by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?

To answer [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Most headlines on Iran’s launch of uranium-related sites on April 9^th — its National Day of Nuclear Technology — linked it to the diplomatic deadlock in Kazakhstan. Tehran was regarded as pursuing escalation, perhaps in frustration with the situation. But was this really the case?

To answer this question, one needs to consider what Iran has previously done on this anniversary, the significance of the Islamic Republic’s new sites and its escalatory options.

The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad launched the National Day of Nuclear Technology in 2006. This was part of the push for a harder stance on the nuclear issue after the breakdown of talks with European powers, during which Iran voluntarily agreed to freeze enrichment-related activities.

As part of the first festivities in 2006, Iran announced that it would — in defiance of a UN Security Council warning — enrich uranium on an industrial scale. A total of 164 centrifuges at Natanz started to spin, churning out uranium enriched below 5%.

During the past seven years, the Islamic Republic has largely used its Nuclear Technology day to unveil new achievements, both for domestic and foreign audiences. As the occasion has repeatedly coincided with nuclear diplomatic developments, it has often been used to signal Iranian attitudes.

In 2007, Iran used the anniversary to announce that it had crossed the Western red line of 3,000 operational centrifuges. Back then, David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, asserted that “Ahmadinejad is trying to demonstrate facts on the ground and negotiate from a stronger position.”

The year after, Iran used the occasion to announce that it would begin installing 6,000 centrifuges and alluded to the testing of a new generation of centrifuges. Then in 2009, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the country’s first Fuel Manufacturing Plant in the central city of Isfahan. The Islamic Republic also said its number of centrifuges had increased to 7,000.

In 2010, as the UN Security Council convened to discuss fresh sanctions, Iran unveiled new “third-generation” centrifuges, said to have separation power six times that of first-generation centrifuges. Iran also declared that “considerable” uranium reserves had been found in Yazd province. That year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had 8,610 centrifuges installed, of which 3,772 were operating.

In 2011, after dialogue over Iran’s production of 19.75%-enriched uranium had broken down, it opted to simply praise past achievements. Apart from this, it announced the resumption of fuel reloading at the Bushehr power plant. And last year, after the escalation of Western sanctions, Iran announced that local scientists had produced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor containing uranium enriched to 19.75%.

This year, Iran announced on the anniversary that it had opened two uranium mines and a yellowcake processing plant named after an assassinated nuclear scientist. What’s the significance of these sites?

In terms of capacity, the yellowcake facility is insignificant. Its stated output of 60 tons a year is less than one third of what’s needed to fuel the Bushehr atomic power plant. Moreover, the discovery of the uranium deposits, which are now being extracted, was first announced years ago. Along the same line, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran had announced in February 2012 that the mines would be operational in about a year, that is, right around this time.

The most important fact to keep in mind, however, is that Iran has for a long time been projected to be close to exhausting its limited supply of yellowcake. Without feedstock to inject into its centrifuges at Natanz (in gaseous form), Iran’s uranium enrichment — at least to 3.5% — would grind to a halt.

In short, the new sites unveiled on April 9th are designed to ensure the status quo.

There are other factors which also signify Iran’s pursuit of the status quo rather than escalation. For example, considering the many powerful escalatory options in its possession — wider use of new-generation centrifuges, expansion of operations at Fordow, increases in enrichment levels and construction of long-promised, new enrichment sites — the announcements this year seem geared towards signaling  restraint to a foreign audience without appearing empty-handed in front of a domestic public facing unprecedented sanctions.

Indeed, the Islamic Republic has little interest in escalating the situation at this point, especially as it faces its first presidential election since the disputed vote in 2009. The idea that Iran prefers to quietly kick the can down the road until it gets its house in order was also recently expressed by former top US non-proliferation official, Gary Samore.

Meanwhile, it could also be argued that the United States – or at least its Congress — is pursuing escalation.

Following the deadlock in Kazakhstan, US lawmakers have been pushing for fresh sanctions that would constitute something akin to an Oil-for-Food Program 2.0. The draft Senate bill states that the proposed embargo won’t be lifted until Iran releases political prisoners, respects the rights of women and minorities and moves toward “a free and democratically elected government.”

Moreover, last week, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) — a front for the until recently terror-listed Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (MEK) — opened an official office one block away from the White House. The group was put on the State Department’s terror list by the Clinton Administration. In the past, the MEK was behind a series of killings and bombings in Iran — one of which led to the permanent paralysis of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s right arm. The MEK, which sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, was also reportedly involved in the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Among these men is Darioush Rezaeinejad, whom the new yellowcake facility is named after.

The signal that’s being sent to decision-makers in Tehran, regardless of whether the Obama Administration approves of the MEK’s new office, is that the sanctions have little to do with their nuclear program. Combined with the wording of the proposed embargo, the situation ominously fits into Ayatollah Khamenei’s narrative that even a nuclear deal won’t be enough to roll back American pressure.

All things considered, one should be careful about linking Iran’s latest announcements about its nuclear achievements to the continued deadlock in talks with the 6 world powers, or viewing Iran’s actions as deserving of the escalation pursued by at least one of these powers.

It is becoming ever clearer that both Iran and the United States need to get their houses in order before they can move in the right direction. More than ever, cool heads need to prevail.

by Peter Jenkins

Divining the Obama administration’s foreign policy intentions can be intellectually challenging.

At the beginning of February the US Vice President appeared to be offering Iran an opportunity to enter into bilateral talks on the nuclear dispute.

Three weeks ago the US was encouraging its European allies to review [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Peter Jenkins

Divining the Obama administration’s foreign policy intentions can be intellectually challenging.

At the beginning of February the US Vice President appeared to be offering Iran an opportunity to enter into bilateral talks on the nuclear dispute.

Three weeks ago the US was encouraging its European allies to review their opening position for the upcoming Almaty talks and be open to demanding a bit less of Iran while offering a little more.

Two weeks ago the Secretary of State was hailing the outcome of the Almaty meeting as useful and expressing hope that serious engagement could lead to a comprehensive agreement.

Yet last week in New York, addressing a UN Security Council committee, Ambassador Susan Rice, a member of President Obama’s cabinet, was speaking of Iran as though nothing had changed since the end of January.

There are many clever people working for the Obama administration. So I suppose we must assume that this apparent incoherence is in fact part of a highly sophisticated stratagem, which will deliver what most — though not all — of us want: peace in our time.

Any, though, who are less inclined to think more of US officials than former British diplomats do, should be forgiven for feeling perplexed — perhaps even a little worried — by Ambassador Rice’s remarks.

Let me try to illustrate that by reviewing a few of her points from the position of a Non-Aligned (NAM) member of the UN. Of course, a former British diplomat cannot hope to imagine the thoughts of NAM counterparts with pin-point accuracy. But I have rubbed shoulders with NAM diplomats for a sufficient number of years, and listened to enough of their intergovernmental interventions, to have a rough idea of what impression Ambassador Rice will have made.

“The Iranian nuclear issue remains one of the gravest threats to international security” she intoned. Really? I, as a NAM diplomat, am not sure Iran has ever violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and am certain Iran has not violated that treaty’s most important provisions. Surely North Korea, which has just conducted its third nuclear test, is a greater threat? And what about Israel, which possesses hundreds of dangerous weapons of mass destruction, as well as sophisticated long-range delivery systems? What about India and Pakistan, which came close to nuclear blows in 2002? What about Israel’s refusal to withdraw from territories it has occupied for over 45 years, a standing affront to Arab self-respect? What about the potential consequences of Western-sponsored civil war in Syria, civil unrest in Iraq, and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan?

“We meet at a time of growing risks.” Is that so? Surely the latest International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report suggests that Iran is being careful to deny Israel’s Prime Minister a pretext to draw the US into a war of aggression?

“[Iran is] obstruct[ing] the IAEA’s investigation into the program’s possible military dimension by refusing to grant access to the Parchin site.” Well, yes. But surely the question of access to Parchin is legally more open to dispute than this implies? And hasn’t the US intelligence community concluded that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program ten years ago? Don’t the IAEA’s suspicions relate to experiments that may have taken place more than ten years ago and that would have involved only a few grams of nuclear material? Why all the fuss?

“More alarming still…Iran is now….installing hundreds of second-generation centrifuges”. Why is this so alarming? Surely Iran has declared this installation to the IAEA, will submit the machines’ operations to frequent IAEA inspection and intends to use them to produce low-enriched uranium for which Iran will account? Developing centrifuge technology under IAEA safeguards is not a treaty violation.

“These actions are unnecessary and thus provocative.” Since when have states been entitled to dictate what is necessary to one another? Some states certainly don’t see these actions as provocative.

“[Iran’s missile launches] allow Iran to develop a technology that [could] constitute an intolerable threat to peace and security.” Iran has no treaty obligation to refrain from developing missile technology. Many other states have done so. And, didn’t I (NAM diplomat) read recently on the US Congressional Research Service that Iran is unlikely to have an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015?

“Working together, we can continue to clarify for Iran the consequences of its actions and show Iran the benefits of choosing cooperation over provocation.” My, that sounds patronising, even a little threatening! Will it encourage Iranians to believe that the latest US offer of engagement is sincere?

So what, US readers may feel. The US can say what it likes; it’s a Great Power. Yes, but a power that has the misfortune to be great in an age when greatness confers responsibility for nurturing a law-based international system.

It doesn’t do much good to that system for US ambassadors to sound unreasonable, alarmist, bereft of a sense of proportion and perhaps a little inclined to double standards. Good leaders lead from the middle, not one of the extremities.

And could it be the case that the US is a Great Power that needs a diplomatic solution to an intractable dispute? Neither the Pentagon nor the US public wants another war at this stage. Sanctions have been hurting innocent Iranians but benefitting Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and conservative elite, who feel confident of their ability to contain popular discontent.

When one is running out of options, negotiating theorists suggest that building trust in one’s good faith is a better tactic than dishing out hyperbole and half-truths.

Photo Credit: US Embassy New Delhi/Flickr 

Gary Sick (Columbia University professor who served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan), Joe Cirincione (President of the Ploughshares Fund), Trita Parsi (President of the National Iranian American Council) and Michael Eisenstadt (senior fellow at the Washington Institute) discuss the results of last week’s talks [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Gary Sick (Columbia University professor who served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan), Joe Cirincione (President of the Ploughshares Fund), Trita Parsi (President of the National Iranian American Council) and Michael Eisenstadt (senior fellow at the Washington Institute) discuss the results of last week’s talks between Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team in Almaty, Kazakhstan (see my related story here) on HuffPost Live and the path ahead.

by Peter Jenkins

As I mentioned in a previous piece, I have been dipping into The Arrogance of Power, written by Senator William Fulbright in 1966. It has been a comforting experience in one respect. The divisions within the US foreign policy community that have been so apparent to European observers [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Peter Jenkins

As I mentioned in a previous piece, I have been dipping into The Arrogance of Power, written by Senator William Fulbright in 1966. It has been a comforting experience in one respect. The divisions within the US foreign policy community that have been so apparent to European observers since 2001 have clearly been a characteristic of the world’s only Great Power since the senator offered his diagnosis 47 years ago. Yet the world has survived.

In another respect it has been troubling. The senator saw two tendencies that were evenly matched, and believed that the tendency he characterised as “moderate” could prevail. Yet over the last 12 years, the tendency he characterised as “full of a passionate intensity” (cf. “The Second Coming”, W.B. Yeats) has shown itself to be in rude health, whereas the moderate tendency seems to have suffered a loss of form.

Let me start to clarify what I am trying to say by a lengthy quote from the final chapter of The Arrogance or Power:

There are two Americas.  One is the America of Lincoln and Adlai Stevenson; the other the America of Teddy Roosevelt and the modern superpatriots.  One is generous and humane, the other narrowly egotistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous;…one is moderate, the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious and the other arrogant in the use of great power.

We have tended in the years of our great power to puzzle the world by presenting to it now the one face and now the other; and sometimes both at once. Many people all over the world have come to regard America as being capable of magnanimity and farsightedness but no less capable of pettiness and spite…

After twenty five years of world power the United States must decide which of the two sides of its national character is to predominate – the humanism of Lincoln or the arrogance of those who would make America the world’s policeman…

What seems to be happening…is that the feel of America in the world’s mind has begun to change and faith in “the idea of America” has been shaken for the world…much of the idealism and inspiration is disappearing from American policy but they are not yet gone and by no means are they irretrievable.

The foremost need of American foreign policy is a renewal of dedication to an “idea that mankind can hold to” – not a missionary idea full of pretensions about being the world’s policemen but a Lincolnian idea expressing that powerful strand of decency and humanity which is the true source of America’s greatness.

I imagine that I don’t need to defend the assertion that the Teddy Roosevelt tradition has been in rude health since 2001. What grounds have I for claiming that the “humane, “generous”, “moderate” and “judicious” tendency is going through a bad patch?

In November’s US Presidential election one candidate manifestly represented the “superpatriot” tendency, the other stood for moderation and the judicious use of power. The moderate candidate won. This should be reason for hope and rejoicing for all those outside the US who prefer the country’s moderate face and who fear the possibility of a third war in the Persian Gulf. It is not, though.

President Obama let his first term pass without striving to resolve the greatest current threat to world peace, the Iranian nuclear dispute. He allowed himself to be deterred by advisers who were more concerned with conciliating Israel and Congress, and keeping in tune with (an ill-informed) public opinion, than with showing the statecraft that would be needed to crack such a tough nut. All of this emerges clearly from the writings of Trita Parsi and lately, it seems, Roger Cohen, who recently penned a scathing piece based on a book by Vali Nasr – all of which is hardly surprising if, as some of my US friends allege, the President has no real interest in foreign policy.

And now the second term is getting off to no better a start. The 6-world power P5+1 are travelling to Kazakhstan with the same stale proposals in their briefcases. Washington appears reluctant to follow-up an offer of bilateral talks by making the demonstration of good faith for which Tehran has asked, preferring to imagine, perhaps, that Ayatollah Khamenei has ruled out any bilateral process. Senior members of the administration continue to trot out the same old rhetoric of penal pressure.

There’s still time for the moderate tendency to up its game, I suppose. But will it? Can the men and women who lead it recognise two of the unspoken assumptions of Senator Fulbright and others of his generation?

- it is the responsibility of statesmen to form and lead opinion;

- statesmen take short-term political risks to avert the long-term national risks of inaction.

Pity the rest of the world if they can’t.

Photo: President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and senior staff, react in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, as the House passes the health care reform bill, March 21, 2010. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza) 

by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay

After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay

After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, and no doubt Western negotiators hope for a similar outcome with Iran’s controversial nuclear activities. Previous negotiations with Iran fell apart in the summer of 2012, and the question on everyone’s mind is: will this time be different?

There’s reason to hope that it will. Certainly, some circumstances have shifted in ways that could be favorable to a deal. Most obviously, the squeeze of sanctions has made it much more difficult for Iran to defy the international community. The depletion of Iran’s currency reserves is testing the regime’s ability to sidestep sanctions, and leaders are worried about public discontent with the state of the economy. Iran has also been downgrading some of its enriched uranium to a level that can’t easily be converted to weapons-grade, which may be a small indication that the government is willing to moderate its stance. Key Iranian figures from the foreign minister to the intelligence ministry have also expressed a measure of willingness to cooperate with Western diplomatic efforts.

On the other hand, the path to negotiations has seen a number of stumbling blocks. Signals from Iran have been mixed at best. Supreme Leader Ali Khameini recently rejected the idea of negotiating with the United States, saying that Iran “would not be intimidated” by US pressure. Iran also just revealed plans to install thousands of new centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear facility. Finally, it’ll soon be election season in Iran, which means officials will be anxious not to be seen as caving under Western pressure.

Ultimately, though, all of this may not tell us much, because what lies behind us is far less important than what lies ahead. The hopeful or ominous developments of the past few months only matter insofar as they signal what negotiators will or won’t be willing to put on the table. To that end, it’s worth speculating not just about what this new centrifuge and that new statement might mean, but also about what compromises could be made to make this round the one that matters.

The crucial issue to resolve is Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, and Iran has been relatively more flexible on this than other matters. A workable deal might require Iran to deposit its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium abroad, stop enriching at the Fordow facility, and agree to limit future enrichment to a low level suitable for civilian power reactors. Under such a deal, Iran would also need to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, to facilitate future inspections. In exchange, the P5+1 could offer sanctions relief and a freeze on new sanctions.

That’s how a deal might ideally resolve the thorniest issues in Iran’s standoff with the West. But the talks could bring progress even if we don’t make it that far. An alternative strategy could focus on confidence-building measures, or “baby steps” that ease the two sides out of the straitjacket of mistrust that has constrained previous efforts. For instance, Iran could agree to temporarily halt uranium enrichment or to downgrade its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to the less potent form needed for civilian reactors. In exchange, the P5+1 could agree to temporarily suspend some key sanctions, which would open the door for further sanctions relief once other issues (the Fordow facility, the Additional Protocol, enrichment levels in the future) are resolved.

Negotiators might also take a big-picture approach that brings in other, more long-standing concerns, such as Iran’s alleged links to terrorist groups, suspicions of previous weapons development, and the question of gradually normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the West.

In sum, although some forecasts for the talks have been gloomy, there actually is no dearth of options available — that is, if negotiators want to take them. It’s almost a truism to say, but a rehash of last year’s negotiations will only bring a rehash of last year’s dismal outcome. As Einstein famously said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

So this time in Almaty, let’s try a new approach, one oriented around mutual concessions rather than stubborn digging into unworkable positions. If we do that, with any luck, this time really can be different.

- Laicie Heeley is the senior policy analyst and Usha Sahay a Hurbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow, both at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a Washington-based non-profit think tank.

Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of  EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istambul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)

When Iranian officials sit down at the negotiating table in Almaty with representatives from six international powers, Kazakhstan will gain kudos that will burnish its international diplomatic image and raise the prestige of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The event may also encourage the United States and European Union members to restrain criticism of [...]]]> by Joanna Lillis

When Iranian officials sit down at the negotiating table in Almaty with representatives from six international powers, Kazakhstan will gain kudos that will burnish its international diplomatic image and raise the prestige of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The event may also encourage the United States and European Union members to restrain criticism of Kazakhstan’s democratization shortcomings. “Kazakhstan has long tried to shape the state’s image as an intermediary in various conflicts and offer a platform for discussion of regional problems,” said political analyst Dosym Satpayev, director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group think-tank.

Catherine Ashton, the European Union foreign policy chief who heads the six-nation group negotiating with Iran, confirmed in an e-mailed statement on February 5 that talks would take place in Almaty on February 26. She said the negotiations were agreed on between Helga Schmid, the European External Action Service’s deputy secretary general, and Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Ashton also thanked Kazakhstan’s government “for its generous offer to host the talks.”

The confirmation came after Tehran had signaled two days earlier that it was ready to talk to the six-nation group – comprised of Russia, the United States, China, Britain, France and Germany — after an eight-month hiatus. Speaking in Munich on February 3, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi first disclosed the “good news” that Kazakhstan would be hosting a meeting in late February.

Nazarbayev’s administration has on several occasions offered to act as host for talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. On February 4, Altay Abibullayev, a spokesperson for the Kazakhstani president’s Central Communications Service, reiterated the administration’s eagerness to lend a helping hand. “We as the receiving side will make all efforts to create the most favorable conditions for successfully holding these talks in Kazakhstan,” he said.

Hosting the Iran nuclear talks dovetails with Kazakhstan’s long-standing efforts to become a global diplomatic player. In connection with those endeavors, Kazakhstan chaired the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010 and is current lobbying for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2016.

When it comes to agreement on the Iranian nuclear question, Astana’s influence over the negotiations will be limited, Satpayev pointed out. “There is Kazakhstan’s desire to present itself as an intermediary, and then there are the [real] possibilities [of what the talks can achieve],” he said. “It all depends on Iran’s political will.”

The discussions on Iran’s nuclear program have been deadlocked since negotiations in Moscow last June. The six-nation group is pressing Iran to comply with UN Security Council resolutions to end uranium enrichment and close an underground enrichment facility. The international community also wants Iran to hand over stockpiles of uranium already enriched to the level of 20 percent (a critical stage in the nuclear bomb-making process) for international safe-keeping. Tehran insists its program is for peaceful purposes, and wants international sanctions lifted.

Kazakhstan is a fitting host for the Iranian nuclear discussions, given its own history. The country voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons arsenal it inherited following the 1991 Soviet collapse. It is also home to the mothballed Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk that has left a devastating environmental and health legacy on the country.

Nazarbayev has sought to play a leading international role in anti-proliferation efforts. In an opinion piece published by the New York Times in March 2012, Nazarbayev asserted that Kazakhstani authorities “have worked tirelessly to encourage other countries to follow our lead and build a world in which the threat of nuclear weapons belongs to history.”

Nazarbayev went on to address the Iranian nuclear question directly, urging Tehran “to learn from our [Kazakhstan’s] example” and opt for “building peaceful alliances and prosperity over fear and suspicion.”

In a bid to reduce proliferation risks, Kazakhstan has offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency that would give states access to low-enriched uranium for peaceful purposes. And the fuel bank offer has won plaudits from Washington: last fall former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised it, noting that “few countries can be compared to Kazakhstan in terms of its experience in non-proliferation.”

This suggests Washington sees Kazakhstan as an honest broker in nuclear talks involving Iran. Kazakhstan cultivates good relations with all the big powers, including the United States, Russia and China, and is viewed as a “more or less neutral state” to offer a platform for dialogue, Satpayev said.

By Nick Turse

via Tom Dispatch

They looked like a gang of geriatric giants. Clad in smart casual attire — dress shirts, sweaters, and jeans — and incongruous blue hospital booties, they strode around “the world,” stopping to stroke their chins and [...]]]> How the Empire Changed Its Face, But Not Its Nature

By Nick Turse

via Tom Dispatch

They looked like a gang of geriatric giants. Clad in smart casual attire — dress shirts, sweaters, and jeans — and incongruous blue hospital booties, they strode around “the world,” stopping to stroke their chins and ponder this or that potential crisis. Among them was General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a button-down shirt and jeans, without a medal or a ribbon in sight, his arms crossed, his gaze fixed. He had one foot planted firmly in Russia, the other partly in Kazakhstan, and yet the general hadn’t left the friendly confines of Virginia.

Several times this year, Dempsey, the other joint chiefs, and regional war-fighting commanders have assembled at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico toconduct a futuristic war-game-meets-academic-seminar about the needs of the military in 2017. There, a giant map of the world, larger than a basketball court, was laid out so the Pentagon’s top brass could shuffle around the planet — provided they wore those scuff-preventing shoe covers — as they thought about “potential U.S. national military vulnerabilities in future conflicts” (so one participant told the New York Times). The sight of those generals with the world underfoot was a fitting image for Washington’s military ambitions, its penchant for foreign interventions, and its contempt for (non-U.S.) borders and national sovereignty.

A World So Much Larger Than a Basketball Court

In recent weeks, some of the possible fruits of Dempsey’s “strategic seminars,” military missions far from the confines of Quantico, have repeatedly popped up in the news.  Sometimes buried in a story, sometimes as the headline, the reports attest to the Pentagon’s penchant for globetrotting.

In September, for example, Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., revealed that, just months after the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq, a unit of Special Operations Forces had already been redeployed there in an advisory role and that negotiations were underway to arrange for larger numbers of troops to train Iraqi forces in the future.  That same month, the Obama administration won congressional approval to divert funds earmarked for counterterrorism aid for Pakistan to a new proxy project in Libya.  According to the New York Times, U.S. Special Operations Forces will likely be deployed to create and train a 500-man Libyan commando unit to battle Islamic militant groups which have become increasingly powerful as a result of the 2011 U.S.-aided revolution there.

Earlier this month, the New York Times reported that the U.S. military had secretly sent a new task force to Jordan to assist local troops in responding to the civil war in neighboring Syria.  Only days later, that paper revealed that recent U.S. efforts to train and assist surrogate forces for Honduras’s drug war were already crumbling amid a spiral of questions about the deaths of innocents, violations of international law, and suspected human rights abuses by Honduran allies.

Shortly after that, the Times reported the bleak, if hardly surprising, news that the proxy army the U.S. has spent more than a decade building in Afghanistan is, according to officials, “so plagued with desertions and low re-enlistment rates that it has to replace a third of its entire force every year.”  Rumors now regularly bubble up about a possible U.S.-funded proxy war on the horizon inNorthern Mali where al-Qaeda-linked Islamists have taken over vast stretches of territory — yet another direct result of last year’s intervention in Libya.

And these were just the offshore efforts that made it into the news.  Many other U.S. military actions abroad remain largely below the radar.  Several weeks ago, for instance, U.S. personnel were quietly deployed to Burundi to carry out training efforts in that small, landlocked, desperately poor East African nation.  Another contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force trainers headed to the similarly landlocked and poor West African nation of Burkina Faso to instruct indigenous forces.

At Camp Arifjan, an American base in Kuwait, U.S. and local troops donned gas masks and protective suits to conduct joint chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training.  In Guatemala, 200 Marines from Detachment Martillo completed a months-long deployment to assist indigenous naval forces and law enforcement agencies in drug interdiction efforts.

Across the globe, in the forbidding tropical forests of the Philippines, Marines joined elite Filipino troops to train for combat operations in jungle environments and to help enhance their skills as snipers.  Marines from both nations also leapt from airplanes, 10,000 feet above the island archipelago, in an effort to further the “interoperability” of their forces.  Meanwhile, in the Southeast Asian nation of Timor-Leste, Marines trained embassy guards and military police in crippling “compliance techniques” like pain holds and pressure point manipulation, as well as soldiers in jungle warfare as part of Exercise Crocodilo 2012.

The idea behind Dempsey’s “strategic seminars” was to plan for the future, to figure out how to properly respond to developments in far-flung corners of the globe.  And in the real world, U.S. forces are regularly putting preemptive pins in that giant map — from Africa to Asia, Latin America to the Middle East. On the surface, global engagement, training missions, and joint operations appear rational enough.  And Dempsey’s big picture planning seems like a sensible way to think through solutions to future national security threats.

But when you consider how the Pentagon really operates, such war-gaming undoubtedly has an absurdist quality to it. After all, global threats turn out to come in every size imaginable, from fringe Islamic movements in Africa to Mexican drug gangs. How exactly they truly threaten U.S. “national security” is often unclear — beyond some White House adviser’s or general’s say-so. And whatever alternatives come up in such Quantico seminars, the “sensible” response invariably turns out to be sending in the Marines, or the SEALs, or the drones, or some local proxies. In truth, there is no need to spend a day shuffling around a giant map in blue booties to figure it all out.

In one way or another, the U.S. military is now involved with most of the nations on Earth. Its soldiers, commandos, trainers, base builders, drone jockeys, spies, and arms dealers, as well as associated hired guns and corporate contractors, can now be found just about everywhere on the planet. The sun never sets on American troops conducting operations, training allies, arming surrogates, schooling its own personnel, purchasing new weapons and equipment, developing fresh doctrine, implementing novel tactics, and refining their martial arts. The U.S. has submarines trolling the briny deep and aircraft carrier task forces traversing the oceans and seas, robotic drones flying constant missions and manned aircraft patrolling the skies, while above them, spy satellites circle, peering down on friend and foe alike.

Since 2001, the U.S. military has thrown everything in its arsenal, short of nuclear weapons, including untold billions of dollars in weaponry, technology, bribes, you name it, at a remarkably weak set of enemies — relatively small groups of poorly-armed fighters in impoverished nations like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen — while decisively defeating none of them. With its deep pockets and long reach, its technology and training acumen, as well as the devastatingly destructive power at its command, the U.S. military should have the planet on lockdown. It should, by all rights, dominate the world just as the neoconservative dreamers of the early Bush years assumed it would.

Yet after more than a decade of war, it has failed to eliminate a rag-tag Afghan insurgency with limited popular support. It trained an indigenous Afghan force that was long known for its poor performance — before it became better known for killing its American trainers. It has spent years and untold tens of millions of tax dollars chasing down assorted firebrand clerics, various terrorist “lieutenants,” and a host of no-name militants belonging to al-Qaeda, mostly in the backlands of the planet. Instead of wiping out that organization and its wannabes, however, it seems mainly to have facilitated its franchising around the world.

At the same time, it has managed to paint weak regional forces like Somalia’s al-Shabaab as transnational threats, then focus its resources on eradicating them, only to fail at the task. It has thrown millions of dollars in personnel, equipment, aid, and recently even troops into the task of eradicating low-level drug runners (as well as the major drug cartels), without putting a dent in the northward flow of narcotics to America’s cities and suburbs.

It spends billions on intelligence only to routinely find itself in the dark. It destroyed the regime of an Iraqi dictator and occupied his country, only to be fought to a standstill by ill-armed, ill-organized insurgencies there, then out-maneuvered by the allies it had helped put in power, and unceremoniously bounced from the country (even if it is now beginning to claw its way back in). It spends untold millions of dollars to train and equip elite Navy SEALs to take on poor, untrained, lightly-armed adversaries, like gun-toting Somali pirates.

How Not to Change in a Changing World

And that isn’t the half of it.

The U.S. military devours money and yet delivers little in the way of victories. Its personnel may be among the most talented and well-trained on the planet, its weapons and technology the most sophisticated and advanced around. And when it comes to defense budgets, it far outspends the next nine largest nations combined (most of which are allies in any case), let alone its enemies like the Taliban, al-Shabaab, or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but in the real world of warfare this turns out to add up to remarkably little.

In a government filled with agencies routinely derided for profligacy, inefficiency, and producing poor outcomes, its record may be unmatched in terms of waste and abject failure, though that seems to faze almost no one in Washington. For more than a decade, the U.S. military has bounced from one failed doctrine to the next. There was Donald Rumsfeld’s “military lite,” followed by what could have been called military heavy (though it never got a name), which was superseded by General David Petraeus’s “counterinsurgency operations” (also known by its acronym COIN). This, in turn, has been succeeded by the Obama administration’s bid for future military triumph: a “light footprint” combination of special ops, drones, spies, civilian soldiers, cyberwarfare, and proxy fighters. Yet whatever the method employed, one thing has been constant: successes have been fleeting, setbacks many, frustrations the name of the game, and victory MIA.

Convinced nonetheless that finding just the right formula for applying force globally is the key to success, the U.S. military is presently banking on that new six-point plan. Tomorrow, it may turn to a different war-lite mix. Somewhere down the road, it will undoubtedly again experiment with something heavier. And if history is any guide, counterinsurgency, a concept that failed the U.S. in Vietnam and was resuscitated only to fail again in Afghanistan, will one day be back in vogue.

In all of this, it should be obvious, a learning curve is lacking. Any solution to America’s war-fighting problems will undoubtedly require the sort of fundamental reevaluation of warfare and military might that no one in Washington is open to at the moment. It’s going to take more than a few days spent shuffling around a big map in plastic shoe covers.

American politicians never tire of extolling the virtues of the U.S. military, which is now commonly hailed as “the finest fighting force in the history of the world.” This claim appears grotesquely at odds with reality. Aside from triumphs over such non-powers as the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada and the small Central American nation of Panama, the U.S. military’s record since World War II has been a litany of disappointments: stalemate in Korea, outright defeat in Vietnam, failures in Laos and Cambodia, debacles in Lebanon and Somalia, two wars against Iraq (both ending without victory), more than a decade of wheel-spinning in Afghanistan, and so on.

Something akin to the law of diminishing returns may be at work. The more time, effort, and treasure the U.S. invests in its military and its military adventures, the weaker the payback. In this context, the impressive destructive power of that military may not matter a bit, if it is tasked with doing things that military might, as it has been traditionally conceived, can perhaps no longer do.

Success may not be possible, whatever the circumstances, in the twenty-first-century world, and victory not even an option. Instead of trying yet again to find exactly the right formula or even reinventing warfare, perhaps the U.S. military needs to reinvent itself and its raison d’être if it’s ever to break out of its long cycle of failure.

But don’t count on it.

Instead, expect the politicians to continue to heap on the praise, Congress to continue insuring funding at levels that stagger the imagination, presidents to continue applying blunt force to complex geopolitical problems (even if in slightly different ways), arms dealers to continue churning out wonder weapons that prove less than wondrous, and the Pentagon continuing to fail to win.

Coming off the latest series of failures, the U.S. military has leapt headlong into yet another transitional period — call it the changing face of empire — but don’t expect a change in weapons, tactics, strategy, or even doctrine to yield a change in results. As the adage goes: the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at the Nation Institute.  An award-winning journalist, his work has appeared in theLos Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch. He is the author/editor of several books, including the just published The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Spies, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare  (Haymarket Books). This piece is the final article in his serieson the changing face of American empire, which is being underwritten byLannan Foundation. You can follow him on Tumblr.

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