by Peter Jenkins

So many thoughtful analyses of the significance of Dr. Hassan Rouhani’s election are already in circulation that part of me thinks I ought to spare LobeLog readers one more. As a compromise, I will limit my focus to the election’s implications for a peaceful resolution of the dispute [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Peter Jenkins

So many thoughtful analyses of the significance of Dr. Hassan Rouhani’s election are already in circulation that part of me thinks I ought to spare LobeLog readers one more. As a compromise, I will limit my focus to the election’s implications for a peaceful resolution of the dispute that has preoccupied me for the last ten years: the nuclear dispute.

First, unless it gets tarnished — and we must hope that the inevitable smear campaigns underestimate the good sense of the average member of the public — Rouhani’s image as a man of wisdom and moderation will make it easier for Western leaders to contemplate a nuclear deal.

Contrast Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose appearance and rhetoric created a deplorable impression in the West. He became toxic. Image-conscious Western politicians could not run the risk of doing a nuclear deal that might be seen by the public, unaware of Iran’s power-sharing complexities, as entailing trust in Ahmadinejad.

Jack Straw, who as British Foreign Secretary met Rouhani on several occasions, described the president-elect in the Daily Telegraph as a tough but pragmatic defender of Iranian interests, potentially “a huge relief to do business with”. Straw continues to see the deal he did with Rouhani in October 2003 as good for Britain and Europe. He would reject as baseless the claim that Rouhani duped his European counterparts (as would I, for what that is worth!).

Lord Lamont, another British ex-Cabinet Minister, writing in The Times on 18 June, reminded readers of Margaret Thatcher’s prescient declaration that Mikhail Gorbachev was a man “with whom we can do business”. Lord Lamont’s suggestion that the same can be said of Rouhani may not be entirely welcome in Tehran where Gorbachev is seen as responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union. But many Times readers will find the comparison apt and reassuring.

Of course, it would be a big mistake to assume that because Rouhani is pragmatic and moderate, he will also be a soft touch. He won’t be. His advent will not change the fundamentals of the Iranian position on the nuclear issue.

Whoever is appointed chief nuclear negotiator (an early opportunity for Rouhani to demonstrate his wisdom) will be looking for guarantees that the West can accept ongoing Iranian production of low-enriched uranium for civil purposes under state-of-the-art safeguards, and that all nuclear-related sanctions will be eliminated once it has been verified that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or material in Iran.

Second, Rouhani’s image will make it harder for Israel’s Prime Minister and his Israeli and US acolytes to scare-monger. Back in 2005, the “mad mullah” campaign was losing credibility. Ahmadinejad’s arrival at the head of the Iranian state was a god-send. It was easy to convince the public that such a president might be capable of even the most suicidal of follies.

The scare-mongering will not cease. Already some are suggesting that Rouhani’s election in no way diminishes the (imagined) nuclear threat from Iran. Others are portraying Rouhani as guilty by association with terrorist acts, or the repression of student protests in 1999, and, by implication, capable of anything. But one can sense that for these people, events have taken a discomforting turn. A severe test of their skills as practitioners of the black art of propaganda lies ahead.

Third, Iranian reactions to Western diplomacy are likely to be more coherent and far-sighted than over the last eight years. In 2005, Ahmadinejad’s first administration rejected EU nuclear proposals out-of-hand instead of taking them as a basis for negotiation. In 2007 and 2009, Iranian infighting scuppered opportunities for a confidence-building stop-gap agreement.

Of course political fissures may open up under Rouhani. But that will happen, if at all, against the run of form, because what we hear suggests that Rouhani is on good terms with Iran’s supreme authority and with the main political currents.

Fourth, Rouhani may be able to soften Saudi opposition to Iran possessing uranium enrichment plants. Saudi-Iranian relations have not always been as strained as under Ahmadinejad, especially since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria. Under Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, when Rouhani was serving as National Security Council secretary, relations recovered from post-revolution lows. Both sides know they are condemned by geography to co-exist.

During a press conference on 17 June, Rouhani (who has good Arabic) referred to Saudi Arabia as a “brother country”, and recalled his successful negotiation of a security agreement in the late 90s. Prince Turki bin Faisal recently told an interviewer from Der Spiegel that it would be disastrous for Saudi Arabia if Israel or the US were to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, and expressed interest in regional nuclear confidence-building. Israeli opposition will stymie his hope for a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. But, like the members of Euratom in the 1950s, the Gulf states, Iran and Turkey could agree on a mutual nuclear-monitoring arrangement or a sub-regional weapons-free zone.

The Iranian nuclear issue is like the stables of King Augeas. It is littered with evil-smelling heaps of distrust, suspicion, fear and resentment. For the last eight years, Ahmadinejad has given Western leaders an excuse to leave their shovels in the tool-shed. Now, though, they have as good an opportunity to emulate Hercules as they are ever likely to get…

Since the collapse of the European effort to persuade Iran to renounce uranium enrichment, it has become a trope in British statements that if left unchecked, Iran’s nuclear programme will trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Even the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reportedly via Lobe Log

Since the collapse of the European effort to persuade Iran to renounce uranium enrichment, it has become a trope in British statements that if left unchecked, Iran’s nuclear programme will trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Even the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reportedly believes this.

There seems to be a similar emphasis in US statements on Iran. This March, President Barak Obama said that an Iranian nuclear weapon “would trigger a nuclear arms race in the most dangerous part of the world” during a joint Press Conference with UK Prime Minister, David Cameron. Similar statements have been made by other officials over the years, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

So it may be worth subjecting the arms race claim to a little analysis.

Uppermost in British minds is the fear of Saudi Arabia becoming nuclear-armed. It seems to have been planted there by senior Saudis who may or may not see Iran’s nuclear activities as a threat to Saudi security, but who resent the nuclear achievements of an arch rival and fear that in some mysterious way a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will acquire “hegemony” over neighbouring Arab states.

Yet a few minutes’ thought suffices to suggest reasons why Saudi policy-makers would hesitate to embark on a nuclear weapons programme. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It has made a formal commitment not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It would risk international ostracism and UN Security Council counter-measures if it were to violate that obligation.

Saudi Arabia has been a close ally of the US since the 1930s. US friendship helps sustain in power the leaders of a tribe that acquired control of the Hejaz (and the Holy City of Mecca) by driving out the Hashemites less than a hundred years ago and that is unsure of its right to dominate the Arabian Peninsula. As partial and discriminatory as the US’s Middle East policy has sometimes appeared in the last decade, it is hard to imagine that the US would stand by while its Saudi ally set about proliferating, or, that Saudi rulers would risk that friendship by defying America’s wishes.

Jack Straw, a former British Foreign Secretary, recounts a senior Saudi’s reply when asked about Saudi nuclear intentions:

We say that we will have to keep step with Iran. But in reality our people would never forgive us for tolerating Israeli nuclear weapons for so many years and developing nuclear weapons to balance their acquisition by Islamic Iran.

So, Saudi proliferation seems an unlikely prospect. Saudi/Iranian rivalry, however, remains a problem. If ever the West were to decide to tolerate an Iranian enrichment capacity, this problem would have to be addressed.

One solution would be to build a multinational enrichment plant on Saudi soil. The Saudis themselves suggested such a plant to their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies and to Iran in the mid-2000s. The United Arab Emirates, which has four nuclear power plants under construction, and other GCC states that are looking into nuclear power, could be interested in becoming stake-holders. Western enrichment technology could be “black-boxed” and the plant opened to the same degree of international inspection as enrichment plants in Europe and Japan. The result would be a boost to Saudi confidence in their ability to thwart Iran’s supposed hegemonic aspirations and a reminder to Iran that action can trigger reaction.

The other nuclear competitor posited by British politicians is Turkey. Yet Turkey, also an NPT party, is a member of NATO and thus already has indirect access to nuclear deterrent forces. For more than forty years, Turkey shared a border with a hostile nuclear-armed Soviet Union but never sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. In recent years, Turkish Ministers have shown no sign of feeling obliged to compete with, or threatened by Iran’s nuclear activities.

At a recent meeting in London, the Turkish ambassador took strong exception to one speaker’s mention of Turkey in a regional arms race context.

A state that is a past regional rival of Iran is Egypt. But Egypt, also an NPT party, is economically and militarily dependent on US friendship and would thus be inhibited from nuclear adventurism by its proximity to Israel and its vulnerability to pre-emptive Israeli strikes.

Similar factors would weigh against a Syrian nuclear weapons programme if a Western-backed regime replaced the Iranian-backed Assad regime. (Ironically, Iranian-backed Syria is the only other state in the region that is suspected of having had a nuclear weapons programme in the last decade. Only the most ingenious sophist could claim that Iran provided the spur to that “race”.)

In sum, the claim that Iranian enrichment of uranium under IAEA supervision will trigger a Middle East nuclear arms race seems unreasonable. It should not pass unquestioned. Careless claims can have costly consequences.