The new year may have brought with it some signs of progress toward a comprehensive deal between world powers and Iran, lending credence to one of Graham Fuller’s 2015 predictions for the Middle East. However, any movement toward a nuclear agreement must now contend with a potentially game-changing complication: the desire of a new and more hawkish Republican-led Congress to impose additional sanctions on Iran regardless of how the talks are progressing.
The Associated Press reported on Friday that the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China) had reached a tentative agreement with Iranian negotiators on a plan to have Tehran ship some portion of its stockpiled low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia. The agreement would presumably be along the lines of the arrangement that was first reported by IPS’s Gareth Porter in October whereby Iran’s stockpiled LEU, as well as much of its newly enriched LEU, would be converted by the Russians into fuel for its Bushehr civilian nuclear facility.
If the AP report is accurate, the deal could represent a major breakthrough in one of the core areas of dispute between the parties: the size of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. The P5+1 have sought to limit the number of centrifuges that Iran would be allowed to operate under the terms of a deal in order to lengthen the amount of time it would take the Iranians to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a single nuclear bomb if it chose to pursue one (Iran’s “breakout time”). But Iran has balked at the idea of reducing its centrifuge program. However, another element in the “breakout time” calculation (part of the so-called “Rubik’s Cube” of a final nuclear deal) is the amount of LEU that Iran has stockpiled. Were Iran to agree to ship its LEU (which can be fairly easily enriched to levels required for weaponization) to Russia for conversion into fuel rods (which cannot be easily converted to a weaponizable form), then Iran’s “breakout time” could be extended with only a relatively minor –and perhaps even no — reduction in Iran’s current centrifuge capacity.
It should be noted that the AP report contained no specifics, saying simply that “both sides in the talks are still arguing about how much of an enriched uranium stockpile to leave Iran.” It also offered no indication that the deal would motivate the US/P5+1 negotiators to alter their demand that Iran cut its current number of operating centrifuges by over 50%, to 4500, under a final deal. In addition, Iran’s foreign ministry quickly dismissed the AP report, with spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham saying that “no agreement has been reached yet on any of the issues [being discussed] during nuclear talks,” although that denial could reflect diplomatic posturing on Iran’s part.
Other news out of Tehran, however, has offered a more encouraging sign that the sides may be moving closer to a deal. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Sunday argued that Iran should be prepared to accept some limits on its uranium enrichment program if doing so could help achieve a larger aim:
Speaking to an economic conference in Tehran, Rouhani both countered hard-line critics worried Iran will give up too much while also attempting to signal his administration remains open to negotiation with the six-nation group leading the talks.
If “we are ready to stop some types of enrichment which we do not need at this time, does it mean we have compromised our principles and cause?” Rouhani asked.
He responded: “Our cause is not linked to a centrifuge. It is connected to our heart and to our willpower.”
Rouhani’s remarks caused a bit of a social media storm, with some reputable analysts, including Suzanne Dimaggio who heads the Iran initiative at the New American Foundation, suggesting that a final deal is on the horizon.
Important speech by #Iran‘s @HassanRouhani today: “Our ideals are not bound to centrifuges.” Preparing for a deal. http://t.co/f9CB66RT9G
— Suzanne DiMaggio (@suzannedimaggio) January 4, 2015
Additionally, Rouhani seemed to suggest that he could put the terms of a final nuclear deal to a national referendum, possibly in order to bypass potential opposition from hardliners in the Majles (Iran’s parliament) and higher up the country’s religious and political hierarchy. As Juan Cole notes, the results of such a referendum could still be overruled by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but Khamenei may be reluctant to overrule the will of a majority of the Iranian public.
Unfortunately, these positive developments take place amid the rise of a new threat to the ongoing negotiations, not from hardliners in Iran’s parliament but rather from hardliners in the newly installed (as of Saturday) US Congress. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) visited Israel late last month and told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that there would be a vote on the previously stymied Kirk-Menendez bill (to impose additional sanctions on Iran) sometime in January, and that the new Congress would “follow [Netanyahu’s] lead” on dealing with Iran and the nuclear talks. Putting aside the astonishing sight of a US senator pledging allegiance to a foreign leader, sanctions are a clearly decisive issue for Tehran. The imposition of another round of broad US sanctions, even if they are made conditional on Iran abandoning the talks or breaking its obligations under the existing negotiating framework, would strengthen hardliners in Tehran who have long argued that Washington cannot be trusted. The Obama administration has pledged to veto any additional sanctions on Iran so long as talks are ongoing, but that may not matter; Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) told reporters last week that he expects the new Congress to pass a new sanctions bill with veto-proof majorities in both the House and the Senate.
The most recent extension of the talks called for a final framework to be in place by March 1 and for a full deal to be reached by July 1. It seems likely that most Republicans in Congress will do their best to scuttle the talks before either of those deadlines can be reached, putting negotiators (who will meet again Jan 15. in Geneva) on an even tighter timeframe.
]]>by Jim Lobe
With the snow in Washington and Russian moves in Crimea diverting all national news attention away from AIPAC’s ongoing policy conference, I understand House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer are circulating their own AIPAC-approved letter among colleagues for signature. The tone seems [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
With the snow in Washington and Russian moves in Crimea diverting all national news attention away from AIPAC’s ongoing policy conference, I understand House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer are circulating their own AIPAC-approved letter among colleagues for signature. The tone seems a bit more congenial than the Senate version, but the House letter appears to suffer from some of the same ambiguities and uncertainties, notably its insistence that “enrichment-related… facilities” be dismantled as a condition for any deal — a non-starter if interpreted literally — as well as its explicit reference to Iran’s “nuclear weapons ambitions,” which makes an assumption that is not yet supported by the U.S. intelligence community.
It also raises other issues, such as alleged terrorism, and destabilization of Iran’s neighbors, human rights, and the fate of U.S. citizens believed to be detained in or by Iran, but does not relate them specifically to the nuclear negotiations. Also on the plus side is that it suggests there will be no House move to enact prospective automatic sanctions as in the Kirk-Menendez bill, S. 1881, by noting that if Iran violates the Joint Plant of Action or if no agreement is reached, Congress would have to “act swiftly to consider additional sanctions…”
On the other hand, unlike the Senate version, this one concludes by implicitly raising the military option by insisting that “we must keep all options on the table to prevent this dangerous regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.” Such language naturally raises hackles and strengthens hardliners in Tehran.
Here’s the draft in the event you want to weigh in with your congressperson.
]]>Dear Mr. President:
As your partner in developing the broad-based sanctions that – in bringing Iran to the negotiating table – have played an essential role in your two-track approach to encourage Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, we support your diplomatic effort to test Iran’s willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions and satisfactorily resolve all critical issues concerning its nuclear program.
Iran’s history of delay, deception, and dissembling on its nuclear program raises serious concerns that Iran will use prolonged negotiations as a tool to secure an economic lifeline while it continues to make progress towards a nuclear weapon. Iran’s leaders must understand that further sanctions relief will require Tehran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon and fully disclose its nuclear activities.
We are hopeful a permanent diplomatic agreement will require dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons-related infrastructure, including enrichment-, heavy water-, and reprocessing-related facilities, such that Iran will not be able to develop, build, or acquire a nuclear weapon. We do not seek to deny Iran a peaceful nuclear energy program, but we are gravely concerned that Iran’s industrial-scale uranium enrichment capability and heavy water reactor being built at Arak could be used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Because we believe any agreement should include stringent transparency measures to guarantee that Iran cannot develop an undetectable nuclear weapons breakout capability, Tehran must fully and verifiably implement its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, answer pending IAEA questions, and comply with the transparency measures requested by the Director General of the IAEA, as well as with any additional verification and monitoring measures necessary to ensure Iran is abiding by the terms of any agreement. Such measures should include an agreement granting the IAEA necessary access to inspect all suspect sites, including military facilities, and providing an unfettered ability to interview Iranian scientists and personnel associated with Iran’s nuclear program.
As negotiations progress, we expect your administration will continue to keep Congress regularly apprised of the details. And, because any long-term sanctions relief will require Congressional action, we urge you to consult closely with us so that we can determine the parameters of such relief in the event an agreement is reached, or, if no agreement is reached or Iran violates the interim agreement, so that we can act swiftly to consider additional sanctions and steps necessary to change Iran’s calculation.
Finally, although the P5+1 process is focused on Iran’s nuclear program, we remain deeply concerned by Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, its horrendous human rights record, its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, its pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its threats against our ally, Israel, as well as the fates of American citizens detained by Iran. We want to work with you to address these concerns as part of a broader strategy of dealing with Iran.
We are hopeful your two-track strategy will convince Iran to change course and abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. None of us desires military conflict, but as you yourself have acknowledged, we must keep all options on the table to prevent this dangerous regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.
by Jim Lobe
Just four days before 14,000 members arrive for AIPAC’s annual policy conference and a keynote by none other than Bibi Netanyahu himself, the group appears at sea, tossed between Republicans eager to do the Likud leader’s bidding and embarrass President Barack Obama on the one hand and the [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Just four days before 14,000 members arrive for AIPAC’s annual policy conference and a keynote by none other than Bibi Netanyahu himself, the group appears at sea, tossed between Republicans eager to do the Likud leader’s bidding and embarrass President Barack Obama on the one hand and the administration and leading Democratic lawmakers who believe that any new sanctions legislation will likely sabotage the ongoing negotiations with Iran and bring the country closer to another Mideast war.
The latest move is predictably coming from the Republican side, which seems determined to find a new legislative vehicle for the stalled Kirk-Menendez (“Wag the Dog”) sanctions bill. They apparently intend to propose — and try to force a vote on — an alternative to a military veterans’ bill (S. 1982) put forward by Sen. Bernie Sanders. The alternative, sponsored by North Carolina Sen. Richard Burr, reportedly includes most of the Kirk-Menendez provisions. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell made clear Wednesday that the Republican stratagem was very much linked to the AIPAC conference when he made yet another appeal to Majority Leader Harry Reid to permit a vote on sanctions legislation. Here’s what he said on the floor:
Now I know many active Members of AIPAC — the Majority Leader mentioned AIPAC — they want to have this vote. They’ll be coming to Washington next week from all over the country. I’ll bet you, Mr. President, this is a vote they want to have.
So far, however, it appears that Reid and the Democrats are standing firm against the move, as the caucus tweeted in response to McConnell:
Please do not inject the Iran sanctions issue into a debate on how we can improve the lives of veterans. #Veterans pic.twitter.com/8ZBCmmXp3M
— Bernie Sanders (@SenSanders) February 26, 2014
They quickly marshalled strong support from key veterans groups, including the American Legion, whose National Commander, Daniel Dellinger, put out the following statement:
Iran is a serious issue that Congress needs to address, but it cannot be tied to S. 1982, which is extremely important as our nation prepares to welcome millions of U.S. military servicemen and women home from war. This comprehensive bill aims to help veterans find good jobs, get the health care they need and make in-state tuition rates applicable to all who are using their GI Bill benefits. This legislation is about supporting veterans, pure and simple. The Senate can debate various aspects of it, and that’s understandable, but it cannot lose focus on the matter at hand: helping military personnel make the transition to veteran life and ensuring that those who served their nation in uniform receive the benefits they earned and deserve. We can deal with Iran – or any other issue unrelated specifically to veterans – with separate legislation.
The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA) quickly followed suit with its director, Paul Rieckhoff tweeting that Iran sanctions were “not relevant” to the bill and suggesting that the Republican maneuver was another example of “gridlock” in Washington. Later in the day, Reid himself tweeted:
The @iava and @AmericanLegion are right: We should keep vets bill focused on vets. Republicans are trying to divert attention from this.
— Senator Harry Reid (@SenatorReid) February 26, 2014
The question, of course, is where is AIPAC in all this? I sent an email query to the group’s spokesman, Marshall Wittman, around noon but had received no reply as of late Wednesday night, suggesting either that the organization had not yet formed an opinion or simply preferred not to comment, a rather striking possibility given the proximity of its policy conference which will end with all of the attendees fanning out across Capitol Hill to lobby their lawmakers on a range of priorities, no doubt beginning with Iran. As the delegates will have just heard a no-doubt hawkish exhortation from Netanyahu himself Tuesday morning and the Burr alternative may be the only pending Iran-related measure that reflects his views, what marching orders will AIPAC offer its legions? Moreover, given the strong Democratic opposition to date, lobbying in favor of Burr will make AIPAC’s claim to bipartisanship appear ever more hollow. And while that may be the direction in which some of the group’s biggest donors would like to take it, such a move would risk further alienating its largely Democratic base.
AIPAC’s two top leaders sought last weekend to clarify its position in an op-ed in the New York Times entitled “Don’t Let Up on Iran,” which, in addition to misstating a number of facts, succeeded only in muddying the waters by noting, “Earlier this month, we agreed with Mr. Menendez on delaying a vote in the Senate, but we remain committed to the bill’s passage.” What that means at this point, however, is anybody’s guess. Do they think that what they agreed to delay just two weeks ago should now be voted on despite the stronger opposition among Democrats? Not clear, not clear at all. It would seem that the flailing I referred to a couple of weeks ago continues.
Meanwhile, two likely Republican president candidates, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, made clear Wednesday they have no reservations about supporting new sanctions or, for that matter, war if it comes to that. Both senators suggested that if Iran obtained a bomb, it might very well transfer it to Venezuela. (Shades of pre-Iraq war hype.) “They both hate us,” declared Cruz. Meanwhile, Cruz’s fellow-Texan, Pastor John Hagee has scheduled his big annual Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in Washington for July 21-22; that is, two days after the expiration of the six-month Joint Plan of Action (JPA) negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany), which, however, can be extended by another six months by agreement of the parties. If, as anticipated, such an extension will be agreed, AIPAC will be joined by its Christian Zionist brothers and sisters in a major new push for sanctions.
Photo: Senator and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky speaking at CPAC 2011 in Washington, D.C. Credit: Gage Skidmore
]]>by Jim Lobe
The Iran Project has just published the first in a series of “Short Reports” on Iran, its negotiations with the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany), and U.S. policy, which it plans to put out over the next few months. This one, entitled “Assessing Claims [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
The Iran Project has just published the first in a series of “Short Reports” on Iran, its negotiations with the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany), and U.S. policy, which it plans to put out over the next few months. This one, entitled “Assessing Claims and Counter Claims over New Sanctions,” reviews the recent debate over the Kirk-Menendez bill. S. 1881, which I called the “Wag the Dog Act of 2013.” Among other conclusions, the report, which was drafted by Jim Walsh, an international security expert at MIT, finds that new sanctions at this time would likely undermine the prospects for a successful negotiation, particularly given the fact that all of the parties in the P5+1 are themselves clearly opposed to the legislation. It also found that new sanctions may yet prove useful, but not when negotiations are just getting underway, as they did today in Vienna. And it noted that some critics of the bill, presumably including some administration officials, probably overstated the intentions of many of the bill’s 59 co-sponsors as deliberately wanting to sabotage the negotiations (as opposed, presumably, to deliberately wanting to sabotage President Obama). In any event, you can find the new report here.
The Iran Project, which has involved an impressive number of foreign policy veterans led by Amb. William Luers (ret.) and Amb. Thomas Pickering (ret), who served as Washington’s chief envoy in virtually every hot spot — from Moscow to San Salvador and from Lagos and Tel Aviv to Turtle Bay (in the run-up to and during the first Gulf War) — has itself conducted Track II diplomacy with leading Iranians over the past decade or so, including and especially many of the same Iranians, such as Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who have filled key posts in Hassan Rouhani’s government. The group has also played a key role in shaping the elite debate here over Iran during the past few years. Although it has maintained a relatively low public profile, opponents of the engagement policy, of which AIPAC and the Israel lobby are the most important, know how effective the Project has been.
In addition to Luers, Pickering and Walsh, the new report is signed by Amb. Frank Wisner (ret.); Paul Pillar, the CIA veteran who served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace president Jessica Tuchman Mathews; and Rockefeller Brothers Fund president Stephen Heintz. Upcoming reports will include an analysis of the Nov. 24, 2013, accord between Iran and the P5+1 (the Joint Plan of Action, or JPA); the issues that must be addressed in a comprehensive agreement; and the challenges of lifting sanctions if a comprehensive agreement is indeed reached.
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