by Marsha B. Cohen

One of the more remarkable aspects of the recent news coverage of Iraq — the Maliki government’s loss of control over the northern region of the country, the deadly confrontations taking place between Iraqi Shia and Sunnis, and the clashes between Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Marsha B. Cohen

One of the more remarkable aspects of the recent news coverage of Iraq — the Maliki government’s loss of control over the northern region of the country, the deadly confrontations taking place between Iraqi Shia and Sunnis, and the clashes between Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS) — is the absence of any mention of Israel.

Commonalities between the Kurdish quest for a long-denied state of their own and Israel’s struggle to survive in a sea of geopolitical enemies are ubiquitous in reports on the Kurdish struggle, both in the Israeli press and among Israel’s supporters abroad. Indeed, it’s not unusual to see Kurdish separatism invoked and idealized as a reflection of the quest to establish a Jewish state, underscored by imagined historical parallels between  Jews and Kurds. For example, in an essay titled, “Surprising Ties between Israel and the Kurds,” in Middle East Quarterly’s Summer 2014 issue, Ofra Bengio, a senior research fellow specializing in Kurdish affairs at Tel Aviv University, points out several of these perceived parallels:

Both are relatively small nations (15 million Jews and 30 million Kurds), traumatized by persecutions and wars. Both have been leading life and death struggles to preserve their unique identity, and both have been delegitimized and denied the right to a state of their own. In addition, both are ethnically different from neighboring Arabs, Persians, and Turks, who represent the majority in the Middle East.

The idealized goals and strategies of sovereignty seeking Kurdish separatists are often contrasted with those of  Palestinian Arabs, as illustrated by Victor Sharpe at the American Thinker:

 …(A)fter the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds displayed great political and economic wisdom. How different from the example of the Gazan Arabs who, when foolishly given full control over the Gaza Strip by Israel, chose not to build hospitals and schools, but instead bunkers and missile launchers. To this they have added the imposition of sharia law, with its attendant denigration of women and non-Muslims.

The Kurdish experiment, in at least the territory’s current quasi-independence, has shown the world a decent society where all its inhabitants, men and women, enjoy far greater freedoms than can be found anywhere else in the Arab and Muslim world — and certainly anywhere else in Iraq, which is fast descending into ethnic chaos now that the U.S. military has left.

For decades, Israel has been a silent stakeholder in northern Iraq, training and arming its restive Kurds. Massimiliano Fiore, a fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, cites a CIA document found in the US Embassy in Tehran and subsequently published, which reportedly attested that the Kurds aided Israel’s military in the June 1967 (Six Day) War by launching a major offensive against the Iraqi Army. This kept Iraq from joining the other Arab armies in Israel, in return for which, “after the war, massive quantities of Soviet equipment captured from the Egyptians and Syrians were transferred to the Kurds.” Former Mossad operative Eliezer Tsafrir has described in detail the decade of cooperation between 1965-75 of Israel’s Mossad and Iran’s SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, in arming and training Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces. That cooperation ceased when, without warning, the Shah and Saddam Hussein made a secret deal that abruptly ended the Israeli-Iranian partnership in northern Iraq.

The First Gulf War in 1991 gave Kurds a safe haven with an unprecedented degree of autonomy in the no-fly zone enforced by the US-led Coalition. In oil-rich northern Iraq, Kurds held regional parliamentary elections in May 1992, establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Jacques Neriah, a retired colonel who served as foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and as deputy head for assessment of Israeli military intelligence, explains in a 2012 report published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs:

After the collapse of the Kurdish uprising of March 1991, which broke out after Saddam Hussein’s defeat by the U.S.-led coalition, Iraqi troops recaptured most of the Kurdish areas and 1.5 million Kurds abandoned their homes and fled to the Turkish and Iranian borders. It is estimated that close to 20,000 Kurds died from exhaustion, hunger, cold, and disease. On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq end its measures against the Kurds and allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations. This was the first international document to mention the Kurds by name since the League of Nations’ arbitration of Mosul in 1925.

A decade ago, Seymour Hersh called attention to Israel’s close ties with the Kurds. Hersh’s “Annals of National Security: Plan B“, published in the New Yorker is noteworthy, particularly in light of mounting criticism against the Obama administration’s handling of the current crisis. US officials interviewed by Hersh told him that by the end of 2003, “Israel had concluded that the Bush Administration would not be able to bring stability or democracy to Iraq, and that Israel needed other options.” One of those options was expanding Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurds and “establishing a significant presence on the ground in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan.” Although the reliability of Hersh’s sources was challenged at the time, they have been affirmed by more recent articles and reports. Neriah, writing in August 2012, cites numerous reports in the Israeli media about the activities of Israeli security and military personnel working for Israeli firms in Kurdistan:

According to Israeli newspapers, dozens of Israelis with a background in elite combat training have been working for private Israeli companies in northern Iraq, helping Kurds there establish elite antiterror units. Reports say that the Kurdish government contracted Israeli security and communications companies to train Kurdish security forces and provide them with advanced equipment.

Shlomi Michaels, an Israeli-American entrepreneur, and former Mossad chief Danny Yatom provided “strategic consultation on economic and security issues” to the Kurds, according to Neriah, although the Israeli government denied any official involvement.

Tons of equipment, including motorcycles, tractors, sniffer dogs, systems to upgrade Kalashnikov rifles, bulletproof vests, and first-aid items have been shipped to Iraq’s northern region, with most products stamped “Made in Israel.”The Kurds had insisted that the cooperation be kept secret, fearing that exposure of the projects would motivate terror groups to target their Jewish guests. Recent warnings that Al-Qaeda might be planning an attack on Kurdish training camps prompted a hasty exit of all Israeli trainers from the northern region. In response to the report, the Defense Ministry said: “We haven’t allowed Israelis to work in Iraq, and each activity, if performed, was a private initiative, without our authorization, and is under the responsibility of the employers and the employees involved.”

Laura Rozen, writing in Mother Jones in 2008, offered a less benign view of Michaels’ activities in Kurdistan.  Besides promoting corruption through kickbacks, Michaels attempted to sell — for $1 million — a dossier to the CIA that would prove Saddam Hussein had met with Ukrainian officials in order to develop a covert chemical  weapons program. Rozen also linked the 2005 AIPAC spy scandal to Israeli involvement in Kurdistan. In 2004, US intelligence agencies had heard rumors that Iranian agents planned to target Israeli and US personnel operating in northern Iraq. Larry Franklin, who worked for the Pentagon, had been caught leaking the intelligence to Washington hawks. That’s how he was was recruited by the FBI for a July 2004 sting operation that informed AIPAC officials about the alleged threat to Israelis operating in northern Iraq.  Franklin pled guilty to leaking classified information and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

In her Middle East Quarterly essay, Bengio also mentions many of Hersh’s claims about Israeli involvement in Kurdistan a decade earlier, which she cautiously avers “remain unproven,” drawing upon Neriah’s account of Michaels’ adventures (without naming names):

The Yedi’ot Aharonot newspaper published an exclusive regarding Israel’s training of peshmergas, the Kurdish paramilitary force. Another Israeli source mentioned the activities of an Israeli company in the construction of an international airport in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. The same source revealed “For their part, Iraqi sources, especially Shiite ones, have published lists of scores of Israeli companies and enterprises active in Iraq through third parties.

Less than a year ago, Lazar Berman of the Times of Israel, under the optimistic headline, “Is a Free Kurdistan, and a New Israeli Ally, Upon Us?” quoted Kurdish journalist Ayub Nuri who argued that Kurds were “deeply sympathetic to Israel and an independent Kurdistan will be beneficial to Israel.” Fast forward a year later to Neriah’s article titled, ”The fall of Mosul could become the beginning of Kurdish quest for independence,” where he says nothing about the stakes for Israel. Would an increasingly independent Kurdistan continue to look to Israel as its patron?

Or will Kurdistan fully join an anti-ISIS Iraqi alliance, backed jointly, if discreetly, by Iran, with the approval of the US? Any scenario in which Iran is part of the solution, rather than the underlying problem, is a nightmare for Israel. “[W]e would especially not want for a situation to be created where, because both the United States and Iran support the government of (Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri) al-Maliki, it softens the American positions on the issue which is most critical for the peace of the world, which is the Iranian nuclear issue,” Yuval Steinitz, the Israeli minister of strategic affairs, told Reuters. 

After so many decades of trying to make use of the Kurdish dream of independence as a narrative and nuisance against its enemies, Israel stands at the cusp of being the biggest loser in whatever comes next in strife-ridden Iraq.

This article was first published by LobeLog. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

by Peter Jenkins

The parties to the current negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are being discreet about the details, as is sensible. Nonetheless, from the occasional statement or remark to journalists it is possible to form some impression of the issues that are causing the greatest difficulty.

These include restrictions [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Peter Jenkins

The parties to the current negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are being discreet about the details, as is sensible. Nonetheless, from the occasional statement or remark to journalists it is possible to form some impression of the issues that are causing the greatest difficulty.

These include restrictions on Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium during an interim period, the duration of that period, the phasing of sanctions relief, and, a late-comer to the agenda, restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program.

If, as the remarks imply, the gap between positions on such issues is still wide, it does not follow necessarily that the negotiating deadline of July 20 will be missed. It is all too common for negotiators to keep the most painful concessions in reserve until the 11^th hour, in the hope that they will not be needed.

It will, however, be interesting to review some of the problems that have come to light and to imagine ways of handling them.

Duration of the interim period

Al Monitor’s Laura Rozen reported May 15 that an Iranian source said it is the Iranian team’s expectation that “after the signing of a comprehensive deal, there will be an interim period,” where there will be restrictions on Iran’s program “and the [possible military dimensions issue] will be resolved.”

But there has to be a “basis” for the duration of that interim period, according to the Iranian source. If the restrictions should last for 10, 15 or 20 years, the parties have to “examine” the basis. “Why 20 years?” he asked.

A solution to this problem would be to agree that the duration of the interim period will be determined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the sense that it will be co-extensive with the time required by the Agency to affirm that there are no undeclared nuclear facilities or material in Iran and, in effect, that Iran’s nuclear program is as peaceful as that of any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS) party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The “basis” or rationale would be that requiring Iran to accept constraints on certain nuclear activities is logical for as long as it can reasonably be questioned whether Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Once the IAEA has found the same grounds for confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s program as exist in other NNWS, this rationale would no longer be logical.

A similar solution was proposed in January 2004, in relation to the duration of the suspension of uranium enrichment that had been agreed in Tehran on October 21, 2003. On that occasion it was rejected by Iran because Tehran hoped to be able to resume enrichment well before the Agency would be able to provide grounds for confidence — and rejected by the UK, France and Germany because they wanted the suspension to last indefinitely, if not forever.

Ten rather grim years later, can the parties bring themselves to accept this logic and bend it to the cause of an agreement?

The phasing of sanctions relief

Arash Karami reported May 21 that a spokesman for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee told Iran’s Tasnim News that the P5+1 said after an agreement “we have to prove our goodwill. They will then remove sanctions one by one,” over a period of ten years.

It is not hard to imagine how unappealing such an offer must seem to an Iranian government that is banking on sanctions relief to improve the living standards of ordinary Iranians.

Iran will have understood long ago that the US administration will require many years to persuade Congress to repeal the nuclear-related sanctions that Congress has imposed. But Iran must surely be hoping that non-US and particularly EU firms will be free to trade and invest in Iran within months of agreement on a comprehensive solution.

“Iran would not mind front-loading the final deal,” another Iranian source told Rozen. “Iran would take all the measures [agreed] at the beginning of the deal, and expect its counterpart to do the same.”

It tends to be forgotten that when, on January 23, 2012, EU Ministers agreed to what Foreign Secretary William Hague described as an “unprecedented set of sanctions against Iran,” their aim was to coerce Iran into a nuclear negotiation.

“This is a major increase in the peaceful, legitimate pressure on Iran to negotiate over its nuclear program,” Hague told the House of Commons the next day.

If EU Ministers such as Hague are concerned about legitimacy, there is a chance that it would trouble their consciences to maintain such “unprecedented” (an euphemism for draconian) sanctions not just after Iran’s appearance at the negotiating table, but even after the conclusion of a comprehensive negotiation. And if legitimacy is not a concern, perhaps they can at least be persuaded to lift EU sanctions by all the EU firms that are hoping to resume normal business with Iran.

Iran’s ballistic missile program

“Iran also rejects that its ballistic missile program should be a subject for discussion with the P5+1, Iran’s negotiators have repeatedly said,” wrote Rozen May 21.

For their part, US negotiators have justified the inclusion of this issue on the agenda, despite the absence of any reference to it in the November 24 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), by recalling the JPOA reference to “addressing the UN Security Resolutions” (the last of which, 1929 (2010), contains a brief missile-related provision).

As a justification this leaves a bit to be desired. The reference to UN resolutions is in the preamble of the JPOA, not in the final operative section, which itemizes the agenda for the current negotiation. It is uncommon to consider preambular wording as binding on the parties to an agreement.

Moreover, the relevant bit of operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010) scarcely lends itself to the sort of restrictions that Israeli leaders and their Congressional supporters have been demanding that the administration obtain. It reads “[The Security Council] decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches…”

These words are clearly no basis for requiring Iran to surrender or destroy any of the ballistic missiles in its possession. At most they provide an opening for requesting that Iran refrain from testing some of its existing stock (those “capable of delivering nuclear weapons”), and from developing new models with that capability.

But even that request is contestable. Iran could deny that it possesses a nuclear weapons delivery capability. Since an internationally agreed definition of what constitutes that capability is lacking, and since that capability is contingent on being able to produce warheads of an appropriate diameter, US negotiators might end up wishing they had suggested, instead, a debate on how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

Such objections might sound semantic; but the US, which has long relied on semantics to deny that Iran has a right to enrich uranium, would be ill-placed to jib at a dose of its own medicine.

It’s the Politics!

Speaking to the press on May 16, a senior US administration official said: “We’re focused on how all of the elements fit together to ensure Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.”

It must be hoped that the senior official meant to say “will not”, and not, “cannot.” Indeed, if these negotiations are about denying Iran the capability to produce nuclear weapons, they are doomed to fail.

It is in the nature of nuclear weapon technology that once a state has passed a certain threshold, as Iran has, it can produce nuclear weapons, sooner or later, if it makes that decision. It is not axiomatic, however, that states will choose to do so.

On the contrary, since 1970 the evidence is that very few weapon-capable states want nuclear weapons; most recognize that their security is better served by backing the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

This perception has been well articulated by Scott Kemp, a former adviser on nuclear non-proliferation at the State Department. In an interview with the MIT News office Kemp said, “We need to get past the idea that we can control the destiny of nations by regulating access to technology. International security must ultimately resort to the difficult business of politics.”

The current negotiation can succeed if the West’s goal is political: denying Iran a rational basis for wanting nuclear weapons. Since President Hassan Rouhani’s words and deeds suggest that he recognizes Iran will be more secure, and more prosperous, as a fully compliant NPT-state without nuclear weapons, this is a realistic goal.

Photo Credit: FARS News/Majid Asgaripour/

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by Jasmin Ramsey

by Jasmin Ramsey

The US and Iran made history today here in New York City. While many prominent American members of the press, academic, business and think tank worlds were listening intently to President Hassan Rouhani give a speech at a Asia Society/ via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

by Jasmin Ramsey

The US and Iran made history today here in New York City. While many prominent American members of the press, academic, business and think tank worlds were listening intently to President Hassan Rouhani give a speech at a Asia Society/CFR-hosted event at the Hilton Hotel (where Jim and I were in attendance) and answer questions on some controversial issues later on (including one from yours truly), Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was talking to Secretary of State John Kerry at the UN in the highest-level organized meet between the two countries since the first year of Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Many were wondering what President Obama’s surprising announcement during his UN General Assembly speech about Kerry being directly involved in nuclear talks with Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 would boil down to. As of today it’s resulted in a handshake, a 30-minute meeting, positive reactions from both sides and suggestions of much more to come — hardly a bad start.

Laura Rozen and others have already reported on some of the details, including, for example, the fact that Kerry suggested to Zarif that they chat alone, which Zarif agreed to do. “We had a constructive meeting, and I think all of us were pleased that Foreign Minister Zarif came and made a presentation to us, which was very different in tone and very different in the vision that he held out with respect to possibilities of the future,” said Kerry in his post-meeting remarks. “Now it’s up to people to do the hard work of trying to fill out what those possibilities could do,” he said.

Rouhani seemed happy to see a smiling Zarif enter the Ballroom where around 200 people were seated shortly before the president finished answering a collection of the 40 or so questions that were posed to him. I’m sure the audience was also pleased after Asia Society president and moderator Josette Sheeran convinced Zarif to provide a briefer of the historic ministerial meeting that was hosted by EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton.

Zarif said that during the “very good and substantive meeting” it was agreed that Iran and its negotiating partners would “jumpstart the process” in moving forward by agreeing first to the “parameters of the endgame”; where Iran’s nuclear program will be in a year; deciding on steps that need to be taken to address each side’s concerns; and work towards finalizing them (he may have been referring to the entire negotiation process here) “within a year’s time” — a pleasant surprise for Zarif, who was apparently worried that the quickened timeline that Iran’s new government wants to operate on would have received a different response.

Zarif described his short bilateral meeting alone with Kerry (Rozen tweets that US P5+1 representative Wendy Sherman chatted with Iranian diplomats in the hall during this time) as “more than a chat”, by the way, which contrasts with the “moment” description used by Kerry. We don’t know yet exactly what they discussed during this time, but Zarif did seem very positive about Kerry’s “readiness” to work together, adding that “we now have to match words with actions”, which he hopes will be an “opportunity” rather than a “challenge.”

While the Kerry-Zarif meeting was tonight’s show-stopper, I was impressed by the question/answer period with Rouhani as well. All invitees were given an opportunity to write their questions down on paper upon entering the venue and as far as I can recall, everything that was put forward by Sheeran (the Iranians apparently had no say in what could and couldn’t be asked) focused on Iran’s most controversial issues, including Iran’s political prisoners, women’s rights and the Holocaust (see Mitchell’s post on this topic yesterday).

From what I could see, Rouhani was listening to everything in English and answering in Persian (all attendees had access to headphones broadcasting the audio in English and Persian). The entire 1.5 hour event posted above is worth watching, and I may write about it more before Monday (I have to trek back to DC tomorrow!) but I’m going to focus on my question now, since I’m feeling grateful that it was put forward along with my name. I asked Rouhani how he plans on navigating through domestic opposition to any kind of rapprochement between the US and Iran (at around 54:33), to which he responded:

Well, the government, after all, has actually witnessed a new era, a new environment that has been created by the people, I would say. So given that it’s created by the people, has brought about new conditions inside the country, and just as we are active in social, political and cultural fields, we — and the more we do in those fields, the more we will realize that this way of thought that is beginning to shape based on moderation will get stronger, and this can advance further, as time advances, and those who oppose it will normally just weaken in the process. But this is a long path, having said that, and we are just taking the initial steps here.

I can guess why his answer was not as in-depth as I hoped it would be. You probably can too.

by Jasmin Ramsey

Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News Agency reports that during a telephone call with his German counterpart, Zarif welcomed the completion of the UN’s inspection of sites where chemical weapons were allegedly used, advised against making hasty decisions on the issue and strongly condemned any outside military force in Syria, saying that it would only make the situation worse.

But my question persists: why has Rouhani not made these statements himself as of yet? It could very well be that when push comes to shove, he will. LobeLog contributor Wayne White tells me that “quite possibly Rouhani simply wanted his government to be on the record as reiterating Iran’s opposition to chemical weapons use while at the same time planning not to accept that his Syrian ally used them and preparing to condemn anyone using force against the Assad regime for doing so.” But Rouhani’s chosen words on his English Twitter account could also be, as Suzanne Maloney noted to me, indicative of a “a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria”. This may be the case even if he submits to pressure for him to take a harsher stance.

And here’s another interesting angle to this story. The perceptive Laura Rozen reports that the visit of the UN’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman to Tehran at this time is a sign of intensifying UN diplomacy on Syria:

Feltman, in his meetings in Iran, discussed “the worsening situation on the ground in Syria, including the U.N.’s grave concerns about the potential use of chemical weapons and how the U.N. can work together with Iran and other states to end the bloodshed and suffering of the Syrian people,” [UN spokesman Farhan] Haq said.

“Unclear as yet is if, in exchange for Iran not overreacting to any U.S. action in Syria, the U.S. will acquiesce to Iran attending Geneva2, or indeed, given Feltman’s reported discussions in Iran, whether it had already done so. Both Russia and the UN’s [Lakhdar] Brahimi have repeatedly stated that Iran should be able to attend,” writes Rozen.

Adding to my fascination with all this is the fact Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said was also in Tehran this week. As this Economist editorial notes, the sultan has a history of serving as a messenger between Iran and the US and could be one on Syria:

Al-Hayat, a pan-Arab newspaper, quoted sources in Iran as saying that the trip was “not normal and does not fall under normal protocol”. Bahar, a publication linked to Iran’s newly-empowered reformist bloc, reported that the sultan was visiting as a precursor to future talks between America and Iran to negotiate a deal on greater nuclear transparency in exchange for sanctions relief. Fararu, a reformist-leaning website, has suggested that a new back channel might be established between the two countries, to pave the way for discussions over Iran’s disputed nuclear programme as well as the crisis in Syria.

Photo: Iranian FM Javad Zarifi meets with UN political affairs chief Jeffrey Feltman in Tehran. Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr

Readers who recall that four years ago a new US President seemed eager to defuse the West’s quarrel with Iran over its nuclear activities may wonder why we are all still waiting for white smoke. I am not sure I know the answer, but I have a hunch it has something to [...]]]> by Peter Jenkins

Readers who recall that four years ago a new US President seemed eager to defuse the West’s quarrel with Iran over its nuclear activities may wonder why we are all still waiting for white smoke. I am not sure I know the answer, but I have a hunch it has something to do with a lack of realism on one side and a profound mistrust on the other.

The lack of realism is a Western failing. The US and the two European states, France and the UK, that still have the most influence on the EU’s Iran policy, ten years after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first reported certain Iranian failures (long since corrected) to comply with nuclear safeguards obligations, are still reluctant to concede Iran’s right to possess a capacity to enrich uranium.

These Western powers know that the treaty which governs the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not prohibit the acquisition of uranium enrichment technology by the treaty’s Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS).

They know that several NNWS (Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa) already possess this technology.

They know that the framers of the treaty envisaged that the monitoring of enrichment plants by IAEA inspectors would provide the UN Security Council with timely notice of any move by an NNWS to divert enriched uranium to the production of nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, they cannot bring themselves to tell Iran they accept that Iran, as a NNWS party to the NPT, is entitled to enrich uranium, provided it does so for peaceful purposes, under IAEA supervision, and does not seek to divert any of the material produced.

One of the reasons for this goes back a long way. When India, a non-party to the NPT, detonated a nuclear device in 1974, US officials decided that it had been a mistake to produce a treaty, the NPT, which did not prohibit the acquisition of two dual-use technologies (so-called because they can be used either for peaceful or for military purposes) by NNWS.

The existence of a non-sequitur in their reasoning, since India was not a party to the NPT, seems not to have occurred to them. They set about persuading other states that were capable of supplying these technologies (uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) to withhold them from NNWS.

This could be defended, of course, on prudential grounds. However, it caused resentment among the NNWS who felt that their side of the NPT bargain was being eroded surreptitiously; ultimately, like all forms of prohibition, it was short-sighted, because it encouraged the development of a black market and enhanced the risk of clandestine programmes, unsupervised by the IAEA.

Denying Iran the right to enrich uranium, and trying to deprive Iran of technology that it had developed indigenously, (albeit with help from the black market), seemed more than prudential in 2003. It seemed a necessity, because at the time there were good reasons to think that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme.

Nevertheless, by 2008, the US intelligence community had concluded that Iran abandoned that programme in late 2003 and would only resume it if the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs.

Despite that and subsequent similar findings, this prohibitionist mind-set is still prevalent in Washington, Paris and London. It is one explanation for a lack of progress since President Obama first stretched out the hand of friendship four years ago.

Another explanation is Israel. Israel shares with North Korea, Pakistan and India the distinction of being one of only four states that do not adhere to the NPT. It nonetheless enjoys considerable influence over US, French and British nuclear non-proliferation policies. Israeli ministers are deeply opposed to Iran possessing a uranium enrichment capability.

They may or may not believe what they frequently claim: that Iran will use its enrichment plants to produce fissile material and will use that fissile material to attack Israel with nuclear weapons, directly or through Hezbollah. In reality, few outside Israel believe this, and many inside are sceptical. However, they do not want Israel’s room for military manoeuvre to be reduced by the existence of a south-west Asian state that could choose to withdraw from the NPT and seek to deter certain Israeli actions by threatening a nuclear response.

A third explanation is Saudi Arabia. Leading Saudis are as opposed as Israeli ministers to Iran retaining an enrichment capability. They are less inclined than Israelis to talk of this capability as posing an “existential” threat; but they share the Israeli fear that it will erode their options in the region. They also fear that it will enhance the regional prestige of their main political rival, an intolerable prospect – all the more so now that Iran and Saudi-Arabia are engaged in a proxy war in Syria that seems increasingly likely to re-ignite sectarian conflict in Iraq.

Finally, there remains strong hostility to Iran in some US quarters, notably Congress. This makes it difficult for any US administration to adopt a realistic policy of accepting Iran’s right to enrich uranium, relying on IAEA safeguards for timely detection of any Iranian violation of its NPT obligations, and minimising through intelligent diplomacy the risk of Iran’s leaders deciding to abuse their enrichment capability.

On the Iranian side, the lack of trust in the US’ good faith has become increasingly apparent. It is in fact a hall-mark of Iran’s supreme decision-taker, Ayatollah Khamenei. One hears of it from Iranian diplomats. The Ayatollah himself barely conceals it in some of his public statements.

As recently as March 20, marking the Persian New Year, he said: “I am not optimistic about talks [with the US]. Why? Because our past experiences show that talks for the American officials do not mean for us to sit down and reach a logical solution [...] What they mean by talks is that we sit down and talk until Iran accepts their viewpoint.”

This distrust has militated against progress in nuclear talks by making Iran’s negotiators ultra-cautious. They have been looking for signs of a change in US attitudes – a readiness to engage sincerely in a genuine give-and-take – and have held back when, to their minds, those signs have not been apparent.

Instead of volunteering measures that might lead the West to have more confidence in the findings of Western intelligence agencies (that Iran is not currently intent on acquiring nuclear weapons), the Iranian side has camped on demanding that its rights be recognised and nuclear-related sanctions lifted.

Unfortunately, this distrust has been fuelled by the Western tactic of relying on sanctions to coerce Iran into negotiating. Ironically, sanctions have had the opposite effect. They have sowed doubts in Ayatollah Khamenei’s mind about the West’s real intentions, and they have augmented his reluctance to take any risks to achieve a deal.

Compounding that counter-productive effect, Western negotiators have been reluctant to offer any serious sanctions relief in return for the concessions they have asked of Iran, whenever talks have taken place. One Iranian diplomat put it this way: “They ask for the moon, and offer peanuts.”

Here part of the problem is a continuing Western hope, despite all experience to date, that unbearable pressure will induce Iran to cut a deal on the West’s unrealistic (and unbalanced) terms.

Another part is ministerial pride in having persuaded the UN Security Council, the EU Council of Ministers, and several Asian states to accept a sanctions regime that is causing hardship among ordinary Iranians (but from which Iran’s elites are benefitting because of their privileged access to foreign exchange and their control of smuggling networks). It sometimes seems as though causing hardship has ceased to be a means to an end; it has become an achievement to be paraded, a mark of ministerial success.

Many of the factors listed in the preceding paragraphs have been visible during the latest round of talks between the US and EU (plus Russia and China), which took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on April 5 and 6, 2013.

According to a draft of the proposal to be presented to Iran which Scott Peterson described in The Christian Science Monitor on April 4, the US and EU demanded:

• the suspension of all enrichment above the level needed to produce fuel for power reactors [5% or less];
• the conversion of Iran’s stock of 20% U235 into fuel for research reactors, or its export, or its dilution;
• the transformation of the well-protected Fordow enrichment plant to a state of reduced readiness [for operations] without dismantlement;
• the acceptance of enhanced monitoring of Iranian facilities by the IAEA, including the installation of cameras at Fordow to provide continuous real-time surveillance of the plant.

In exchange, the US and EU offered to suspend sanctions on gold and precious metals, and the export of petrochemicals, once the IAEA confirmed implementation of all the above measures. They also offered civilian nuclear cooperation, and IAEA technical help with the acquisition of a modern research reactor, safety measures and the supply of isotopes for nuclear medicine. In addition, the US would approve the export of parts for the safety-related repair of Iran’s aging fleet of US-made commercial aircraft.

Finally, the proposal stressed that additional confidence-building steps taken by Iran would yield corresponding steps from the P5+1, including proportionate
relief of oil sanctions.

The initial Iranian response on April 5 seems to have been less than wholeheartedly enthusiastic. On the first day of the talks they irritated the US and EU negotiators by failing to react directly to the US/EU proposals. Instead they reiterated their demand for the recognition of Iran’s rights and the lifting of sanctions as preconditions for any short-term confidence building curbs on their 20% enrichment activities.

On the second day, however, according to Laura Rozen, writing for Al Monitor on April 6, and quoting Western participants in the talks, Iran “pivoted to arguing for a better deal.” The Iranian team started to make clear what they would require in return for curbing Iran’s 20% activities, notably the lifting of “all unilateral sanctions.” These mainly comprise the oil and financial sanctions imposed in 2012.

“I’ve never seen anything quite like it,” a US diplomat said. “There was intensive dialogue on key issues at the core of [the proposed confidence building measures].”

Will that pivot be a turning-point? The latest proposal clearly falls far short of what Iran seeks by way of clarity that ultimately the US and EU can accept Iran retaining a dual-use enrichment capability, and by way of relief from oil and financial sanctions. There has been no sign that the US and EU can bring themselves to offer significant movement on either of these points.

Yet, a scintilla of hope can be drawn from the fact that on April 6 there may have been the beginnings of a haggle. If both sides can resume their talks in that haggling mode, progress may finally be achievable. Haggling is central to any good negotiation. Until now it has been sorely lacking in dealings with Iran under President Obama.

This article was originally published by the Fair Observer on April 10th, 2013.

by Jasmin Ramsey

The Director of National Intelligence submitted the annual report on the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” today. The report can be accessed here and following are key passages that are relevant to Iran’s nuclear program, compliments of the Ploughshares Fund Early Warning [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Jasmin Ramsey

The Director of National Intelligence submitted the annual report on the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” today. The report can be accessed here and following are key passages that are relevant to Iran’s nuclear program, compliments of the Ploughshares Fund Early Warning mail-out, which I encourage everyone to sign up for.

–On Iran: “We assess Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

–“We judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran…In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities and avoid severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime threatening sanctions.”

–While Iran has enhanced its uranium production capabilities, “we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU before this activity is discovered.”

Interesting Iran-related takeaways from this latest US intelligence community assessment include the notion that Tehran’s decision-making process with regard to its nuclear program can be influenced, as Laura Rozen reported today, and that while it has grown increasingly autocratic at home, much of Iran’s foreign strategy is described as defensive, according to this analysis by Mideast expert, Trita Parsi. “This is not to say that Clapper discounts or dismisses the challenge Iran poses to the U.S.,” wrote Parsi today, “but his assessment is devoid of the panic-stricken and sensationalist narrative that hints of the coming Iranian land invasion of the U.S. and its desire to destroy Western civilization.”

Following is the DNI’s assessment of Iran’s WMD-Applicable Capabilities (more on this later):

We assess Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

Tehran has developed technical expertise in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year that better positions it to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, should it choose to do so. Despite this progress, we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU before this activity is discovered. We judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program. In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities and avoid severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime threatening sanctions.

We judge Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon, if one is ever fielded. Iran’s ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD. In addition, Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps—along with a regime hostile toward the United States and our allies—provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Iran’s growing ballistic missile inventory and its domestic production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and development of its first long-range land attack cruise missile provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including US forces.

Photo: National Intelligence James Clapper. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Iran seems to be maintaining its previous stance on uranium enrichment — a key issue for Western powers and Israel — ahead of proposed talks by the 6-power P5+1 negotiating group. On Tuesday, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation (AEOI), said Iran would ”not suspend 20 percent [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Iran seems to be maintaining its previous stance on uranium enrichment — a key issue for Western powers and Israel — ahead of proposed talks by the 6-power P5+1 negotiating group. On Tuesday, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation (AEOI), said Iran would ”not suspend 20 percent uranium enrichment because of the demands of others.”

Iran insists that it has an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium on its soil. That right is guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory, but the US and Iran appear to interpret it differently. Several UN Security Council resolutions also demand that Iran suspend its enrichment program until IAEA concerns are satisfied.

The US believes Iran is working towards nuclear weapon capability, but has not decided to build a nuclear weapon. Interestingly, some high-level US foreign policy luminaries have called the US position of 0% Iranian enrichment untenable, as Tony Karon has reported.

Laura Rozen points out that Abbasi-Davani’s comments “came a day after Iran’s foreign minister struck a conciliatory tone, expressing optimism about prospects for progress at upcoming nuclear talks.” Last week, Herman Nackaerts, the deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said the agency had a “good meeting” in Tehran even though Iran refused to allow the agency to enter its Parchin military site at this time.

These developments suggest it’s anyone’s guess at this point whether resumed talks, if they go so far, will lead to substantive progress during the diplomatic process. But it’s easy to forget that while all this is going on, a related cyberwar is quietly taking place.

While telling Israel’s Army Radio that Israel’s “red line” with Iran is still “our top priority”, Moshe Ya’alon, Israel’s Likudnik Vice Prime Minister, brought up the issue today:

“In the meantime, there are interesting things happening in Iran, such as worms, viruses and explosions,” alluding to clandestine cyber-warfare operations targeting the Islamic Republic that many suspect are carried out by Israel.

Yesterday, Iran reported that its computers are being targeted by malware that wipes data from hard drives. The source is unknown.

I’m not sure how cyber attacks, particularly large-scale ones, affect Iran’s negotiating stance or its alleged nuclear ambitions. But is it fair to say that this is an important issue that’s overlooked when assessing “defiant” Iran’s unreasonable stance towards the West, just as the now forgotten issue of targeted assassinations against Iranian scientists was? Not to mention cyber blowback and another potentially calamitous form of warfare that’s slowly being unleashed upon the world, be it from Iran, or anyone else. Those issues may deserve some attention now too.

Laura Rozen reports that the six world power negotiating team may not be revamping its package to be more generous with Iran as many were hoping (Russia has not even signed on to the new version yet) ahead of resumed talks which likely won’t take place until January.

Laura Rozen has an exclusive on alleged Iranian attempts to establish back-channel contacts with non-official Americans ahead of the (hopefully) resumed nuclear negotiations:

Mostafa Dolatyar, a career Iranian diplomat who heads the Iranian think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), which has close ties to Iran’s [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Laura Rozen has an exclusive on alleged Iranian attempts to establish back-channel contacts with non-official Americans ahead of the (hopefully) resumed nuclear negotiations:

Mostafa Dolatyar, a career Iranian diplomat who heads the Iranian think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), which has close ties to Iran’s foreign ministry, was tapped by Iran’s leadership to coordinate contacts with American outside-government policy experts, including those with former senior US officials involved unofficially in relaying ideas for shaping a possible nuclear compromise, the analysts told Al-Monitor in interviews this week. The IPIS channel is for coordinating non-official US contacts, which in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, have formed an important, if not unproblematic, part of Iran’s diplomatic scouting and Washington’s and Tehran’s imperfect efforts to understand and influence each others’ policy positions.

The appointment is the result of a desire “on the Iranian side for a more structured approach to dealing with America,” Mark Fitzpatrick, an Iran nuclear expert at the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, told Al-Monitor in an interview Monday, adding that he now doubts that there are agreed plans for direct US-Iran talks after the elections.

But last week former top CIA South Asia specialist Bruce Reidel warned that Iran is sending signals that it will respond forcefully to attacks:

Iran’s capabilities to inflict substantial damage on the Saudi and other gulf-state oil industries by cyberwarfare are difficult for outsiders to assess. Iran is a relative newcomer; until now, it has been mostly a victim. Iranian and Hizbullah abilities to penetrate Israel’s anti-missile defenses are also hard to estimate. Those defenses are among the best in the world, thanks to years of U.S. military assistance and Israeli ingenuity. So it is hard to know how hard Iran can really strike back if it is attacked. Bluffing and chest-thumping are a big part of the Iranian game plan. But the virus and the drone together sent a signal, don’t underestimate Iran.

Presuming the reports are true, it appears the Iranians are making a show of strength prior to the talks, just as the US has with its relentless sanctions regime. This may be because the Iranians want to put more pressure on their negotiating partners to offer a mutually acceptable settlement, or, as Iran hawks claim, because they are stalling for more time to develop a bomb to unleash against the world. While the latter scenario is certainly flashier, it doesn’t exactly square with the facts.

But progress in the next round of talks is still a possibility, according to the Arms Control Association’s Daryl Kimball. “Whatever happens after the election, the most important thing is that the P5+1 process resumes and that it be a much more dynamic negotiation that is not simply a reiteration of previous well-understood positions,” he said in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Iran expert and Lobe Log contributor Farideh Farhi meanwhile warns that inflexibility on both sides will impede a peaceful resolution to this decades-long dispute:

Laura Rozen’s recent interview with former Mossad director Efraim Halevy focuses heavily on diplomatic options for the US, Israel and Iran in the impasse over the Iranian nuclear program. Halevy, like former Mossad director Meir Dagan and a number of past and present US and Israeli national security officials, opposes preventive [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Laura Rozen’s recent interview with former Mossad director Efraim Halevy focuses heavily on diplomatic options for the US, Israel and Iran in the impasse over the Iranian nuclear program. Halevy, like former Mossad director Meir Dagan and a number of past and present US and Israeli national security officials, opposes preventive military action against Iran because he fears it will lead to the collapse of the international sanctions regime, a regional war and only embolden Iran to build and deploy nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the years following the attack.

Particularly interesting is Halevy’s description of Obama and Romney’s approach to the Iran issue.

Obama has placed emphasis on negotiations. In this current election for the US presidency, his hands are tied. He cannot proceed, because he cannot appear soft on Israel’s security.

Negotiating with Iran is perceived as a sign of beginning to forsake Israel. That is where I think the basic difference is between Romney and Obama. What Romney is doing is mortally destroying any chance of a resolution without war. Therefore when [he recently] said, he doesn’t think there should be a war with Iran, this does not ring true. It is not consistent with other things he has said. […]