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IPS Writers in the Blogosphere » LA Times http://www.ips.org/blog/ips Turning the World Downside Up Tue, 26 May 2020 22:12:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1 How Rotella Reported Another Dubious Iranian Bomb Plot http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/how-rotella-reported-another-dubious-iranian-bomb-plot/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/how-rotella-reported-another-dubious-iranian-bomb-plot/#comments Wed, 21 Aug 2013 03:54:05 +0000 Gareth Porter http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/how-rotella-reported-another-dubious-iranian-bomb-plot/ via LobeLog
by Gareth Porter

[While the terrible events in Egypt have delayed my plans to reply to ProPublica’s response to my critique of Sebastian Rotella’s report on the alleged build-up of Iran’s terrorist infrastructure in the Americas, Gareth Porter has written the following essay [...]]]> via LobeLog
by Gareth Porter

[While the terrible events in Egypt have delayed my plans to reply to ProPublica’s response to my critique of Sebastian Rotella’s report on the alleged build-up of Iran’s terrorist infrastructure in the Americas, Gareth Porter has written the following essay on a 2009 article by Rotella for the Los Angeles Times about an alleged bomb plot to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2008. It offers a very good illustration of some of the problems raised in my original critique of Rotella’s most recent work, notably the virtually exclusive reliance on sources that are clearly hostile to Iran with an interest in depicting it in the most negative light possible. But you be the judge. -- Jim Lobe]

It happened in Baku, transforming the capital of Azerbaijan into a battleground in a global shadow war.

Police intercepted a fleeing car and captured two suspected Hezbollah militants from Lebanon. The car contained explosives, binoculars, cameras, pistols with silencers and reconnaissance photos. Raiding alleged safe houses, police foiled what authorities say was a plot to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic that borders Iran.

Thus begins the only detailed English-language press account of an alleged Iranian terror plot in Azerbaijan in 2008: a May 2009 article, written with a Paris dateline, by Sebastian Rotella for the Los Angeles Times.

But despite the sense of immediacy conveyed by his lede, Rotella’s sources for his account were not Azerbaijanis. Rather, the sources Rotella quoted on the details of the alleged plot, the investigation and apprehension of the suspects consisted of an unnamed “Israeli security official”, and Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow at the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the author of a constant stream of articles, op-eds, and Congressional testimony reflecting the Israeli government’s interest in promoting the perception of a growing Iranian terrorist threat around the world.[1]

It was Levitt who described the alleged plot in Baku to Rotella as having been “in the advanced stages” when it was supposedly broken up by Azerbaijani security forces, an assertion echoed by the anonymous Israeli security official cited in the article:

 ”[Iran] had reached the stage where they had a network in place to do an operation,” said an Israeli security official, who requested anonymity for safety reasons. “We are seeing it all over the world. They are working very hard at it.”

So readers of the LA Times received a version of the plot that was filtered primarily, if not exclusively, through an Israeli lens.[2] Relying on Israeli officials and a close ally at a pro-Israel US think tank for a story on an alleged Iranian bomb plot against an Israeli Embassy is bound to produce a predictable story line where the accuracy can hardly be assumed at face value. Indeed, in this case, there were and remain many reasons for skepticism.

Yet, three years later, in a July 2012 article for ProPublica, he referred to the plot as though it was established fact.

Had Rotella sought an independent source in Azerbaijan, he would have learned, for example, that such alleged plots had been a virtual perennial in Baku for years. That is what a leading scholar of Azerbaijan’s external relations, Anar Valiyev, told me in an interview last November. “It’s always the same plot year after year,” said Valiyev, Dean of the School of International Affairs of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy in Baku.

In fact, security officials in Azerbaijan had claimed the existence of a similar plot in October 2007 and January 2012 and only two months later, authorities arrested Azerbaijani suspects in two different allegedly Iranian-initiated plots to carry out terrorist actions against Western embassies, the Israeli Embassy and/or Jewish targets. In early 2013, prison sentences were announced in yet another alleged terrorist plot to attack the Eurovision song contest in Baku in 2012. Valiyev told me that those detained by Azerbaijani security officials are always charged with wanting to kill Israeli or US officials and subsequently tried for plots to overthrow the government, which carries the maximum sentence of 15 years in prison.

In a 2007 article in Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus, Valiyev observed that plots, assassination and coup-attempts were “thwarted” with regularity in Azerbaijan. “Periodically the government finds a scapegoat,” he wrote, to justify attacks on domestic critics, including “Wahabbis”, followers of Kurdish-Sunni scholar Said Nursi and/or Shiite radicals. Valiyev suggested that security officials might be “trying to show that radical Islamists could come to power…should the incumbent government lose the election.”

The Azerbaijani government and its security forces are not known for their devotion to the rule of law. The current president, Ilham Aliyev, is the son of Azerbaijan’s first president, Heydar Aliyev, who, in turn, was the head of the Soviet KGB before Azerbaijan’s independence. According to Jim Lobe, who visited Baku last year, dissidents regard the first Aliyev’s tenure as relatively liberal compared that of his son. A 2009 State Department cable described Ilham Aliyev as a “mafia-like” figure, likening him to a combination of Michael and Sonny Corleone in the “The Godfather”.

Valiyev observed that virtually nothing about the alleged plot made sense, beginning with the targets. According to Rotella’s story, the alleged Hezbollah operatives and their Azerbaijani confederates had planned to set off three or four car bombs at the Israeli Embassy simultaneously, using explosives they “intended to accumulate” in addition to the “hundreds of pounds of explosives” they had allegedly already acquired from “Iranian spies.”

But the Israeli Embassy is located in the seven-story Hyatt Tower office complex along with other foreign embassies, and no automobiles are allowed to park in close proximity to the complex, according to Valiyev. So the alleged plotters would have needed a prodigious amount of explosives to accomplish such a plan.

For example, the bomb that destroyed the eight-story US Air Force barracks at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was estimated at 23,000 pounds of explosives detonated less than 100 feet away from the building. Valiyev told me that it is “practically impossible to find such components in Azerbaijan” because “Even a few kilograms of explosives would be tracked down by the ministry of national security.”

In his article, Rotella also referred — though only in passing — to the prosecutor’s charge that the alleged conspirators were planning to attack a Russian radar installation at Gabala (sometimes spelled Qabala) in northern Azerbaijan. But that part of the plot was also highly suspect, according to Valiyev. No reason was ever given for such a target, and it would have made no sense for either Hezbollah’s or Iran’s interests.

Built in 1984, the Gabala radar station was leased to the Russians until 2012, and 900 troops from the Russian Space Forces were stationed there. An attack on the station by Hezbollah or its supposed proxies in Azerbaijan would have represented a major provocation against Russia by Iran and Hezbollah, and was therefore hard to believe, as Valiyev pointed out in a July 2009 report for the Jamestown Foundation. Valiyev said it was far more plausible that the alleged plotters were simply carrying out surveillance on the station which, according to some reports, was being considered for possible integration into a regional US missile defense system.

Rotella failed to mention yet another aspect of the prosecution’s case that should arouse additional skepticism. The indictment included the charge that the leader of the alleged terrorist cell plotting these attacks was working simultaneously for Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. Even though it has been long been discredited, the idea of an Iran-al-Qaeda collaboration on terrorism has been a favorite Israeli theme for some time and one that continues to be propagated by Levitt.

Rotella’s account of how the suspects were apprehended also appears implausible. In May 2008, when the bombings were supposedly still weeks away, according to his story, the suspects realized they were under surveillance and tried to flee.

But instead of hiding or destroying incriminating evidence of their terrorist plot — such as the reconnaissance photos, the explosives, the cameras and the pistols with silencers — as might be expected under those circumstances, the two suspects allegedly packed all that equipment in their car and fled toward the border with Iran, whereupon they were intercepted, according to the official line reported by Rotella.

Somehow, despite the surveillance, according to anonymous “anti-terrorist officials” cited by Rotella, “a number of Lebanese, Iranian and Azerbaijani suspects escaped by car into Iran.” Only those with the incriminating evidence — including, most implausibly, hundreds of pounds of explosives — in their car were caught, according to the account given to Rotella.

Even Rotella’s description of the two Lebanese suspects, Ali Karaki and Ali Najem Aladine, as a veteran Hezbollah external operations officer and an explosives expert, respectively, should not be taken at face value, according to Valiyev. It is more likely, he said, that the two were simply spies working for Iranian intelligence.

Even the US Embassy report on the trial of the suspects suggested it also had doubts about the alleged plot. “In early October after a closed trial,” the reporting cable said, “an Azerbaijani court sentenced a group of alleged terrorists arrested the previous Spring and supposedly connected to Lebanese Hezbollah plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Baku AND the Qabala radar station in northern Azerbaijan” (emphasis in the original). It added, “In a public statement the state prosecutor repeated earlier claims that the entire plot was an operation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.”

Yet another striking anomaly about the alleged plot was the fact that nothing was published about it for an entire year. No explanation for the silence was ever made public. This silence is all the more significant because during 2009 and 2010, the Israeli government either publicly alleged or leaked stories of Iranian or Hezbollah plots in Turkey and Jordan about which the host country authorities either did not comment on or offered a different explanation. But despite the extremely close relationship between Azebaijani and Israeli intelligence services (confirmed by this US Embassy cable), neither the Israeli media nor foreign journalists were tipped off to the plot until the Israelis leaked the story to Rotella a year later.[3]

The complete absence of any leak by the Israelis for an entire year about an alleged Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Baku casts some circumstantial doubt on whether such a plot had indeed been uncovered in 2008, as claimed in the article.

Despite the multiple anomalies surrounding this story — the complete lack of any publicly available corroborating evidence; the well-established penchant for the Aliyev government for using such alleged plots to justify rounding up domestic critics; the US Embassy’s apparent skepticism, his failure to consult independent sources; and the 2009 publication by the Jamestown Foundation of Valiyev’s own critique of the “official” version of the case — Rotella has shown no interest in clarifying what actually happened.  In fact, as noted above, he referred to the plot again in a July 2012 article for ProPublica as if there was not the slightest doubt with regard to its actual occurrence, identifying it, as he did in the original article, as an attempted retaliation for the assassination of a senior Hezbollah operative three months before:

Conflict with Israel intensified in February 2008 after a car bomb in the heart of Damascus killed Imad Mughniyah, a notorious Hezbollah military leader and ally of Iranian intelligence. Iranian Hezbollah publicly accused Israel and vowed revenge.

Within weeks, a plot was under way against the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan. Police broke up the cell in May 2008. The suspects included Azeri accomplices, a senior Hezbollah field operative and a Hezbollah explosives expert. Police also arrested two Iranian spies, but they were released within weeks because of pressure from Tehran, Western anti-terror officials say.[4] The other suspects were convicted.

As narrowly sourced as it was, Rotella’s original 2009 story thus helped make a dubious tale of a bomb plot in Baku part of the media narrative. More recently, he continued that pattern by promoting the unsubstantiated charge by Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman and various pro-Israel groups and right-wing members of Congress, such as Florida Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, that Iran poses a growing terrorist threat to the US in the Americas. While Jim Lobe has helped deconstruct that story line, I have recently marshaled evidence showing that Nisman’s charges about alleged Iranian involvement in the 1994 AMIA bombing and the 2007 JFK airport plot were tendentious and highly questionable.

Photo: Iran’s former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a dinner hosted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in November 2010.


[1] In one illustration of Rotella’s and Levitt’s long-time symbiosis, Levitt cited Rotella’s account of the alleged Baku plot as his main source about the incident in a 2013 article on alleged Hezbollah terrorism published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC).

[2] Rotella referred twice to “anti-terrorism officials” as sources for describing the surveillance of the alleged perpetrators that preceded their arrest and past work for Hezbollah. Of course, the phrase “anti-terrorism officials” does not exclude the possibility that they, too, were Israeli.)

[3] The first time the alleged plot’s details appeared in the Anglophone Israeli press was when Haaretz published a several hundred-word piece based virtually exclusively on Rotella’s account with the added detail, citing “Israeli sources,” that the “plotters also planned to kidnap the Israeli ambassador in Baku…”

[4] This account, incidentally, was the first to report the arrest in the case of “two Iranian spies”, another anomaly that may be explained by a flurry of media reports in 2010 that it was the two Lebanese who were released as part of a larger prisoner exchange that also included an Azerbaijani nuclear scientist arrested as a spy by Iran.

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Afghanistan Today http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/afghanistan-today/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/afghanistan-today/#comments Sun, 30 Dec 2012 01:34:46 +0000 Jasmin Ramsey http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/afghanistan-today/ via Lobe Log

This pretty much says it all, no?

Col. Babagul Aamal is a proud veteran of 28 years in the Afghan National Army. Short and fit, with a thick black beard, he’s a leader who blurts out exactly what he’s thinking.

“I don’t talk politics — I talk facts,” Aamal said, wearing [...]]]> via Lobe Log

This pretty much says it all, no?

Col. Babagul Aamal is a proud veteran of 28 years in the Afghan National Army. Short and fit, with a thick black beard, he’s a leader who blurts out exactly what he’s thinking.

“I don’t talk politics — I talk facts,” Aamal said, wearing a sweater beneath his uniform in his unheated command office on a dusty base 40 miles east of Kabul.

It shames him, Aamal said, that he is not allowed to wear his pistol when he enters the fortified gate of the new American military base next door. Though he’s a brigade commander, he’s required to stand before an airport-type scanner with his arms raised, almost in surrender. [emphasis added]

Caption: A Soldier from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), watches cattle run for their lives while a CH-47 helicopter prepares to land on Landing Zone Shetland during Operation Saray Has July 19 near Forward Operating Base Naray, Afghanistan.www.army.mil” (U.S. Army Photo)

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Overwrought Empire http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/overwrought-empire/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/overwrought-empire/#comments Wed, 10 Oct 2012 16:47:56 +0000 Tom Engelhardt http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/overwrought-empire/ The Discrediting of U.S. Military Power 

By Tom Engelhardt

via Tom Dispatch (a version of this article appeared in the LA Times)

Americans lived in a “victory culture” for much of the twentieth century.  You could say that we experienced an almost 75-year stretch of triumphalism — think of it [...]]]> The Discrediting of U.S. Military Power 

By Tom Engelhardt

via Tom Dispatch (a version of this article appeared in the LA Times)

Americans lived in a “victory culture” for much of the twentieth century.  You could say that we experienced an almost 75-year stretch of triumphalism — think of it as the real “American Century” — from World War I to the end of the Cold War, with time off for a destructive stalemate in Korea and a defeat in Vietnam too shocking to absorb or shake off.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, it all seemed so obvious.  Fate had clearly dealt Washington a royal flush.  It was victory with a capital V.  The United States was, after all, the last standing superpower, after centuries of unceasing great power rivalries on the planet.  It had a military beyond compare and no enemy, hardly a “rogue state,” on the horizon.  It was almost unnerving, such clear sailing into a dominant future, but a moment for the ages nonetheless.  Within a decade, pundits in Washington were hailing us as “the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome.”

And here’s the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then and yet everything seems different.  Think of it as the American imperial paradox: everywhere there are now “threats” against our well-being which seem to demand action and yet nowhere are there commensurate enemies to go with them.  Everywhere the U.S. military still reigns supreme by almost any measure you might care to apply; and yet — in case the paradox has escaped you — nowhere can it achieve its goals, however modest.

At one level, the American situation should simply take your breath away.  Never before in modern history had there been an arms race of only one or a great power confrontation of only one.  And at least in military terms, just as the neoconservatives imagined in those early years of the twenty-first century, the United States remains the “sole superpower” or even “hyperpower” of planet Earth.

The Planet’s Top Gun

And yet the more dominant the U.S. military becomes in its ability to destroy and the more its forces are spread across the globe, the more the defeats and semi-defeats pile up, the more the missteps and mistakes grow, the more the strains show, the more the suicides rise, the more the nation’s treasure disappears down a black hole — and in response to all of this, the more moves the Pentagon makes.

A great power without a significant enemy?  You might have to go back to the Roman Empire at its height or some Chinese dynasty in full flower to find anything like it.  And yet Osama bin Laden is dead.  Al-Qaeda is reportedly a shadow of its former self.  The great regional threats of the moment, North Korea and Iran, are regimes held together by baling wire and the suffering of their populaces.  The only incipient great power rival on the planet, China, has just launched its first aircraft carrier, a refurbished Ukrainian throwaway from the 1990s on whose deck the country has no planes capable of landing.

The U.S. has 1,000 or more bases around the world; other countries, a handful.  The U.S. spends as much on its military as the next 14 powers (mostly allies) combined.  In fact, it’s investing an estimated $1.45 trillion to produce and operate a single future aircraft, the F-35 — more than any country, the U.S. included, now spends on its national defense annually.

The U.S. military is singular in other ways, too.  It alone has divided the globe — the complete world — into six “commands.”  With (lest anything be left out) an added command, Stratcom, for the heavens and another, recently established, for the only space not previously occupied,cyberspace, where we’re already unofficially “at war.”  No other country on the planet thinks of itself in faintly comparable military terms.

When its high command plans for its future “needs,” thanks to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, they repair (don’t say “retreat”) to a military base south of the capital where they argue out their future and war-game various possible crises while striding across a map of the world larger than a basketball court.  What other military would come up with such a method?

The president now has at his command not one, but two private armies.  The first is the CIA, which in recent years has been heavily militarized, is overseen by a former four-star general (who calls the job “living the dream”), and is running its own private assassination campaigns and drone air wars throughout the Greater Middle East.  The second is an expanding elite, the Joint Special Operations Command, cocooned inside the U.S. military, members of whom are now deployed to hot spots around the globe.

The U.S. Navy, with its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier task forces, is dominant on the global waves in a way that only the British Navy might once have been; and the U.S. Air Force controls the global skies in much of the world in a totally uncontested fashion.  (Despite numerous wars and conflicts, the last American plane possibly downed in aerial combat was in the first Gulf War in 1991.)  Across much of the global south, there is no sovereign space Washington’s drones can’t penetrate to kill those judged by the White House to be threats.

In sum, the U.S. is now the sole planetary Top Gun in a way that empire-builders once undoubtedly fantasized about, but that none from Genghis Khan on have ever achieved: alone and essentially uncontested on the planet.  In fact, by every measure (except success), the likes of it has never been seen.

Blindsided by Predictably Unintended Consequences

By all the usual measuring sticks, the U.S. should be supreme in a historically unprecedented way.  And yet it couldn’t be more obvious that it’s not, that despite all the bases, elite forces, private armies, drones, aircraft carriers, wars, conflicts, strikes, interventions, and clandestine operations, despite a labyrinthine intelligence bureaucracy that never seems to stop growing and into which we pour a minimum of $80 billion a year, nothing seems to work out in an imperially satisfying way.  It couldn’t be more obvious that this is not a glorious dream, but some kind of ever-expanding imperial nightmare.

This should, of course, have been self-evident since at least early 2004, less than a year after the Bush administration invaded and occupied Iraq, when the roadside bombs started to explode and the suicide bombings to mount, while the comparisons of the United States to Rome and of a prospective Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East to the Pax Romanavanished like a morning mist on a blazing day.  Still, the wars against relatively small, ill-armed sets of insurgents dragged toward their dismally predictable ends.  (It says the world that, after almost 11 years of war, the 2,000th U.S. military death in Afghanistan occurred at the hands of an Afghan “ally” in an “insider attack.”)  In those years, Washington continued to be regularly blindsided by the unintended consequences of its military moves. Surprises — none pleasant — became the order of the day and victories proved vanishingly rare.

One thing seems obvious: a superpower military with unparalleled capabilities for one-way destruction no longer has the more basic ability to impose its will anywhere on the planet.  Quite the opposite, U.S. military power has been remarkably discredited globally by the most pitiful of forces.  From Pakistan to Honduras, just about anywhere it goes in the old colonial or neocolonial world, in those regions known in the contested Cold War era as the Third World, resistance of one unexpected sort or another arises and failure ensues in some often long-drawn-out and spectacular fashion.

Given the lack of enemies — a few thousand jihadis, a small set of minority insurgencies, a couple of feeble regional powers — why this is so, what exactly the force is that prevents Washington’s success, remains mysterious.  Certainly, it’s in some way related to the more than half-century of decolonization movements, rebellions, and insurgencies that were a feature of the previous century.

It also has something to do with the way economic heft has spread beyond the U.S., Europe, and Japan — with the rise of the “tigers” in Asia, the explosion of the Chinese and Indian economies, the advances of Brazil and Turkey, and the movement of the planet toward some kind of genuine economic multipolarity.  It may also have something to do with the end of the Cold War, which put an end as well to several centuries of imperial or great power competition and left the sole “victor,” it now seems clear, heading toward the exits wreathed in self-congratulation.

Explain it as you will, it’s as if the planet itself, or humanity, had somehow been inoculatedagainst the imposition of imperial power, as if it now rejected it whenever and wherever applied.  In the previous century, it took a half-nation, North Korea, backed by Russian supplies and Chinese troops to fight the U.S. to a draw, or a popular insurgent movement backed by a local power, North Vietnam, backed in turn by the Soviet Union and China to defeat American power.  Now, small-scale minority insurgencies, largely using roadside bombs and suicide bombers, are fighting American power to a draw (or worse) with no great power behind them at all.

Think of the growing force that resists such military might as the equivalent of the “dark matter” in the universe.  The evidence is in.  We now know (or should know) that it’s there, even if we can’t see it.

Washington’s Wars on Autopilot

After the last decade of military failures, stand-offs, and frustrations, you might think that this would be apparent in Washington.  After all, the U.S. is now visibly an overextended empire, its sway waning from the Greater Middle East to Latin America, the limits of its powerincreasingly evident.  And yet, here’s the curious thing: two administrations in Washington have drawn none of the obvious conclusions, and no matter how the presidential election turns out, it’s already clear that, in this regard, nothing will change.

Even as military power has proven itself a bust again and again, our policymakers have come to rely ever more completely on a military-first response to global problems.  In other words, we are not just a classically overextended empire, but also an overwrought one operating on some kind of militarized autopilot.  Lacking is a learning curve.  By all evidence, it’s not just that there isn’t one, but that there can’t be one.

Washington, it seems, now has only one mode of thought and action, no matter who is at the helm or what the problem may be, and it always involves, directly or indirectly, openly or clandestinely, the application of militarized force.  Nor does it matter that each further application only destabilizes some region yet more or undermines further what once were known as “American interests.”

Take Libya, as an example.  It briefly seemed to count as a rare American military success story: a decisive intervention in support of a rebellion against a brutal dictator — so brutal, in fact, that the CIA previously shipped “terrorist suspects,” Islamic rebels fighting against the Gaddafi regime, there for torture.  No U.S. casualties resulted, while American and NATO air strikes were decisive in bringing a set of ill-armed, ill-organized rebels to power.

In the world of unintended consequences, however, the fall of Gaddafi sent Tuareg mercenaries from his militias, armed with high-end weaponry, across the border into Mali.  There, when the dust settled, the whole northern part of the country had come unhinged and fallen under the sway of Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda wannabes as other parts of North Africa threatened to destabilize.  At the same time, of course, the first American casualties of the intervention occurred when Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans died in an attack on the Benghazi consulate and a local “safe house.”

With matters worsening regionally, the response couldn’t have been more predictable.  As Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post recently reported, in ongoing secret meetings, the White House is planning for military operations against al-Qaeda-in-the-Magreb (North Africa), now armed with weaponry pillaged from Gaddafi’s stockpiles.  These plans evidently include the approach used in Yemen (U.S. special forces on the ground and CIA drone strikes), or a Somalia “formula” (drone strikes, special forces operations, CIA operations, and the support of African proxy armies), or even at some point “the possibility of direct U.S. intervention.”

In addition, Eric Schmitt and David Kilpatrick of the New York Times report that the Obama administration is “preparing retaliation” against those it believes killed the U.S. ambassador, possibly including “drone strikes, special operations raids like the one that killed Osama bin Laden, and joint missions with Libyan authorities.”  The near certainty that, like the previous intervention, this next set of military actions will only further destabilize the region with yet more unpleasant surprises and unintended consequences hardly seems to matter.  Nor does the fact that, in crude form, the results of such acts are known to us ahead of time have an effect on the unstoppable urge to plan and order them.

Such situations are increasingly legion across the Greater Middle East and elsewhere.  Take one other tiny example: Iraq, from which, after almost a decade-long military disaster, the “last” U.S. units essentially fled in the middle of the night as 2011 ended.  Even in those last moments, the Obama administration and the Pentagon were still trying to keep significant numbers of U.S. troops there (and, in fact, did manage to leave behind possibly several hundred as trainers of elite Iraqi units).  Meanwhile, Iraq has been supportive of the embattled Syrian regime and drawn ever closer to Iran, even as its own sectarian strife has ratcheted upward.  Having watched this unsettling fallout from its last round in the country, according tothe New York Times, the U.S. is now negotiating an agreement “that could result in the return of small units of American soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to General Caslen, a unit of Army Special Operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with intelligence.”

Don’t you just want to speak to those negotiators the way you might to a child: No, don’t do that!  The urge to return to the scene of their previous disaster, however, seems unstaunchable.  You could offer various explanations for why our policymakers, military and civilian, continue in such a repetitive — and even from an imperial point of view — self-destructive vein in situations where unpleasant surprises are essentially guaranteed and lack of success a given.  Yes, there is the military-industrial complex to be fed.  Yes, we are interested in the control of crucial resources, especially energy, and so on.

But it’s probably more reasonable to say that a deeply militarized mindset and the global maneuvers that go with it are by now just part of the way of life of a Washington eternally “at war.”  They are the tics of a great power with the equivalent of Tourette’s Syndrome.  They happen because they can’t help but happen, because they are engraved in the policy DNA of our national security complex, and can evidently no longer be altered.  In other words, they can’t help themselves.

That’s the only logical conclusion in a world where it has become ever less imaginable to do the obvious, which is far less or nothing at all.  (Northern Chad?  When did it become crucial to our well being?) Downsizing the mission?  Inconceivable.  Thinking the unthinkable?  Don’t even give it a thought!

What remains is, of course, a self-evident formula for disaster on autopilot. But don’t tell Washington. It won’t matter. Its denizens can’t take it in.

Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as The End of Victory Culture, his history of the Cold War, runs the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com. His latest book, co-authored with Nick Turse, is Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050

Copyright 2012 Tom Engelhardt

 

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Don’t Iraq Iran: Foolproof the Intelligence http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/dont-iraq-iran-foolproof-the-intelligence/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/dont-iraq-iran-foolproof-the-intelligence/#comments Tue, 02 Oct 2012 21:00:48 +0000 Jasmin Ramsey http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/dont-iraq-iran-foolproof-the-intelligence/ via Lobe Log

Roger Z. George, a former national intelligence officer who teaches at the National War College in Washington, explains how to avoid making the same mistakes the US made before invading Iraq in 2003, with Iran:

- set extremely high standards for evidence
- don’t over-rely on information gathered and supplied by [...]]]>
via Lobe Log

Roger Z. George, a former national intelligence officer who teaches at the National War College in Washington, explains how to avoid making the same mistakes the US made before invading Iraq in 2003, with Iran:

- set extremely high standards for evidence
- don’t over-rely on information gathered and supplied by foreign governments
- keep U.S.personnel at arm’s length from policy discussions
- never call on the intelligence community to make the case for intervention, as was the situation in 2003
- have the intelligence community prepare candid assessments of the effect military strikes against Iran’s    
  nuclear facilities could have on both Iranian politics and regional stability

He concludes:

Needless to say, the decision to attack another Islamic state would carry consequences far beyond reducing Iran’s military potential, and the intelligence community needs to analyze those consequences concurrently with its analysis of intelligence regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions.

These steps will not guarantee that intelligence used to reach the important decisions regarding Iran will be perfect. Clearly, it will not be. However, the intelligence community should not repeat mistakes it made in 2002 and 2003, nor allow itself to become the scapegoat for decisions that properly reside with the nation’s political and military leadership.

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“In a porous world, sanctions are largely ineffective” http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/in-a-porous-world-sanctions-are-largely-ineffective/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/in-a-porous-world-sanctions-are-largely-ineffective/#comments Fri, 31 Aug 2012 15:11:45 +0000 Jasmin Ramsey http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/in-a-porous-world-sanctions-are-largely-ineffective/ via Lobe Log

Najmedin Meshkati and Guive Mirfendereski argue in the Los Angeles Times that sanctions against Iran have been ineffective at substantially curbing its alleged nuclear ambitions:

Policies of restriction or containment through sanctions and economic mechanisms do not work. In a porous world, sanctions are largely ineffective. Sanctions didn’t change [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Najmedin Meshkati and Guive Mirfendereski argue in the Los Angeles Times that sanctions against Iran have been ineffective at substantially curbing its alleged nuclear ambitions:

Policies of restriction or containment through sanctions and economic mechanisms do not work. In a porous world, sanctions are largely ineffective. Sanctions didn’t change the behavior of Saddam Hussein or Moammar Kadafi (despite what some think, other factors forced Kadafi to disarm hisnuclear program) or affect North Korea, and Cuba has survived in spite of comprehensive U.S. sanctions. Where a U.S. sanctions policy has been successful, it has been coupled with constructive or positive engagement: the ending of apartheid in South Africa and of communism in Eastern Europe, Arab-Israeli peace (through U.S. engagement of Jordan and Egypt), protection of intellectual property in China — all have come about because of influence through involvement.

Proponents of further tightening of the so-called crippling sanctions or the oxymoronic “smart sanctions” on Iran point to the significant drop in Iran’s oil exports, shortage of foreign currency and the economic hardship in Iran as evidence of the effectiveness of sanctions. However, the sole intended consequence of all these sanctions has been zero insofar as scaling back or curtailing Iran’s nuclear program.

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Doves and Hawks agree that U.S. Policy on Iran is failing, but oh how their reasoning differs http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/doves-and-hawks-agree-that-u-s-policy-on-iran-is-failing-but-oh-how-their-reasoning-differs-2/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/doves-and-hawks-agree-that-u-s-policy-on-iran-is-failing-but-oh-how-their-reasoning-differs-2/#comments Tue, 06 Dec 2011 04:27:02 +0000 Jasmin Ramsey http://www.lobelog.com/?p=10690

Frequent IPS News contributor Barbara Slavin begins this C-Span discussion on Iran’s nuclear program by noting that she’s concerned about the trajectory the U.S. is on with Iran:

…it’s very easy to impose sanctions, and more sanctions and more sanctions, more pressure on the country, but to what end? [...]]]>

Frequent IPS News contributor Barbara Slavin begins this C-Span discussion on Iran’s nuclear program by noting that she’s concerned about the trajectory the U.S. is on with Iran:

…it’s very easy to impose sanctions, and more sanctions and more sanctions, more pressure on the country, but to what end? If there isn’t a really sound diplomatic engagement strategy coupled with it, then you may be put in a position where Iran behaves more like a pariah state because it really doesn’t see any more options for itself. I think we had some indications of that with that strange business at the British embassy.

U.S. hawks agree that their country is going in the wrong direction with Iran, but for different reasons. Last week Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations declared that the “only credible option” for significantly delaying the Iranian nuclear program considering the U.S.’s “lack of success” with its sanctions policy would be a “bombing campaign”.

These words are coming from a man who famously made his “Case for American Empire” shortly after 9/11 by claiming that the U.S. needed to go to war with Afghanistan first, so it could take on Iraq. And what were his views on the false allegations that Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11? The truth doesn’t matter plus another unsubstantiated claim:

The debate about whether Saddam Hussein was implicated in the September 11 attacks misses the point. Who cares if Saddam was involved in this particular barbarity? He has been involved in so many barbarities over the years–from gassing the Kurds to raping the Kuwaitis–that he has already earned himself a death sentence a thousand times over. But it is not just a matter of justice to depose Saddam. It is a matter of self defense: He is currently working to acquire weapons of mass destruction that he or his confederates will unleash against America and our allies if given the chance.

Now Boot is claiming that the U.S. is suffering from a “failure of imagination” by failing to “face up” to the “growing threat from the Islamic Republic”. Given the history of Boot’s predictions, and the low premium he places on facts, we can only hope that policy makers will regard his apocalyptic predictions with the degree of skepticism that they failed to show in the case of Iraq.

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The Daily Talking Points http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/the-daily-talking-points-120/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/the-daily-talking-points-120/#comments Wed, 02 Feb 2011 19:51:54 +0000 Eli Clifton http://www.lobelog.com/?p=8185 News and views on U.S.-Iran relations for February 2:

The New York Times: Yossi Klein Halevi, a fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute and a contributing editor at The New Republic, writes, “Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.” Hezbollah’s [...]]]> News and views on U.S.-Iran relations for February 2:

The New York Times: Yossi Klein Halevi, a fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute and a contributing editor at The New Republic, writes, “Israelis fear that Egypt will go the way of Iran or Turkey, with Islamists gaining control through violence or gradual co-optation.” Hezbollah’s increasingly strong role in Lebanon, Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip, and the downturn in Israel-Turkey relations leads Halevi to comment, “[A]n Islamist Egypt could produce the ultimate Israeli nightmare: living in a country surrounded by Iran’s allies or proxies.” While the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has forsworn violence, “it is small comfort to Israelis, who fear that the Brotherhood’s nonviolence has been a tactical maneuver and know that its worldview is rooted in crude anti-Semitism.”

National Review Online: The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Rubin opines on the developing situation in Egypt and suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood and “anti-Western forces will look to blame Egypt’s problems on the U.S.” “What worries me is this: Today marks the 32nd anniversary of Khomeini’s return to Iran. Most people making dark allusions to Iran forget that more than nine months passed between Khomeini’s return and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy,” says Rubin. “The question then becomes, what grievances can the Muslim Brotherhood or other anti-Western forces manufacture in those nine months to try to appeal beyond their natural constituency of perhaps 25 percent?” Rubin concludes that Obama should avoid making George W. Bush’s mistake of supporting elections in Gaza and “enabl[ing] political groups which maintain militias to claim the mantle of electoral legitimacy.”

Los Angeles Times: Jonah Goldberg, also based at The American Enterprise Institute, warns that the democracy movement in Egypt could turn into “a replay of the Iranian revolution, in which justified popular discontent with an authoritarian ruler was exploited by Islamists who ultimately imposed an even crueler brand of tyranny.” Goldberg goes on to compare political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to a “contagion.”

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Iran Hawks Draw Lessons from DPRK Despite Ongoing Uncertainty on Korean Peninsula http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/iran-hawks-draw-lessons-from-dprk-despite-ongoing-uncertainty-on-korean-peninsula/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/iran-hawks-draw-lessons-from-dprk-despite-ongoing-uncertainty-on-korean-peninsula/#comments Tue, 23 Nov 2010 22:42:35 +0000 Eli Clifton http://www.lobelog.com/?p=6056 Details are still emerging on the exchange of artillery fire in the Yellow Sea following what has been described as a North Korean artillery attack on South Korea. However, this incident, combined with reports of Pyongyang’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) facility, has given new life to the eternally rehashed comparisons between North Korea and [...]]]> Details are still emerging on the exchange of artillery fire in the Yellow Sea following what has been described as a North Korean artillery attack on South Korea. However, this incident, combined with reports of Pyongyang’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) facility, has given new life to the eternally rehashed comparisons between North Korea and Iran.

Of course the similarities between the two countries, comprising two-thirds of George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” are limited. North Korea is a self-imposed “hermit kingdom.” Iran, much to the dismay of those calling for ever tighter sanctions, is eager to establish both trade and political links with both its neighbors and allies around the world.

The week started with what appears to be widely held assumptions that Iran and North Korea may have collaborated on Pyongyang’s HEU facilitity, or North Korea might transfer the technology to Iran, or Tehran might have transferred technology to Pyongyang. This leaves a lot of room for questions. However, the conventional thinking is that there is a link — with no agreement on how, or if, a technology transfer has occurred.

The WSJ‘s Jay Solomon interviewed the Washington Institute for Near East Policy‘s (WINEP) Simon Henderson, who told him:

One has to assume that Iran either has the P-2 centrifuge from North Korea, or could get it very easily.

And former UN ambassador, outspoken hawk, and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) fellow John Bolton wrote in the LA Times:

There is substantial reason for concern that Tehran’s capabilities and its penchant for cooperating with the North exceed U.S. intelligence estimates.

Indeed hawks from WINEP and AEI are not the only ones making assumptions about how Pyongyang’s announcement might impact Iran’s nuclear program.

The extremely well informed Nelson Report, an insider newsletter which focuses on U.S.-Asia policy, suggested that a technology transfer may have occurred from Iran to North Korea. An anonymous expert who told them:

From what we’re seeing, you have to think the components of this plant were moved-in from elsewhere and set up, which is a stunning defeat for our intelligence, since it could equally imply there are many HEU-related facilities elsewhere in N. Korea, in addition to whatever was imported from Pakistan and/or Iran.

The Report also wrote:

Every expert we touched base with today felt that despite its years of known effort to achieve HEU capability, the equally known assistance and information sharing with Pakistan, and the presumed but not proven cooperation with Iran, leads the experts to assume that the DPRK had help with the current HEU facility.

Indeed, uncertainty continues to run rampant over the extent of the DPRK-Iran relationship and how a technology transfer may have played a role in Pyongyang’s HEU announcement. The lack of details hasn’t slowed hawkish pundits from translating this week’s artillery attack and the earlier Cheonan sinking into the conclusion that containment is a failed policy. Thus, the U.S. should take any and all actions to prevent Iran from reaching North Korea’s level of nuclearization.

Council on Foreign Relations fellow Max Boot writes in Commentary (my emphasis):

For those who advocate containment as the solution to the Iranian nuclear threat, it is worth noting how destabilizing a nuclear-armed rogue state can be and how hard it is to contain. Even now, North Korea could be planning to export nuclear know-how or uranium to Iran. If so, what are we going to do about it? My guess: not much. That is an argument for stopping Iran by any means necessary before it crosses the nuclear threshold and becomes as dangerous as North Korea.

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The Daily Talking Points http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/the-daily-talking-points-78/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/the-daily-talking-points-78/#comments Tue, 23 Nov 2010 21:43:46 +0000 Eli Clifton http://www.lobelog.com/?p=6023 The Wall Street Journal: The WSJ‘s Jay Solomon writes on North Korea’s reported upgrades to its nuclear-fuel production capabilities and the increasing fears among lawmakers that Pyongyang may provide Iran with assistance in its nuclear program. “One has to assume that Iran either has [...]]]> News and views on U.S.-Iran relations for November 23, 2010:
  • The Wall Street Journal: The WSJ‘s Jay Solomon writes on North Korea’s reported upgrades to its nuclear-fuel production capabilities and the increasing fears among lawmakers that Pyongyang may provide Iran with assistance in its nuclear program. “One has to assume that Iran either has the P-2 centrifuge from North Korea, or could get it very easily,” said Simon Henderson, a proliferation expert at the hawkish Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). Solomon ends his article with the acknowledgement that it is unclear which country is actually more advanced in its nuclear program: “Nuclear experts also noted that North Korea could be facing similar technical difficulties as Iran in operating the equipment.”
  • Los Angeles Times: Former UN ambassador and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Senior Fellow John Bolton opines on North Korea’s new enrichment plant. “There is substantial reason for concern that Tehran’s capabilities and its penchant for cooperating with the North exceed U.S. intelligence estimates,” Bolton warns. “The spinning of North Korea-related intelligence in recent years bears an uneasy similarity to the famously distorted 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” he adds, calling on the new Congress to investigate “such politicization of intelligence.”
  • Pajamas Media: Foundation for Defense of Democracies scholar Michael Ledeen scribbles on his “Faster, Please!” blog, in a typically scatter-shot post, that the regime in Iran is on the verge of collapse. “The Iranian dissidents have demonstrated remarkable courage and tenacity, and the Green strategy of maintaining pressure on the regime, hoping to eventually provoke its implosion, may succeed,” writes Ledeen. He comments on the government’s stalled efforts to cut off gas subsidies and on a recent pronouncement by opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi about non-violent protests scheduled to take place on the upcoming Student’s Day in Iran. Ledeen’s message of solidarity with — and call for overt support of — Iran’s Green Movement belies the diversity of the opposition. This is particularly noticeable in his praise of Mousavi, who has emerged as a clear reformer, not a regime opponent. Ledeen veers into wild conspiratorial accusations of an Iranian arms shipment through Nigeria/Gambia to Afghanistan, which does not jibe with a simple glance at a map.
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What The Republican Congress Means for Iran Policy http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/what-the-republican-congress-means-for-iran-policy/ http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/what-the-republican-congress-means-for-iran-policy/#comments Thu, 04 Nov 2010 21:08:12 +0000 Eli Clifton http://www.lobelog.com/?p=5394 On the eve of the mid-term elections, George Washington University professor Marc Lynch blogged about how the outcome could impact U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. His Foreign Policy piece included the potential of a GOP-led Congress approving an Iran sanctions bill, which would tie the Obama administration’s hands on enforcement and possibly [...]]]> On the eve of the mid-term elections, George Washington University professor Marc Lynch blogged about how the outcome could impact U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. His Foreign Policy piece included the potential of a GOP-led Congress approving an Iran sanctions bill, which would tie the Obama administration’s hands on enforcement and possibly undermine its efforts at negotiation. And Iran “may conclude that it’s pointless to deal with Obama if they think he can’t deliver on his end.”

Indeed, both of these concerns should be taken seriously as the hawkish Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) takes over as the new Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

A review of her statements from the past year would indicate that the Obama administration’s policy of sanctions, while keeping the door open for negotiations, will be challenged by Ros-Lehtinen.

In a December 14, 2009 op-ed in the LA Times, Ros-Lehtinen wrote:

The regime in Tehran knows only hardball, and nothing less than overwhelming and crippling sanctions could produce a reversal of its threatening programs and policies.

[…]
But these sanctions must be coupled with action on all fronts. The U.S. must also specifically reject Iran’s claim to an inalienable right to produce nuclear fuel.

And, as The Cable’s Josh Rogin cautions, Ros-Lehtinen could cause significant problems for the Obama administration’s foreign policy if, as expected, she pushes the administration to punish Russian and Chinese companies doing business with Iran. She is expected to lead a congressional effort to demand more information about the U.S.-Saudi arms deal, which was widely seen by realists as an Obama administration plan to form a long-term containment and deterrence strategy against a nuclear armed Iran.

In this same article, Rogin quotes from a previously unreported letter obtained by The Cable. In it, Ros-Lehtinen and then House Foreign Affairs chair Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) demanded answers to their questions about the arms deal from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

They wrote:

We are writing to raise concerns and pose a number of strategic questions about the impact such sales would have on the national security interests of the United States and our allies.

It’s fair to ask how Ros-Lehtinen will view the Obama administration’s endorsement of “linkage”—a concept which is accepted at the highest levels of the U.S. military, that resolving the Arab-Palestinian conflict will forward the United States’ broader strategic interests in the region.

So far it appears likely she will oppose the Obama administration’s efforts to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on settlements, having been a vocal critic of the administration’s strained relationship with Israeli leadership.

Lynch concludes:h

I’m gritting my teeth in anticipation of the next Congress becoming a platform for Iran war hawks, hyping the issue even further in anticipation of the 2012 elections… look for another round of sanctions and some kind of Iranian Liberation Act on the horizon, regardless of how things are actually going for U.S. diplomatic efforts. A GOP-controlled Congress may not go for the big $60 billion arms sale to the Saudis, what with that whole “sharia” thing.

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