by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their closed-door dealings. However, judging by the tone of the briefings by the US and Iran coming out of the 5-day session that ended in Vienna last Friday, the pressure has increased as the self-imposed deadline looms. The negotiations can certainly be extended, but as a senior US official noted in a background briefing to the press:
We are all focused on reaching July 20th. As I’ve said before, if we get close and we need a few more days, I don’t think anyone will mind. But we are very focused on getting it done now. We have all agreed that time is not in anyone’s interest; it won’t help get there. And if indeed by the time we get to July 20th we are still very far apart, then I think we will all have to evaluate what that means and what is possible or not.
What are the odds of the now formally titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” being signed by Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) at the end of July? Independent scholar and LobeLog contributor Farideh Farhi offered her take during a June 21 interview with Iran Review:
Two factors work in favor of the eventual resolution of the nuclear dossier and transformation of US-Iran relations from a constant state of hostility and non-communication to interaction, even if not necessarily in constructive ways at all times. One is the seriousness of the negotiations and the political will on the part of the current administrations in both countries to prevent the nuclear dossier from becoming a pretext for war or spiraling into something uncontrollable. And the second is the high cost of failure now that both sides have invested so heavily in the talks.
But there are also factors that inhibit confidence in assuming a point of no return to status quo ante. First, in both countries there are political forces that oppose any type of interaction and lessening of tensions, although at this point my take is that opponents, encouraged by regional players, have more significant institutional power in the United States than Iran. In other words, along with political power, they have extensive policy instruments – the most important of which are legally embedded in the sanctions regime – that can be relied upon to undermine or prevent political accord between the two countries.
The second factor is the unequal power relationship between the two countries, which has consistently led various US administrations to be tempted by the argument that economic, political muscle, and military threats will eventually pay off and force various administrations in Iran to give in irrespective of domestic political equations and the stances they have taken within their own political environment. Currently, this second factor is part and parcel of broader indecision or uncertainty in the US’ strategic calculus regarding whether to come to terms with Iran as a prominent regional player or continue its three decade policy of containing it and alternatively Iran’s commitment to being an independent and powerful regional actor irrespective of fears in the neighborhood.
This dynamic of one side always wanting more than the other can give and/or alternatively being unwilling or incapable of matching concessions with what the other side deems as comparable concessions has been the source of impasse in negotiations. This is not to suggest that inflexibility or lack of realism only comes from one side. During the previous administration, Iran also miscalculated in its assessment of the leverage the United States could build through its ferocious sanctions regime in the same way the United States miscalculated in its assessment of the extent to which Iran could expand its nuclear program in the face of sanctions. As such, Iran’s expectation for the sanctions regime that took years to build to be lifted quickly and permanently is as unrealistic as the US expectation for Iran’s enrichment program to be significantly scaled back.
As to the impact of Iran-US direct talks, it is still possible for the unprecedented high profile direct engagement between the two countries in and of itself to lead to some sort of transformation in the relationship irrespective of the results of nuclear talks. If indeed the two countries’ foreign ministers or even presidents can continue to pick up the phone and talk to each other over matters of common concern or for the sake of de-escalating tensions, that by itself is an important achievement of nuclear talks and its significance should not be under-estimated. But this also depends on how the potential failure of nuclear talks is managed by both sides.
Read more here.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.
Photo: The Iranian nuclear negotiating team headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (center) and Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi (to Zarif’s right) and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.
]]>by François Nicoullaud
From recent declarations of President Barack Obama, echoed by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and various American and French officials, one can foresee the initial bargaining position of the Western members of the P5+1 group in the upcoming negotiation with Iran aimed at “a long-term comprehensive solution” to the nuclear [...]]]>
by François Nicoullaud
From recent declarations of President Barack Obama, echoed by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and various American and French officials, one can foresee the initial bargaining position of the Western members of the P5+1 group in the upcoming negotiation with Iran aimed at “a long-term comprehensive solution” to the nuclear crisis.
“We know they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program, they certainly don’t need a heavy-water reactor at Arak in order to have a peaceful nuclear program, they don’t need some of the advanced centrifuges that they currently possess in order to have a limited, peaceful nuclear program” stated President Obama on Dec. 7.
“…So the question ultimately is going to be, are they prepared to roll back some of the advancements that they’ve made that could not be justified by simply wanting some modest, peaceful nuclear power, but, frankly, hint at a desire to have breakout capacity.”
In the same vein, Laurent Fabius wrote about one week later: “It is unclear if the Iranians will accept to definitively abandon any capacity of getting a weapon or only agree to interrupt the nuclear program… What is at stake is to ensure that there is no breakout capacity”.
Addressing the two routes to the bomb
It is certainly a legitimate goal to try to erect around the Iranian nuclear program a tight barrier on the two ways that could lead to acquiring a bomb: the enrichment of uranium at the highest levels at Natanz and Fordow, and the production of weapons-grade plutonium by running a research reactor such as the one presently under construction at Arak. But the formulas put forward by President Obama and Foreign Minister Fabius have little chance of persuading the Iranian government. Significantly, they are not reflected in the Nov. 24 agreement that laid the groundwork for the negotiation to come. The final part of the agreement addresses these two points, but in a different way. Regarding enrichment, it asserts the necessity of defining an enrichment program “consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity… and stocks of enriched uranium.” Concerning the production of weapons-grade plutonium, it affirms the will to “fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak”.
The route to the uranium bomb
What is really at stake? Starting with enrichment, it has been estimated by some that the Iranian enrichment program, with its 19,000 centrifuges, its stock of around seven tons of uranium enriched up to 5% plus a few hundred kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20%, would be able to produce the fissile material necessary for a bomb in just a few weeks; that is, 20 to 25 kilograms of 90% enriched uranium. That would be too short a time for inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to detect such a breakout and for the international community to react effectively. To be on the safe side, according to these estimates, it would be necessary to roll back Tehran’s program. Iran should not possess more than a few thousand centrifuges of its current prevalent model, the IR1, and should not be permitted to produce more efficient models. And it should not retain more than a minimal stockpile of low-enriched uranium available for further enrichment.
But what is the practical value of such estimates? First, having the material for the bomb does not mean having the bomb. Several months, possibly a good year or more, would still be necessary to manufacture and test a first nuclear explosive device. Second, to maintain a minimal deterrent effect after an initial test, at least two or three bombs should be kept in stock. To obtain such a deterrent, however, would significantly add to the time needed for enrichment to 90%. Some argue that as soon as this highly enriched uranium would be produced, and subsequently diverted, it would escape the safeguards of the IAEA, making it much more difficult for the international community to react. But why? The whole country would still be there, both as a possible target for increased sanctions and more. And if a few weeks are theoretically enough for a successful breakout, a few days should be enough to deploy and deliver an adequate response.
Forbidding Iran to develop more efficient models of centrifuges than its first-generation, low-yield, IR1s does not seem realistic either. Such a ban on research can be imposed on a defeated nation. In 1945, Germany, for example, was required to abandon all of its R&D in the field of aircraft engines. But Iran is not in such a position. The limitation of Iran’s enrichment capacities should be addressed, not in terms of numbers and models of centrifuges, but rather in terms of total enrichment capacity (calculated in the nuclear jargon, in separative work units). Once such a ceiling is fixed by mutual consent between Tehran and the P5+1, Iranians scientists and engineers should be left free to make their own technological choices.
As for the small underground enrichment facility of Fordow, it will be hard to convince Iran to close it. Fordow is placed under the same IAEA safeguards as any other Iranian nuclear facility, and being buried 70 yards deep makes no difference. It would make a difference in case of air strikes, but Iran, which is party to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has no reason to facilitate the destruction of its nuclear facilities, especially by a non-signatory of the NPT, or by any of the five members of the NPT authorized to keep their nuclear arsenals.
On the other hand, it is Iran’s urgent duty to address the widespread suspicions raised by the vagueness of its ambitions when it comes to its nuclear power and research program. Professor Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, recently announced that Iran should produce 150 tons of nuclear fuel to supply five nuclear power plants. Would it be possible to know how exactly, in what time-frame, through which procedures and on what budget such projects are to be implemented? When one knows that 150 tons of idle low-enriched uranium, through further enrichment, is theoretically capable of producing about 150 bombs, the international community is entitled to have access to and thoroughly assess Iran’s plans in this regard.
The route to the plutonium bomb
A word about the plutonium route. The Arak reactor has a design similar to various existing reactors used to produce weapons-grade plutonium, be it in Israel, India or Pakistan. Even if this reactor has little chance to be operational for another three or four years, the concerns about it are legitimate. Furthermore, to recoup the plutonium generated in the reactor’s core, the Iranians would have to build and operate a dedicated side facility. Until now, they have foregone such a possibility. All in all, even with the worst intentions, Iran could hardly produce the first six or seven kilograms of plutonium necessary to build one bomb before the end of the decade. And even so, because of the specific challenges presented by the plutonium route, the time span between the beginning of a possible breakout and the acquisition of a first batch of plutonium would be significantly greater than that of the uranium route.
True, the Arak reactor, once in operation, could not be destroyed without incurring unacceptable nuclear-related damage to the surrounding populations. But this cannot justify a legally indefensible preventive strike on a construction site that has been placed under IAEA safeguards. All in all, the proliferation risk raised by the Arak reactor looks much less pressing than the one generated through uranium enrichment. But it is also true that the best way to permanently alleviate this risk would be to modify, while there is still time, the design of the reactor in order to reduce its capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium without affecting its other capacities. This is possible with international cooperation, and money.
Suspicion against suspicion
Let us go back to basics. In 1968, the newly signed NPT drew a clear line between licit and illicit nuclear activities for those countries willing to renounce the acquisition of a bomb. For better or worse, that line was drawn at the point before the actual manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. But this was not enough to dispel suspicions of possible breakouts by unruly countries. It has therefore been tried repeatedly — and now again with Iran – to prevent countries from developing the capacities that could theoretically lead to the construction of a bomb. But nations in the forefront of such endeavors have often been among the same ones authorized by the same NPT to retain their nuclear arsenals. It has thus been tempting to interpret their efforts to limit the development of nuclear programs of other nations as an attempt to consolidate their own strategic advantage, especially as they have shown limited enthusiasm for following through on their own NPT commitments to nuclear disarmament. Still another source of suspicion has arisen from the fact that the six members of the P5+1 together comprise the world’s major source of enriched uranium. Their efforts to limit the enrichment capacities of other nations may thus come across as an effort to preserve their own commercial interests.
Even putting aside sources of contention between Iran and the great powers and its regional rivals beyond the nuclear realm, one can see why mutual suspicion still looms so large, even after the breakthrough of the Nov. 24 agreement. To overcome it, vision, restraint, and steady diplomatic work will be critical on both sides in the months to come.
]]>by François Nicoullaud
Had the foreign ministers of the seven countries involved in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remained at home, the last round that were held in Geneva would have been presented as a success. At the end of that session, the two lead negotiators — Catherine Ashton for the [...]]]>
by François Nicoullaud
Had the foreign ministers of the seven countries involved in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remained at home, the last round that were held in Geneva would have been presented as a success. At the end of that session, the two lead negotiators — Catherine Ashton for the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), and Abbas Araqchi for Iran — would have issued a joint communiqué expressing their satisfaction with the important progress achieved and their hope to reach, with some more hard work, a complete agreement in one or two more meetings.
Ministers don’t usually join a complex negotiating process unless the agreement under discussion is all but finalized. One or two points of contention can be left to their discretion if they correspond to their level of responsibility, which is political, certainly not technical. This was not the case in Geneva’s last meeting. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, was already there from the outset. One day later, the US Secretary of State John Kerry abruptly modified his Middle East agenda so he could rush to Geneva. But, at that time, the text of the draft agreement still bore square brackets around language touching upon crucial points.
Why, then, was such a decision made? Perhaps it was Kerry’s initiative, or that of Catherine Ashton, or maybe it was the U.S. team in Geneva — or both — who told Mr. Kerry to come since the agreement was close to completion. (In any case, somewhere along the way there was a wrong assessment of the situation, and probably some dose of over-confidence in the American capacity to wrap up an agreement.) In still another hypothesis, perhaps the draft was practically finalized, thus authorizing the arrival of the ministers for signature, but the French unexpectedly reneged on their initial consent. This would have represented a grave breach of rules on France’s part. Until now, no evidence has confirmed such a scenario.
From then on, things could only go from bad to worse. The mere announcement of Kerry’s arrival created a wave of unfounded optimism. Informed of Kerry’s decision, the European ministers felt an obligation to come to Geneva, if only to be part of the game. Pressed by a crowd of journalists, the ministers could not keep silent for long. Most of them confined themselves to general, upbeat statements. But Laurent Fabius went the opposite way. His breaking of the rule of confidentiality and his visible annoyance at the turn of events made him, and France with him, the lightning rod, attracting all the frustrations created by the widening gap between high expectations and the practical hurdles of the negotiation process. And nothing could be changed by the last-minute arrival of the Russian and Chinese ministers. That session was already doomed.
If there was a mistake on Fabius’ side, it was to corner himself in the role of the bad cop. Of course, he could have also made a deliberate choice in favor of French interests in Israel and in the Arabian Peninsula; history will tell. But if it was indeed a matter of commercial interest, France should have positioned itself as the best friend of Iran — where 75 million consumers crave western goods and equipment — and appealed for an early lifting of sanctions. Indeed, Iran is a country where France could almost instantly sell at least one or two nuclear power plants, two or three dozen Airbuses, resume production of hundreds of thousands cars, regain the exploitation of major oil and gas fields, and even substantially upgrade a widely obsolete system of defense.
Coming back to diplomacy, in previous times, when officials empowered by their respective governments had reached an agreement on a common draft, they used to initial the text. This meant that the negotiation was closed. It was then up to the governments to approve or reject the document as it was. If all governments agreed on the text, it could be signed at the political level, usually through a meeting of foreign ministers. This was of course before cell phones, and government airliners that now enable ministers to rush instantly to any corner of the planet. But the participants to the current negotiations would be well advised to keep in mind at least the spirit of such time-proven procedures. This could indeed be useful for the rough ride still ahead of them, as the next round of talks will need to bypass several more difficult and tense stages beyond the first agreement, which will hopefully be signed soon.
]]>by Alireza Nader
Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) came tantalizingly close to reaching a nuclear deal this past weekend in Geneva, but the talks ended without an agreement.
Although both Iran and the United States expressed optimism that much was achieved, a blame game [...]]]>
by Alireza Nader
Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) came tantalizingly close to reaching a nuclear deal this past weekend in Geneva, but the talks ended without an agreement.
Although both Iran and the United States expressed optimism that much was achieved, a blame game between the different players soon ensued.
The international media reported that the French Foreign Minister had “sabotaged” the talks at the last minute, while Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Iran had walked away from a deal.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in turn blamed the United States for “gutting” the deal at the last minute.
The failure to achieve a deal in Geneva has given members of Congress, Israel, and Saudi Arabia a chance to mobilize against what they view as a “bad” deal.
Motivating factors
All the countries involved undoubtedly want to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, but the Middle East’s geopolitical balance is also at play.
Israel and Saudi Arabia fear that a U.S.-Iran rapprochement may hurt their interests, while France appears to view negotiations as a means to enhance its influence with Tel Aviv and Riyadh.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government faces perhaps the hardest and most complicated task of all: to stop Iran’s nuclear program, reduce tensions with Tehran, mollify its closest allies, and achieve a deal in the face of fierce opposition at home.
French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was reportedly concerned that the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 did not adequately address Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor.
Reputable organizations such as the Arms Control Association have identified Arak as a long-term proliferation concern that can be addressed in the later stages of nuclear negotiations.
It appears that while Iran would not complete Arak under the first step of the proposed nuclear agreement, it would have nevertheless been able to continue Arak’s construction.
Israel is also particularly worried about Arak, as it could provide Iran with a plutonium-based option to produce nuclear weapons.
The Israelis would also be unable to bomb Arak once it’s completed, as a military strike would create an environmental catastrophe affecting the whole region.
Geopolitics at play
France may have had other motivations in taking a harder line and obstructing what appeared to be a done deal.
Regional American allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia are unhappy about U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Tel Aviv, which saw Iran become ostracized and increasingly weak under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, fears that the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani will be able to dig Iran out from its state of crisis and restore its position as a major player in the region.
Israel has demanded the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, perhaps knowing that this unrealistic objective may create enough congressional pressure to scuttle a possible détente between Tehran and Washington.
The Saudis also disapprove of U.S. policies in the region, particularly in light of the Arab Spring.
They see the Obama administration’s “abandonment” of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and its lack of ironclad support for the embattled and repressive Bahraini monarchy as signs of American fecklessness, or at worst, a lack of U.S. commitment to Saudi security.
Riyadh is particularly unhappy about the U.S. decision not to attack and ultimately overthrow the pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria.
France appears to have sensed an opportunity to exploit this, and is eager to shore up its alliance with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and perhaps sell more weapons to each.
The struggling French economy could not only benefit from weapons sales, but could attract even more Saudi investments in important economic sectors such as agriculture.
For their part, Rouhani and Zarif are eager to increase Iran’s regional influence by striking a nuclear deal that lifts sanctions while allowing Iran to save face by keeping a significant portion of its nuclear capabilities.
This would allow Iran to fully resume its oil and natural gas exports, and attract much needed Western investment into its energy sector.
Major economic powers such as the UK and Germany, which supported the Geneva deal, may be eager to resume their commercial relations with a more pragmatic and less ideological Islamic Republic.
The French may not be welcomed in Tehran for some time to come.
As for the United States, a nuclear deal would not only stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, but also decrease tensions with Iran, which, while weakened by sanctions and isolation, is still capable of destabilizing the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East.
Reduced tensions with Tehran would also allow Washington to lessen its dependence on Gulf Arab states.
American partners such as Saudi Arabia appear to perceive some of their interests as diverging from those of the world’s remaining superpower. A more balanced relationship could therefore benefit both sides.
However, a nuclear deal with Iran will not likely change the fundamentals of the U.S.-dominated regional order.
Neither France nor any other foreign power can replace the United States as the region’s security guarantor.
Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on U.S. weaponry and military technology and needs the United States to deter regional powers such as Iran.
Despite tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv, the Israeli government is unlikely to find a more committed and powerful ally than the United States.
And even Tehran, faced with tremendous economic pressure, needs America more than it would like to admit.
The blame game in Geneva should come as no surprise; the stakes are high for all countries involved, and each one is nervous about its own interests.
But instead of suspecting American motives, Israel and Saudi Arabia should realize that a nuclear deal is meant to preserve a regional order that has benefitted both countries.
Much in the Middle East has changed in the last few years, but America’s fundamental interests and commitments remain the same.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers
]]>by Ali Reza Eshraghi
Negotiation, as the French writer Marquis de Sade once said, “like certain portions of the anatomy, always runs more smoothly when lubricated.” In the most recent session with Iran in Geneva, the lubricant was strikingly effective. The jovialness and the diplomatic experience of Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad [...]]]>
by Ali Reza Eshraghi
Negotiation, as the French writer Marquis de Sade once said, “like certain portions of the anatomy, always runs more smoothly when lubricated.” In the most recent session with Iran in Geneva, the lubricant was strikingly effective. The jovialness and the diplomatic experience of Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry showed the extent it could help pave the road to agreement. But it seems that de Sade’s home country, France, preferred a tough negotiation with no lubricant.
According to initial media reports, the tougher stance of French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius impeded an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program on Nov 10. Kerry later tried to shift the blame to Iran, but Zarif indirectly implied in a tweet that it was France that “gutted over half of US draft” and “publicly commented against it.” Ultimately it appears that a deal was reached before France’s arrival and then scuppered due to French objections, which Iran could not accept at that point.
In Iran, this recent experience in Geneva should leave President Hassan Rouhani and his administration with two important realizations:
First, for more than a decade, Rouhani and his diplomatic team have been arguing that without the US presence, negotiations won’t be successful. For example, Iran believes that the 2003 agreement with France, Britain and Germany was spoiled because the former administration of President George W. Bush did not attend the talk. The Geneva talks last week showed that the presence of the US in negotiations is necessary, but it isn’t sufficient for making a deal.
Second, it is argued that Iran should implement a Plan B to take advantage of the gap between two sides of the Atlantic Ocean and get closer to the Europeans (just as it did during the nuclear negotiations of the 2000s) in case America continues to keep an inflexible stance against a win-win agreement with Iran. However, now that France, as a member of the European troika, has become an obstacle to a potential agreement between Iran and the US, this plan would be more difficult to execute.
Iranian elites want to use the threat of economic retaliation in response to the French stonewalling. Two days ago, the renowned Iranian economist Mousa Ghaninejad said, “France will not benefit from the obstacles it created [at Geneva talks] after [economic] relations between Iran and the West become normalized.” This soft tone sounded very much like the argument that Ahmadinejad’s government used; in 2010, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, the former First Vice President said that if only Iran “frowns” at France once, the French economy will suffer a meltdown.
Such remarks are based on a presupposition that economic ties can lead to lasting political alliances. Coincidentally, France has proved this is not the case. Nine years ago French Foreign Trade Minister Francois Loos, speaking at a seminar on “Foreign Investment Prospect in Iran,” proudly declared that Iran ranks first among France’s trade partners in the Middle East. Based on that economic alliance reasoning, we should not have seen France abandon Iran in the nuclear dispute in the first place — but it did. (This could also raise a red flag for the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, which have — since the presidency of the former president Nicolas Sarkozy — established warm economic relations with the French.)
At the same time, it is not surprising that some Iranian and foreign analysts are inclined towards conspiracy theories in assuming that France is taking the position of bad cop that the United States once held. Others reduce France’s intentions in the talks to a personal level. Sadegh Kharazi, Iran’s former ambassador to France, said that Fabius is not the representative of all of France but is “speaking on behalf of a French radical minority.” Such analysis might be plausible in a way, but neglects the big picture.
A look back at France’s history vis-à-vis the nuclear issue reminds us of its Prometheus-like role in the region. In the late 1950s, it was France that helped Israel go nuclear. Two decades later, the French sold nuclear reactors to Iraq. During the term of the former French President, France signed a deal to build a nuclear reactor for the UAE, and the French have also offered Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco civil nuclear cooperation agreements. And this October, while referring to the “huge program the Saudi government wants to implement in the nuclear field”, the French ambassador to Saudi Arabia said, “France has a lot to bring.”
In 2009, France insisted on being part of the “Fuel Swap” agreement that Saeed Jalili, the top Iranian negotiator at the time, was about to close. But Iran did not want France to be the provider of fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran’s excuse was that France cannot be trusted since it has refused to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility in which Iran is a shareholder.
These historical examples show a certain continuity in French policy. France has been playing the Joker card — sometimes helpful and sometimes hostile — in Iran’s nuclear deck. But the present tells us even more.
Iran’s nuclear conundrum is only part of a more complicated and bigger puzzle that goes back to defining Iran’s role and influence in the Middle East. Yet, the assumption is that by putting the nuclear issue in brackets, one can postpone negotiating over other Middle East issues. But these issues cast a shadow over the nuclear negotiations more than any other time and haunt the prospect of a nuclear deal.
The current state of the Middle East, in the words of Hamlet, is “out of joint.” The power balance in the region has been upset after the US attack on Iraq and the subsequent Arab Spring. The Middle East has become embroiled in an unknown process of reconfiguring alliances. This condition is also strangely reminiscent of a post-modern situation: alliances have become unstable and floating. Turkey, for example, informs Iran about an Israeli spying ring while competing alongside Israel with Iran over Syria as well as its fighting against Saudi Arabia over influence in Egypt.
That is not all. The pseudo-hegemony that the US had in the Persian Gulf throughout the 1990s and early 2000s has faded. Take the Saudis for example, who sent troops to help with a crackdown in Bahrain without US permission. Put simply, these countries may still cooperate with one another but with fewer strings attached.
Saudi Arabia and Israel are also concerned that the Obama administration won’t take their interests completely into consideration and recognize that a nuclear deal with Iran will have a strong impact on the new hegemonic formation of the region. A few months ago, there was chatter from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf littoral states about wanting to participate in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the big world powers. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly rejected this request. It is only natural for players like France — which have lost its traditional influence in The Levant — to use the existing vacuum to take on bigger roles.
Rephrasing the words of the American author Bo Bennett, “more than saying or doing the right things at the right time,” under the current circumstances, the art of diplomacy over the Iranian nuclear issue must be “to avoid saying or doing the wrong thing at any time.”
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
“Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan” — John Kennedy’s pithy phrase also has its opposite. We have seen this since last weekend’s failed effort to reach an accord on nuclear matters between Iran and the so-called “P5+1”, the five permanent members of the UN Security [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
“Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan” — John Kennedy’s pithy phrase also has its opposite. We have seen this since last weekend’s failed effort to reach an accord on nuclear matters between Iran and the so-called “P5+1”, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Did Iran scuttle the talks in Geneva on the future of its nuclear program? Did the French Foreign Minister? Or was it a gremlin in the system, a mutual recognition that the issues remain in the “too tough to solve right now” category? It is hard to judge, given the vow of silence imposed by the negotiators on their talks, but most of them have presented their individual version of events in the media.
The prize for being cute goes to the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, who said, “It was a completely united position [by the P5+1] that was put to the Iranians at the close of our discussions.” No open dishonesty in that sentence. The operative word is “our,” which refers to the outcome of an intense, late-night struggle, not involving the Iranian Foreign Minister, but rather taking place on the non-Iranian side of the bargaining table, almost surely to give France what it was demanding, lest “the West” look disorganized. That Iran rejected a position significantly revised from that ready to be launched before French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius arrived in Geneva is carefully hidden from view.
Truth, it seems, is not only the first casualty of war, but also of multilateral diplomacy.
All is not lost, many commentators have said, given that the negotiators, albeit at a “lower level,” will get back to work on Nov. 20 — assuming that there is no intervening putsch in Tehran by its hardliners against the Iranian negotiating team.
It is true that the diplomatic “process” now taking place has effectively taken the “military option” against Iran off the table, unless some new external factor puts it back again. Who remembers, now, that only a few weeks ago the Syrian government’s defiance of the US President’s “red line” against the use of chemical weapons almost led America to engage in its third Middle East war since 2001? The Syrian chemical weapons are still there; how to get rid of them has not been solved; but war is off this table, as well, to President Obama’s relief (and, one hopes, that of the rest of the civilized world).
In putting the best face on failure at Geneva, US Secretary of State John Kerry has also stressed unity among the Western representatives, perhaps with his fingers crossed behind his back. He had a choice to make: to allow it to look like the US had drifted onto Iran’s side of the argument — something totally unacceptable, certainly in US politics — or to reinforce allied “solidarity” at the price of fostering incredulity. He was in fact given a Hobson’s choice. Either M. Fabius had blind-sided the United States (and stiffed President Obama) — which France vigorously denies, claiming that it had made its concerns clear weeks ago, as a “matter of principle;” or Mr. Kerry had been let down by his State Department negotiating team. Indeed, in the absence of French perfidy, the US team should never have allowed him to put his prestige (and that of the United States) on the line by rushing to Geneva for a bit of last minute, pro forma deal-cutting (a traditional diplomatic practice to show that the boss is really in charge), followed by a formal accord-signing, without first sounding out all the other parties to be sure that nothing could come unstuck at the last minute. Otherwise, the US negotiators should have given Mr. Kerry a clear message to keep his distance.
There is no third possibility to explain what happened.
Nevertheless, with the diplomatic process now clearly underway, the chances are probably greater for success than failure in the bargaining over the Iranian nuclear program — though in the Middle East, counting chickens prematurely is always dangerous. For the proponents both of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb and of a new conflict in the region, that should be good news.
But that category does not include everyone. Israel is understandably worried about its security and wants any deal drawn so tightly that Iran could not possibly get the bomb. The French have commercial interests with Arab states in the Persian Gulf to be served by their current obduracy. Along with other Sunni states, plus Israel, Saudi Arabia is desperately concerned that the US and Iran could become reconciled, with, perhaps in time, Iran’s becoming a rival for US affiliation (though not affection) as it was before 1979. Indeed, the first true and open US-Iran diplomatic engagement in three decades has already caused a geopolitical earthquake in the region of a magnitude rivaling the social-political earthquake of the so-called Arab Spring.
It is not surprising, therefore, that several American Middle East allies oppose a resolution of the Iranian imbroglio – opposition going far beyond fears that Iran might lead the US down the garden path and still get the bomb. For Israel, notably, an end to the valid perception of a potential nuclear threat from Iran would bring the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict back to the front-burner, an issue on which Israel has almost no supporters outside of the United States.
Yet the intense — indeed strident — efforts by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to squelch US diplomacy with Iran carries with it potential risks for Israel. Until now, there has rarely been daylight between US and Israeli strategic interests in the region: Iran’s stance against both the US “Great Satan” and the Jewish state went a long way to provide the glue. But with the possibility that Iran’s revolutionary era and related anti-Western activities are beginning to run their course, Mr. Netanyahu’s approach is no longer necessarily consonant with all US strategic interests in the region. Will the US protect Israel’s security? Yes, including against the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons. But Israel needs to be chary of undercutting the US desire to explore whether Iran can be drawn back into the international system and, as a potential side benefit, whether the region’s Sunni-Shiite civil war can be damped down if not stopped.
Netanyahu has welcomed France’s scuttling, at least temporarily. But the Israeli Prime Minister is not necessarily acting in Israel’s best long-term interests. At the tactical level, he is not wise to align Israel with some of the US president’s most strident domestic political enemies. At the strategic level, it does not help Israel if America’s capacity to be effective and influential in the Middle East and in the Western Alliance is reduced: the US, after all, is Israel’s only true friend and supporter. This is an asset that shouldn’t be casually eroded.
Such considerations have no doubt contributed to Netanyahu’s increasing isolation from much of the Israeli strategic, intelligence, and military elite, the backbone of Israel’s security since its inception, and which steadfastly opposes any gap — real or just perceived — in US and Israeli strategic orientation.
Provided that Obama sticks to his current course and assuming that Iran’s political leadership does not fall prey to its own domestic opponents of successful negotiations, there is not yet reason for pessimism to prevail.
But what happened in Geneva last week will impose serious costs. Opponents of an agreement between the US and Iran — in the Middle East and in the US — now have extra time to marshal their efforts. France, which for some years has sought to be one of America’s favorite allies, is unlikely to find the welcome mat on the White House doorstep. President Obama is likely to think even less than he does already of the virtues of multilateral diplomacy and the utility of the Atlantic Alliance for advancing US strategic interests beyond Europe. And while Israel will still be able to count on US commitment to its security, strategic alignment with the US on other matters cannot, at least for the time being, be taken for granted.
These are heavy prices to be paid for the pursuit of tactical advantages at Geneva last week.
Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers
]]>by Peter Jenkins
Sometimes the fog of diplomacy can be as thick as the fog of battle. So it has been in the case of last week’s talks in Geneva — until, that is, the publication of an account in The Guardian by Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, which rings true, [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Sometimes the fog of diplomacy can be as thick as the fog of battle. So it has been in the case of last week’s talks in Geneva — until, that is, the publication of an account in The Guardian by Julian Borger and Ian Traynor, which rings true, to my mind at least.
On that basis a preliminary assessment of why hopes that had been raised high were dashed can be attempted.
The crucial factor appears to have been French insistence on re-opening a text that Iran believed to have been essentially agreed upon and pressing Iran on two points: the cessation of work on the Arak reactor for at least six months and state assurance about the future of Iran’s enrichment program.
On Arak, fairness requires conceding reason to France. The Arak reactor is a legitimate proliferation concern. An initial agreement that lacked any confidence-building provision in relation to Arak would be like a house without one of its walls.
On the end-state enrichment assurance point, however, the French intervention is hard to excuse. The E3+3 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) have known since last year’s meetings with Iran, if not longer, that Iran cannot volunteer confidence-building measures in the absence of such an assurance, for fear of being nickel-and-dimed. And some accounts of last week’s meetings suggest French officials raised no objection to the inclusion of an assurance when the text was being negotiated at an official level.
So what was the French Foreign Minister’s game? Some observers believe that this was an act of sabotage, intended to appease the Prime Minister of Israel and curry favour with the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in the hope of commercial gain.
That may be right. French diplomacy can be selfish. But French diplomacy is rarely stupid. So it is improbable that French Ministers and officials would imagine that their EU partners would forgive them for putting French commercial interests, or the appeasement of a state whose policies in the West Bank are considered deeply unjust by most Europeans, ahead of the interests of the EU as a whole. EU interests are to seize what may be a last opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear dispute peacefully, to reopen the Iranian market to hard-pressed EU traders and investors, and to give the global economy a boost from lower oil prices.
An alternative explanation could be that Mr. Laurent Fabius intended to trade an end-state assurance for a satisfactory provision on Arak, hoping perhaps to avoid having to pay for the latter with additional sanctions relief. If so, he misjudged his man. Iran’s Foreign Minister is happy if he can get others to pay twice for a concession but doesn’t go in for paying twice himself!
The Guardian account also prompts at least one question about US diplomacy. Why did Secretary of State John Kerry fail to point out to his French colleague that reopening the text on so vital a point to Iran was likely to prove a deal-spoiler? Around this question the fog remains dense.
Where does all this leave the outlook? Less promising than when I last wrote. US and UK public announcements that the E3+3 are united, and the tactless (and unfair) blaming of Iran for the break-down, suggest a lack of will to form up to France on the end-state assurance. This can be a recipe for failure when the parties reconvene on Nov. 20.
EU Ministers could come to the rescue by stressing that they expect France to put EU interests first and their conviction that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prohibit Iran from enriching uranium for peaceful purposes. But will they? Hitherto they have been reluctant to assert themselves on the Iranian nuclear question.
Were my advice requested (which I do not expect!) I would advocate that the parties look for a way out of these difficulties by dropping the idea of a two stage (initial/comprehensive) agreement and instead, over the next five weeks, aiming, through intensive negotiations, to produce a broad agreement that dispels all uncertainty on the points that are crucial to one side or the other.
Both sides have already given so much thought to the issues that such a goal would be realistic as long as political will to resolve this dispute peacefully continues to exist. An early broad agreement that was demonstrably in the interests of all parties (and of the global community) would strengthen the political positions of governments vis–à–vis opponents of a deal by attracting public support. There is much to be said for wrapping up the essentials of a peaceful settlement before the further round of US sanctions legislation that appears to be in the offing.
Photo Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS
]]>by James A. Russell
Since the high-level talks that occurred in Geneva, conflicting messages have surfaced on what really stopped a groundbreaking deal over Iran’s nuclear program from being signed this weekend. On Monday, Secretary of State John Kerry said it was Iran and not France who could not accept [...]]]>
by James A. Russell
Since the high-level talks that occurred in Geneva, conflicting messages have surfaced on what really stopped a groundbreaking deal over Iran’s nuclear program from being signed this weekend. On Monday, Secretary of State John Kerry said it was Iran and not France who could not accept the final draft of an agreement. That same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif indirectly replied through his official Twitter account that a deal only began to fall apart after French objections. Whatever the case, there is little reason to doubt that France’s objections in some way impeded the deal that so many were expecting; Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was, after all, the most vocal in opposing one save for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. With that in mind, it’s interesting to consider France and Israel’s previous stances on nuclear issues.
The partnership between the two states on nuclear matters dates back to the late 1940s and 1950s, when France provided vital assistance in helping Israel set up its own clandestine reactor and enrichment facility at Dimona in southern Israel.
The site is today protected by a network of US radars stationed in Israel tied into the global US missile defense system and, one supposes, to Israel’s own missile defense system paid for by the United States. Israel is today an undeclared nuclear state with an arsenal estimated at between 200 and 400 warheads that can be delivered on its Jericho missiles.
Sixty years ago, France gave Israeli scientists free reign to wander around its nuclear research centers at Saclay and Marcoule as part of the then burgeoning nuclear partnership. In exchange, Israeli scientists are believed to have helped speed up France’s own nuclear program.
At the time, both states saw nuclear weapons as central to their prestige and national survival. It’s worth noting that the cooperation in nuclear matters happened in a wider context, with France also supplying Israel with arms that proved critical in Israel’s ongoing wars of independence.
Few remember that a French-supplied Mirage aircraft delivered the pre-emptive strikes on Egypt’s airfields at the outset of the 1967 Six –Day War. French President Charles DeGaulle subsequently ended the security relationship after the war when it became clear that Israel intended to illegally occupy the land seized in the conflict. He correctly foresaw that the occupation would only lead to continuation of the war through the scourge of terrorism. The Johnson administration then decided that the United States would assume the role taken by France, selling Israel advanced F-4 Phantom aircraft in 1968. Today, 45 years later, there are few weapons in America’s arsenal not now in service with the Israeli Defense Forces — by far the most powerful military in the Middle East.
This history provides an interesting backdrop to moves made by the French and the Israelis in undermining a first stage accommodation with Iran in Geneva. If the reports of the heavily guarded details of the deal are true, it seems sensible from the perspective of those seeking to reign in Iran’s program to do so in a phased approach in which Iran would gradually return to good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations in exchange for sanctions relief. The net result would be a welcome reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the only meaningful global mechanism to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Perhaps more importantly, such a deal would reduce the prospect of another regional war in the Persian Gulf and see Iran potentially readmitted to the international community in a positive way. A deal also opens the door to possible US-Iranian rapprochement, which would also reduce the prospects of war in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to the deal is no mystery. He has made a career out of derailing peaceful accommodation with Israel’s adversaries, profiting politically from the resulting siege-like and perpetual war atmosphere that grips Israel in an unhealthy way. Israeli politics have swung inexorably in his direction over the last 15 years, as the Likud and its politics of confrontation and war dominate the political landscape. As long as Netanyahu is in charge, it is hard to imagine Israel agreeing to any meaningful political settlement with its enemies. Most recently, Israel’s disinterest in seeking a deal with the Palestinians was signaled by further Israeli illegal settlements as negotiations with the Palestinian Authority are underway.
More mysterious is France’s role in highlighting the shortcomings of the first stage of what would have to be a long-term deal to ensure Iran’s program returns to comprehensive IAEA oversight. As one of the five declared nuclear states, France clearly has a vested interest in ensuring that the NPT continues as the main vehicle to ensure that nuclear technology around the world is used solely for peaceful purposes. Surely a deal with Iran that gradually brings its program back under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and monitoring is in the interests of all the declared nuclear powers.
For the United States, the erosion of its relations with its two “twin pillars” in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Israel) is perversely affected by the lack of progress with Iran. Both the Saudis and Israelis appear terrified at the prospect of a deal to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, which, in turn might create circumstances for a better US-Iran political relationship. Ironically, neither states sees the strategic benefits to these developments, which would enhance the security of both states over the long run. Instead, both Saud Arabia and Israel continue to embrace the politics of confrontation that will only lead to more war, death, and destruction — potentially dragging the United States along behind them to clean up the resulting mess.
The Obama administration is right to pursue accommodation with Iran and correctly sees the strategic benefits of deal to restrain the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. The next time around, however, maybe the phone calls from the White House need to be placed to Paris instead of Jerusalem.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated
Geneva — While diplomats involved in negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program here have been mostly tight-lipped about the details of their meetings, France — which along with Britain, China, Russia and the United States plus Germany composes the so-called P5+1 [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated
Geneva — While diplomats involved in negotiations over Iran’s controversial nuclear program here have been mostly tight-lipped about the details of their meetings, France — which along with Britain, China, Russia and the United States plus Germany composes the so-called P5+1 — vocalized today some of its concerns.
Stating that he is interested in an agreement that is “serious and credible”, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius argued that the “initial text made progress but not enough” during an interview with France Inter radio.
According to François Nicoullaud, France’s former ambassador to Tehran (2001–05), the French position on Iran’s nuclear program has not changed since François Hollande replaced Nicolas Sarkozy on May 12 as President.
“We have a kind of continuity in the French administration where the people who advised Mr. Sarkozy are the same ones who advise the current administration,” the veteran French diplomat told IPS, adding that France’s relations with Iran were more positive during the Jacques Chirac administration.
“This is especially true for the Iranian nuclear case because it’s very technical and complex and the government really needs to be convinced before it changes its position,” he said.
Fabius expressed concerns earlier today over Iran’s enrichment of 20%-grade uranium and its Arak facility, which is not yet fully operational.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated that “If the news from Geneva is true, this is the deal of the century for #Iran,” on Nov. 7 from his official Twitter account, has previously accused Iran of trying to build a nuclear bomb byway of its Arak nuclear facility.
“[Iran] also continued work on the heavy water reactor in Arak; that’s in order to have another route to the bomb, a plutonium path,” said Netanyahu during his Oct. 1 speech at the UN General Assembly in New York.
Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), says its nuclear program is completely peaceful.
While the Obama administration has declared that it will prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, the US intelligence community has not officially assessed that Iran has made the decision to do so.
According to the 2013 US Worldwide Threat Assessment, Iran “has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.”
Daryl Kimball, the head of the Arms Control Association, says the Arak facility “is more than a year from being completed; it would have to be fully operational for a year to produce spent fuel that could be used to extract plutonium.”
“Iran does not have a reprocessing plant for plutonium separation; and Arak would be under IAEA safeguards the whole time,” he noted in comments printed in the Guardian.
“The Arak Reactor certainly presents a proliferation problem, but there is nothing urgent,” said Nicoullaud, a veteran diplomat who has previously authored analyses of Iran’s nuclear activities.
“The best solution would be to transform it before completion into a light-water research reactor, which would create less problems,” he said, adding: “This is perfectly feasible, with help from the outside.”
“Have we tried to sell this solution to the Iranians? I do not know,” said Nicoullaud.
The unexpected arrival of US Secretary of State John F. Kerry yesterday and all but one of the P5+1’s Foreign Ministers in Geneva — following positive EU and Iranian descriptions here at end of the first day of the Nov. 7-8 talks — led to speculation that some form of an agreement would soon be signed.
While diplomats involved in the talks have provided few details to the media, it’s now become clear that the approximately 6-hour meeting last night between Kerry, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton involved the consideration of a draft agreement presented by the Iranians.
That meeting also contributed to speculation that a document would soon be signed until the early morning hours of Nov. 9, when the LA Times reported that after reaching a critical stage, the negotiators were facing obstacles.
While Western and Iranian diplomats involved in the talks have stated that “progress” has been made, it’s not yet clear whether that has led to a mutually acceptable agreement.
“There has been some progress, but there is still a gap,” Zarif said to reporters earlier today according to the Fars News Agency.
While briefing Iranian media here this afternoon, Zarif acknowledged French concerns but insisted on Iran’s positions.
“We have an attitude and the French have theirs,” said Zarif in comments posted in Persian on the Iranian Student News Agency.
“Negotiation is an approach that is based on mutual respect. If not, they won’t be stable,” he said.
“We won’t allow anyone to compile a draft for us,” said Zarif.
Photo Credit: U.S. Mission Geneva/Eric Bridiers
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