain some measure of traction in coping with a situation that had expanded to include the scourge of wholesale sectarian cleansing that displaced at least 1.5 million Iraqis and eradicated the once rich culture of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad.

Once that decision had been made, the Sunni Arab “Awakening” deal took more than 100,000 insurgents off the battlefield and turned them into critical US assets against AQI. Only then could sufficient forces be freed up to crack down effectively on rampaging Shi’a militias — primarily Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army.”

Petraeus also wrongly paints al-Maliki as supportive of the deal with Sunni Arab combatants, albeit merely in Sunni Arab areas, in 2007. From my vantage point in US Intelligence, I watched as the Iraqi PM set about actively trying to torpedo the arrangement during 2007 — even going to the extreme of ordering a major Iraqi army attack on an Awakening force west of Baghdad (in a Sunni Arab area), thankfully headed off by US forces, in addition to other attempted attacks on specific “Awakening” commanders as well as the kidnapping of some of their relatives.

Petraeus rejects the notion that “we got lucky with the Awakening,” but that is, in fact, far closer to the truth because the “Awakening” emanated from Iraq’s Sunni Arab community — not from “a conscious decision” on the part of the US (save for a belated US decision to accept a deal that had been on the table for two years). Had the Bush administration instead continued to reject such a deal in 2007-08, US forces probably would not have had nearly such a decisive impact on the war — regardless of Petraeus’ otherwise more creative approach to the conflict. Conversely, had Washington allowed the deal to be accepted far earlier, Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen. George Casey, would have enjoyed a lot more success (despite a less savvy tactical approach).

Petraeus, nonetheless, is correct that welcoming — rather than spurning — Iraq’s Sunni Arabs is perhaps the only way out of the current escalating spiral of violence. Unfortunately, Maliki’s determination to minimize Sunni Arab political participation over the past four years especially has so poisoned the well of sectarian trust that it could be very difficult to achieve such a shift in policy so long as al-Maliki remains in power. It is, therefore, supremely ironic that after ignoring years of US entreaties to abandon his marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and embrace reconciliation instead, al-Maliki should be meeting with President Obama today asking for American anti-terrorism assistance to address the violence he and his cronies have done so much to provoke.

by Wayne White

The latest round of frustrating nuclear talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its next session with the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) set for February 26 have generated more arguments that Western demands are excessive and Western concessions insufficient [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Wayne White

The latest round of frustrating nuclear talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its next session with the P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, Russia, China plus Germany) set for February 26 have generated more arguments that Western demands are excessive and Western concessions insufficient to merit a serious response from Tehran. Likewise, there are renewed assertions that Iran should be entitled to continue its nuclear enrichment program much as it wishes, why Tehran is therefore justified in standing its ground, how continuing assurances on the part of the Iranian regime that it has no interest in nuclear weapons should be taken at face value, and that continued Israeli and US threats of potential military action against Iran are mostly bluff.

Yet, although I sympathize with some of these arguments, it seems clear that key players like the IAEA, the P5+1 and most significantly of all, Israel and the US, remain unimpressed and probably will not change their position that Iran ultimately may be seeking a nuclear weapons capability and therefore must be convinced (or somehow compelled) to downgrade its nuclear enrichment program.

And, personally, I do not find it as easy as some others to brush aside years of UN resolutions, Iranian concealment and suspicions concerning Iran’s nuclear program cited by the IAEA and a number of governments as utterly without foundation (especially after seeing examples of Tehran’s duplicity on other issues I observed while inside the US Intelligence Community). Iran’s simultaneous pursuit of an aggressive ballistic missile program also is troubling in this overall context. Finally, amidst obviously deceptive Iranian assurances concerning the fairness of national elections, highly suspect denials of its thousands of human rights abuses, and so on, I am leery about dismissing all doubts about the ultimate aims of Tehran’s nuclear program based merely on various official regime claims of disinterest in — or opposition to — the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Admittedly, the various parties pressing the Iranian regime for a robust inspection regime and a downgrade of its enrichment program could be the victims of a certain amount of “groupthink.” After all, as many argue, the UK, the US and others possessing supposedly impressive intelligence capabilities were wrong about Iraq’s nuclear, WMD and missile programs back in 2003. That devastating and (to a considerable extent on the US side) politically-driven blunder was especially galling because monitoring agencies had been given unprecedented access to relevant Iraqi facilities after Iraq’s defeat in 1991, oversaw the destruction of much of the capabilities in question and had a vast database from which more accurate conclusions could have been drawn.

The Iranian case, however, is not a valid parallel. The international community has never had anything approaching such sweeping access on the ground to what Iran has been working on (especially in recent years), so doubts about what it has been doing are less surprising. While this does not mean all officially stated concerns about Iran are on target, likewise it may be a tad cavalier to dismiss most all doubts about Tehran’s nuclear intentions.

And, naturally, it is troubling that some writers on opposite sides of this debate appear to have assumed, effectively, roles similar to those of prosecutors or defense attorneys. On one side are those who seem determined to ignore all inconsistencies that could undermine allegations of suspicious or questionable Iranian nuclear activity. Then, at the other end of the spectrum, there are those who appear to have little doubt that most everything Iran says in its defense is valid, and all accusations and concerns to date are without any merit. As each phase of this impasse plays out, often I find myself caught in the middle — unconvinced by some allegations, but concerned about a few others, and with suspicions that Tehran has neither revealed all its nuclear activities nor, possibly, accurately described its ultimate intentions.

Word of a new “serious and substantial” P5+1 offer in upcoming talks with Iran is not all that heartening since all my hopes of breakthroughs at various other junctures have been dashed. Thus, I remain dubious about some of the actions of all three sides in this controversy: Tehran, the US along with Israel especially, and some of those observers instinctively critical of the P5+1, the US and Israel.

So far, Tehran seems fairly confident it can simply continue scoffing at suspicions and pushing back hard against proposals aimed at limiting or rendering more transparent its nuclear program (even at times exaggerating its own progress) — all without much risk of military consequences. Indeed, on the eve of the upcoming talks, according to the IAEA, Tehran has begun installing more advanced systems at its main uranium enrichment facility and advancing its work on another key plant.

Meanwhile, Israel and the US appear convinced the “military option” against Iran would not produce the destabilizing (and quite possibly prolonged) crisis in the Middle East region with uncertain consequences I fear so greatly. But there are those who maintain that neither the US nor Israel would act on their threats because of the supposed weakness of their case concerning Iran’s activities, a relatively soft domestic consensus for military action, practical concerns related to such action, or all three.

Yet, a recent Iran Project report, “Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran”, supported by a group of typically more reasoned and cautious Washington insiders, although not taking a position on the military option, adopted as part of its “Shared Understandings” that a “nuclear-armed Iran would pose dangerous challenges to US interests and security.” That position is a step toward reinforcing, at least implicitly, the premise that without a diplomatic settlement, military action should at least be worth considering.

So unless US and Israeli threats (backed by certain underlying assumptions) are, in fact, little more than bluster, continued diplomatic stalemate could lead to major conflict in the region at some point. And if the US were to engage in military action against Iran, or is drawn into the fray by an Israeli attack, the scope of what Washington reportedly has had in mind would mean war. Highly misleading is the notion circulated by too many Washington politicians that military action against Iran merely would be “surgical” in nature.

Consequently, still more focus needs to be placed on examining why US characterizations of potential attacks against Iran as “surgical” or “limited” are so off-base. Decisive military action against most all of Iran’s vast nuclear infrastructure and a broad swathe of Iranian military defenses would not be “limited.” Nonetheless, that assurance is likely to be a key portion of any attempt on the part of political Washington to sell such a conflict to the American people. Finally, more work also should be done on why a nuclear-armed Iran probably would not be the self-destructive, bomb-throwing caricature advocates of military action have made it out to be in order to justify what they call “pre-emptive” or “preventative” attacks.

Continuing attempts to convince broader American audiences that Iran can be taken at its word that it is not seeking nuclear weapons simply will not work given the extent of longstanding, widespread American mistrust and hostility toward post-1979 Iranian governments. And some of Tehran’s assurances might turn out to be false in any case. So, changing various exaggerated impressions in the public mind associated with the likely behavior of a nuclear-armed Iran and distortions related to the supposed ease of acting militarily to crush Iran’s nuclear program prior to its full development are of the highest priority.

Photo: The P5+1′s chief negotiator Catherine Ashton meets the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, on on April 14, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS