But one thing that is well known is that, generally speaking, Iranian commercial passenger airliners are in [...]]]> The exact cause of a plane crash in Iran that reportedly left more than 70 people dead remains unknown as of Sunday afternoon. There was apparently bad weather in the area, and the snow impeded rescue efforts.

But one thing that is well known is that, generally speaking, Iranian commercial passenger airliners are in disrepair. (Reuters has a timeline of Iranian airplane crashes since early 2000.) One possible cause: sanctions. Iran is banned from acquiring parts and maintenance for its fleet of planes that carry nothing more than civilians.

The Washington Post provides some context at the bottom of its wire service article on the latest crash:

Iran has a history of frequent air accidents blamed on its aging aircraft and poor maintenance. IranAir’s fleet includes Boeing and Airbus aircraft, many of them bought before the country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, which led to a cutoff in ties between the two nations.

Iranian airlines, including those run by the state, are chronically strapped for cash, and maintenance has suffered, experts say. U.S. sanctions prevent Iran from updating its 30-year-old American aircraft and make it difficult to get European spare parts or planes as well. The country has come to rely on Russian aircraft, many of them Soviet-era planes that are harder to get parts for since the Soviet Union’s fall.

State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley basically admitted last fall that a shift had occurred wherein U.S. sanctions were no longer seeking to assiduously focus pressure on certain figures associated with Iran’s leadership. In other words, innocent Iranians — ‘Jamshid Averages’ — were now on the hook for the behavior of their government.

One may wonder whether this plane full of Iranians was dangling precariously from that hook before it broke in mid-air and fell to the ground.

With Iran seemingly recalcitrant on its nuclear program and the United States unwilling to put up “robust economic, political and strategic incentives that will give Iran’s leaders [...]]]> At the Middle Eastern affairs journal Muftah, Hani Mansourian takes a well warranted critical look into the human cost of sanctions against Iran.

With Iran seemingly recalcitrant on its nuclear program and the United States unwilling to put up “robust economic, political and strategic incentives that will give Iran’s leaders reason to cooperate,” many proponents of escalating measure hold out hope that the people of Iran to rise up and oust their regime due to ever tightening sanctions and perhaps even an eventual military attack.

While a regime change as a result of military attack is regularly dismissed by people in the know — just ask top Iranian activists what they think — far less attention is given to the viability of tough sanctions leading to a mass uprising.

Remember that the U.S. State Department has admitted its sanctions have expanded to pressuring ordinary Iranians — Jamshid Average, if you will — thus conflating the people with the government of Iran.

Mansourian examines precedents — focusing on the failures of broad-based sanctions against Iraq and targeted ones against Zimbabwe — and contrasts these with the situation in Iran. He shows that even the targeted sanctions will prove counterproductive, because they are crushing Iran’s fragile economy and thereby destroying the middle class that drives the Iranian opposition.

Mansourian writes:

Many years of sanctions coupled with sub-optimal economic policies in Iran has resulted in a weak economy and a fragile middle-class. The latest round of UN, U.S., and EU sanctions on Iran is likely to drive millions into poverty and destitution. As economic opportunities for the growth of a solid middle-class disappear, the young Iranians that have historically been the agents of change in the country will lose their social base.  Ironically, then, sanctions may do more to increase the power of the Iranian government and to weaken the domestic opposition movement, to the ostensible detriment of U.S. interests

The Iraq example is especially compelling. In the 1996, Secretary of State Madeline Albright notoriously told a CBS reporter that sanctions were “worth it,” even though a half a million dead Iraqi children had died. Iraq’s infant mortality rose from one in 30 in 1990 to 1 in 8 in 1997. “Worth what?” one might ask, considering that as far as the hawks were concerned Iraq still needed to be invaded.

Note that Mansouraian’s analysis takes for granted the questionable notion, put forward by sanctions-hawks that the Green Movement is anywhere united behind regime change rather than incremental reform.

But sanctions as a means to regime change isn’t the only goal based on questionable premises. Even the notion of sanctions as a means to change Iranian behavior on the nuclear program is unlikely to succeed.

At a conference called “War With Iran?” last month at Columbia University, Prof. Richard Bulliet expressed fear that the U.S. Iran policy may be heading down the same path as Iraq policy — implementing a sanctions regime that can never work, followed by a military attack (video):

After 1991, the U.S. put sanctions on Iraq that could not possibly be satisfied. Iraq could say, ‘Okay, we have completely given up WMD.’ And we would say, ‘We don’t believe you. And the only way we can be sure is to get rid of your regime’ … My worry is that we’re moving a little bit in this direction with Iran, that we are creating a focus on a sanctions regime that it may not be possible for Iran to satisfy the fears of the people who are putting on the sanctions.

Give a read to Andrew Cockburn’s essay on the impact of sanctions on Iraq in July’s London Review of Books. The developments with regards to Iran may well seem eerily similar.

Despite a long-held policy of going after regime figures and their associations — and not “Jamshid Average” — the Washington Post reports [...]]]> The U.S.-led sanctions effort against Iran is indeed ‘biting.’ But rather than only eat away at the plates of those the sanction’s target, the program is also ‘biting’ lots of everyday Iranians.

Despite a long-held policy of going after regime figures and their associations — and not “Jamshid Average” — the Washington Post reports that planes operated by Iran Air are unable to refuel in most of Europe as the result of a deal struck last month between four European oil companies and the United States.

Thomas Erdbrink writes in the Post that this is part of a broader move to “discourage international businesses from dealing with Iran.” Thus, going after the refueling of Iranian jets

illustrates a shift away from an earlier U.S. policy of reaching out to the Iranian people and trying to target mostly state organizations central to Iran’s nuclear program. Officials now admit that the increased pressure is hurting ordinary Iranians but say they should blame their leaders for the Islamic republic’s increasing isolation.

[...] As a result of the canceled jet fuel contracts, all Iran Air planes departing from destinations such as Amsterdam, London and Stockholm are now forced to make lengthy fuel stops either at an airport in Germany or one in Austria, where Total of France and OMV of Austria are still providing the 66-year-old airline with jet fuel until their contracts run out, possibly as soon as next month. At that point, Iran Air could be forced to cancel or severely reduce flights.

Iran Air flies reports to fly about 500,000 passengers each year between Tehran and 11 European capitals and other destinations.

At his press conference on Friday, State Department Spokesperson P.J. Crowley told reporters (with my emphasis):

We want to see the Iranian people have the same opportunities to travel, to engage as others in the region and around the world have. And the only thing that’s impeding Iran from having that kind of relationship with the United States and the rest of the world is the government and policies of Iran. If they change their policies, if they meet their obligations then certainly, as we continue to offer the prospect of engagement and a different kind of relationship, that depends squarely on what Iran does and what policies it chooses to pursue.

Of course it is untrue that the behavior of the Iranian leadership is the only thing preventing Iranians from traveling around Europe. The U.S. sanctions program certainly bears some responsibility.

Crowley’s statement clearly conflates the Iranian leadership and the nation’s people: “Iranian people…impeding Iran…policies of Iran…they change their policies…what Iran does and what policy it chooses.”

If Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sticks by her claim earlier this year that Iranian is drifting toward a military dictatorship, and if anyone in the administration buys into the idea that the 2009 Iranian elections were fraudulent, it seems pretty tough to understand how the U.S. administration could be holding the Iranian people responsible for the actions of their leaders.