Tom Ricks, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) senior fellow, adds his take to the list of disastrous scenarios which could follow an Israeli attack on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.
[...]]]>Tom Ricks, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) senior fellow, adds his take to the list of disastrous scenarios which could follow an Israeli attack on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.
On his Foreign Policy blog, The Best Defense, Ricks reflects on a note received from (ret.) Col. Peter Mansoor–Gen. David Petraeus’ executive officer from February 2007 to May 2008–in which Mansoor outlines the potential fallout from an Israeli strike and, rather ominously, describes such an attack as “a likely scenario”. Ricks had been coming to the conclusion that, “…the more Israeli officials chat with journalists about [bombing Iran], the less likely I think it is to happen,” but Mansoor’s note appears to be giving him second thoughts.
The note, reposted on Ricks’ blog, reads:
]]>“Whether it is Israel or the United States that attacks Iranian nuclear facilities, the Iranians will respond by trying to close the Straits of Hormuz and unleashing terror attacks in the ME and around the world. In the event of an attack, the United States will have to destroy Iran’s capacity to close the straits, which means destroying their anti-ship missile batteries, submarines, aircraft, and the assortment of small boats and mine layers that can wreak havoc on Gulf shipping. Israel will no doubt have to invade southern Lebanon again to suppress the inevitable barrage of missiles from Hezbollah. The West will have to go on high alert against terror attacks. The oil shock alone will no doubt spiral the West into a double dip recession/depression.
Not a pretty picture to contemplate, but a likely scenario. Despite the crowd of academics in the United States that says we can live with an Iranian bomb, Israel will not allow the Iranians to go nuclear — at least, not while a Holocaust denier who has made pointed threats against the Jewish state remains in power.”
Matlock, who titles his blog post, “Bomb Iran? Craziest Idea of the Century (So Far),” makes the case that a bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities would choke off a significant portion of the world’s oil supply, fail to ensure that Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon, turn the Muslim world against the United States to an even greater degree, and help hard-line Iranian leaders.
Matlock, along with most realists who have entered into the debate, appears to share a consensus mindset that an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran would fail to achieve any definable objective and hurt U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.
Matlock writes:
]]>Those of us spending our August out in the boonies may have missed the blog frenzy emanating from Washington the past few weeks predicting that Israel is insisting on bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities to remove an “existential threat.” If the U.S. is not willing to do so, the story line goes, Israel will have to do the job itself. The blog hysteria took wings when the Atlantic magazine published an article by Jeffrey Goldberg in its September issue which portrayed the Netanyahu government as irrationally bent on bombing the Iranian nuclear sites.
Such an action would border on insanity, as, apparently, American military leaders understand. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, it is reported, strongly oppose any U.S. support for an attack on Iran. The results, in fact, would be disastrous since Iran has the capability to close the Straits of Hormuz to shipping, thus choking off a major portion of oil exported to world markets.
It also would not ensure that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapons capability. An attack on Iran would be viewed in most Islamic countries as an attack on Islam. Under such conditions, the security of Pakistan’s weapons could not be assured.
Therefore, an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities not only would fail to achieve any rational objective, but would actually produce a greater threat than the one it was supposed to eliminate.
Most likely, hard-line Iranian leaders like Ahmadinejad would actually welcome an Israeli attack. It would strengthen their hand against the democratic elements who believe (rightly) that the last election was stolen. It would allow Ahmadinejad to rally much of the Islamic world against the U.S. and Israel and greatly increase the threat of terrorist attacks within the U.S.
The resolution now making its way in Congress to encourage an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is sheer idiocy. Truly, its sponsors know not what they do! It may seem a cheap bone to throw to ill-informed constituents, but it is truly dangerous. It just gives more apparent justification in Iran for the necessity of getting hold of the bomb, lest it be invaded like Iraq was (to the delight of the Iranian hard-liners!).
Iran, even with nuclear weapons, does not pose an existential threat to Israel, as fanatics claim. Iran’s leaders, though unprincipled hoodlums, are not suicidal and Israel’s reported hundred or so nuclear weapons are sufficient to pose an existential threat to Iran.
I do not believe that Bibi Netanyahu is as deranged on this issue as Jeffrey Goldberg pictures him. He is a master manipulator, and I believe that he and his Likud-minded colleagues are using the issue to distract attention from Israeli policies that are making the peace process impossible: the continuation of settlement activity in the West Bank and the illegal isolation of the Gaza strip. These are policies that make a true settlement with the Palestinians impossible. They are policies that empower Iranian diplomacy in the area, even in Arab countries which traditionally fear Iranian influence.
The most serious existential threat to a Jewish state in Palestine comes from the policies of the existing Israeli government. All the bru-ha-ha about an alleged “existential threat” from Iran is most likely designed to deflect U.S. and world attention from that fundamental fact.
Among the many comments on this issue, I would recommend in particular those by Gary Milhollin, by Robert Wright in the New York Times Blog, and by Arnaud de Borchgrave.
Some relevant portions of Yossi Alphers analysis, published by Americans for Peace Now, are included below.
]]>Q. Jeffrey Goldberg’s “Atlantic” article on the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program is causing quite a stir. What’s your take?
A. The article contains a lot of interesting perspectives and is worth a read. But I believe Goldberg inadvertently exaggerates or misunderstands a number of issues.
First, he cites the consensus assessment of the 40-some Israeli decision-makers, past and present, that he spoke with, to the effect that “there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike by next July”, then adds, “They were not part of some public-relations campaign.” I beg to differ; they were. Most of these people knew exactly whom they were talking to and how influential he is in certain circles in Washington. Most of them without a doubt believe that it is possible to influence President Obama’s ultimate decision–if and when sanctions fail–as to whether the US itself should attack Iran. They understand (as Goldberg himself notes) that the US can do the job far better than Israel and that an Israeli attack not coordinated with Washington that Goldberg writes about would be disastrous for Israel’s relations with the US as well as the rest of the world.
So, some or all of Goldberg’s interviewees didn’t “lay it on thick” for him in an effort to increase the pressure on both Iran and Washington? That’s a naive supposition. After all, as Goldberg recognizes, the Israeli strategy for dealing with Iran is premised on the need to persuade the international community to deal with Iran as an international, not just Israeli, problem. Goldberg’s article is one more tool for achieving this objective.
Second, had Goldberg spoken to Iran experts and not just “decision-makers”, whether in Israel or the US, he would have heard that, overall, the Iranian leadership (and not just President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad) for the most part is not based on “a messianic apocalyptic cult” as Netanyahu is quoted as opining and that the messianic types are not at the center of Iranian decision-making. And those Iran experts, including in IDF and Mossad intelligence, can be expected to have a say in any decision to attack Iran. It is no accident that current IDF Chief of Staff Gaby Ashkenazi is described by Goldberg as being skeptical about the wisdom of an attack.
Third, largely because of his father, PM Binyamin Netanyahu is described by Goldberg as being “different” in that (quoting Israel’s ambassador in Washington, Michael Oren), “He has a deep sense of his role in Jewish history.” Well, so had every Israeli prime minister in the country’s history. With or without his father’s influence, Netanyahu is neither more nor less committed to preventing another Holocaust than was Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir or Yitzhak Rabin.
Then there is the argument, attributed by Goldberg to Ehud Barak and Ephraim Sneh, that if Israel is obliged to live under an Iranian nuclear threat, the country will suffer a huge brain drain and effectively wither away. I don’t buy it. To his credit, neither does Goldberg. Reading between the lines of his article, he didn’t hear this from most of his Israeli interlocutors. Accordingly, this certainly should not have been alluded to by Goldberg as a compelling reason to go to war.
On the other hand, what Goldberg does not talk about is that an Israeli decision to coexist with an Iranian nuclear threat would oblige Israel to raise its own nuclear profile. Could this conceivably generate a stable balance of mutually assured destruction that might be preferable to a destructive war? Goldberg doesn’t ask.
Then there is a second area of Israeli thinking about war with Iran that Goldberg has neglected. This is unfortunate, because it is important for both Israelis and Americans to punch holes in it. More than three decades after the Islamic revolution in Iran, there are some prominently placed Israelis who actually believe an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would somehow bring down the ayatollahs’ regime and restore the “good guys” to power in Tehran. This is a dangerous case of nostalgia for the periphery doctrine of Israel’s early decades, when we made common cause with Iran, Turkey and other non-Arabs or non-Muslims in the region against Arab nationalism and aggression driven by Nasserism.
Israel’s current outrage at Turkey’s regional policies is another instance of poorly controlled periphery-nostalgia. Today, Israel’s primary enemy is militant Islam as embodied in non-Arab and non-state actors in the region. The Arabs are potential allies, though due to the weakness of the Arab state system this doesn’t mean much. One way or another, there is every reason to believe that an attack on Iran would only strengthen the Iranian regime. Certainly, regime-change in Tehran should not be a factor in Israeli or American decision-making concerning an attack on Iran.
Q. Can you yourself conceive of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure?
A. Yes, but only if all the following conditions are fulfilled, some of which Goldberg seemingly ignores or underestimates:
1. The regime in Tehran continues to call for Israel’s destruction.
2. The Iranian nuclear program is crossing a “red line” and the timetable for obtaining the capacity to attack Israel with nuclear weapons has become extremely short.
3. All international efforts based on diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions are understood unequivocally to have failed.
4. All clandestine efforts to slow the Iranian program (which have apparently been very effective over the past 15 years) are understood to have failed.
5. It is clear to Israel that neither the US nor any other international actor is prepared to deal militarily with Iran. If possible, Israel obtains at least a “yellow light” from the US.
6. Israel has safe physical access for its aircraft via one or more of the countries separating it from Iran.
7. An Israeli attack can set back the Iranian military nuclear program for a significant period of time.
8. A sober cost-benefit analysis persuades Israeli planners that the benefit of significantly damaging the Iranian program outweighs the very heavy potential ancillary costs of the strike: rocket attacks on Israel from the north and south and missile attacks from Iran; regional and international outrage and isolation; an historic crisis in Israeli-American relations; dangers to Diaspora Jewish communities from terrorist attack; etc.
If indeed, all these conditions are fulfilled at some time in the future, I can imagine any Israeli leader, even one who hails from the left or center and whose father is not Ben Zion Netanyahu, concluding that the future of the Jewish people and certainly of the Jewish state rests on his/her shoulders.
But we are not there, and are not likely to be there next spring.